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FACTORS UNDERLYING STUDENTS’ CONCEPTIONS OF DEEP TIME: AN 
EXPLORATORY STUDY 
By Kim A. Cheek 
ABSTRACT 
Geologic or “deep time” is important for understanding many geologic processes.  
There are two aspects to deep time.  First, events in Earth’s history can be placed in 
temporal order on an immense time scale (succession).  Second, rates of geologic 
processes vary significantly.  Thus, some events and processes require time periods 
(durations) that are outside a human lifetime by many orders of magnitude.  Previous 
research has demonstrated that learners of all ages and many teachers have poor 
conceptions of succession and duration in deep time.  The question is why.  
This exploratory, qualitative study investigates the viability of a model (a deep time 
stool) to capture the underlying factors necessary for a concept of deep time.  The 
model posits that a concept of deep time rests upon: an understanding of succession 
and duration in conventional time; a robust understanding of large numbers and the 
proportional relationships among numbers of various magnitudes; and a learner’s 
geoscience content knowledge.  While all three factors may not exist to the same 
degree in any one individual, all must be present to support a conception of deep 
time. 
Thirty-five students in the United States participated in individual task-based 
interviews: 12 eighth and 11 eleventh graders from a public charter school in the U.S. 
and 12 university students from two institutions enrolled in an introductory 
geoscience course.  Tasks and questions probed students’ understandings of the three 
factors within and outside a deep time context, and the study is unique for that 
reason. 
Results indicate all three factors play an important role in how students understand 
deep time.  While succession in conventional time proved non-problematic, duration 
was more difficult for participants.  Some students were confused about the 
relationships among numbers in the thousands and millions, and others appeared to 
have little understanding of time periods up to 100 years.  Participants had just as 
much difficulty dealing with the duration for events in conventional time as they did 
for those in deep time if the events were unfamiliar to them.   
Time and number share a similar spatial mapping strategy while knowledge of large 
numbers and geoscience content knowledge appear to provide reference points that 
can be used to judge the temporal order or duration of geoscience events.  
Implications for future research and classroom practice are discussed. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
A CONTEXT FOR THE RESEARCH STUDY 
On the geologic time scale, a human lifetime is reduced to a brevity that is too 
inhibiting to think about.  (McPhee, 1982, p.128) 
How can human beings hope to comprehend the vastness of geologic time?  Is 
it an impossible task for anyone but a geologist or an astronomer?   If it is such an 
impossible task, then why does geologic time figure into the curriculum for children as 
young as eleven?  Are there more fundamental concepts that might either foster or 
inhibit that understanding?  This thesis is designed to explore a model that might 
account for factors that influence how students understand geologic or deep time.  
Chapter one sets out the context for the study.  Here I discuss the importance of deep 
time and briefly review the development of geoscientists’ understanding of the 
concept.  Next, I outline what it means to say one “understands” the concept and 
what one prominent U.S. standards document for science says students at different 
ages should know about deep time.   An explanation of the study’s origins is followed 
by the statement of the problem and the study’s aims and research questions.  
Chapter one concludes with a brief discussion of what the reader will not find in this 
thesis.  Chapter two reviews literature in three areas:  1) factors contributing to an 
understanding of conventional time, 2) how people understand large numbers, and 3) 
the role of subject matter knowledge in concept acquisition.  These areas are then 
related to the literature on conceptions of deep time.  Chapter three describes the 
methodology of the study.  Chapter four reports the results by area.  Chapter five 
2 
 
synthesises the results and connects them to literature reviewed in chapter two.  
Chapter six provides conclusions and suggests avenues for future research. 
1.1 Importance of the concept of deep time 
 There are two major themes that underlie all of geoscience, both of which are 
largely outside human perceptual experience.  The first is plate tectonics.  Due to the 
fact that the outermost part of the Earth is composed of movable plates, surface 
features of the Earth are continually changing.  Earth, in the distant past, looked very 
different than it does today, and Earth in the distant future will appear far different 
than the planet we inhabit.  Yet, this doesn’t fit with our perception of Earth as terra 
firma.  It is difficult to imagine that the mountains we see outside our window were 
not always there and will not be there at some point in the future.  Earthquakes and 
volcanic eruptions provide evidence on human timescales that lithospheric plates are 
in motion, although their relationship to plate tectonics is unknown to many adults.  It 
is a large conceptual leap from earthquakes and volcanoes to envision the formation 
of a collisional mountain range like the Appalachians (Eastern U.S.), particularly when 
one has to imagine the rate at which the process occurs. 
This brings us to the second theme.  The mechanisms that shape Earth’s 
surface take place in the context of geologic or deep time.   Many of the processes by 
which Earth’s surface are constantly changing take a very long time to occur; most 
take place well outside the span of a human lifetime.  All of recorded history 
represents an infinitesimally small fraction of Earth’s 4.6 billion year history.  
Geological thinking requires the ability to envision events on an immense scale.  How 
we perceive deep time influences our understanding of everything we study in the 
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field.  Zen (2001) describes deep time as “a cornerstone of our scientific 
understanding” (p. 8).   
In fact, one of the most revolutionary ideas in the history of geology was James 
Hutton’s 1785 statement that,  
As there is not in human observation proper means for measuring the waste of 
land upon the globe, it is hence inferred, that we cannot estimate the duration 
of what we see at present, nor calculate the period at which it had begun; so 
that with respect to human observation, this world has neither a beginning nor 
an end. (Hutton in Repcheck, 2003, p. 152-153) 
Hutton did not argue that the world literally had neither a beginning nor an 
end, but rather that “with respect to human observation” the amount of time 
required to create the sedimentary strata he observed around Edinburgh was much 
longer than any time frame that had been suggested up to that point.  He argued on 
philosophical grounds that Earth must be infinitely old.   Given the relatively long 
period of time required for scientists to reach consensus on the age of the Earth (see 
section 1.2), it is not surprising that students find it difficult.  Since our understanding 
of the world is mediated by our experiences it is a formidable challenge to develop a 
concept of time that lies outside personal experience.  Yet, if the longest time we can 
think of is 1,000 years, we will not really develop a very clear understanding of many 
geological processes.   
In the last twenty-five years there have been several attempts to characterise 
the nature of concepts that are essential to a discipline.  If those critical ideas are not 
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apprehended by students, they will be unable to make significant advances in their 
knowledge.  Schoon & Boone (1998) use the term “critical barriers” to identify those 
alternative conceptions that make it difficult for students to progress in understanding 
in an area of science while Clement, Brown, & Zietsman (1989) refer to “anchoring 
conceptions” upon which scientific instruction can be built.   
More recently Meyer and Land (2003) have coined the term threshold 
concepts to denote those concepts that act as portals through which a student must 
pass in order to more fully understand the concepts in a field.  If a student is unable to 
pass through the portal, then that student remains fixed at a point and is able to go no 
farther.  Meyer and Land’s focus is on concepts that must be grasped in order to 
become an expert in a discipline.  From an educational standpoint some alternative 
conceptions in science are probably inconsequential to the average person or even to 
the average teacher.  Others, however, limit one’s ability to progress as a science 
student or effectively teach the next generation of students. A threshold concept 
possesses four characteristics It is: 1) transformative, 2) most likely irreversible, 3) 
integrative, 4) often but not always bounded, and 5) frequently troublesome (Cousin, 
2007, p. 4). 
The fifth characteristic—the troublesome nature of a threshold concept—is 
especially significant from an educational standpoint.  Although they have not all used 
the term troublesome knowledge, many authors have noted how difficult a concept 
deep time is for students to grasp (Dodick & Orion, 2003a, 2003b; Libarkin, et al, 2005; 
Trend, 1998, 2000, 2001a, 2001b; Truscott, et al, 2006).   
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Meyer and Land (2003)  and Perkins (2006) refer to five types of knowledge 
that could be troublesome to students: ritual, inert, conceptually difficult, foreign or 
alien, and tacit knowledge.  Deep time might be considered ritual and/or inert 
knowledge, particularly if students have memorized an age for the Earth but then 
proceed to reason about deep time as if that age was irrelevant.  More likely deep 
time can be considered both conceptually difficult and alien.  A human lifespan is 
inconsequential in terms of geologic processes such as mountain building or the 
sculpting of the Grand Canyon.  To grasp that rocks can behave plastically, continents 
move, and the mountains we visit will one day be gone is clearly conceptually difficult.  
In order to help students cross the threshold of this troublesome concept of deep 
time we must determine what requisite knowledge is essential to the development of 
this idea.   That will help us better understand its troublesome nature and devise 
instructional strategies to improve students’ conceptions.  We first briefly consider 
how the geoscience community has reached its current understanding about deep 
time.   
1.2 History of our understanding of deep time 
 How did geoscientists come to our current understanding regarding the age of 
the Earth?  I summarise the history of scientific thinking on this subject in brief terms 
as an extended discussion is not pertinent to this thesis.  There are many sources that 
describe the development of our understanding about geologic or deep time more 
comprehensively than I do here.  The Chronologers’ Quest: The Search for the Age of 
the Earth (Jackson, 2006) is one such source. 
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 Discussions about the age of the Earth generally begin with Christian clerics.  
James Ussher, Archbishop of Armagh (1580-1656) is well-known for his attempts to 
determine the Earth’s age using historical and genealogical information from the 
Bible.  In the process he determined that the Earth was created in 4,004 BCE.  
Although Ussher was not the only one to come up with a figure that put the Earth’s 
age at around five or six thousand years, his name is most often associated with this 
idea as a note with his name attached was inserted into the margin of the book of 
Genesis in the 1701 edition of the King James Bible (Jackson, 2006).   
 Not everyone agreed that Ussher’s methodology was the best way to 
determine Earth’s age.  In the 18th and 19th centuries, several attempts were made to 
use scientific rather than Biblical chronologies to determine the age of the Earth.  
Georges-Louis Leclerc, le Comte de Buffon (1707-1788), a French zoologist, [though he 
would not have described himself using that term] hypothesised that the Earth was 
originally molten and very slowly cooled to its current state.  He calculated that the 
Earth was 75,000 years old, considerably older than Ussher’s date but still far from our 
current understanding of 4.6 billion years (Monroe & Wicander, 2006).   
 James Hutton (1726-1797) has already been mentioned.  His contributions to 
the field of geology are significant.  Hutton’s observations that many rocks in his 
native Scotland were composed of previously eroded material and that erosion 
happens throughout the Earth led him to conclude that Earth’s features could be 
accounted for by geologic processes that were at work in the present.  This idea of 
uniformitarianism remains a bedrock principle of geology.  Hutton also realised that if 
current Earth processes have been at work throughout Earth’s history then the planet 
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must be extremely old, much older than any of the figures suggested at the time.  
Hutton, himself, did not calculate an age for the Earth, but his work laid the 
foundation for what was to follow. 
 Although Hutton is credited with originating the idea of uniformitarianism, it 
remained for Charles Lyell (1797-1875) to propagate the idea more widely and to coin 
the phrase, “the present is the key to the past” (Jackson, 2006, p. 130).  The first 
edition of his book, Principles of Geology was published in 1830 and was widely 
distributed on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.  This book was instrumental in the 
acceptance of the idea that the Earth was exceedingly old (Monroe & Wicander, 
2006).  Principles of Geology was important for another reason.  Charles Darwin (1809-
1882) took a copy with him on the H.M.S.Beagle.  Natural selection was possible 
because the Earth was seemingly almost limitlessly old.   
 Yet, not everyone in the 19th century agreed that the Earth was exceedingly 
old.  I already described Buffon’s attempt to calculate the age of the Earth.  A later 
attempt to determine Earth’s age was undertaken by the physicist, William Thomson 
(1824-1907), more widely known as Lord Kelvin.  He rejected the notion of absolute 
uniformitarianism on the basis that if an originally molten Earth had been steadily 
cooling, then geologic processes in the past would of necessity have been different 
than those in the present.  He calculated an age for the Earth of between 20 million 
and 400 million years which he later revised toward the lower end of the range 
(Repcheck, 2003).  Kelvin’s views were clearly at odds with those of Hutton, Lyell, and 
Darwin regarding the virtually limitless age of the Earth.  However, it was not until the 
discovery of radioactivity that his ideas were decisively shown to be incorrect.  Kelvin 
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is sometimes much maligned when discussing the history of attempts to date the 
Earth.  Yet, his general approach—namely that physical methods could be use to 
establish an upper limit for Earth’s age was sound.  The problem was that his 
calculations rested on a faulty premise.  He did not know that the Earth has its own 
internal heat source. Thus Earth’s temperature has decreased at a much slower rate 
than Kelvin thought was the case (Monroe & Wicander, 2006).   
 Early work on radioactive elements by Marie (1867-1934) and Pierre (1859-
1906) Curie and others led to the use of their decay rates as a clock that could be used 
to date the age of Earth materials.   Arthur Holmes, who for part of his career was a 
member of the Geology Department at Durham University, was instrumental in using 
radioactive decay rates to establish dates for the various divisions of the geologic 
timescale (Jackson, 2006).  The age of the Earth has been repeatedly revised upward 
with advances in scientific understanding.  By the 1930s and 1940s, the number was 
around two or three billion years old.   
 In 1953, Clair Cameron Patterson (1922-1995), an American geologist, isolated 
lead pieces from the Canyon Diablo meteorite that hit the U.S. about 50,000 years 
ago.  The Earth contains a variety of lead isotopes, some of which are generated from 
the decay of uranium.   Lead not produced from the decay of uranium is known as 
“primeval lead” or the isotope of lead that was present at the formation of the solar 
system.  The problem was that scientists of the day didn’t know the isotopic 
composition of “primeval lead.”  Harrison Scott Brown (1917-1986), Patterson’s 
doctoral advisor, had concluded that meteorites were composed of material left over 
from the origin of the solar system.  If the particular isotope of lead found in an iron 
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meteorite could be determined, that information could be used to calculate the age of 
the lead that was present at the time the Earth and the rest of the solar system 
formed.  When Patterson tested the lead from the meteorite, he determined it was 
4.5 billion years old—older than any age suggested for the Earth up to that point in 
time.  Subsequent analysis of additional meteorites confirmed his initial findings.  The 
Earth is much older than we had previously thought (Jackson, 2006).   
As educators we are charged with the task of helping students acquire a 
concept (deep time) that scientists themselves have understood for a relatively short 
period of time.  In fact, Patterson’s work that established our current thinking on the 
age of the Earth occurred less than 60 years ago—less than an eye blink in geologic 
time.  If we are to help students acquire the concept we must answer the question of 
what it means to say someone possesses a concept of deep time.   
1.3 What does it mean to say someone possesses a concept of deep time? 
How will we recognise a concept of deep time when we see it?  It is an 
important question, particularly so because it is a concept that cannot be directly 
experienced in the way many concepts can.  Would we expect students at different 
ages to understand it differently?  Does exposure to information about deep time in 
school settings seem to influence students’ conceptions? 
There is a more fundamental problem, however.  That is, how do we define the 
term concept itself?  It is a conundrum.  In fact, researchers investigating conceptual 
development often avoid the question completely (Vosniadou, 2008).  The task is 
fraught with difficulty and no good consensus definition exists inside the research 
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community, let alone outside it.  Murphy and Alexander (2008) point to the lack of 
agreement on what constitutes a concept in their attempt to synthesize literature on 
conceptual change.  They say, “one of the most central and pervasive terms within the 
conceptual change literature was rarely explicitly defined and only infrequently 
implicitly defined.  That term is concept,” (p. 598).  Further, how the term is defined 
varies depending upon one’s theoretical orientation.   
Outside science education the broader literature on concepts tends to 
conceive of concepts as classes of objects containing certain critical features (G. 
Murphy, 2002).   Dog and bird are of this type.  Thus, someone learns to distinguish 
examples and non-examples of the class.  However, we are considering deep time 
which does not represent a class of objects in the way dog does.  In this thesis I will 
follow the definition suggested by White & Gunstone (2008)  that a concept can best 
be described as “a set of knowledge that a person associates with a particular term” 
(p. 622).   Learners will understand deep time at a variety of levels.  Some may possess 
isolated pieces of factual information, i.e. The Earth is 4.6 billion years old.  However, 
that information is merely inert knowledge if it is not connected to other ideas about 
deep time.  We now turn to the components that make up a concept of deep time. 
To comprehend deep time requires several underlying ideas.  First, a person 
must be able to place geologic events in temporal order on an immense scale.  
However, temporal order alone is not enough.  One must also have a sense of relative 
time.  If I am asked to think about the break-up of the supercontinent Pangaea during 
the Mesozoic Era [120 my], can I compare how long that took to other events in 
Earth’s history such as the Pleistocene Ice Age *2.5 my+?  Additionally, an individual 
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must be able to recognise that certain Earth processes occur quite rapidly and can be 
observed over human time scales while others lie well outside human ability to 
experience.  Information about the rates of geologic processes can be used to 
determine how long the process in question takes to occur.  It is precisely these two 
ideas that are fundamental to an understanding of conventional time. The first is 
termed succession, or the ability to perceive the temporal order of events both in 
absolute and relative terms.  In a geologic context this would involve stratigraphic and 
fossil succession.  The second idea is called duration which refers to the amount of 
time necessary for an event or process to occur.  This is inversely proportional to the 
rate at which the event proceeds.  Furthermore it is not directly proportional to the 
magnitude of the event or process.  A layer of volcanic ash deposited in one eruptive 
event can be much thicker than a much thinner underlying layer of shale deposited 
over several million years.  
What is required for such an understanding of deep time as it is played out in 
geological processes and events?  A certain amount of geoscience content knowledge 
is required to have a solid understanding of deep time.  Principles of relative dating 
are applied to rock strata and fossiliferous sequences to determine the temporal order 
of events.  Depositional rates vary so that even when considering the same rock type 
no constant rate of deposition can be assumed.  There are unconformities, or gaps, in 
the rock record.  Rock layers are eroded and we often have no way of telling what or 
how much is missing.  Radioactive decay can be used to generate more precise ages 
for geologic events.  Some understanding of tectonic processes and their rates is also 
important.  Finally, the numbers involved must be meaningful to students.  It will 
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mean little to me to say a mass extinction took place 65 million years ago if I cannot 
envision what 65 million years means.   
The foregoing discussion would imply that only a geoscientist could ever hope 
to comprehend deep time.  Yet, the topic appears in the curriculum for school-age 
children.  What, then, can we expect children of various ages to understand about the 
subject? 
1.4 What should students of different ages understand about deep time?   
The geosciences, including geology, are a part of the K-12 elementary and 
secondary curriculum in the United States.  Education in the early 21st century is a 
content standards and assessment driven enterprise.  As a former middle school 
science teacher (ages 11-14), I can attest to the assessment obsession that currently 
exists in American schools.  In order for conceptions research at the K-12 level to be 
deemed relevant by that community it must be connected to curriculum standards 
documents.  There are two sets of science standards in the United States that were 
developed at the national level: The Project 2061 Benchmarks for Science Literacy 
(American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1993) and the National 
Science Education Standards (Center for Science, Mathematics, and Engineering 
Education, 1996).  At present there is no national curriculum in the U.S.  Instead 
individual states draft a set of standards in each subject area.  The majority have 
modelled them after the NSES ones rather than the Benchmarks.  Therefore, although 
there are two sets of “national” standards documents, I have chosen to refer to the 
NSES standards since they have arguably had a greater impact upon what is taught in 
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U.S. classrooms than the Benchmarks.   They provide a basis from which to answer the 
question of what students at various ages should understand about deep time. 
U.S. schools are generally organised in the following manner.  Elementary 
schools are for children entering school at age 5 until about age 11.  These ages 
correspond to kindergarten through grade 5.  Middle schools are usually for grades 6-
8 and children in those schools are 11-14-years-old.  High schools are comprised of 14-
18-year-olds who are in grades 9-12.  There is some variability to these arrangements 
as individual school districts often make building configuration decisions based upon 
space availability.  In fact, the reader will note from Table 1.1 that the NSES groups 5-8 
grades together rather than 6-8.  Table 1.1 lists standards from the NSES that relate 
specifically to deep time for grades 5-12.  While geoscience concepts are mentioned 
for elementary students, our focus will be on standards for middle through high 
school because those are the ages at which deep time appears most often in the U.S. 
curriculum.  Elementary school geoscience units tend to focus on Earth materials such 
as rocks, minerals, and soil and emphasize descriptions of those materials rather than 
processes that occur in deep time to alter them.   
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National Science Education Standards (NSES) 
Grades 5-8 Grades 9-12 
Lithospheric plates on the scales of 
continents and oceans constantly move at 
rates of centimetres per year in response 
to movements in the mantle.  Major 
geological events, such as earthquakes, 
volcanic eruptions, and mountain building 
result from these plate motions. 
The sun, the earth, and the rest of the 
solar system formed from a nebular cloud 
of dust and gas 4.6 billion years ago.  The 
early earth was very different from the 
planet we live on today. 
 
The earth processes we see today, 
including erosion, movement of 
lithospheric plates, and changes in 
atmospheric composition are similar to 
those that occurred in the past.  Earth 
history is also influenced by occasional 
catastrophes, such as the impact of an 
asteroid or comet. 
Geologic time can be estimated by 
observing rock sequences and using 
fossils to correlate the sequences at 
various locations.  Current methods 
include using the known decay rates of 
radioactive isotopes present in rocks to 
measure the time since the rock was 
formed. 
 
Fossils provide important evidence of how 
life and environmental conditions have 
changed. 
Interactions among the solid earth, the 
oceans, the atmosphere, and organisms 
have resulted in the ongoing evolution of 
the earth system.  We can observe some 
changes such as earthquakes and volcanic 
eruptions on a human timescale, but 
many processes such as mountain 
building and plate movements take place 
over hundreds of millions of years. 
Some changes in the solid earth can be 
described as the “rock cycle.” 
 
Evidence for one-celled forms of life—the 
bacteria—extends back more than 3.5 
billion years.   
 
 The “big bang” theory places the origin 
[of the universe] between 10 and 20 
billion years ago. 
Table 1.1 National Science Education Standards for grades 5-12, earth and space 
science (Center for Science, Mathematics, and Engineering Education, 1996) 
 
It is not so easy to see from these standards how a student’s understanding of 
geologic or deep time would be expected to improve from grades 5-8 to 9-12 although 
there is clearly more content knowledge required for the older students.  Relative and 
absolute dating methods are mentioned as are the Big Bang and the nebular 
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hypothesis.  Yet, uniformitarianism, fossil succession [groups of fossils succeed one 
another in a predictable order], the rock cycle, and mountain building are all part of 
the curriculum for younger pupils.  Absolute ages are mentioned in the grade 9-12 
standards but are not in the grade 5-8 ones.  However, it will be difficult for younger 
pupils to make much sense of the processes if they have little sense of the time 
frames involved. 
The picture becomes even more complicated when we consider what the 
curriculum for any specific school looks like.  Because individual state standards vary, 
it is difficult to say with certainty what students across the country are being taught.  
Some states mandate a particular topic in elementary school while a neighbouring 
state might teach that topic in middle school.  For example, while many states teach 
the rock cycle in middle school in accordance with the NSES, some teach it at the 
elementary level.  In other state standards, the term “rock cycle” isn’t mentioned until 
high school.  At the risk of generalising too broadly, I offer a list of topics that can 
often be found at either the middle or high school level based upon my own teaching 
experience in grades 3-8 in several states, along with my perusal of a variety of state 
curriculum frameworks documents and widely-used textbooks at those levels.  
Students in grades 5-8 generally learn about surface processes, fossils, the rock cycle, 
and plate tectonics, including earthquakes and volcanoes.  Pangaea is frequently 
discussed, but it is generally the only supercontinent mentioned.  It is not unusual to 
find at least some coverage of mountain building processes, albeit at a fairly 
superficial level.   Types of plate boundaries are discussed, but often little mention is 
made of the amount of time required for tectonic processes to occur.  Not all high 
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school students in the U.S. take a course in geoscience.  Those who do revisit the 
topics discussed in middle school, often in greater detail.  There may be more focus on 
radiometric dating and principles of fossil succession.  Evolutionary processes in deep 
time may be discussed in a biology course as well as a geoscience course.  The topics 
generally covered in U.S. schools mirror the ages outlined in the NSES.  Unfortunately, 
we have still not answered the question of what students at specific ages are expected 
to know about deep time.  The NSES are not explicit on that point and state-level 
standards documents are equally vague.  The one exception to the last statement is 
New York State which has a well-developed syllabus for high school earth science that 
has been in use for many years. 
There are no standards that guide geoscience instruction at the university 
level.  The situation is further complicated in the U.S. because most introductory 
geology classes contain students who plan to major in geology along with students 
across the university who are enrolled simply to fulfil a general education science 
requirement.  There have been several attempts in the past decade to articulate in 
general terms the conceptual knowledge introductory geoscience majors should 
possess as well as what could be expected of non-majors.  A 2002 workshop funded 
by the National Science Foundation and the Johnson Foundation was one such 
attempt (Manduca, Mogk, & Stillings, 2002).   The Earth Science Literacy Initiative 
(“ESLI Home”) is the most recent effort in this regard.  The Earth Science Literacy 
Principles document may ultimately provide consensus on what constitutes essential 
geoscience knowledge for all Americans since it articulates big ideas and supporting 
concepts for the entire K-16 spectrum.   The principles are currently in the 
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dissemination phase, and it is too soon to tell what impact they will have on 
introductory geoscience education at U.S. universities.  Deep time appears most 
prominently in four of the Big Ideas and supporting concepts in the principles, all of 
which are quite similar to the grade 9-12 standards in the NSES. 
 Big Idea 2: Earth is 4.6 billion years old. 
 Big Idea 3: Earth is a complex system of interacting rock, water, air, and life. 
 Big Idea 4: Earth is continuously changing. 
 Big Idea 6: Life evolves on a dynamic Earth and continuously modifies Earth. 
(“ESLI Home,” n.d.) 
Precisely because introductory geoscience courses at the university level 
contain students from a variety of majors, their content is often similar to that which 
is taught in a high school geoscience course.  These survey type courses provide an 
overview of major geoscience topics.  Any student enrolled in one of these courses at 
an American university will be expected to master some content regarding deep time.  
Given the fact that it is still unclear what the ultimate impact of the ESLI principles will 
be, evaluating university students against the NSES used for grades 5-12 will provide a 
minimum level of expectation. 
1.5 Origins of the study 
This study flows out of my experience as a science and mathematics teacher of 
middle school pupils (ages 11-14) as well as primary teacher trainees.  I have observed 
that both groups appear to hold many of the same alternative conceptions about 
geoscience phenomena.  They often treat rock and mineral as if the terms are 
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synonymous.  They believe Pangaea was present at Earth’s formation.  They 
frequently display a very poor understanding of the decimal number system.  They are 
confused about numbers less than one and those greater than 1,000.   While they 
might be able to perform calculations with small and large numbers, if they make an 
error they are unable to see the unreasonableness of their answer.  Some of the 
alternative conceptions I have seen appear to emanate from apparently logical ideas 
(e.g., it is winter in the Northern hemisphere because the Earth is farther from the 
Sun).   
As I began to read broadly in the geoscience conceptions literature I noticed 
recurring themes across studies, including those dealing with different geoscience 
topics.  I began to wonder if there might be some underlying notions that could 
explain students’ alternative conceptions.  In the meantime I interviewed a few 
university and middle school students regarding their notions of several different 
geological ideas.  (A summary of these interviews and their role in the development of 
this research study appears in section 3.3.)  Again, there was marked similarity 
between the conceptions held by the middle school and the university students 
suggesting that if there had been any intervening geoscience instruction it had not 
been very successful.   
One of the more interesting ideas that emerged from these preliminary 
interviews was the fact that students ascribed very short periods of time to the 
durations of geologic events.   When looking at an animation of an oceanic-oceanic 
divergent plate boundary, one student said that it would take “forever” for the plates 
to diverge.  When asked what she meant by “forever” she replied, “200 years.”  I was 
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struck by how inadequate these students’ conceptions were for understanding many 
geological processes.  My own study in the geosciences had shown me how critical an 
understanding of deep time is to understanding geology.  I wondered about my own 
trajectory and what might have helped me develop a fuller understanding of deep 
time.  These circumstances caused me to wonder specifically about what might 
account for student difficulties with conceptions of deep time. 
1.6 Statement of the problem 
Students’ poor understanding of deep time is a theme throughout much of the 
geosciences conceptions literature that impacts students’ conceptions in other areas 
of geoscience (Happs, 1984).  As chapter two will demonstrate, conceptions research 
on deep time has shown that children of all ages and their teachers hold views about 
geologic time that differ significantly from contemporary scientific understanding. 
These studies, which have primarily employed large-scale quantitative methods, have 
described the problem well.  What is missing in the literature, not just in deep time 
but across the geosciences are two types of studies.  The first is more targeted 
descriptive studies that attempt to tease out why students apparently don’t 
understand a concept as opposed to simply demonstrating their deficiencies.  The 
results from these studies could guide the second type that is needed: intervention 
studies.    
A number of models are often purported to help students better understand 
deep time—the one year timeline, the human life timeline, the encyclopaedia, the 
toilet paper roll, etc. (e.g., Hume, 1979; Ritger & Cummins, 1991).  All appear to have 
marginal success at improving student understanding.  They presume that we know 
20 
 
why students don’t understand deep time when, in fact, we may not.  Currently we 
lack empirical evidence to substantiate that we truly know the source of the problem.  
It is easy to say out of hand that students have trouble because deep time is so far out 
of the realm of human experience.  Yet, that doesn’t help us figure out what to do to 
help students better understand the concept.  It may be that student difficulties with 
deep time reflect a variety of underlying problems none of which is sufficient in and of 
itself to result in solid understanding but all of which contribute in some way to the 
concept.  In this thesis I propose a working model that may account for why students 
have such great difficulty comprehending deep time.   
1.7 Aims of the study 
 This study is a descriptive, exploratory one.  Its chief goal is to create a basis for 
a research programme that can provide information to teachers that will help them 
more effectively teach their students about deep time.  As will be seen from chapter 
two, the existing literature on deep time conceptions shows that students’ (and 
teachers’) ideas are very similar across ages and amongst those who have varying 
levels of exposure to geoscience content.  Further, large-scale quantitative 
questionnaires have been the preferred method of data collection.  A different type of 
study is called for at this point in time. 
 The aim of this exploratory study is to investigate three underlying factors that 
could account for student difficulties with deep time: a poor understanding of 
conventional time, a poor understanding of large numbers, and limited subject matter 
knowledge.  A model to account for those three factors appears in chapter two 
(section 2.7) and arises from the literature review in chapter two.  If the model proves 
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plausible, this study can provide introductory data that can suggest avenues for future 
research into deep time conceptions.  Specifically, questions in three areas are 
explored: 
1. Do students apply the same strategies to solve conventional time and deep 
time tasks, and do they make similar errors regardless of the length of time 
involved? 
2. Do students understand the size of numbers in the thousands or greater, as 
well as proportional relationships among numbers of various magnitudes? 
3. When students answer questions about deep time, do they cite geoscience 
ideas as rationales for responses or everyday ideas that may or may not be 
relevant to the task at hand?   
 Ultimately, the findings from this study and those that follow it could result in 
the development of instructional practices to help students move from current 
conceptions to scientifically correct ones.  Insight into why deep time is so difficult 
may suggest particular methodologies to improve student understanding and may 
also explain why practices commonly suggested have not been highly successful.  If all 
three factors are important, merely providing students with a scale model of deep 
time, for example, may not prove helpful if one or more of the three factors is missing.   
As we are better able to articulate specifically why deep time is so difficult, we will be 
better equipped to design instruction that will improve student understanding. 
The thesis can also serve to inform future research in the field.  The 
exploratory nature of the study cannot be overemphasised.  The results of this study 
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can be used to design future research, some of which would undoubtedly employ the 
use of questionnaires and large samples.  More will be said about this in chapter six. 
Completion of the thesis was a dynamic process with synergy among tasks at 
all stages of the process.  The thesis was completed in stages as delineated in Table 
1.2.  This brief overview of key events along the way may help the reader better 
understand what follows in the remainder of the thesis. 
Date Event Explanation 
 October 
2005 
Initial literature review begun Broad literature review on 
geoscience concept knowledge 
 
 Nov. 2006-
Jan. 2007 
Preliminary interviews conducted 
with 4 university students & 2 
middle school students (12-14-
yrs.-old) 
 
See section 3.3 for discussion of 
preliminary interviews 
Spring 2007 “Stool” metaphor emerged Continued review of the literature 
& results of preliminary interviews 
led to development of working 
model (See chapter 2 especially 
section 2.7) 
 
Summer to 
early fall 
2007 
Revision of interview protocol to 
final form; administered to 2 
additional university students 
 
See section 3.3-3.4 for description 
of the interview protocol & 
Appendix A for interview script 
with correct answers to all 
questions  
 
Nov. 2007, 
March 
2008, & 
May 2008 
 
Interviews conducted See chapter three for description 
of participants 
2008-2009 Data analysed, thesis written & 
revised 
 
 
October 
2009 
Thesis completed and submitted  
Table 1.2 Key events in the development of the thesis 
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1.8 What this thesis is not 
 The reader may be expecting to see an extended discussion in chapter two of 
how this thesis fits within the broader context of the conceptual change literature in 
science education.  That discussion will not be found for an important reason.  The 
purpose of this thesis is not to investigate what students know about how particular 
geologic structures are formed or about their ability to place geologic events on a 
scale that is sufficiently large.  It is not an attempt to describe how students’ ideas 
about geologic time change over time or in response to instruction.  The research 
reviewed in section 2.6 will demonstrate that students of all ages and their teachers 
have a poor understanding of deep time.  I find no evidence of disagreement on this 
point.  This thesis is an attempt to go deeper and ask why students (and teachers) 
experience such difficulty with the concept.  Thus, this is not a thesis about conceptual 
change for the reasons outlined in sections 1.6 and 1.7.  Nonetheless, it is useful at 
this point to briefly outline several current theoretical orientations within the 
conceptual change literature.  Ultimately, research on students’ understandings of 
deep time needs to sit within a broader theoretical framework that accounts for 
conceptual learning in science.  This thesis will contribute to that discussion by linking 
deep time conceptions to more fundamental underlying ideas.  This thesis does not 
commit to a single view on conceptual change because I think it is premature to do so.   
 The first question that must be answered in conceptions research is what we 
should call students’ non-scientific ideas.  Reflecting science conceptions literature 
more broadly, these ideas have been referred to in the geoscience conceptions 
literature as misconceptions (Bisard, Aron, Francek, & Nelson, 1994), preconceptions 
(DeLaughter, S. Stein, C. Stein, & Bain, 1998), and alternative conceptions (Dove, 1998; 
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Schoon & Boone, 1998).  No matter what term is used, there is wide agreement that 
the students’ current conceptions have a profound influence upon future learning in a 
domain (Ausubel, 1968).  Throughout this thesis I will use the term alternative 
conceptions as the most inclusive of the three and under which the other terms can be 
subsumed.  At times, students’ current ideas are simply incorrect and act as barriers to 
new learning.  In that sense they are misconceptions.  Sometimes, they might serve as 
building blocks for scientific conceptions.  Thus, they could be viewed as 
preconceptions.  In all cases, they are alternatives to scientific ideas.  The exception to 
the use of alternative conceptions throughout the thesis will be instances in which 
another author has used a different term with a very specific meaning.  In those cases, 
I will use the author’s term to more accurately capture the writer’s original intent. 
There are a number of conceptual change theories in science.  All view 
students’ current knowledge in slightly different ways.  Perhaps the greatest divide 
exists between those who see students’ pre-existing ideas as relatively unstructured 
versus those who see them as components of more well-organised structures.  In 
discussing the four theories, I will refer to these by the names of the authors with 
which they are often associated.  That is not to diminish the role of their colleagues in 
the development of the ideas, but is done merely for ease of reading.  I will not 
provide a substantive critique of the relative merits of the theories.  They are 
presented here to give the reader a brief overview of ways in which many in the 
science education research community view students’ conceptual development. 
Andrea diSessa (e.g., diSessa, 2002, 2008; Smith, diSessa, & Roschelle, 1993) 
views students’ existing knowledge as a large number of small ideas known as 
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phenomenological primitives or p-prims.  While diSessa sometimes uses the word 
intuitive to describe p-prims, he seems to see them as strongly related to perceptual 
experiences.  He does not appear to be advocating for a nativist view in which p-prims 
are innate or hard-wired in any way.  Rather, p-prims can best be characterised as 
reasonably straightforward notions of perceptual experiences.  (If I push a box across 
the floor, the box moves in the same direction as the push.)  Conceptual change 
occurs as p-prims are reorganised into a coherent whole. 
Ruth Stavy and Dina Tirosh (2000, 1999) posit the existence of underlying 
structures that can explain misconceptions [their term] across disciplines in science 
and mathematics.  Their use of the word misconceptions to describe students’ ideas 
indicates that they view these intuitive ideas as barriers to new learning in contrast to 
diSessa who views existing ideas as building blocks upon which new knowledge is 
constructed. Like diSessa, they use the term intuitive but do not appear to have 
innateness in mind.  Rather they see misconceptions as extrapolations of ideas that 
have been experienced as correct in a previously encountered situation.  
Extrapolations result because the two situations share a common surface feature.  The 
problem is that, while the surface features are similar, the underlying conceptual ideas 
are not.  In contrast to diSessa who posits a larger number of p-prims, Stavy and 
Tirosh hypothesise that three ideas can account for misconceptions in a variety of 
domains.  While they acknowledge that students often respond inconsistently to tasks 
designed to probe the same conception, they expect to see consistent responses 
across a wide variety of unrelated domains due to the use of an intuitive rule based on 
surface features of the tasks. 
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Stavy and Tirosh do not address why they think the three intuitive rules they 
describe exist while others do not.  Two of those rules might be relevant to the thesis.  
The first is, “More A, more B.”  This says that if two things differ in terms of a feature 
A, such that the first thing has more of A than the second, then the first thing must 
also possess more of feature B than the second.  A second rule is, “Same A, same B.”  
This says that if two things share the same feature A to the same extent, then they will 
also share B to the same extent (Stavy & Tirosh, 2000).   Their final rule, “Everything 
can be divided,” is not applicable to this thesis. 
The remaining two authors allege that naive ideas are theory-like in that they 
are organised in a systematic manner, though they are not necessarily theories in a 
scientific sense.  New information is either assimilated into the existing theory in some 
way or the theory is revised in light of it.   For Michelene Chi and her colleagues (e.g., 
Chi, 2008, 2006; Chi & Roscoe, 2002), learners possess mental models of how the 
world works.  Sometimes their present ideas serve as building blocks for new 
knowledge, but just as often, those ideas can hinder learning.  When an individual 
possesses limited or no prior knowledge of a science topic, but perhaps does have 
some related domain knowledge, new scientific information is added to current 
conceptions.  New information serves to “fill in the gaps.”  When a learner’s existing 
conceptions are at odds with scientific information, conceptual change is required.  
Chi views misconceptions [her term] as the result of the assignment of something to 
an incorrect ontological category.  For example, a student sees electricity as part of 
the ontological category substances rather than processes.  As a result the student 
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believes electricity resides in a battery in the same way that water can be found in a 
pond. 
Stella Vosniadou and her associates (e.g., Vosniadou, 1994, 2002; Vosniadou & 
Brewer, 1992; Vosniadou, Skopeliti, & Ikospentaki, 2004; Vosniadou, Vamakoussi, & 
Skopeliti, 2008) see learners’ ideas as residing within larger frameworks or models.  In 
that sense, they agree with Chi.  Like the other theorists described in this section, for 
Vosniadou, children’s early ideas about how the world works are constructed as part 
of everyday perceptual experiences.  In her view, children’s ideas are coherent and 
provide a framework within which children generate mental models of concepts such 
as “Earth.”  As students acquire scientific information it is initially incorporated into 
existing frameworks often resulting in the creation of new models that synthesise the 
contradictory new and old information resulting in a model that is frequently 
internally inconsistent.  Ultimately, the goal is to move from those inconsistent 
synthetic models to scientifically correct ones.  For Vosniadou, conceptual change 
happens as a learner either changes specific domain related theories or more 
fundamental ideas about how the world works. 
While diSessa (2008) would largely reject efforts to find common ground 
among the theories, all agree that inconsistent responses, knowledge fragmentation, 
alternative conceptions, and inert knowledge, often characterize learners, even 
experts in a field (diSessa, 2008, p. 47).  All acknowledge the possibility that a learner 
will hold both incorrect and correct ideas in tandem.  Currently in the geosciences, it is 
very difficult to say whether students’ existing ideas can be characterized as bits and 
pieces of knowledge, an intuitive rule, an incorrect ontological category, or a naïve 
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theoretical framework.  In fact, the answer to that question is outside the scope of this 
thesis.  It would be unreasonable to expect an exploratory study like this to resolve 
the issue.  I will, however, attempt to determine what may account for students’ 
current ideas about deep time thereby answering the research questions outlined in 
section 1.7. 
1.9 Concluding remarks 
 Deep time is one of the most fundamental organising principles in geoscience.  
A student who has little understanding of the concept will be limited in the ability to 
acquire other important geoscience concepts.  Although a number of research studies 
have chronicled students’ deep time conceptions (Dodick & Orion, 2003a; Hidalgo & 
Otero, 2004; Libarkin, Kurdziel, & S. Anderson, 2007; Marques & Thompson, 1997; 
Trend, 1998, 2000, 2001a, 2001b), we lack an understanding of why students struggle 
with this important idea.  This exploratory study is a first step toward answering this 
foundational question. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
In chapter one I proposed a series of criteria that could be used to determine 
whether or not someone possesses a concept of deep time.  The reality, of course, is 
that it is not an all or nothing proposition.  People will possess such a concept to a 
greater or lesser degree.  I also briefly outlined what U.S. standards documents 
indicate students at particular ages should understand about deep time.  The purpose 
of this chapter is to review and analyze the research literature that is relevant to 
students’ understanding of deep time.  Not surprisingly, there is a great difference 
between what students should understand and what they actually do.  This naturally 
leads us to ask why that is so.     
2.1 A context for a review of the literature 
 Students’ conceptions of deep time intersect and influence other areas of 
conceptions in the geosciences such as Earth materials and processes (Cheek, in 
review).  When someone posits a period of hundreds of years for the Atlantic Ocean 
to open, there is an alternative conception about something that is operational.  The 
source of the conception may not be immediately obvious.  Is the student 
misinformed about rates of plate tectonic processes?  Are hundreds of years the 
largest period of time that has any meaning for the student?  Conversely, does this 
individual understand how the rate of a process influences its duration?   Developing a 
sense of why students don’t understand deep time is crucial if we are to have any 
hope of addressing this issue within an instructional context.  While there is not as 
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large a body of alternative conceptions research in the geosciences as there is in some 
other areas, many authors have noted how difficult a concept deep time is for 
students to grasp (Dodick & Orion, 2003a, 2003b; Libarkin, et al, 2005; Trend, 1998, 
2000, 2001a, 2001b; Truscott, et al, 2006).   There could be several reasons for this 
problem.  It may be that when we ask students questions about geoscience processes 
in deep time we are really finding out the extent to which they have been taught and 
learnt specific geoscience content information.  If students maintain life was present 
before Earth’s formation (DeLaughter et al., 1998; Marques & Thompson, 1997) does 
that mean they don’t understand time or that they don’t know the earliest evidence 
of life is from the Middle Archean Eon?  Perhaps they’ve never even heard of the 
Archean Eon, or at least don’t remember that they have.  A confounding factor is that 
deep time employs numbers in the millions and billions, quantities with which humans 
have little direct experience.  Conceivably, the size of the numbers involved could be a 
barrier to understanding.  A more fundamental question arises as to what extent a 
concept of deep time is similar to or different from a concept of conventional time.  
Some (Ault, 1980, 1982; Dodick & Orion, 2003a, 2003b) have argued there is a 
qualitative difference between the two because geology requires one to judge time by 
examining structures in which the processes that gave rise to them cannot be 
observed.   
Before ascertaining how conventional time, large numbers, and geoscience 
content knowledge relate to a concept of deep time, a frame of reference must be 
established.  What is the state of our current understanding of how people conceive 
of conventional time?  What are the key ideas that must be grasped?  How do 
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individuals understand numbers that seem large to them but are significantly smaller 
than those necessary to understand deep time?  Finally, in what ways does a person’s 
current understanding of a particular subject influence new learning in the domain?   
I begin by reviewing literature in each of these areas outside a deep time 
context.  After looking at each area separately, I then describe the relationship of this 
body of literature to the research on deep time.  Finally, I propose a model that can 
account for students’ difficulties comprehending deep time.  The review begins with a 
discussion on conventional time, proceeds to large number concepts, and then, 
research into the role of subject matter knowledge in concept acquisition.   
2.2 Conventional time 
What then, is time?  I know well enough what it is, provided that nobody one 
asks me; but if I am asked what it is and try to explain, I am baffled.  
(Augustine) 
 It is easy to identify with Augustine.  We live in a world where time is a 
fundamental part of our daily existence yet it can be difficult to define.  We may have 
waited for a train for an hour feeling as if the time inched by ever so slowly.  Another 
time, lost in a good book, we may have been surprised to discover we had been 
reading for hours.  If we wish to ascertain how an understanding of deep time is 
related to conventional time, we must first consider what is essential to a concept of 
the latter and whether both rest on the same basic premises. 
 A point of clarification is in order.  This thesis is based entirely on a Newtonian 
understanding of time in which there is such a thing as absolute time and two 
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durations can be judged as equivalent to one another.  Clocks tick independently of 
the events they measure at a steady rate.  Thus, the passage of time is constant 
regardless of where one is or what one is doing.  Two observers standing at different 
spots can concur on the simultaneity of events.  Time is linear, and events can be 
ordered along a linear scale in relative position to one another.  Generally speaking, a 
Newtonian conception of time is sufficient for one’s day-to-day existence.   Previous 
research on how individuals understand conventional time is based upon these same 
Newtonian ideas.  Therefore, I have adopted the same framework. 
There are several important components to this understanding of time.  First, 
one must be able to place events in relative and absolute temporal succession in both 
past and future directions.  In relative terms, if this is February I know that December 
was more recent than August of the preceding year.  I also know that it will be spring 
before it will be fall.   Sometimes I am only concerned with these relative temporal 
relationships, but at other times they are insufficient.  I may also want to know in 
absolute terms how long ago August was (six months ago if this is February) or how 
much longer it has been since I went to the beach in August compared to when I went 
to a holiday party in December (four months longer if this is February).   
A second component is that events or processes take place over different 
periods of time or durations.  If I am headed to a party it is good to know 
approximately how long it will take to get there so that I arrive neither too late nor too 
early.  I also need to understand that how fast I drive to the party affects how long it 
takes me to get there.  That is because if the distance to the party remains the same, 
the amount of time it takes to get there is affected by the rate at which I drive. 
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 A third key idea is that units of time are independent of the events they 
measure.  One hour has the same duration as every other hour no matter if my 
perception is that one hour passes more slowly than another based upon the activity 
in which I am engaged.  As such those units of time can serve as reference points to 
help me judge durations of particular events.  A final idea that is rarely mentioned in 
the context of deep time is that time is linear but is measured in units that repeat in a 
cyclical fashion.  Cycles of minutes, hours, days, months, and years recur in a 
predictable way that allows us to orient events in our lives.  If it is winter I go skiing, 
but if it is summer I go to the beach.  It’s generally not the other way round.  Although 
in an era of widespread air travel or if you are lucky enough to live in Vancouver, 
British Columbia, it is possible to go skiing and to the beach in the same day.  Cyclical 
patterns like climatic fluctuations occur in deep time, but we tend not to think of the 
time periods themselves as representing cycles in the way we do with lived time, 
possibly because we cannot experience an entire cycle within a human lifetime. 
A discussion of how a concept of conventional time might relate to a concept 
of deep time is an important focus of this thesis.  There are several reasons for this 
emphasis.  One is that every question we ask students about their concepts of deep 
time deals either with succession or duration.  Naturally, we must ask whether their 
understanding of those ideas in conventional time may be an impediment to their 
understanding in deep time.  The second is that there is a lack of agreement as to 
whether or not a conception of deep time is fundamentally different from a concept 
of conventional time.  This question will also be addressed in this section.   
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The review of literature on conventional time is divided into several parts.  The 
first deals with pioneering research by Jean Piaget on the development of a concept of 
time in children.  His work is discussed separately due to its foundational role for what 
follows.  Next, literature since Piaget dealing with succession and duration is 
discussed.  A separate section is devoted to the work of Jacques Montangero since his 
ideas are crucial to the work of Dodick and Orion (2003a, 2003b, 2006), two important 
researchers in the area of deep time conceptions.   
2.2.1 Piaget and the development of a concept of conventional time 
Piaget conducted extensive research into the development of a concept of 
time in children.   This work is embedded within the larger context of his 
characterisation of cognitive development in children across domains passing through 
a series of qualitative stages.  From his interviews of children aged five to nine Piaget 
focused on succession and duration as the two ideas that develop in tandem, with the 
growth of one fostering the growth of the other.   
According to Piaget, an understanding of succession or a sequence of events 
involves the ability to reconstruct the order of events after the events have occurred 
and/or to perceive the correct order of events while they are occurring (Piaget, 1969).  
In one experiment two mechanical snails were run simultaneously across a table but 
at different speeds, with the first either stopping before, at the same time, or after the 
second snail.  The child was then asked which snail stopped first.  The youngest 
children in the sample (ages 4-5) equated distance travelled with time travelled and 
responded that the snail that travelled the greater distance travelled for the longer 
time and stopped second.  Slightly older children (ages 4 ½ - 7 ½) evinced a 
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progression in their thinking but were characterised by inconsistent responses.  By age 
eight or nine, children were able to “divorce temporal from spatial succession“(p. 
104). Thus, they understood that time travelled is independent of distance travelled if 
we are considering objects travelling at different velocities. 
Piaget also investigated how children develop an understanding of the 
duration of events by relating speed, duration, and starting and ending times.    In 
another experiment, a device that was composed of two bottles one on top of the 
other was shown to children.  The top bottle was an inverted pear shape and the 
bottom was a cylinder with the identical capacity as the top bottle.  Coloured water 
could be moved from the top to the bottom bottle by means of a tap.  Because the 
shapes of the two bottles were different the water level of the top bottle did not 
decrease by the same extent to which the water level in the bottom bottle rose.  
Water was allowed to flow through the tap from the top to the bottom bottle and was 
stopped at various intervals.  Piaget refers to these intervals as I1, I2, II1, II2, etc. with I 
referring to the change in water level for the top bottle and II referring to the change 
in water level for the bottom bottle.  Thus, the durations for I1 and II1 are identical 
since they represent a given volume of water flowing from the top to bottom bottle.  
Children were asked if the amount of time it took for the water level to change a given 
amount in the top bottle was the same as or different from the amount of time for the 
water level to change a given amount in the bottom bottle.  The youngest children in 
the sample equated the magnitude of the change in water level with the amount of 
time required for the change to occur.  In their thinking the durations of I1 and II1 were 
not equivalent.  Again, there was a progression in children’s thinking until about age 
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eight or nine when a milestone was reached and children were able to see that 
duration and velocity are inversely proportional to one another. In other words, they 
were able to understand that a particular amount of water that flows out of one 
container and into another at a constant rate requires the same amount of time.  
These children were able to judge durations based on the starting and ending times of 
the actions.   
The notion of operational thought was a key idea of Piaget.  The ability to put 
succession and duration together occurs when children are able to conceive of time as 
a reversible operation. While time itself is linear and irreversible, through thought, 
one is able to reconstruct the past and work backwards to determine both duration 
and succession.  “As soon as the motions to be compared can be mentally extended in 
two directions, time becomes an operational entity” (Piaget, 1969, p. 103).  In terms 
of the previous examples, children’s conception of time becomes operational when 
they can mentally work backwards to compare starting and stopping times (in the case 
of the snails) to determine which one stopped first.  Similarly, in example two, Piaget 
suggests that some children use the amount of water flowing from one bottle to the 
other as a clock [his term].  Because they recognize the same amount of water flowed, 
they conclude that the durations must be the same even though the water levels did 
not change by the same amount (p. 75). 
Piaget’s work on physical time looked at children’s ability to conceive that two 
durations were the same even if the end results of two actions were different.  He is 
sometimes criticised for what is perceived as an exclusive reliance on tasks involving 
motion with spatial distance (e.g., Ault, 1982; Dodick & Orion, 2003a).  Yet, not all of 
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his tasks were of that variety.  He also explored the development of the concept that 
units to measure time (seconds, minutes) are independent of the actions they are 
measuring.  In another experiment, children were asked to count to 15 with the beat 
of a metronome that was set for one beat per second while simultaneously watching 
the second hand move on a clock, which obviously advanced at the same rate as the 
metronome.  The clock was hidden from view and children were asked to count more 
rapidly to 15 (the metronome was set at a faster rate) and then asked to predict how 
far the second hand would travel on the clock.  Children who did not understand that 
seconds represent a constant unit said that the clock would still reach 15 since they 
equated the movement of the clock with the rate of the metronome.    
Another experiment that cannot be criticised for a reliance on spatial motion 
concerned the development of a concept of age.  Children were asked if a younger or 
older sibling would still be younger or older than the child when they were both 
adults.  Children who did not have an operational understanding of time failed to 
grasp that the age difference between two siblings would remain the same into 
adulthood (Piaget, 1969).  These same children also held to the notion that while they 
would continue to grow older their parents would not.  One explanation is that these 
children possessed little sense of standard units of time that are independent of the 
events they measure.  They also tended to equate size with age for animals, plants, 
and even rocks. 
According to Piaget, a concept of time becomes operational around the ages of 
eight or nine.  Thus, a concept of conventional time should be no impediment to an 
understanding of deep time for either adolescents or adults.  Any difficulties they may 
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have comprehending deep time could not be attributed to a failure to understand 
conventional time.  It turns out that the picture may not be quite so clear. 
2.2.2 Succession research since Piaget 
 Piaget was not interested in adults’ conceptions of time or how children and 
adults understand various time scales.  His focus was specifically on how children 
develop an operational understanding of time.  Research post-Piaget has asked how 
much younger children and adults understand both succession and duration.  I begin 
with literature on succession. 
William Friedman (1982, 1990, 2005) has investigated children’s and 
adolescents’ conceptions of time scales.  While he has found that infants appear to 
possess primitive concepts of both duration and succession, he agrees with Piaget that 
time does not become a concept in its own right prior to middle childhood.  Children’s 
early exposure to succession in time scales is a verbal list procedure in which they are 
taught to recite the days of the week or months of the year.  This list-based learning 
means that succession of days and months can be more easily determined in a 
forward direction than in a backward one.  In one experiment children as young as 
eight were able to correctly state the month that was two months after June while it 
was not until age 15 that they could consistently name the month that was two 
months before June (Friedman, 2005).  On the other hand, 4-and 5-year-olds were 
able to correctly sequence the order of daily events (Friedman, 1982) which might be 
explained by the fact that those events occur in largely predictable patterns in a 
repeating cycle with which a four-year-old has already had significant experience. 
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 Older children and adults seem to rely more heavily on image or location-
based processes to place events in time.  The result is that adults are often more 
accurate on finer scales of time than grosser ones, e.g., they remember the time of 
day, but not the month.  In one experiment, adults were asked to indicate when 
specific stories were shown on “60 Minutes,” an American television programme that 
features current news stories.  While adults were able to judge past distances from 
the present in a linear fashion for the previous two months, after that point the 
distances between events were much more compressed.  For example, people 
indicated it had been only slightly longer since they saw a program shown one year 
ago than one shown six months ago (Friedman, 2005).  A similar result was obtained 
with 3- to 6-year-olds who were asked to judge how long ago their birthdays and 
several holidays had occurred.  Like the adults, children judged two past events as 
being more temporally related than was actually the case.  Friedman says, “Together 
these findings tell us that distance-based processes provide differentiated information 
about the times of events from the past several months, but the times of older events 
are more difficult to distinguish from one another,” (Friedman, 2005, p. 150).   
 A study by Janssen, Chessa, and Murre (2006) looked at several aspects of 
succession which are applicable to this thesis.  First, they investigated whether there 
was a difference in accuracy of age determination for events depending upon how 
long ago the events occurred, similar to Friedman’s work just described.  They also 
explored whether the type of age information people were asked to provide, either 
relative or absolute affected accuracy.  The authors define the terms “relative” and 
“absolute” differently than I have throughout this thesis and those differences must 
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be discussed.  According to their definition, relative time is the distance [their term] 
from the present to a specific event, for example, three months ago.  Absolute time is 
described as location or the ability to place an event in an exact time period.   
Examples include March 15, 2009 or simply, March 15th.   While distance from the 
present is considered relative by their definition, I have considered it as absolute time 
since it situates the event at a specific point in time and is precisely how we indicate 
radiometric dates in the geologic past.  We say the mass extinction at the end of the 
Cretaceous period took place 65 million years ago.   In fact, if we were to simply say 
the Cretaceous period, (a date according to Janssen, et al.’s definition), that would be 
less precise than 65 million years ago.  Hence, by my definition, both of their tasks 
constitute absolute time in that an individual must situate an event at a specific point 
in time.  If this is February, and I say an event occurred either three months ago or in 
November, I have placed it specifically.  In this thesis, I have followed Trend (1998, 
2000, 2001a, 2001b) and referred to relative time as the relative temporal order of 
events.   Thus, relative time refers to my ability to say that Halloween came before 
Christmas.  This does not necessarily mean that I know how much longer ago 
Halloween was than Christmas. 
There are some methodological concerns with their study.  Participants in 
Janssen, Chessa, and Murre’s study were 1,579 adults who accessed an Internet 
survey.  It appears that participants self-selected to participate, thereby resulting in 
participation bias, a concern in the interpretation of results.  They were presented 
with a total of 10 randomly selected cue words and asked to describe a personal event 
associated with that cue word.  These cues included words such as hospital, cat, and 
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mountain (p. 147).  Cue words were alternated with questions about national and 
international news events from the 1950s to 1990s.  News questions were of the type, 
When did Princess Diana die in Paris? Or When did the Russian submarine Kursk sink? 
(Janssen et al., 2006, p. 141). Individuals were placed into one of four treatment 
groups.  In one group, participants were required to answer news questions and 
situate events associated with cue words in the relative format, while a second group 
was required to answer in the absolute format [according to their definitions of the 
terms].  In two other groups, participants were able to choose between either the 
relative or absolute formats, but their order of presentation on the screen was varied.   
Thus, in the third group, the request for a relative answer appeared above the request 
for an absolute answer, while it was reversed for the fourth group.  No one had to 
provide both a relative and absolute date for any event.   
Despite the different definitions of terms and methodological concerns, their 
study is useful.  First, Janssen, Chessa, and Murre found that events that occurred 
more than 1,000 days ago were likely to be judged as having happened more recently 
than they actually had.  In contrast, events that happened between 100 and 1,000 
days ago were deemed to have occurred slightly longer ago than they actually had.   
They also found greater backward displacement of events between 100 and 1,000 
days ago when using the relative format than when using the absolute.  Similarly, 
there was greater forward displacement of events for those greater than 1,000 days 
ago in the relative format.    Although this was not one of the questions in their study, 
an example may clarify.  When asked to indicate how long ago the London 
Underground bombings occurred in absolute terms, an individual may correctly say 
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2005.  When asked to judge how long ago the event occurred in relative terms, 
someone is more likely to underestimate how long ago it was.   However, since a 
person only had to say 2005 to be deemed correct in the absolute format in their 
study (rather than 7 July, 2005), there could still be a telescoping effect that is not as 
readily apparent as it is with the relative format.  There is no way of knowing from 
their study design when the person would situate the bombings in 2005.  Their 
estimation could be off by five or six months, but the response format does not make 
that clear. 
Concerns with the methodology of Janssen, Chessa, and Murre’s (2006) study 
have already been mentioned.  Thus, it would be unwise to make much of the 
differences they found between the relative and absolute formats for dating events.  
The usefulness of their findings lies in the fact that they corroborate Friedman’s 
results (2005) described earlier.  These two pieces of research indicate that adults 
have difficulty accurately judging how long ago events occurred even when we are 
talking about events that happened less than three years ago.   
There is a strong suggestion in the aforementioned research that there is a 
spatial component to how humans perceive time.  In fact, Friedman uses the term 
“location-based processes” (2005, p. 149) to describe how people situate events in 
time.  One author (Boroditsky, 2000) argues that a reason for this is that we regularly 
use spatial terminology to describe time, e.g., we turn our clocks forward, say the 
train is running behind today, or I live five minutes from school.  Perhaps even more 
relevant to the discussion of deep time is the co-mingling of time and spatial ideas in 
the term light-year.  Boroditsky further argues that people actually employ spatial 
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metaphors to think about time, not merely to talk about it.  She reports (2000) on a 
series of experiments which were conducted with university undergraduates enrolled 
in a psychology course.  In the second experiment, the one of greatest relevance to 
this thesis, several questions about time were embedded within a larger written 
questionnaire completed by 302 students.  The questionnaire is not described but the 
reader is told that the majority of the questions were unrelated to the experiment 
described.  Experimental items in the questionnaire were preceded by what she terms 
either temporal or spatial primes.  These primes were designed to predispose 
students to activate either temporal or spatial thinking in a particular way and then 
investigate how that influenced their subsequent thinking about time.   
Examples may clarify.  Temporal primes consisted of statements such as the 
following, “On Thursday, Saturday is before us,” or “Thursday comes before 
Saturday,” (p. 12).  In the first statement the individual is the referent since when it is 
Thursday, Saturday is in the future. It could, of course, be argued that if it is Thursday 
there are many Saturdays that are behind us.  Nonetheless, the statement, “Thursday 
comes before Saturday,” is true in terms of the normal weekly cycle [as represented 
by a U.S. or European calendar].  In the second statement, Saturday is the referent.  
Again, in the normal weekly cycle it is Thursday before it is Saturday.  Half of the prime 
statements were true and half were false.    “March comes after May,” (p. 27) is an 
example of a false prime.  Spatial primes were drawings accompanied by statements 
such as, “The flower is in front of me,” or “The hat box is in front of the Kleenex,” (p. 
12).  Three-fifths of the statements were true and two-fifths were false.   
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Experimental questions were deliberately either temporally or spatially 
ambiguous.  A temporally ambiguous question was of the type, “Next Wednesday’s 
meeting has been moved forward two days.  What day is the meeting now that it has 
been moved?” (p. 12).  Students who had been prompted with a statement in which 
the person was the referent such as, “The hat box is in front of me,” were more likely 
to say the meeting had been moved to Friday.  Conversely, those who were prompted 
with a statement like, “The hat box is in front of the Kleenex,” were more likely to say 
the meeting had been moved to Monday.  Moreover, Boroditsky found that students 
were more likely to be influenced by spatial primes when answering temporal 
questions than the other way round.  Thus, if a student was shown a spatial prime and 
then asked a temporal question, the individual was more likely to answer in a way 
consistent with the prime statement than if the student was shown a temporal prime 
and then asked a spatial question.  In fact, approximately 2/3 of participants were 
influenced by the spatial primes.  Slightly less than half were influenced by temporal 
primes when answering spatial questions, a result that would be predicted by chance.  
In other words, prompts of the Thursday and Saturday type mentioned in the previous 
paragraph had little effect on responses to spatially ambiguous questions.  Not 
everyone appeared to be influenced by the spatial primes, a finding which Boroditsky 
interprets as evidence that the application of spatial metaphors to an understanding 
of time does not occur in all cases.  This could be especially true when temporal 
relationships are very familiar such as the days of the week.   When temporal 
relationships are not so clear, as in the case of very long periods of time, those spatial 
metaphors may be more important for how people think about time.   
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The three studies just reported share a common theme.  Many people 
perceive temporal succession spatially.  Recent work (Liberman & Trope, 2008) argues 
that temporal and spatial distances are related to each other in that they represent 
psychological distance.  While each may have unique qualities, people apply similar 
mechanisms to deal with them.  The authors concur with the conclusion already 
described that there is less discrimination between more temporally distant events 
than between more recent ones.   The issue appears to be one of perspective and a 
person’s reference point.  The distance from the temporal reference point determines 
how an event is situated in time.  Does a similar phenomenon apply to duration?  We 
now turn to that question. 
2.2.3 Duration research since Piaget 
For Piaget, duration can be judged in different ways, depending upon the 
information that is available to the child.  Since many, but not all, of his experiments 
involved motion, I will use motion examples to illustrate.  Sometimes duration can be 
judged solely on the basis of starting and stopping times.  If a child possesses an 
operational understanding of duration, then distance travelled is immaterial as is 
velocity.  All that matters is which object started or stopped first.  At other times, 
starting and stopping times may be unknown.  In those situations, duration can be 
judged by taking into account distance travelled and the rate at which each object was 
travelling.  Some research since Piaget has looked at how people judge duration based 
upon starting and stopping times while others have explored how people use distance 
and rate to make judgements.    
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 Several authors have questioned some of Piaget’s results, particularly the 
notion that children are unable to judge simultaneous durations before ages eight or 
nine (Berndt & Wood, 1974; Friedman, 1990; Levin, 1982), with some arguing that 
children understand duration earlier while others say it’s later.  Friedman, who was 
mentioned previously, maintains that infants possess a primitive notion of both 
succession and duration. Levin argues that Piaget introduced too many confounding 
variables into his experimental design, thereby exceeding children’s information 
processing abilities rather than demonstrating a poor concept of duration per se.  
Specifically, she says that the spatial information in many of Piaget’s studies (e.g., 
moving of snails) was so powerful that children were unable to ignore it.  In one 
experiment, she had preschoolers, first and third graders judge the sleeping time of 
two dolls who either went to sleep at the same time or woke up at the same time, 
thereby using starting and ending times to judge duration.  Even the preschoolers 
were able to accurately judge which doll slept longer although the justifications for 
their responses were often incomplete.  She acknowledges that she applied a less 
rigorous definition of a concept of time than Piaget because spatial information was 
not a factor, when in many everyday instances it is.    When judging duration solely by 
starting and ending times, it is not necessary to take into account how speed affects 
duration.  If starting or ending times are the same or are unavailable, speed’s effect on 
duration must be addressed. 
 In contrast to Levin’s work, at least one study suggested that students older 
than ten may have difficulty judging durations from starting and ending times.  
Poduska and Phillips (1986) investigated the ability of 100 college students to perform 
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Piagetian tasks involving distance, time, and speed.  The time task was very similar to 
the one used by Piaget with young children and described in section 2.2.1.  It involved 
water flowing from one container to another.  Following the demonstration 
participants were asked two questions about which of two containers filled more 
quickly.  Only 18 of the 100 students in the sample answered both questions correctly; 
seventy-five got one question correct.  Poduska and Phillips’  standard for correctness 
was quite rigorous since a participant not only had to give the correct answer but also 
had to articulate the correct reason for the answer.  They do not indicate the number 
of students who chose the correct answer but whose justification was either incorrect 
or incomplete.  No sample responses or lists of criteria used to judge the correctness 
of responses are provided.   There are other questions regarding experimental 
procedures such as whether tasks were counterbalanced.  The time questions 
comprised only one part of a larger study on distance, time, and speed.  Thus, it is 
probably inappropriate to conclude, based upon their results, that a large percentage 
of their sample did not possess a solid concept of conventional time.  Their findings 
may reflect the nature of the experimental design, or they may simply be an anomaly.   
There is another possibility.  Consistency of responses is not always the 
hallmark of operational thought Piaget expected it would be.  While Levin and others 
provide data that suggests young children possess some concept of duration, it may 
be that under certain circumstances even adults do not display the operational 
understanding they would be expected to possess.  They may not lack an operational 
understanding of conventional time, but in some situations they may not employ that 
understanding (see Wilkening, 1981).  Further discussion of this point follows. 
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  Several studies (Acredolo, Adams, & Schmid, 1984; Matsuda, 2001; Wilkening, 
1981) have explored the relationships among distance, speed, and duration which 
require participants to judge duration based upon the interaction between distance 
and speed.  In contrast to Levin who alleged that Piaget had too many confounding 
variables, Wilkening (1981) says that Piaget’s isolation of one variable for study made 
the task less realistic since in everyday experience one must deal with distance, speed, 
and duration simultaneously.  The overall design of these studies is similar.  A scenario 
is set up in which animals travel a certain distance in response to a barking dog 
(Acredolo et al., 1984; Wilkening, 1981) or trains of different colours travel along a 
track (Matsuda, 2001).  In Wilkening (1981) and Matsuda (2001), participants only had 
to deal with the movement of one animal or train at a time while in Acredolo et al. 
(1984) children had to compare distance, duration, and speed for two animals.  In 
each study one of the three variables (distance, duration, or speed) is the dependent 
variable and relationships between the other two are varied.  A duration example 
from Wilkening (1981) should clarify.  Participants were shown a picture of a turtle, 
guinea pig, or cat that was placed 70 cm from a picture of a dog.  Children were asked 
to press a button that would produce a recording of the dog barking.  They were to 
keep pressing the button long enough to indicate the amount of time the animal 
would have had to run in response to the barking to travel that distance.  It was 
expected that they would press the button longer for the turtle than the cat if they 
understood that a cat could travel at a faster rate and would therefore traverse the 70 
cm in less time than the turtle. 
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 Wilkening found that 5-year-olds, 10-year-olds and adults could all infer 
distance correctly if given speed and time.  In fact, graphs of responses show that 
participants at all three ages knew that the difference between the distance travelled 
by the turtle and the cat in the task described in the previous paragraph would be 
greater for a longer period of time than for a shorter one.  Wilkening concludes that 
even the 5-year-olds were employing a multiplicative strategy.  That is to say, they 
knew that if an animal travelled twice as long at a constant speed, it would travel 
twice as far.  The younger children did experience difficulty integrating speed and 
distance to infer duration.   They did not clearly understand that two animals 
travelling at different speeds would require different amounts of time to traverse the 
same distance.  His results suggest that the direct relationship where distance = speed 
x duration is easier than the inverse relationship of duration = distance ÷ speed.   
Matsuda’s (2001) results with Japanese children provide a cross-cultural 
comparison of Wilkening’s data.  The youngest children in her study were 4 years old, 
and the oldest were 11 years, 11 months.  Like Wilkening her sample included adults 
for comparative purposes.  None of the adults in her sample made errors on any task.  
She found that a majority of the youngest children could correctly deduce direct 
relationships such as determining distance if speed varied but duration was held 
constant or duration if distance varied but speed was held constant.  Consistent with 
Wilkening’s results, the youngest children made fewer correct responses for questions 
requiring the use of an inverse relationship between distance and speed to determine 
duration.   
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Unlike Wilkening, Matsuda asked participants to justify their responses and the 
examiner provided feedback to them.  Even though many of the youngest children did 
well on some of the tasks they had difficulty articulating why their answer was correct, 
which is not surprising.  At every age group, including adults, individuals referred to 
speed more frequently than either of the other attributes in the justifications for their 
responses, but there was no significant increase in the number of references to speed 
from 7-year-olds to adults (Matsuda, 2001, p. 469).  She hypothesizes that children 
may be employing a “more A, more B” strategy (Stavy & Tirosh, 2000) which works for 
the direct relationship but produces an incorrect response for the inverse one where 
the correct idea is “more A, less B.”  In the former case, greater speed results in 
greater distance.  In the second case, greater speed results in a shorter duration.  
Further, for the direct relationship the correct answer could be obtained by attending 
to only two of the variables without taking the third variable into account, a strategy 
that Matsuda describes as a two-by-two relation.  This strategy works for inferring 
duration if distance varies and speed is held constant.  At the same rate of speed it will 
take longer to run a greater distance than a shorter one.   
In a follow-up longitudinal study in which she interviewed children yearly from 
kindergarten through sixth grade, Matusda (2001) reports that even though some 11-
year-olds referred to all three variables in their justifications for responses they did 
not do so consistently.  Rather, they focused only on the two-by-two relation and 
ignored the third variable.  She interprets her findings thus, 
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They used the coordination of two-by-two relations in the simple task to reduce 
processing load and answered the first problem in the complex task without 
switching over to the duration-distance-speed system. (p. 478) 
Acredolo et al. (1984) told first through fifth grade (6-11 years) children a story 
about a farmer who has a dog to guard his cabbages from skunks and rabbits.  They 
were given two of the three bits of information (distance, duration, or speed) and had 
to determine the third.  Consistent with the findings reported above, problems 
involving the inverse relationship between speed and distance proved more difficult 
than those involving a direct relationship.  Moreover, in line with others (Piaget, 1969; 
Wilkening, 1981) distance was deemed to be such an important feature that children 
attended to it and ignored the inverse relationship between speed and duration.  In 
line with Matsuda (2001), these authors suggest that the direct relationship could be 
obtained by only considering the relationship between distance and speed or distance 
and duration while ignoring the third dimension.  In contrast the inverse relationship 
between duration and speed requires that all three variables be accounted for.  The 
coordination of all three ideas requires processing capabilities that younger children 
may not possess.  This could also explain why some researchers (Berndt & Wood, 
1974; Levin, 1982) found that younger children could solve duration problems 
correctly if some of the interfering cues were removed.  In some situations one of the 
dimensions can be ignored and the correct answer will be achieved but sometimes 
that is not the case.   
A more recent study (Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008)  explored the relationship 
between space and time for duration.  This is a follow-up to Boroditsky’s earlier work 
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(section 2.2.2) dealing with succession in which she concluded that spatial thinking 
had a greater influence on temporal judgments than the other way round.  The 
authors report on six experiments designed to test whether there is a similar 
asymmetric relationship between space and time for duration.  All subjects were 
students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  In the first four experiments, 
students watched a line “grow” horizontally across a computer screen and then 
disappear when it reached its maximum length.  Durations ranged from one to five 
seconds.  Conditions were varied across experiments.  In some cases, they were asked 
to indicate how long the line was at its maximum length (distance), and other times 
they were asked to state how long the line appeared on the screen (duration).  
Sometimes students knew ahead of time if they would be asked about duration or 
distance; other times they didn’t.  In one version there were delay periods before and 
after the line grew, and in another a tone played concurrently with the line growing.   
In all experiments, the effect of spatial information on judgments of duration 
was highly significant at the p < 0.001 level.  Longer lines were judged to have longer 
durations than shorter ones.  The effect of duration information on distance was not 
significant.  Students did not equate shorter durations with shorter lines to the extent 
they viewed short lines as indicative of short durations.   Overall, students’ judgments 
about duration were quite accurate although errors followed a particular pattern.  
Shorter lines were judged to have taken less time and longer lines were judged to 
have taken longer time than they actually had to “grow” across the screen.  This 
finding is quite similar to the forward and backward telescoping found by Janssen, 
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Chessa, and Murre (2006) for succession that was reported in section 2.2.2.  In both 
cases, shorter time periods were compressed and longer ones were expanded. 
Casasanto and Boroditsky (2008) conducted two follow-up experiments to test 
whether the use of a moving line affected results.  In one experiment, students 
watched a dot move across the screen.  Again, results were the same as in the first 
four experiments.  In a final experiment, students viewed stationary lines on a screen 
that were visible for a time and then removed from the screen.  Participants were 
asked to either estimate the length of the line or to judge how long it had been visible 
on the screen.  Once again, the spatial length of the line had a far greater impact on 
judgments of duration than the amount of time the line was visible had on judgments 
of length.  An ANOVA indicated that the size of the asymmetry was similar across the 
six experiments. 
The authors very nicely sum up their own results: 
Piaget concluded that children could not reliably distinguish the spatial and 
temporal components of events until about age nine.  Like many contemporary 
results in cognitive science, our findings suggest that Piaget was right about 
the phenomenon he observed, but wrong about the age at which children 
resolve their confusion: apparently MIT undergraduates cannot reliably 
distinguish the spatial and temporal components of their experience, either (p. 
588). 
 There are several possible reasons for why space (distance) and time 
(duration) are often confused.  Levin (1992) says it is because they both accumulate.  
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Friedman alleges that adults rely on both distance and image-based processes for 
understanding time (1992).  Both are spatial ways of comprehending time.  Liberman 
and Trope (2008) have taken the notion one step farther and maintain that both 
spatial and temporal distances are at root psychological distances.  Thus, spatial or 
temporal distances that are closer to the psychological reference point are magnified, 
while distances farther from the reference point are compressed. 
2.2.4 Montangero and diachronic thought 
The work of Jacques Montangero (1996; Pons & Montangero, 1999) is 
discussed separately since his ideas were used by two major researchers in the area of 
deep time conceptions (Dodick & Orion, 2003a, 2003b).  Montangero has adopted a 
different framework than that of the conventional time research described in previous 
sections.  As such, his work must be juxtaposed against what has been previously 
discussed, particularly the work of Piaget.  
In contrast to Piaget and other researchers, Montangero (1996) conceived of 
temporal thinking as a separate type of reasoning related to but distinct from 
operational thought.  He introduced the term “diachronic thinking” or the “diachronic 
approach” to explain how one understands present events within the context of the 
larger process of which they are a part.  For him, the ability to employ a diachronic 
approach necessitates the ability to conceive of a series of actions as representing one 
event that occurs over a period of time.  He agrees with Piaget that children progress 
in their thinking about time but posits the shift to be a bit later than Piaget at around 
age ten with a reasonably well-formed conception of time by ages eleven or twelve in 
terms of children’s understandings of biological and physical processes, which is 
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consistent with what others have found (e.g., Levin, 1982)    Yet, it is his contention 
that diachronic thought, while related to operational thought, is a distinct reasoning 
ability (Pons & Montangero, 1999, p. 193) that must be addressed.  
He identifies four schemes that determine diachronic thought (Montangero, 1996, 
p. 166-169). 
1. Transformation: including a quantitative change, i.e., either an increase or 
decrease in size or a qualitative change (e.g., the shape of a tree) 
2. Temporal organization: involving the capacity to link stages in an evolving 
process in a time-ordered sequence and taking into account that some 
processes are linear while others may be cyclical 
3. Interstage linkage: including both cause and effect relationships and those 
prerequisite actions that are more a matter of convention than necessity.  For 
example, while many narrative stories begin with a description of the setting, it 
is equally possible to begin with an event. 
4. Dynamic synthesis: indicating the ability to determine that a series of stages 
effectively represents a single event over time 
As evidence for his contention of a separate reasoning ability, he and Pons 
compared eight- to twelve-year-old children’s thinking on diachronic tasks with their 
ability to solve problems necessitating operational thought (Pons & Montangero, 
1999).  There were three diachronic tasks.  In the first, children were asked to depict 
the life of a tree with a series of pictures.   While there was no real difference in the 
number of pictures drawn by children at different ages, younger children tended to 
draw a series of pictures that depicted quantitative change only.  They drew a series of 
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trees that all looked similar to one another but increased in size.  In contrast, older 
children drew a series of pictures that depicted both quantitative and qualitative 
changes.  They began with a bud, then a small sapling, a small tree, and finally a larger 
fully formed tree.  A similar experimental design with 9-, 12-, and 15-year-olds is 
described in Montangero (1996).  In this instance children were also asked how long 
the tree’s growth process takes.  Twelve-year-olds thought that the tree grew over a 
longer duration than younger children did.  They could conceive of a growth process 
requiring 100 years while the 9-year-olds mentioned times closer to their own 
lifetimes, such as ten years.  Furthermore, younger children tended to view the time 
period between successive stages in the growth process as constant.  In other words, 
they thought the rate of change remained the same throughout the life of the tree. 
  In the second task reported in Pons and Montangero (1999), children were 
shown a series of six pictures illustrating a person’s day trip to the beach.  The first 
picture showed the person arriving in the morning as the sun was just coming up over 
the horizon.  The fifth picture showed the person leaving the beach as the sun was 
setting.  The final picture showed the individual in bed with the moon and stars visible 
from a window.  Children were told to draw the rays of the sun in each picture and to 
draw more rays the hotter they thought the sun would be.  Finally, they were given 
pink, red, brown, and white crayons and asked to colour the person’s skin in each of 
the pictures.  They were instructed that they did not need to use all the crayons and 
were told that in the first picture (arrival at the beach) the person’s skin was white (a 
culturally sensitive statement).  Finally children were directed to the pictures of the 
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day trip to the beach and asked, “If you take all these pictures together, what do they 
represent?” (p. 195). 
 Younger children saw a direct relationship between the heat of the day and 
the redness of the person’s skin.  That is, they coloured the skin its reddest during the 
hottest part of the day and progressively less red as the day wore on with the skin 
returning to white in the final picture.  Older children were able to divorce the effect 
from the cause and realize that if the person was sunburned, the skin would remain 
red throughout the entire day and evening. 
Another set of tasks reported in the same study was designed to determine 
children’s operational thought.  The first task was a probability task in which children 
were shown collections of black and white tokens in different ratios and asked in 
which cases someone with eyes closed would be more likely, less likely, or equally 
likely to pick a white token.  In a spatial reasoning task children were shown a rotating 
cylinder with a pen attached to a rail above the cylinder that could be moved 
backward and forward along the cylinder.  The experimenter described specific 
motions of the cylinder and pen and children were asked to draw the resulting 
pictures that would be produced.  Responses on diachronic and operational tasks 
were sorted into three levels, the first indicating a reliance on only one variable (Level 
I), the second a transitional stage in which there is minimal attention to two variables 
(Level II), and the third in which multiple variables are accounted for (Level III).  Pons 
& Montangero report a high degree of correlation among the three diachronic tasks 
and between the two operational tasks, but a weaker correlation across diachronic 
and operational tasks.   They conclude, “The results show that it *diachronic thought+ 
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is actually a specific form of reasoning in spite of its relationship with operatory 
thought” (Pons & Montangero, 1999, p. 196).   
Montangero (1996) acknowledges possible objections to his assertion that 
diachronic thinking is a separate reasoning ability.  While he argues for this separate 
capacity, it is also possible to view a concept of time as one manifestation of 
operational thought.  In describing results for both diachronic and operational tasks, 
he and Pons report that across similar tasks (diachronic or operational), children were 
likely to achieve the same level and very rarely differed by more than one level across  
the two types of tasks.  (Someone who was at the transitional Level II on the 
diachronic tasks was often also at Level II on the operational tasks.)  This minimal 
variation makes it difficult to definitively conclude that diachronic thought is a 
separate form of reasoning distinct from operational thought.  Among those 
demonstrating different levels across diachronic and operatory tasks, about one-third 
achieved a general operational level that was higher than the diachronic while 16 
percent achieved a higher diachronic level than operational.  If one takes a Piagetian 
view of development, this could be interpreted to mean that some children are in a 
transitional stage.  This explanation is bolstered by the fact that the authors describe 
age as the “common denominator of diachronic and operatory reasoning (p. 198).  A 
wider variety of tasks would be useful to help determine whether a distinction in 
children’s abilities across diachronic and operational tasks can be justified.  For 
indeed, children who do not yet possess an operational understanding exhibit 
instability of responses (Piaget, 1969, p. 113).   
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Furthermore, the diachronic tasks themselves can be reinterpreted as 
problems of duration and succession.  In the first task in which children had to draw a 
series of pictures to depict the life cycle of a tree, children were deemed to be at Level 
I if the size of the tree changed in each drawing but not the shape.  Level II children 
were those in which the size of the tree changed in each drawing and shape changed 
in a minority of drawings.  Level III children were those who changed both the size and 
shape of the tree in successive drawings.  The authors appear to be making the 
assumption that these changes in the types of drawings must be due solely to changes 
in children’s reasoning ability.  Yet there is no evidence that children were asked to 
explain their drawings.  Perhaps differences in drawings can be explained on the basis 
of improved motor skills and/or a general ability to simultaneously consider multiple 
aspects of change and not merely temporal ones.  They may have been able to 
successfully order a series of drawings that depicted both qualitative and quantitative 
changes in a tree over time.  The authors do not adequately demonstrate why other 
explanatory mechanisms are inadequate. 
Another possible explanation is simply that older children bring to the tasks a 
greater number and variety of experiences with the phenomena in question.  While 
none of the children are likely to have watched any particular tree go through a full 
succession of growth stages, older children will have had opportunity to see a 
particular tree change over time and to have seem more trees at different stages of 
the growth process.  They also have greater experience with the qualitative and 
quantitative changes that are part of growth for any living organism including 
themselves.  They are likely to have had more school science experiences with plant 
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growth.   Older children can generally be expected to possess a better concept of trees 
as representing a class of objects with similar characteristics.  According to Friedman 
(1990), the fact that young children possess such a short time frame of experiences 
themselves means that their notions of past events are more undifferentiated. 
Consider the day at the beach task described previously.  In order to reach 
Level III children must be able to distinguish between the duration of the cause (the 
height of the sun in the sky representing the passage of time) and the duration of the 
effect (how long the skin stays red).  Younger children conceived of a co-variance 
between the two.  As the sun gets higher in the sky, the skin gets redder, and as the 
sun sets, the skin returns to its original white colour.  In reference to an earlier, similar 
study, Montangero ascribed this phenomenon to children’s confusion between the 
progression of time and the process (1996, p. 66) and cites this as evidence for 
diachronic thought as a construct.  However, it could also be inferred that younger 
children have had fewer sunburns than older children and therefore are not reasoning 
based upon a lack of diachronic thought as much as a lack of experience.   Thus, 
children’s responses may not be indicative of a poor concept of duration.  Rather, they 
simply don’t know that the effects of some actions outlast the actions themselves.  
They are equating duration (the amount of time the skin is red) with the action itself.   
Additional questions exist as to whether or not specific responses to 
experimental tasks indicate faulty understanding or merely a child who relates only 
the main ideas of a story, as some children do.  Montangero’s 1996 work provides an 
example.  Children were shown a picture of the familiar storybook characters Babar 
and Celeste on pieces of ice.  They were provided with additional sheets of paper 
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containing a picture of Babar and Celeste and were instructed to draw what happened 
before and after the original picture and then comment on their drawings.  The 
following is an example of one child’s description of his drawings and is described by 
Montangero as a scenario two response (out of a possible four): 
 Babar and Celeste are ice skating. 
 The sun comes out and starts to melt the ice. 
 The sun gets hotter and hotter and makes the ice melt more. 
 The sun gets so hot that it melts all the ice and Babar and Celeste fall in the 
water.  (Montangero, 1996, p. 61) 
This is contrasted with a scenario three response which is deemed to evince a higher 
level of diachronic thought. 
 Babar and Celeste are ice skating, they are making marks on the ice. 
 They go on skating; they make more and more marks.  The ice which is too thin 
is beginning to crack. 
 The more they skate, the more the ice cracks.  Babar and Celeste are left on 
little bits of ice.   
 They fall in the water. (p. 61) 
Scenario three is more elaborate than scenario two, yet it is not obvious why it is 
determined to be of higher conceptual quality.  Montangero states that it is because it 
demonstrates a dissociation of the time of the cause from the time of the effect.  
Without additional information about the children’s responses, this is a difficult claim 
to accept.  One would like to ask both of these children to explain their answers more 
fully.  It could be that there are no real differences in their reasoning abilities.  Instead, 
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the difference in their answers may simply indicate that one child spontaneously 
provides more detailed responses than the other.  Montangero has not clearly defined 
his criteria for the reader.  This makes it difficult to judge the validity of his evidence, 
and consequently, his theory.  
Montangero’s findings could also be seen as similar to Piaget’s results with 
children who said that it took more time to draw a large number of lines quickly than 
fewer lines slowly even though the time interval for both was fifteen seconds (Piaget, 
1969).  The ability to realize that fifteen seconds is a standard interval regardless of 
the amount of work accomplished is a characteristic of an operational understanding 
of time.  Therefore, it seems unnecessary to invoke a separate reasoning ability known 
as diachronic thinking to explain the progression of children’s thinking and reasoning 
about time.   
2.2.5 Summary of the research on conventional time 
Researchers from Piaget (1969) forward have shown the importance of an 
understanding of succession (the temporal order of events) and duration (the length 
of time of events or processes) to an understanding of conventional time.  A concept 
of duration requires the ability to account for differences in distance and/or speed.  
Some, like Piaget have isolated the two ideas.  Others (Acredolo et al., 1984; Matsuda, 
2001; Wilkening, 1981) have looked at the relationships among duration, distance, 
and speed.  While very young children possess rudimentary concepts of both 
succession and duration, the age at which that can be consistently applied for many 
time scales is clearly later than Piaget thought.  For reasons that are not completely 
obvious, even adults do not always display the operational understanding of time that 
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would be expected.  Nonetheless, the body of research on conventional time supports 
Piaget’s contentions that the notions of succession, duration, and the ability to 
mentally move forwards and backwards to reconstruct events are sound.  Individuals 
at all ages appear to find the direct relationship speed x duration = distance easier 
than the inverse relationship distance ÷ speed = duration.   
There are strong suggestions that people map time spatially and that both 
spatial and temporal distances represent psychological distance.  Events in the past or 
future are viewed as temporally distant from oneself in the present or some other 
event that is fixed in time.  There is a telescoping of events with those in the more 
distant past being judged as being closer to the present and to each other.   This is the 
same phenomenon that occurs spatially as one drives down the road and sees two 
large hills in the distance.  The hills appear quite close to one another when one is at a 
distance from both.  It is only as one gets closer to the first hill, and the reference 
point changes that one can see the two are actually quite far apart.  In the same way, 
from the vantage point of the present, events in the past are viewed as closer in time 
to one another than they really are. 
No compelling reason can be found to argue for a separate reasoning ability 
known as diachronic thinking.   Minimally, the strong relationship between how 
people reason spatially and temporally argues that temporal reasoning is not distinct 
from more general reasoning.  If one alleges a separate temporal reasoning ability, 
then it would also be necessary to propose that spatial and temporal reasoning differ 
from each other in significant ways.  At present, the data does not support such a 
claim.  The validity of diachronic thinking is also called into question by the fact that 
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many tasks deemed to provide evidence for its existence can just as easily be 
interpreted as succession and duration tasks.  Thus, the research from Piaget to the 
present indicates that an understanding of conventional time is built upon the twin 
understandings of succession and duration.  In situations where there is a direct 
relationship between the variables involved, making a judgment about succession or 
duration is fairly straightforward.  When an individual must determine how to 
reconcile competing pieces of information (an indirect relationship) to judge 
succession or duration, the task is more complicated.  In section 2.5, we will explore 
how these ideas relate to deep time.  First, we consider research into how people 
understand large numbers.  
2.3 Large numbers 
For all practical purposes, an $800 billion stimulus package is as opaque as a 
703,000-hectoshekel package; we have no real grasp of what it means.  Big 
numbers fuzz our brains, and that is just as true in business as it is in public 
policy.  Speaking in “millions” and “billions” is like your second year of Spanish: 
You’ve memorized the vocabulary, but it’s hard to think in the language. (D. 
Heath & C. Heath, 2009, p. 59) 
We are surrounded by large numbers in many areas of life.  Yet, intuitively we 
aren’t sure we really understand them.  Heath and Heath’s use of the phrase “fuzz our 
brains” captures that view.  Why do many humans possess such poor number sense 
for large numbers?  To answer that question it is important to briefly describe what 
constitutes number sense for numbers considered “smaller.”  
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Among other things, number sense involves the ability to determine the 
relative magnitude of numbers and understand how two numbers relate to one 
another.  Elementary (primary) teachers spend a considerable amount of time helping 
children explore how numbers are related to one another.  Good number sense 
requires a basic understanding of the decimal number system in which multiples of 
ten function as benchmarks to which other numbers can be related.   As children get 
older they must also develop an understanding of the proportional relationships 
between numbers.  Proportional reasoning enables someone to not only determine 
that 12 is three times greater than four, but also to move multiplicatively through 
orders of magnitude in the base-ten system.    This section reviews literature on how 
students relate numbers of various magnitudes to one another and how they 
understand proportional relationships between numbers.  A number of studies have 
been conducted primarily with children and illustrate how younger pupils understand 
relationships amongst numbers.  Research into adults’ understanding of number 
extends the findings of the studies with children.   
2.3.1 An understanding of number and relationships among numbers 
One strand of research into how people understand number deals with how 
individuals map numbers onto space, or a number line.   The majority do not deal with 
numbers in the range involved in deep time, but they provide useful parallels.   A 
number of the studies (Booth & Siegler, 2006; Dehaene, Izard, Spelke, & Pica, 2008; 
Kadosh, Tzelgov, & Henik, 2008; Laski & Siegler, 2007; Petitto, 1990; Siegler & Opfer, 
2003) employed a similar research design that varied slightly across studies.  Children 
were shown a number line on which the endpoints, either 0 and 100 or 0 and 1,000 
were marked.  They were subsequently asked to place specific numbers on the 
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number line in their appropriate place.  Kindergartners used what Dehaene, et al., 
(2008) terms a compressed logarithmic scale.  This does not mean that young children 
employ a true logarithmic scale in the sense of a slide rule which would represent a 
sophisticated understanding, to be sure.  Rather it is more akin to the example of a 
decreasing interval scale as illustrated in Figure 2.1.    This figure does not represent 
the scale used by any individual child.  It does, however, nicely illustrate what is meant 
in the literature by a “compressed logarithmic scale.”  The differences between 0 and 
10 or 10 and 20 are exaggerated while differences between numbers closer to 100 (or 
1,000) are diminished.   
 
Figure 2.1 Decreasing interval scale, (Petitto, 1990, p. 73) 
 
Weber’s law, which says humans perceive differences between smaller 
numbers more easily than between larger ones, is often invoked to explain the reason 
for this logarithmic mapping.  Larger numbers must be a greater proportional distance 
apart to be discriminable, (Dehaene et al., 2008, p. 1219).  I am well aware that five 
and seven differ by the same amount as 55 and 57.  I can readily distinguish the 
difference between five and seven sweets lying on the table.  Yet, if I see two piles on 
the table, one containing 55 and the other 57 sweets, I may not be able to distinguish 
that there is a difference between the piles.   
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From a perceptual standpoint why might this be? Consider the role of the 
reference point 0, or the origin.  If I am standing on a number line at 0, a person 
standing at 5 is easily perceived as closer than someone standing at 7.  However, two 
people standing at 55 and 57 will likely appear much closer together than the people 
at 5 and 7.  If we think of the distance from the origin to the larger of the two numbers 
in the pair as our whole distance, the reason for this may become clearer.  The person 
standing at the 7 represents the entire distance in the first pair of numbers.  The 
person standing at the 5 is at 5/7 of the entire distance.  In contrast, if the difference 
between 0 and 57 is taken as the whole distance when comparing our second pair of 
numbers, then 55 is 55/57 of the entire distance.  In other words, from the frame of 
reference of 0 (the origin), 55 is closer to the whole distance of 57 than 5 is to the 
whole distance of 7.   
There is a striking parallel between a logarithmic mapping of numbers and the 
temporal compression of events described in section 2.2.  Thus, it could be argued 
that numbers like time are mapped spatially.  The analogy of the two hills in the 
distance to temporal distortion was described in section 2.2.5, but could be equally 
applied to a logarithmic mapping of numbers.  The reason why the two hills are 
judged to be closer than they actually are can be explained on the same basis as the 
numeric example in the previous paragraph.   The issue is my current frame of 
reference.  
Children’s thinking appears to shift from the logarithmic to a more linear 
representation somewhere between second and fourth grade for the 0-100 number 
line, depending upon the study.  That means that children are then able to map equal 
68 
 
intervals, and the distance between 7 and 18 is seen as the same as the distance 
between 54 and 65.  However, these children still produce a more logarithmic scale 
for a number line from 0-1,000.  By sixth grade, most children are able to place 
numbers on the 0-1,000 number line in a linear fashion.   Increasing experience with 
larger numbers allows children to expand their frame of reference.  Size of a number 
is relative to other numbers to which it is being compared.  One hundred is a large 
number if I am comparing it to 10.  It is not so large if I am comparing it to 1,000.  
The issue of relative size shows up in another way in this body of research.  The 
scale on which a number is placed appears to influence how children represent it. 
There is some evidence that children represent the same number differently 
depending upon which number line was used.   Using the experimental design 
described previously, Siegler and Opfer (2003) asked children to place a subset of 
seven numbers on both the 0-100 and 0-1,000 scales.   They found that some children 
were able to represent a particular number linearly on the smaller number line but 
represented that same number logarithmically on the larger one.  For example, a child 
might site 50 midway between 0 and 100 on the smaller scale, but place the same 
number much farther from 0 than would be appropriate on the 0-1,000 scale.  These 
results seem to hold cross-culturally (Dehaene et al., 2008) although the age at which 
the transition to a more linear scale occurs is not identical.   Siegler and Opfer (2003) 
interpret their results as evidence for the use of a landmark proportionality model to 
map numbers on the number line.  Individuals divide a number line along specific 
reference points that are then used as landmarks to place other numbers on the line.  
The base-ten system lends itself to just such a strategy.  We often refer to reference 
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points (usually numbers ending in 0) as landmarks or “nice numbers” when speaking 
with children and encourage them to use those “nice numbers” in flexible 
computational strategies.   
Adults also exhibit logarithmic mapping in certain situations.  Dehaene et al. 
(2008)  extended the experimental design with number lines described above to an 
Amazonian culture.  Their study included both children and adults.  Their findings 
were highly consistent with earlier studies with children.  In fact, adults as well as 
children mapped numbers logarithmically.  It was not unusual for adults in their study 
to perform similarly to young children in the studies described in the last few 
paragraphs.  While age did not correlate well with performance, educational level did.  
More highly educated participants were more likely to map numbers in a linear 
fashion than those who were less well-educated.  The authors offer two possible 
hypotheses to account for these results.  Students have experiences with standard 
units of measurement in school.  These standard units serve as benchmarks or 
constants that permit two people to measure the same object and get the same 
result.  Dehaene et al. (2008) also allege that experience with addition and subtraction 
fosters the move from a logarithmic to linear concept of numbers.  This is related to 
the first idea because it involves the understanding that consecutive whole numbers 
are related to one another by the standard unit +1 or -1.  I would add that experience 
with multiplication and division is also important.  This is particularly true as the scale 
is extended to larger numbers.  A study that employed a slightly different 
experimental design than what has been previously described illustrates why that is 
so. 
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Confrey (1991) reports on a case-study interview with a female undergraduate.  
The purpose of her paper is to illustrate how researchers use problem solving tasks to 
infer student conceptions.  Thus, Confrey makes no claims that this young woman’s 
conceptions are normative.  That said the type of reasoning in which the student 
(Suzanne) engaged is useful for the present discussion. 
 Suzanne participated in several interviews. Two sessions were designed to 
probe her understanding of scientific notation—specifically how exponents represent 
orders of magnitude.  She was asked to place a series of events from the Big Bang to 
the Renaissance on a timeline and could use as much paper as she needed to 
complete the task.  Suzanne was provided with the age of each of the events, thus 
neither her geoscience nor her historical content knowledge was being assessed.  Still, 
the task may have been complicated by the fact that numbers less than one million 
were written in standard notation while those greater than one million were written 
in scientific notation.  (Standard notation in the U.S. means writing a number in the 
form 2,000.  That same number would be written as 2 x 103 in scientific notation.) 
Suzanne expressed confusion about the fact that some numbers were written one 
way while others were written in a different manner.  At various points she tried 
converting all numbers in standard notation to scientific notation or all those in 
scientific notation to standard notation, but was unsure if she was correct.  Early in 
the interviews she tried to place 1.5 x 1010 midway between 1.0 x 1010 and 1.0 x 1011.  
However, in reality that number is midway between 1.0 x 1010   and 2.0 x 1010.  Thus, 
even on a logarithmic scale her solution was incorrect.    
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 Suzanne initially attempted to place all events on one sheet of paper even 
though she could have used multiple sheets.  She divided up the page into intervals so 
she could do so but lost the relative, proportional scale as a result.  Although she 
stated that the value of numbers between her intervals increased by a power of ten 
(logarithmically), she struggled to interpret distances logarithmically.  Instead, she 
interpreted them linearly, at least at first.  She concluded at one point that dinosaurs 
were around for a shorter amount of time than humans because the space between 
their appearance and extinction was shorter than the space between the appearance 
of humans and the present.  After probing, she was able to reason her way to the 
correct answer by switching the numbers from scientific to standard notation 
although the conversion proved difficult.  By the conclusion of the second session she 
had moved to a more linear scale although it was still somewhat hybrid.  Perhaps the 
use of scientific notation for numbers greater than one million predisposed Suzanne 
to use a logarithmic scale.  While that cannot be ruled out, other results (Dehaene et 
al., 2008; Holyoak & Mah, 1982) suggest that a compressed logarithmic scale is not 
atypical for adults when dealing with larger numbers. 
 This compression of larger numbers and expansion of smaller ones appears to 
hold true in a variety of situations.  It does not seem to matter whether the larger 
number is on the right or the left, thus it is not merely an artefact of a left to right 
orientation.  Even the larger number can be infinitesimally small from a deep time 
context.  Adults, 5-year-olds, and 7-year-olds were asked to bisect a line that had two 
quantities on either end (deHevia & Spelke, 2009).  One version of the task used the 
Arabic numerals 2 and 9 while another used two dots and nine dots.  Order of 
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presentation and the side on which the larger quantity was presented were varied.  
Adults bisected the line toward the larger quantity irrespective of whether it was the 
Arabic numeral or dots.  Seven-year-olds did the same for dots but the pattern was 
less consistent for numerals, perhaps because the numerals held less meaning for 
them as representing specific quantities.  Five-year-olds, who were only tested with 
dots, also bisected the line closer to the larger quantity.  These results are consistent 
with those described previously.  Clearly, individuals could solve the problem in one of 
two ways.  First, they could actually calculate how many numerical units there are 
between two and nine, determine the midpoint, and bisect the line appropriately.  
Second, they could simply bisect the line spatially without any reference to the 
quantities involved.  If they were employing the latter strategy exclusively they would 
be expected to either bisect accurately or to show no real preference to bisect toward 
one number rather than the other.  Neither of those possibilities is what happened.  
The fact that participants at all three ages tested bisected the line closer to the large 
quantity lends support to the contention that people appear to compress the 
difference between larger numbers and expand the difference between smaller ones 
on a number line.  That holds true even when the numbers in question are quite small 
or when those quantities are represented by objects like dots. 
 The use of reference points or a “landmark proportionality model” (Siegler & 
Opfer, 2003)  appears to be hold true in situations not involving number lines.  Izard 
and Dehaene (2008) describe a series of experiments with French young adults.   
Participants were shown arrays of 9, 30, or 100 dots that were scattered in different 
arrangements on a computer screen.  They were then asked to estimate the number 
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of dots in each array.  All participants consistently underestimated the number of dots 
in the arrays, but the degree of underestimation varied from individual to individual.  
Further, estimates across individuals varied more for 30 dots than for 9 and more for 
100 than for 30.  In a follow-up experiment designed to determine whether providing 
individuals with a specific referent would influence their estimation judgments, 
subjects were first shown an array and told it contained 30 dots.  Sometimes the 
original array did contain 30 dots.  Other times, even though subjects were told there 
were 30 dots there were actually either 25 or 39.  Next, participants were shown dot 
arrays on a computer screen identical to what was described for the first experiment.  
Subjects consistently adjusted their estimations for all dot arrays (no matter if they 
contained 9, 30, or 100 dots) to the referent even if the referent was wrong.  Those 
who were shown an array with 25 dots but were told it contained 30, underestimated 
the number of dots in subsequent arrays.  The reverse was true for those who were 
told the referent array contained 39 dots.   
This reliance on a reference point does not only seem to occur with numbers 
or dots.  Holyoak and Mah (1982) investigated how people use reference locations to 
determine how much closer or farther one of two cities was from a reference point, 
(the Atlantic or the Pacific Ocean) than the other city.  When the reference point was 
the Pacific Ocean, university undergraduates rated the distance between two western 
cities as greater than they rated their distance from each other when the reference 
point was the Atlantic Ocean.  Further, when asked which of two cities was closer to 
the Pacific Ocean, response times for western cities were shorter than response times 
for cities in the middle or eastern part of the U.S.  When the Atlantic Ocean was the 
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reference point, the converse was true.  The differences between cities that were 
closer to the reference point were magnified while distances between those that were 
farther away were compressed.   
These results could be an artefact of the experimental design but that design 
might also explain why the phenomenon occurs.  When subjects in Holyoak and Mah’s 
study compared two cities they had to choose a number between one and nine to 
indicate how much closer one city was to the reference point than the other.  A rating 
of nine meant that one city was maximally closer to the reference point than the 
other.  Unfortunately, no specific examples of individual responses are provided to see 
how this played out in the experiment.  However, their results may indicate how 
people use reference points to create units and explain why there is this expansion 
and compression of distance in relation to the reference point.   
For ease of discussion, assume a hypothetical situation in which the Pacific and 
Atlantic Oceans are 1,000 kilometres apart (not true in North America).  Four cities 
which I will call R, S, T, and U are situated roughly on an east-west line between the 
oceans, each 200 kilometres from the next closest city.  If I am asked to determine 
how much closer R is to the Pacific Ocean than S, the Pacific is clearly my reference 
point.  I reason that when I have reached R, I must still travel twice as far to reach S 
since R is 200 kilometres from the Pacific Ocean while S is 400.  I may not even think in 
terms of actual distances, but rather in terms of time.  If it takes me a certain amount 
of time to reach R, I will need to travel twice as long to get to S.  Now reverse the 
scenario.  How much closer is S to the Atlantic Ocean than R?  S is 600 kilometres from 
the Atlantic while R is 800.  With the Atlantic Ocean as my reference point, I can now 
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imagine the distance to S or more probably the amount of time it will take to get from 
the Atlantic Ocean to S.   When I reach S, I must only travel a little farther (or longer) 
to R than the distance I have already gone, not twice as far (or long) as when the 
reference point was the Pacific Ocean.   
Earlier in this section, I hypothesised that people may view 7 and 9 as being 
farther apart than 55 and 57 for a similar reason.  In the first case seven is 7/9 of the 
distance to nine (if 0 is my reference point), while 55 is 55/57 of the distance to 57 
(again, with a reference point of 0).  Thus, from the vantage point of 0, the distance 
between seven and nine is greater than the distance between 55 and 57.  The 
examples with pure numbers and distances are analogous but not identical.  Consider 
the numerical example first.  Here, my prior experience with numbers plays a crucial 
role in my ability to conceive of those two numbers as equidistant apart.  To place all 
four numbers on a linear scale, I must essentially be able to mentally step outside of 
the scale and see the entire scale at once.  It’s reasonable that younger children who 
have had limited experience with large numbers would find that a difficult task.  
For distances, as in the Holyoak and Mah (1982) study, my experience with 
numbers, i.e., knowing that 400 is twice as large as 200, is not the only factor that 
influences how I perceive the task.  A second component of my understanding is my 
experience traversing spatial distances which I often interpret as temporal distances.  
If it takes me two hours to get to R from the Pacific Ocean, then it will take me four 
hours, or twice as long to get to S.  In relative terms, I am still a long way from S.  
Conversely, if it takes me six hours to reach S from the Atlantic Ocean, I will only have 
to travel a short time to reach R.  I am almost there.  Thus, spatial and temporal 
76 
 
understanding are related as we saw in section 2.2.  From the studies reviewed in the 
current section, it appears as if people perceive numbers in analogous ways to how 
they perceive time and space.  Again though, in order to accurately complete Holyoak 
and Mah’s task by placing the distances on a linear scale, I cannot situate myself 
anywhere on the scale.  I must step outside the scale and, in essence, view the five 
cities and the two oceans from space.  Then, I can place the distances between cities 
and oceans on a linear scale.   The third component that comes into play on this task 
will be discussed more fully in section 2.4 but is briefly mentioned here.  I must also 
know something about geography and the five cities in question.  There is an 
interaction between my specific geographical content knowledge and my knowledge 
of numbers.  Each of these facets—my knowledge of numbers and my knowledge of 
geography—provide me with referents that I can use to evaluate my placement of 
distances on the scale. 
 The reader may ask whether it even matters if people map large numbers 
using a logarithmic rather than a linear scale.    One aspect of number sense is the 
ability to distinguish amongst numbers of different magnitudes and to be able to use 
that distinction to judge the plausibility of answers to calculations.  If a child has good 
number sense for two digit numbers, it will be clear that the answer to 46 + 67 could 
not be 1,013.  Anyone who has worked with primary school children will know that 
not all children realise this answer is unreasonable!  Laski and Siegler (2007) argue 
that linear mapping of numbers is critical to this notion of number sense since it 
permits the discrimination of the size of numbers throughout a large range.  In 
contrast, logarithmic mapping means that larger numbers are not distinguished from 
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one another but are simply viewed as “all those big numbers,” (p. 1740).    In that 
compressed logarithmic scale 1 million and 1 billion are either not distinguished from 
one another or the difference between them is seen as less significant than it actually 
is.   
As students age and have more experience with larger numbers they are more 
able to deal with larger numbers on a linear scale.  One reason is because they possess 
a greater variety of larger, meaningful reference points.   The fact that many adults 
don’t have those referents for very large numbers means it is likely that a logarithmic 
representation persists into adulthood for those quantities.  
It may be the case that people never automatically use linear representations 
of numerical magnitude for all types of numbers.  Instead when operating in 
unfamiliar numerical ranges, even adults may need to override the impulse to 
use the logarithmic representation…Thus, adults, as well as elementary school 
children may rely on logarithmic representations in unfamiliar numerical 
ranges.  The frequent confusion of millions, billions, and trillions in news 
magazines and political discussions lends plausibility to this prediction. (Booth 
& Siegler, 2006, p. 200; see also Dehaene et al., 2008) 
In addition to a linear scale and meaningful reference points, students need 
facility with proportional reasoning to be able to deal with very large numbers.  
Tourniaire and Pulos (1985) reviewed some of the literature on proportional 
reasoning.  Proportional relationships are multiplicative.  Tourniaire and Pulos found 
that a common error in responses across studies was the use of an additive problem 
solving strategy rather than a multiplicative one.   Suppose the task is to write a ratio 
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that is equivalent to 5/7.  Instead of using a multiplicative strategy in which both the 
five and the seven are multiplied by two to yield 10/14, the student uses an additive 
strategy producing 7/9 (an error that is not uncommon amongst children).  The size of 
the numbers appears to affect task difficulty for proportional reasoning as does the 
familiarity with the context in which the problem sits.  Thus, one could expect 
students to have greater difficulty dealing with proportional relationships between 
numbers in the millions and billions than for smaller quantities. I have already alluded 
to the role familiarity with the context might play in my discussion of why students 
had difficulty with the Holyoak and Mah (1982) task.  This point will be developed 
more fully in section 2.4 on subject matter knowledge, so I will say nothing more 
about it here.  I now turn to a discussion of the role of a unit to an understanding of 
number. 
2.3.2 The role of a unit 
 Facility with large numbers requires the use of units that are not part of daily 
experience.  The ability to think in terms of a unit allows an individual to reinterpret a 
situation in light of that new unit (Lamon, 1994).  This happens when younger primary 
school children are able to conceive of ten as not simply a collection of ten individuals 
but as a collective unit, so that the child can reason about one ten, two tens, etc.  As 
mentioned in the last section, multiples of ten serve as reference points or landmarks 
around which other numbers sit.  Many models used in science require students to 
conceive of and then work in different units.  One group of researchers (Tretter, Jones, 
Andre, Negishi, & Minogue, 2006; Tretter, Jones, & Minogue, 2006) use an example of 
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a class of 25 students.  While one can think of a unit of a single individual in the class, 
one can just as easily work in the unit of the entire class.    
 A child must understand that a unit represents equal intervals in order to think 
in that new unit.  This equal interval concept doesn’t appear to develop for smaller 
numbers until mid or upper primary school.  Petitto (1990) provided children with five 
rulers that were marked off in the following ways: equal intervals, increasing intervals, 
decreasing intervals, alternating intervals, or irregular intervals.  Children were told 
they could choose a ruler to help them solve number line problems like those 
discussed in section 2.3.1.  Of the 81 first-third graders in the study, only 12.5% 
consistently used the equal interval ruler.  The percentage increased for third graders 
(42.9%), but that hardly represents a solid understanding of equal intervals by the 
group as a whole.  The one unfortunate thing about Petitto’s study is that she does 
not differentiate amongst children who did not consistently use the equal interval 
ruler.  The decreasing interval ruler (see Figure 2.1) corresponds most closely to the 
compressed logarithmic scale that was described in the previous section.   However, 
we do not know if children who did not use the equal interval ruler preferred the 
decreasing interval one to the other incorrect choices. 
Some interesting research into the role of a unit deals with size.  An initial 
cross-age study, (Tretter, Jones, and Minogue, 2006; Tretter et al., 2006) investigated 
conceptions of scale phenomena of fifth, seventh, and ninth graders from the same 
school district in North Carolina, a group of academically talented high school seniors 
from across the state attending a summer program, and doctoral students in science 
or science education.  The first task was a paper-and-pencil questionnaire that was 
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administered in a large group setting and was modelled after a task used by Roger 
Trend (2001b) in his research into conceptions of deep time which will be discussed 
later.   Subjects were given a list of 26 objects such as diameter of a hydrogen atom, 
length of a school bus, and diameter of the Earth and asked to indicate their size from 
less than one nanometre to more than one billion metres.  The second task was a card 
sort, individually administered, in which subjects sorted 31 cards with the name and 
picture of an object into as many size categories as they wished.  Objects ranged from 
the distance from the Milky Way to the farthest galaxy to the size of the nucleus of an 
oxygen atom.  After sorting, subjects were asked to explain their reasoning for their 
sorts and any previous experiences that helped them with the task. 
Relative size rankings were more accurate than absolute for all age groups.  
Thus, participants could compare relative sizes of objects even if they didn’t have a 
good sense of exactly how large either object was.  Not surprisingly, there was greater 
variability within the rankings of the three youngest groups than within the two older 
ones which could be explained by less familiarity with objects at either end of the 
scale.  For example, primary school students are unlikely to have had much exposure 
to microscopic objects and would be unable to reasonably judge their sizes.  In fact, 
the authors note that some of the younger children sorted objects based upon the 
size of the picture on the card rather than the size of the object the picture 
represented.   Without knowledge about the object in the picture, a child could only 
use the size of the picture itself to sort.  Prior experience was a factor for the experts, 
as well.  Those whose work is with small scale phenomena had difficulty with large 
scale distances and vice versa. 
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All groups appeared to use themselves as an important size referent and 
distorted sizes around “self.”  Objects that were closer in size to a human tended to be 
ranked as more different from a human in size than they actually are.   Objects larger 
than the self, such as an elephant, were deemed larger than they actually are and 
those that were smaller, such as a textbook, were rated smaller than they are.   The 
opposite occurred at the extremes of scale.  Here very large objects were rated as 
smaller than they are and very small objects were rated as larger than they are.  This 
distortion is similar to the mapping of numbers onto a number line (e.g., Siegler & 
Opfer, 2003).   In both cases objects or numbers that are farther from the reference 
point are judged to be closer to it and to each other than is correct.   
Generally speaking, older groups conceptualized size categories that were 
more distinct than younger groups.  All ages created three or four categories larger 
than themselves with the largest category being called “big” by all groups except ninth 
graders who had a category called “space.”  Some included continental distances in 
their largest group.   Several high school students made comments to the effect that 
while planetary distances are very different from one another in comparison to the 
size of a bedroom, for example, they are close.   This is additional evidence of the 
compressed logarithmic scale noted earlier.  The distance from New York City to Los 
Angeles is expressed in thousands of kilometres, the distance from the Earth to the 
Moon in hundreds of thousands of kilometres, and the distance from the Earth to the 
Sun in millions of kilometres, yet all were placed in the same size category by some 
students.  In contrast, finer size distinctions were made between objects closer to 
human size.  For all groups, accuracy of large group sizes declined smoothly while a 
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different phenomenon occurred at small scale.  Accuracy was high through the 
smallest visible level and then dropped precipitously after that. 
Of particular importance to the present study is the experts’ use of 
measurement units in describing how they categorized sizes.  The following comments 
were typical of this group, “You know how people create new units to avoid having to 
think of large-scale units you can’t understand,” and “I would measure in units like 
parsecs or astronomical units,” (Tretter et al., 2006, p. 302).  These units serve as 
referents that permit someone to move back and forth between size categories.  
There were several specific ways in which experts employed what the authors call a 
unitizing strategy: 
1. redefined units when it seemed more convenient to do so, e.g., changing one 
million meters to 1,000 kilometres 
2. determined the piles in the card sort based upon the units used to measure 
objects in that pile 
3. thought of an object that would represent that size and then used that as the 
reference point, e.g., one participant indicated using an atom as a reference 
point when thinking of objects measured in nanometres  
When asked about their reasoning, subjects in the three younger groups often 
mentioned trying to think of the largest or smallest thing they knew as a referent.  
Some seventh and ninth graders reported trying to calculate sizes, particularly for 
large scale phenomena.  The seniors evinced a transition to employing a unitizing 
perspective, for example, considering the diameter of the Earth and then comparing 
distances to that referent.  The authors conclude, “From these data, it may be 
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surmised that, to effectively engage at very large or small scales, it is necessary to 
mentally transport oneself to a new world at that scale,” (Tretter, Jones, and 
Montague, 2006, p. 1081).    
I would add that this is only possible if the numbers at that scale have some 
meaning for the learner.  A confounding variable for U.S. students is a lack of 
familiarity with the metric system.  Even though the metric system is taught in U.S. 
schools, it is taught alongside the U.S. customary system, with which children have 
extensive everyday experience.  The authors say they attempted to control for lack of 
familiarity with the metric system by showing 5th and 7th grade students a metre stick, 
explaining the categories to children, and demonstrating them on a metre stick before 
students answered the first four questions on the Scale Anchoring Objects (SAO) task 
which was described above.  For example, the researcher told children a decimetre is 
1/10 of a metre, and pointed that distance out to them on the metre stick.  The metre 
stick was available for the older groups of students but researchers did not go through 
the process of showing them a decimetre as they had with the younger pupils.   It is 
questionable how much benefit 5th and 7th graders were able to make from such a 
brief tutorial.  It is also likely that at least some U.S. 9th graders were unsure that a 
decimetre is 1/10 of a metre and would not know how to indicate that distance on a 
metre stick. 
My contention that a unit must represent a meaningful referent for a learner is 
corroborated by another study.  Jones, Tretter, Taylor, and Oppewal (2008) 
demonstrated how familiarity with standard mathematical units is important for 
accurately estimating size.  Fifty undergraduate and postgraduate trainee teachers 
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and 60 experienced teachers enrolled in a masters’ program in science participated in 
their study.  The authors used the same instruments described in the preceding 
paragraphs (Tretter et al., 2006a; Tretter et al., 2006b).  Consistent with other results, 
both experienced and trainee teachers were able to more accurately estimate sizes at 
the human scale and progressively less so as they dealt with objects toward the 
extremes of scale.  They demonstrated greater accuracy when using standard metric 
units, but less accuracy when using a non-standard unit (body length).  Experienced 
teachers were more accurate at the extremes of scale when using metric units than 
the trainee teachers.   There were no real differences between groups at the extremes 
of scale with non-standard units.  These results lend support to the claim that familiar 
units act as meaningful referents to place objects.   
Several of the aforementioned authors conducted a similar study with 17 
visually impaired students in the U.S. (Jones, Taylor, & Broadwell, 2009).  They found 
an interesting difference between this sample and the studies with sighted individuals 
already reported.  While the overall trends are similar, visually impaired students were 
more accurate when estimating sizes at the extremes of scale than were sighted 
students.  The authors proffer several possible explanations.  One is that since neither 
very small nor very large scales can be experienced kinaesthetically in the way sizes 
closer to the human body can, students normally learn about them through auditory 
or visual means.  Visual channels can lead to spatial distortion in the manner 
described in section 2.2.5 for the two hills in the distance that appear quite close 
together but actually are far apart.  Visually impaired students are not receiving those 
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visual cues which could distort perception.  It is an interesting suggestion that appears 
to agree with other findings discussed in this thesis and bears further investigation. 
2.3.3 Summary of the research on large numbers and the role of a unit 
Large numbers or quantities appear to be perceived and mapped onto a 
compressed logarithmic scale that exaggerates differences between objects or events 
that are close to the reference point.   Numerical mapping is similar to both spatial 
and temporal mapping. Differences between cases that are farther from the reference 
point are compressed.  With numbers, it’s often 0, but could be another benchmark, 
like a multiple of ten.  With space it’s a particular location or size referent.    With 
time, it is often the present.  In terms of number, this logarithmic mapping means 
there is less discrimination between larger numbers than smaller ones.    Greater 
experience with large numbers gives them more meaning.  The problem with really 
large numbers is that we don’t have much experience with them.  To many students 
one million and one billion are both simply very large numbers.  Many older students 
and adults could tell you that a billion is more than a million but how much more is 
elusive.    The proportional relationships between numbers allow for the use of units 
that represent fixed quantities that remain unchanged no matter what is being 
measured.  A solid understanding of units appears to be particularly important for 
making sense of sizes that are outside a human’s ability to directly experience. 
Children in middle to late childhood move toward a more linear mapping of 
numbers, at least up to 1,000.  Children at that same age develop clearer 
understandings regarding both succession and duration that enable them to take 
account of factors other than spatial distance to judge them.  None of the issues that 
86 
 
confuse children about numbers or time ceases to be a problem, even in adulthood.  
In certain circumstances, adults make both temporal and numerical errors that are 
more common to younger individuals. 
I will discuss the role played by subject matter knowledge in concept 
acquisition in the next section.  Yet, it has already crept into the discussion about large 
numbers several times.  Perhaps it is experience within a field using appropriate units 
that is crucial in making sense of the numbers involved.  Several studies discussed 
above have demonstrated that is true with size (Jones et al., 2008; Tretter et al., 
2006a; Tretter et al., 2006b).  Better knowledge of metric units and familiarity with 
specific units gives them meaning for a student.  It’s not the subject matter knowledge 
of any particular discipline, but it is knowledge of quantities and the proportional 
relationships among them.   Possessing one or more mental referents for a specific 
unit of size or time enables one to reason about that unit.  Without that, one million 
years is merely a very long time.  We now turn to the ways in which knowledge within 
a particular domain influences concept acquisition. 
2.4 Subject matter knowledge and concept acquisition 
One generalization has been repeatedly supported in the research on cognition 
and instruction conducted during the past 2 decades.  That generalization 
states that what individuals already know (i.e., prior knowledge) exerts a 
powerful influence on what they will come to know (Alexander, Kulikowich, & 
Schulze, 1994, p. 314). 
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This statement is as true today as it was fifteen years ago when it was written, 
and just as true as when David P. Ausubel made a similar statement in his 1968 book 
on educational psychology (Ausubel, 1968). Constructivism, as a theory of knowledge 
acquisition, rests upon the idea that learners are not empty vessels to be filled with 
knowledge.  Rather, they bring much to the table when confronted with new 
information: knowledge, dispositions, and skills that interact with new information 
and determine if and how the new information will be integrated into existing 
schema.  To be sure, some of what students bring to the table aids in concept 
acquisition while other aspects hinder new learning.  Students’ current conceptual 
ideas are so integral to the acquisition of new ideas that some have argued they are 
the most important factor in determining if and to what extent new information will 
be acquired (Posner, et al., 1982; Scott, Asoko, & Leach, 2007).    
Every section of this chapter points to how prior knowledge of something 
influences conceptual development.   Thus far, I have described how what people 
understand about conventional time and large numbers affects how they are able to 
solve problems or complete tasks in each of those areas. This section focuses more 
broadly on the ways in which subject matter knowledge in a particular domain 
contributes to how students make sense of new information in that field.   I will 
discuss more specifically the role each of these factors plays in a conception of deep 
time in section 2.5.     
2.4.1 A model for the role of subject matter knowledge in concept acquisition 
If we are fuzzy on just what a concept is, trying to explain the role of current 
knowledge in the acquisition of new concepts is a formidable task.  In order to explore 
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subject matter knowledge’s role in concept acquisition it is useful to first think about 
the ways in which subject matter (or domain) knowledge can exist in the mind of a 
learner.  Subject matter (domain) knowledge is multi-faceted.  There are many ways 
to think about how it is constructed.  Every learner brings knowledge from a wide 
variety of areas to a task.  While this broader knowledge plays a role in concept 
acquisition, the focus of this section is on the role played by general knowledge of a 
domain as well as more specific knowledge of topics within that domain.  That is 
because this thesis is concerned with the ways knowledge of geoscience impacts how 
students understand deep time.  Hence, there is no discussion here of the ways in 
which knowledge outside a domain influences learning.  It is a fruitful topic, but 
outside the scope of this thesis.  The domain or subject matter knowledge possessed 
by a learner may be of several types. 
Declarative knowledge refers to content information the learner possesses.  
While it encompasses specific facts, it is more than that as it also involves the full 
range of conceptual schemata a person has for a particular concept.  The richness of 
those schemata varies considerably from person to person, a point which I will 
consider shortly.  Declarative knowledge in any area can be general domain 
knowledge (Alexander et al., 1994).  Domain knowledge is comprised of one’s general 
knowledge of physics, chemistry, or the geosciences, to use science examples.  A 
person could also possess topic knowledge (Alexander, 2003).  One’s knowledge of 
kinematics in physics or glaciers in geoscience would be examples of topic knowledge.  
Topic knowledge might be even more specific such as types of glaciers or the velocity 
differences that occur at various points within a glacier.  Even experts in a field do not 
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possess detailed knowledge of all subtopics within their field.   In fact, people are 
usually experts on one narrow topic within a domain.  Nonetheless, those experts 
generally possess a rich framework of domain knowledge within which their expertise 
resides.   
It is possible to have quite extensive topic knowledge in a narrow area but 
have little domain knowledge.  This would be unlikely to describe an expert in a 
domain, but it could describe someone who is a novice in the field.  Consider the 
example of an amateur fossil hunter to illustrate how a novice might possess topic 
knowledge but more limited domain knowledge.  The collector may be familiar with 
several good fossil-yielding sites and recognise a large number of specimens by sight.  
Yet, that same individual may have little knowledge of what a particular fossil 
indicates about the depositional environment or the paleoecology of the region.  
As its name implies, procedural knowledge means knowing how to do 
something.  Like declarative knowledge, procedural knowledge exists at the domain 
and topic levels.  Domain procedural knowledge has to do with the ways of “doing” a 
particular discipline.  History is not done in the same way as physics or chemistry.   
There are different procedures for the investigation of phenomena in each of those 
disciplines.  One only becomes a member of the guild by learning the way the 
discipline is “done.”  There are also more specific or topical procedures.  The method 
for taking strike-and-dip is a geoscience example that is often learned in an 
undergraduate field geology course.   
The distinctions between what constitutes declarative and what is procedural 
knowledge are not always clear.  Principles of stratigraphic correlation are examples of 
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geoscience procedural knowledge in that they provide a set of guiding criteria that are 
used to correlate strata in the field.  On the other hand, before those ideas are used 
procedurally they are generally learned as a set of axioms that introductory 
geoscience students must recite on an exam.  Doing well on the exam does not 
guarantee the student will have an easy time using them in the field.  Block diagrams 
in geology textbooks are a long way from actual outcrops.  Nonetheless, the 
declarative knowledge becomes a stepping stone to the procedural.  On the other 
hand, as one gains procedural experience in the field, that declarative knowledge 
becomes more solidified and more meaningfully known within a richer set of 
schemata.  In that sense the declarative and procedural inform each other.   
Self-regulatory knowledge deals with how a learner understands himself and 
his knowledge of the domain in question.   It includes how the student monitors his 
own thinking and problem-solving within a domain (metacognition).  Self-regulatory 
knowledge also relates to attitudes toward a particular discipline and how a learner 
views himself as a student of that discipline.  If a student sees himself as incapable of 
mastering a particular domain (say maths or chemistry), there will be implications for 
future learning within the domain. 
Just as declarative and procedural knowledge inform one another, as the 
stratigraphic correlation example illustrates, each component of subject matter 
knowledge interacts with and influences all the others.  General domain knowledge 
provides a framework for the acquisition of specific topic knowledge.  Topic 
knowledge, like that possessed by the amateur fossil collector, could provide a 
stepping stone to more robust domain knowledge.  Self-regulatory knowledge affects 
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how a student approaches new information whether it be declarative or procedural.  
At the same time, the extent and nature of one’s declarative and procedural 
knowledge impact self-regulatory knowledge.   
Within this scheme, we must now ask what role prior subject matter 
knowledge plays when new information is encountered.  One neoclassical 
constructivist view (Chi, 2008) proposes that existing ideas are part of students’ 
mental models of how the world works.  In this view prior knowledge may serve as a 
building block for new knowledge, but it can also hinder new learning, as what may 
seem to be perceptually or intuitively correct turns out to not be so.  New scientific 
information is sometimes added to current conceptions even when the new 
information is actually unrelated to existing knowledge.   From Chi’s perspective, this 
occurs if the individual has no prior knowledge of the topic although the person may 
possess some related domain knowledge.  When a student possesses some correct 
but incomplete prior knowledge, new information serves to “fill in the gaps” and is 
added to existing schema as was true when the pupil had little or no prior knowledge.   
It is equally possible that the student’s current “knowledge” contains one or more 
alternative conceptions that have arisen from everyday experience or from formal, 
school learning.  In this scenario, the new information conflicts with what the learner 
already knows.  Therefore, learning requires conceptual change.  This is a useful 
framework within which to probe how current knowledge affects concept acquisition 
more specifically.    
Section 1.3 briefly outlined the lack of a consensus definition in the literature 
of the term concept.  The lack of a common definition is a major obstacle in any 
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attempt to synthesise literature on subject matter knowledge and its role in concept 
acquisition (K. Murphy & Alexander, 2008; White & Gunstone, 2008). If we are fuzzy 
on just what a concept is, trying to explain the role of current knowledge in the 
acquisition of new concepts is a formidable task.  Many science concepts are of the 
latter type and fit nicely within this framework.  A rich conceptual understanding of a 
domain in science contains declarative and procedural knowledge that is both broad 
and deep.  The self-regulatory knowledge an individual possesses helps her use the 
knowledge she already has and acquire more knowledge in the domain.  We would 
expect an expert in a field to have broad and deep understanding, although even an 
expert’s understanding of some topics will be deeper than others.   
2.4.2 How experts and novices use subject matter knowledge 
One line of research has contrasted how experts and novices (and sometimes 
those in-between) approach new learning in a particular domain.  There are several 
varieties of this type of research.  In some studies two groups, experts and novices, 
are studied (e.g., Chi, Hutchinson, & Robin, 1989).  Others have expanded the 
experimental design to include more groups to better reflect a view of learning as a 
continuum (e.g., K. Anderson & Leinhardt, 2002).  My focus in this section is primarily 
on the novice end of the continuum.  The reality is that very few students we 
encounter in compulsory education or those in introductory courses in U.S. 
universities are on their way to becoming experts in a given field (Alexander, 2003).  I 
will distinguish characteristics of experts from novices, but this discussion is designed 
to set the stage for how students who are not experts in a domain reason when they 
lack significant subject matter knowledge. 
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Novices are novices in a field precisely because they possess less declarative, 
procedural, and self-regulatory knowledge than experts in that field.  The domain or 
topic knowledge they do possess tends to be isolated rather than part of a rich 
schema of ideas (Petcovic & Libarkin, 2007).  One expert-novice study related to 
declarative knowledge involved 10 five-and six-year-old children who were experts or 
novices about dinosaurs (Chi et al., 1989).    Children were placed in groups based 
upon their scores on a pretest of their dinosaur knowledge.  The authors use a 
category membership definition of the term concept applied to dinosaurs similar to 
Murphy’s (2002) mentioned earlier, although that does not diminish its applicability to 
the present study in any way.  In one task, children were shown pictures of unfamiliar 
dinosaurs (those that do not generally appear in children’s books about dinosaurs) 
and asked questions about where they might live, what they would eat, how they 
would defend themselves, and what other dinosaurs they might be related to.   When 
making inferences about unfamiliar dinosaurs, novices based their inferences on 
general knowledge of animals (“like a rhinoceros,” p. 45).  Those inferences tended to 
focus on surface features (i.e., a dinosaur was like a rhinoceros because they both 
have a horn).  In contrast, experts based their inferences upon knowledge of families 
of dinosaurs as well as individuals.  They were much more likely to say something like, 
“It’s a meat-eater because it has sharp teeth,” (p. 50).  They were aware of which 
specific features were important for category membership.  Their relatively richer 
conceptual schemata provided them with a frame of reference that permitted them to 
attend to the features that were truly important to the task at hand.  Novices, who 
only possessed a frame of reference related to animals in general, had no real way to 
judge which features were critical to answer the question.   
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Novices also have less procedural knowledge.   Anderson and Leinhardt (2002) 
explored the ways in which individuals on the expert-novice continuum approached 
problem-solving geography tasks involving maps.  There were 30 participants in their 
study: seven expert geographers, seven described as novice geographers (enrolled in 
their first cartography course), seven referred to as advanced novice geographers 
(geography majors, who had completed at least two cartography classes), and nine 
preservice (trainee) secondary social studies teachers who were midway through a 
master’s program.  The latter were preparing to teach social studies to students in 
grades 7-12 (ages 12-18). 
All participants were individually interviewed using a map.  They were asked to 
draw a line to indicate the shortest distance between two cities: New York and 
Moscow, New York and Cape Town, Santiago and Singapore, Anchorage and New 
York, and Anchorage and Santiago.  A world map was used for the first three questions 
and a map of the Americas was used for the last two.  In order to complete this task 
correctly, a person needed to know that sizes and distances are distorted at the poles 
on a Mercator projection map.  This is the type of map that is most commonly found 
in textbooks or in classrooms as a wall map.  Due to this distortion at the poles, the 
shortest distance between any of the two cities would not be a straight line but a 
curved one.  Furthermore, the depth of the curve is determined by the distance of the 
cities from the poles.   
Several findings are interesting.  Even the experts did not draw all lines 
correctly.  There are several possible explanations for this.  First, this could be due to 
the way answers were scored.  To be scored as correct, the line drawn by the 
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participant had to be within one inch on either side of the correct line for the distance 
between the two cities.  While inter-rater reliability for scoring was high (95%), that is 
expected since the criterion is stringent and fairly straightforward.  The high inter-
rater reliability could give the appearance that the scoring criterion was a valid 
measure of a person’s competence at the task.  Yet, the size of the map or the scale 
could have played a role in a person’s accuracy.  Both of the maps used can be 
described as small-scale maps in which map distances equate to large differences on 
the ground.  What is not clear from the authors’ description is the size of the map.  A 
wall-size world map has a greater margin of error than a textbook-size one would.  If a 
person was off by one inch on the wall-size map this would represent a smaller 
distance on the ground than that one inch error would represent on a textbook-size 
map showing the same geographic area.  Another possibility is that this is similar to 
what Chi (2006) describes as experts’ failure to attend to details or display 
overconfidence.  It does not represent any error in understanding but may reflect the 
idea that this line is “about right.”  If those same experts had been asked to draw a 
line that would indicate a flight route for an airplane they may have drawn the line 
more carefully.  This is speculative, of course, but it is a plausible inference. 
Second, as would be expected, participants with greater domain knowledge 
drew more accurate lines than those with less knowledge.  Individuals preparing to 
teach secondary social studies scored the worst.   This is unfortunate since these 
individuals will be teaching basic map skills to students one day.  However, there is 
nothing in the study to indicate that these students had ever taken a cartography 
course or been exposed to the type of task they were asked to complete.  In that 
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sense, this group was more “novice” than those who were designated as novices by 
Anderson and Leinhardt.  Many of the future teachers did not appear to realise that a 
two-dimensional map distorts distances from a globe as they made reference to the 
notion that “the shortest distance between two points is a straight line” (p. 308).  
However, some of those preservice (trainee) teachers made comments indicating they 
realised there would be distortion from the globe to the map but they did not know 
how to draw a line to reflect that fact.   
Third, novices employed a variety of general reasoning strategies to determine 
the solution to the problem.  In the same way that children who knew little about 
dinosaurs (Chi et al., 1989) used general knowledge of animals to answer questions 
about novel dinosaurs, participants in this map study employed general problem-
solving strategies when they lacked domain-specific ones.  Sometimes these reasoning 
strategies were quite robust.  One novice used a visualisation strategy in which he 
imagined what he terms a “half-way map” on which lines of longitude converged as 
they do on a globe (p. 304).   This strategy helped him solve three of the five tasks 
successfully.  He did, however, possess some domain knowledge since he knew that 
lines of longitude are not parallel, and he knew that piece of information was 
important for solving the problem.  The authors do not discuss which of the tasks this 
student solved successfully and which ones he did not.  That information would be 
helpful in shedding further light on the extent to which he was able to apply his 
domain knowledge.   
All groups in this study applied pre-existing knowledge to the task.  Those with 
greater domain and topic knowledge were better able to determine what knowledge 
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was important.  When they lacked relevant domain or topic knowledge, people 
resorted to more general knowledge and reasoning strategies.  Sometimes that led 
them astray as in, “The shortest distance between two points is a straight line.”  At 
other times, their strategies were powerful enough to enable them to achieve a 
measure of success on the task. 
Alexander and Judy (1988) conducted a literature review of studies dealing 
with the relationship between domain knowledge (either declarative or procedural) 
and strategic (self-regulatory) knowledge.  They use the term strategic knowledge to 
denote an idea that is similar to what I have referred to as self-regulatory knowledge.  
They define strategic knowledge as a type of procedural knowledge, which makes 
their sense of the term somewhat different from how I have used self-regulatory 
knowledge.  However, the authors refer to strategies as “goal-directed” and aids for 
“regulation, execution, or evaluation” of a task (p. 376).  Thus, although their meaning 
for the term strategic knowledge is not identical to the way in which I have defined 
self-regulatory knowledge, there is enough similarity in the terms to apply Alexander 
and Judy’s comments about strategies to this section on self-regulation.  I will use the 
term self-regulatory knowledge in the interest of consistency, with full recognition 
that the term itself does not appear in their paper but the idea does. 
They report a number of findings from their literature review.  As was seen for 
declarative and procedural knowledge, there is interaction between self-regulatory 
knowledge and the other types.  General self-regulatory knowledge that transcends 
domains, as well as that which is specific to a particular domain, helps students both 
use the declarative and procedural knowledge they currently possess and acquire 
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more knowledge.  In turn, self-regulatory knowledge changes as students learn more 
about a domain.  Students who do not possess a lot of domain knowledge, but do 
have well-developed general self-regulatory knowledge apply that general logical 
reasoning to novel tasks and are often successful.  Further, novices who successfully 
solve problems in a domain seem able to see the underlying similarities between two 
problems that appear at the surface to be quite different from one another.  I will 
return to these last two points shortly. 
Novices or experts in a domain and those in-between are regularly 
encountering new information in that area.  Their present subject matter knowledge 
also influences how they evaluate this new information.  Chinn and Brewer (1993) 
state that if students are presented with anomalous data that contradicts their 
existing ideas, students with little background knowledge are more easily convinced 
by the anomalous data than those with more knowledge.  If the new information is 
correct and the present knowledge it conflicts with is minimal, having less rather than 
more background knowledge is advantageous.  On the other hand, students with less 
subject matter knowledge possess little basis on which to critically evaluate data.  
They may not even recognise that this new data conflicts with what they already 
know.  They may judge that information is credible when it is not.  
This rather extended discussion of expert-novice literature relates to the 
discussion in section 2.4.1 but also transcends it.  Thus far, I have considered how 
knowledge within a specific subject area such as the geosciences or chemistry 
influences learning.  However, students do not only bring knowledge of the subject 
matter in question to the learning task.  They also bring broader knowledge of other 
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domains and still more general knowledge and ideas about how the world works that 
cross domains.   This is probably most obvious for self-regulatory knowledge which 
involves strategies for approaching novel tasks as well as a student’s general 
metacognitive abilities.  It includes dispositions and attitudes toward learning in 
general and how someone views herself as a learner.  As was discussed earlier, 
novices who have well-developed self-regulatory knowledge are sometimes able to 
compensate for their lack of knowledge by their general problem-solving skills.   
Similarly, declarative and procedural knowledge exist outside a particular 
domain.  If a learner has little knowledge in one area she will only be able to relate 
new information or experiences to knowledge she has in some other domain.  The 
dinosaur study described earlier (Chi et al., 1989) demonstrates this point.  Children 
who knew little about dinosaurs drew analogies between an unfamiliar dinosaur and 
an animal with which they were familiar (rhinoceros).  To use another example, 
suppose I know little about dogs or procedures about how to care for dogs, but I do 
have experience with horses.  If I am given a dog, I will have minimal “dog knowledge” 
on which to relate to my new pet.  I may not know what dogs eat, how to groom 
them, what kind of medical care they need, or that they need to be walked regularly.  I 
will have some “horse knowledge” that I will draw upon to help me with my new dog.  
There are some similarities between dogs and horses since both are mammals.  Yet, 
my dog is likely to be quite unhappy if I feed him hay and oats for dinner.  What if I 
have no “horse knowledge” but instead I have “goldfish knowledge?”  Now my dog is 
in a much more difficult position as there are fewer commonalities between dogs and 
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goldfish than there are between dogs and horses.  My “goldfish knowledge” does not 
help me very much with taking care of my dog.    
The point here is that background knowledge provides some sort of framework 
or referent by which new information is judged and categorised.  From a constructivist 
perspective there is a relational quality to knowledge.  Without a sense of how pieces 
of information fit together, knowledge is isolated and inert.  Second, if a learner 
possesses minimal or no background knowledge in an area, problem-solving relies on 
the knowledge he does possess so that there is a greater reliance on common surface 
features rather than deep structure.   
The ability to create meaningful referents may be a key factor that separates 
novices from experts in a field.   Jones and Taylor (2009) describe interviews with 50 
professionals from a wide variety of fields from scientists (of many types) to engineers 
to artists to a chef.  All deal with scale (size and/or distance) regularly as part of their 
profession.  This study relates to those described in section 2.3.2 about the role of a 
unit, but it nicely illustrates an important characteristic of experts in a domain.  Thus, 
it is discussed here rather than in the earlier section.   Participants were asked to 
reflect back upon in-school and out-of-school experiences they felt were beneficial in 
developing their understanding of scale.  Repeatedly, these individuals described the 
use of anchor points [I have been using the term referents] against which to judge the 
size of other objects or distances between objects.  As was mentioned in section 2.3.2, 
there is a relationship between numerical units and specific subject referents that 
epitomise those units.  The subject knowledge informs the numerical knowledge and 
vice versa. 
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2.4.3 Summary of research on subject matter knowledge 
The subject matter knowledge a learner brings to a task is multi-faceted.  It is 
composed of declarative—content knowledge, procedural—“how-to” knowledge, and 
self-regulatory—reflective knowledge.  All affect whether and how new concepts are 
learned.  Declarative and procedural knowledge can exist at the more general domain 
level and also at the more specific topic level.  Self-regulatory knowledge occurs at the 
domain level. 
The amount of knowledge a person possesses plays a role in what happens 
when new information is encountered.  Because novices in a domain lack coherent, 
structured knowledge within that area, they must rely on knowledge in other areas.  
The fact that they don’t know much about the important ideas in a particular domain 
means that they often rely on surface features to determine what “related” 
knowledge to use.  Sometimes those decisions mean that new information is 
connected to existing ideas to which they have little to no conceptual relationship.  On 
the other hand, people who successfully solve problems in a domain in which they are 
novices often have good self-regulatory knowledge that cuts across domains and 
makes up for what they lack in domain or topic knowledge. 
2.5 A framework for the review of deep time conceptions research 
 Before reviewing the research on students’ conceptions regarding deep time, it 
is essential to ask how the literature reviewed in previous sections might be germane 
to the topic.  This provides a framework for the review that will follow.   
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2.5.1 Conventional time concepts and a concept of deep time 
 How are succession and duration understood as part of a conception of deep 
time?   This is a major part of the empirical investigation of this thesis.  Are these two 
ideas as important to an understanding of deep time as they are to conventional 
time?  Are they understood in a deep time context in ways that are different from 
how they are understood in the context of conventional time?  I will first discuss 
succession as an issue in a conception of deep time and then duration. 
2.5.1.1 Succession in deep time 
Succession involves the before and after relationship and is essential for an 
understanding of deep time.  One is asked to look at an outcrop and infer the 
process(es) that resulted in what one now sees.  Principles of stratigraphy such as 
cross-cutting relationships (igneous intrusion or fault is younger than strata it cuts 
across), original horizontality (sediments are deposited in basically horizontal layers), 
and superposition (in an undisturbed sequence of strata the oldest layer is at the 
bottom) are employed to determine the succession of events that led to a particular 
formation and require one to work backwards to sequence those events.  Ault (1982) 
and  Dodick and Orion (2003a, 2003b) allege that Piagetian type research into 
succession in conventional time differs from deep time in its reliance on physics 
motion problems while geology requires one to interpret static sequences.  It is 
certainly true that Piaget saw a close connection between motion and spatial distance 
and time.  Much of his methodology that was described in section 2.2.1 employed 
phenomena from physics, to be sure. Nonetheless, his conclusions about the 
underlying notions of what constitutes a concept of time are very germane to geologic 
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time since those static rock sequences required motion of some type to become what 
they now are.  Several of his tasks cannot be criticized on the basis of the observance 
of physical motion (see section 2.2.1). 
Furthermore, children do not merely use motion and spatial distance to 
determine duration, but also use starting and ending times (Levin, 1982; Levin, Iraeli, 
& Darom, 1978).  The problem is that in the case of geologic strata neither 
starting/ending times nor the visual perception of motion are available to help 
someone determine the sequence of the strata.   In some instances this is not at all a 
straightforward process and there is considerable disagreement amongst experts 
regarding the course of events that produced a particular formation.  This does not 
imply that a concept of deep time is somehow qualitatively different from 
conventional time and succession in deep time works differently from succession in 
conventional time.  It merely indicates that an understanding of succession alone is 
insufficient for the task.  The fact that perceptual information available in the 
conventional time tasks is not available when judging succession in deep time does 
not in and of itself make the two fundamentally different.  If it can be shown that 
judging succession is equally difficult in the absence of similar perceptual information 
for conventional time tasks, this would suggest that something other than a 
qualitative difference between conventional and deep time is at work.   
Another complicating factor is the need to conceive of the succession of events 
on an immense time scale.  In relative terms, this involves placing the extinction of the 
dinosaurs prior to the appearance of humans on that scale.  An understanding of 
absolute succession requires the knowledge that the amount of time from the 
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extinction of the dinosaurs to the appearance of humans is considerably less than the 
amount of time from the formation of the Earth to the appearance of the dinosaurs.   
2.5.1.2 Duration in deep time 
A concept of duration as it relates to deep time is bound tightly to a notion of 
the rates of geologic processes.  The concept of duration as inversely proportional to 
velocity is applicable in the same way it is critical to a notion of conventional time.  A 
student must be able to dissociate size from rate and realize that size alone cannot be 
equated with duration.  Two layers of sedimentary strata may be the same thickness 
but have been deposited at very different rates, and, hence, represent different 
durations.  Similarly, a layer of shale may underlie a layer of thicker volcanic ash.  In 
this case, the thicker ash layer would have been deposited in a shorter time than the 
thinner layer of shale.   Many of the studies discussed in section 2.2.3 employed tasks 
that were highly analogous to what is required to interpret a stratigraphic sequence.  
For example, an object was placed some distance from a starting point and the 
participant had to infer the amount of time necessary for the object to traverse the 
distance (Acredolo et al., 1984; Berndt & Wood, 1974; Matsuda, 2001; Wilkening, 
1981).  The key difference between these tasks and the geologic ones is that 
participants in the conventional time studies were likely to know something about the 
rate at which a turtle and a cat move.   They may not be so likely to know much about 
the rates of deposition for sedimentary strata.  That hypothesis is supported by the 
fact that in one study (Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008) university undergraduates did 
have difficulty inferring durations (see section 2.2.3).  Adults in the other studies in 
which they were part of the sample had virtually no problems with the task.  This 
105 
 
could be explained by the fact that the one task was less familiar to them than the 
others. 
In thinking about rates of geologic processes one must not only think about 
very long periods or units of time, but one must also conceive of processes that 
happen at very slow rates and produce significant aggregate effects.  The growth rate 
of the Himalayan Mountains is an example.  Currently the Himalayas are growing at a 
rate of about 1 cm per year.  At this rate, they will be ten kilometres taller than they 
are now in one million years.  If a child were to visit the Himalayan Mountains today 
and then return in 60 years, no size difference would be perceived.  Perception itself 
will not help a person comprehend a growth rate of 1 cm/year since within a human 
lifetime there will be no observable difference to that person viewing them at a 60-
year interval.    
An understanding of duration also requires a clock in which units of time 
progress independent of the events they measure.  The thickness of a layer of rock 
does not necessarily indicate the length of deposition.  When measuring time by a 
clock, size and speed are immaterial.  The only thing that matters is the passage of 
those independent units of time.   
2.5.1.3 Summary of succession and duration in deep time 
In my view, deep time is quantitatively different from conventional time, but it 
is not qualitatively different.   It requires the same basic concepts; however, they must 
be applied to a context that is outside human ability to directly experience.  Those two 
concepts are succession (one event precedes another in time) and duration (the 
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amount of time required for an event to occur is inversely proportional to the rate at 
which it occurs).  The literature on how consistently adults apply ideas of duration and 
succession to conventional time is a bit murky.   The reasons for the inconsistencies 
are even more puzzling.  If a student does not comprehend conventional time he or 
she is unlikely to understand deep time.  To argue that the two are qualitatively 
different requires that there be a different mechanism to account for them.  If what 
separates them is the fact that one occurs within a human lifetime and one does not, 
then we must ask what about a concept of 1,000 years or even 500 years?  Both of 
these also occur outside a human lifetime and yet are not viewed as qualitatively 
different from time periods that are within a human lifetime.  If the difference is 
qualitative at what point does it become so? Is it at the onset of recorded history, or 
perhaps the appearance of Homo sapiens?  The difference is one of degree.  This leads 
us to ask how conceptions of large numbers and geoscience content knowledge may 
influence an understanding of deep time.  
2.5.2 Large numbers and a concept of deep time 
It may seem obvious at this point that a poor conception of large numbers will 
impact a student’s understanding of deep time.  We have seen that numbers appear 
to be mapped spatially in a manner that exaggerates differences closer to the 
reference point and minimizes those farther away.   If students are unable to 
discriminate between two large numbers, lack a meaningful referent against which to 
judge their size, and have little concept of large units of time, deep time is likely to be 
a great mystery.  For example, if I have neither a referent nor a conception of a one 
million year unit, it will simply be a very large number that may not appear much 
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different from a one thousand year unit.   A good conception of proportional 
relationships amongst numbers in the base-ten system contributes to an 
understanding of the difference between a one thousand and a one million year unit. 
Consider how differences across orders of magnitude change the scale.  One thousand 
seconds ago was 17 minutes ago; one million seconds ago was 12 days ago; and one 
billion seconds ago was 12,000 days or 33 years ago.   
This issue is further complicated for time because the entire scale is not built 
upon a base of ten.  Arabic numbers and linear sizes are.  In order to move from one 
to another from very small to very large requires one to multiply and divide by powers 
of ten.  When dealing with time across the entire scale, one encounters base ten at 
the extremes (fractions of a second, 100 years), but units of time encountered on a 
daily or yearly basis are not in base ten at all.   Thus, the proportional relationships are 
even more complicated for time than they are for linear distances. 
2.5.3 Geoscience content knowledge and a concept of deep time 
The amount and nature of geoscience content knowledge a student brings to 
the learning task also influences how deep time is understood.  A certain amount of 
declarative knowledge is required to make sense of geoscience processes.  In order to 
have a sense of the amount of time necessary for collisional mountain ranges to form, 
it is useful to know something about plate tectonics and the average rate at which 
plates move.  If someone thinks the Appalachian Mountains were formed in a period 
of hundreds of years, it could be because the person is unaware that tectonic plates 
move at the rate of centimetres per year or the individual is unable to use the 
information to infer anything about the time required for a collisional mountain range 
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to form.    In this case declarative geoscience knowledge interacts with an 
understanding of units of time.  Even if the student knows something about the rate 
of tectonic plate movement, centimetres/year may have no meaning as a unit.   
Domain and topic knowledge in the geosciences impacts how people 
understand deep time in other ways.  Suppose a student is asked to place the 
Appalachian and the Himalayan Mountains on a relative time scale to indicate which is 
older.   Some topic knowledge about the two mountain ranges could be useful.  More 
general domain knowledge of how weathering and erosion change mountains over 
time would also help a student complete the task.  If the individual lacks relevant topic 
or domain knowledge, the person must rely solely on more general knowledge.  This 
could lead a student to apply faulty reasoning to the task.  While not universally true, 
there are many instances in the natural world where size and age are positively 
correlated.  The biological world is a good example as adults of a species are generally 
larger than juveniles.  If a student lacks knowledge of how surface processes change 
mountain ranges, that student may incorrectly conclude that the Himalayas are older 
than the Appalachians simply because they are larger.  A lack of geoscience content 
knowledge means a student focuses on a surface feature (size) which leads to an 
erroneous conclusion. 
I mentioned principles of stratigraphic correlation in section 2.5.1.1.  There I 
made the connection between those principles and the way succession is judged in 
conventional time.  They are also related to a student’s declarative and procedural 
subject matter knowledge in the geosciences.  If a student does not use fossil 
succession to sequence a series of strata containing fossils, it does not necessarily 
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mean the learner has a poor understanding of temporal succession in deep time.  
Rather, the student may simply be unaware of fossil succession and not know how to 
use index fossils to correlate strata in two outcrops.    
2.6 Literature on conceptions of deep time 
A review of the literature suggests that students of all ages as well as many in-
service teachers hold similar alternative conceptions regarding deep time (Orion & 
Ault, 2007).  It is well established that at least some understanding of deep time is 
essential to conceptual understanding of various geoscience processes (Hume, 1979; 
Zen, 2001). 
There are three basic lines of research.  The first focuses specifically on the 
ability of subjects to place geoscience events in correct temporal order and to indicate 
specific dates for the events.  The second finds questions about deep time located 
within more general geoscience conceptions research.  The third explores how 
students understand processes that occur in deep time.   It will come as no surprise 
that the first two are concerned with succession rather than duration.  However, the 
third type is also primarily concerned with succession.  In fact, there has been minimal 
attention to conceptions of duration in deep time.  
Rather than organise this section by those three types, I have chosen to group 
them by whether they deal with succession or duration.  Research results from all 
three types of studies that relate to succession will be discussed first, followed by 
those dealing with duration.  The ways in which results can be understood in the light 
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of conventional time concepts, large numbers, and geoscience knowledge will be 
described. 
2.6.1 Research on succession in deep time   
One of the earliest researchers to look specifically at how students understand 
the temporal order of geologic processes was Charles Ault (1980; 1982).   One part of 
his investigation involved a task in which 2nd, 4th, and 6th grade children were shown 
three plastic tubes containing “core samples” from various locations in a hypothetical 
compost pile in which each successive layer spread out completely over the previous 
layer (consistent with Nicholas Steno’s principle of lateral continuity).  The children’s 
task was to determine the sequence of layers in the compost pile and explain their 
reasoning.  Subsequently, the children were shown three diagrams of rock exposures 
from the local area, locations which Ault says were familiar to most of the children in 
the study.  The children were then asked where the oldest rocks could be found in 
each of the outcrops.  Even those who were able to satisfactorily sequence the layers 
in the compost pile were less successful determining relative age of the layers in the 
geologic formations.  Children who correctly deduced that the oldest layer was at the 
bottom often did so for the wrong reason.  In his 1982 paper, Ault posits that the 
primary school children in his study were unable to apply temporal reasoning to 
geological settings because the geological phenomena themselves were unfamiliar to 
the students.  This inference is exactly what would be predicted in light of what was 
discussed in section 2.4.  Ault reports the reasons children cited for why the oldest 
rocks in the formation would be found in a particular location.  The children’s 
rationales indicate they were relying on surface features in the absence of specific 
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geoscience content knowledge.  Some used colour, while others thought 
“crumbliness” was the most salient feature to determine age.   Although there is 
nothing in Ault’s writing to indicate this, it is quite possible that children have noted 
the difference in concrete sidewalks or walls that are newer versus older.  Older ones 
are often characterised by broken or “crumbly” pieces of varying sizes.   While this is 
clearly speculative as there is no evidence to support my claim, it would not be 
surprising if children applied similar reasoning to the rock sequences in the field.  
Further, some children in his study said the oldest rocks were found in the centre.  
This accretionary view also fits with certain everyday experiences such as making a 
paper maché mask.  The innermost layer of paper and paste was applied first and is, 
therefore, the oldest layer of the mask.  Ault concludes,  
Children, and by extension, adults, who are ignorant of geological concepts 
cannot grasp the meaning of geological time, not necessarily because the 
number of years involved is large, but because their time conceptualization has 
no referent in the rock record, (1982, p. 309).   
Ault further argues that his geologic task is fundamentally different from 
Piaget’s with its reliance on static sequences versus Piaget’s use of motion.  However, 
Nersessian (2008) points to research that shows people can perform mental spatial 
transformations such as rotation and reflection on both two-and three-dimensional 
figures.  In other words, they can take a static image and move it mentally.  Thus the 
static versus motion distinction may not be so important.  This would seem to 
contradict Ault’s assertion that methodological differences between his research and 
Piaget’s are at least partially responsible for why the children in his study were unable 
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to determine where the oldest rock layers would be found.  More likely, the children 
simply didn’t know there was any reason to imagine the strata being deposited one on 
top of the other according to the principle of superposition.  They made no connection 
between the outcrops and the compost pile activity because they had no reason to 
think the two were connected.  Ault’s contention that the children’s lack of geoscience 
content knowledge played a role in the children’s responses is a better explanation.   
A second aspect of an understanding of succession in deep time is how 
individuals perceive temporal order at that scale.  Roger Trend (1998, 2000, 2001a, 
2001b) provides an interesting line of research in this arena.  Trend used similar 
methodologies which he varied slightly in his work to determine deep time 
conceptions held by 10-and 11-year-olds, primary teacher trainees, and primary 
teachers in the U.K.  An additional study with 17-year-olds was a bit different from the 
others and is discussed separately.  He used several different tasks, but only the ones 
that are germane to this thesis will be discussed here.  His first study was conducted 
with 177 10-and 11-year-old children.  Each child individually sorted three sets of 
cards containing either eight or ten events from geologic history.  There was some 
overlap of items on the three sets of cards so they could be used to establish 
reliability.  Children were only required to place events in relative order.  However, 
the pilot study on which this investigation was based did yield information about 
children’s ideas about an absolute age for the Earth. 
In the studies involving primary teacher trainees (2000), conceptions of deep 
time were assessed in several different ways.  Eighty-five primary trainee teachers 
completed a questionnaire containing 20 geo-events from the Big Bang to the first 
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appearance of humans on Earth.  Participants were provided with nine temporal 
categories and asked to indicate which time period corresponded to when each event 
occurred.  Time periods ranged from “less than one thousand years ago” to “more 
than a million million years ago.”  An additional 60 primary trainee teachers 
completed one of two card sort tasks in which some respondents were given a set of 
21 cards containing the same 20 geo-events as those in the questionnaire and a final 
card labelled “present day.”   In the first task, participants merely sequenced cards in 
temporal order.  In the second task, respondents were given an identical set of cards 
(different colour) but they were also provided a sheet showing the geologic time scale 
divided into 40 divisions with “present day” as the most recent.  The final two 
divisions were named “one million million years ago” and “older than this: please 
state,” (p. 545).  In a follow-up study, in-service primary teachers (2001b) completed 
the same questionnaire the 85 primary teacher trainees did. 
Primary teacher trainees performed more accurately when placing events in 
relative order as opposed to assigning absolute ages to them.  The trainee teachers 
sorted events into three broad categories: extremely ancient, less ancient, and 
geologically recent (Trend, 2000, p. 552) in contrast to the 10-and 11-year old children 
in his first study who only sorted into two categories: extremely ancient and less 
ancient (1998).   Thus, the trainee teachers appeared to have a more well-defined 
concept of long time periods than the children did. 
 Eighty-two percent of the primary teachers placed the formation of the Sun 
prior to the Big Bang based upon their absolute time rankings.  Amongst trainee 
teachers, even though rank order of events for the groups with and without the 
114 
 
geologic time scale were similar, those receiving the geologic time scale tended to use 
the entire scale and assigned dates greater than 50,000 million years ago to events 
from the Big Bang through when the first rocks were made on Earth.  These answers 
are well outside the bounds of current scientific understanding which places the Big 
Bang at around 13.7 billion years ago.  In the later study some in-service primary 
teachers placed even more events prior to the onset of space-time (Trend, 2001b) 
while others placed those early events as less than 1,000 years ago.  Although the 
main study with 10-and 11-year-olds only dealt with relative time, the six children in 
the pilot study who answered the question, “How old is the Earth?” gave answers that 
ranged from the thousands to one trillion years old. 
What could explain the use of dates that are off by many orders of magnitude?  
Trend says, “The huge numbers involved appear to cause confusion,” (Trend, 2001b, 
p. 212).  This makes perfect sense in light of the research reviewed in section 2.3.1.  If 
an individual does not possess a good conception of the distinctions between 
thousands and millions or millions and billions, it will be difficult to deal with the 
numbers necessary to understand deep time.  In his first paper on the topic, Trend 
notes a similar issue regarding the role an understanding of large numbers could have 
on conceptions of deep time for younger students.   
Not surprisingly for 10- and 11-year-old children, their conception of large 
numbers becomes a dominant influence on their answers.  They indicate little 
more than wild guesses, designed to convey the idea of an immense period of 
time, (Trend, 1998, p. 980) 
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Trend’s study with 17-year-olds (2001a) employed a different methodology 
than the other three studies.  First, students were asked to list as many events from 
Earth’s history as possible.  They were instructed to try to include a variety of events 
representing life, climate, surface features, landforms, and Earth materials.  An 
additional group of students was given a set of 24 cards, 18 of which contained the 
name of a geo-event and six of which contained a date.  Students were asked to 
construct a concept map with the cards and write statements that linked the cards to 
each other.  Thirty-six students who completed the first task provided unsolicited 
information about temporal or causal links between events.  Nine of those attributed 
Earth’s formation to the Big Bang.  Concept maps also indicated a rather poor 
understanding of the temporal or causal relationships between events.  Specific 
events were linked with dates that were off by many orders of magnitude.  Further, 
students appeared to meld a few key events in their minds and link them in a causal 
fashion.  For example, 24 participants linked the Ice Age with dinosaurs, most often as 
the cause of their extinction.   
Trend posits that learners bring a mental representation of a set of key geo-
events that serve as a framework for how they understand relative and absolute 
succession in deep time.    This deep time framework (DTF) acts as an Ausubelian 
advance organizer for new learning in geoscience.  Trend says,  
A “deep time framework” (DTF) is proposed as the learner’s personal 
chronology of key geo-events, including their relative and absolute dates, which 
they bring to bear when encountering new geo-events or geoscience 
phenomena.  It is used by learners to assimilate new learning and the quality 
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and security of that new learning is influenced by each learner’s existing 
cognitive framework (Trend, 2001b, p. 192). 
These key geo-events are those which serve as benchmarks around which to place 
other geo-events.  He distinguishes between an individual’s own DTF and a curricular 
DTF which would consist of decisive geo-events that would increase future learning 
and lists possible items for inclusion in a curricular DTF.  
An important component of a deep time conceptual framework is the idea of 
the succession of events on an immense time scale.  In relative terms, this involves 
placing the extinction of the dinosaurs prior to the appearance of humans on that 
scale.  An understanding of absolute succession requires the knowledge that the 
amount of time from the extinction of the dinosaurs to the appearance of humans is 
considerably less than the amount of time from the formation of the Earth to the 
appearance of the dinosaurs.  The notion of a framework implies that people possess 
an overarching model for deep time that is at least somewhat coherent.   
Several themes appear in his writing that relate to research described in earlier 
sections of this chapter.  The first is the role that an understanding of large numbers 
plays in people’s ability to estimate ages in deep time.   Compression of the timing of 
events is common.  Confusion between the timing of the Big Bang and the formation 
of the Sun or the formation of the Earth has already been mentioned.  It might be 
argued that the introduction of a time scale that included dates prior to the Big Bang 
in several of the studies predisposed participants to the notion that those dates must 
be appropriate for some of the geo-events; however other research suggests that 
similar student responses are obtained in the absence of such a scale.  In one study 
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(Libarkin et al., 2007) where no such time scale was provided, university students’ 
responses to, “How old is the Earth?” ranged from thousands of years to trillions.   In 
another study (Janssen et al., 2006), the range was thousands to hundred billions.  In 
Marques and Thompson (1997) the range was hundreds of years to trillions.   
A second theme is Trend’s contention that within a deep time framework 
certain key geo-events serve as benchmarks around which to place other events.  This 
is reminiscent of literature on large numbers that was described in section 2.3.1 which 
showed that when placing numbers on a number line, children rely on reference 
points and then place numbers in relation to those referents.   
Trend (1998, 2000, 2001b) is well aware of the role geoscience content 
knowledge plays in responses.  In his initial study with 10-and-11-year-olds, he reports 
high standard deviations for the relative placement of the Big Bang and the Ice Age in 
the card sort.  He explains this deviation for the Big Bang by suggesting that some 
children have never heard of the event and, hence, place it randomly (Trend, 1998, p. 
985).  In a later study (2000), primary teacher trainees also exhibited considerable 
disagreement about the placement of the Ice Age.  Once again, Trend posits that this 
event holds no temporal or evolutionary meaning for respondents.  Therefore, its 
placement in a sequence is speculative.  
In his 2001 study with primary teachers, Trend describes his rationale for 
including the item, “trilobites became extinct.”  He expected a high standard deviation 
on this item since it was likely to be less well known than other items in the 
questionnaire, and, indeed, that was the case.  Interestingly, its relative position was 
fairly close to where it should have been.  Trend suggests that respondents may have 
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been using cues from other events to figure out where to place this unknown event, a 
highly plausible inference.  The placement of the earliest geo-events in this study had 
the lowest standard deviations, although there was some confusion as to whether the 
Big Bang preceded or followed the formation of the Sun.   In contrast, the later geo-
events had the highest standard deviations.  This could be explained by the notion 
that in the absence of the age of certain events such as the formation of planet Earth, 
it is possible to reason that it must have occurred early in the sequence since many of 
the other events require an existent Earth for them to take place.  However, it is not 
so easy to reason where “Atlantic Ocean started to open,” or “Woolly mammoths 
became extinct,” belong in the sequence without some knowledge of Earth’s history.   
Another study employed a technique very similar to one of the tasks in the 
interview protocol for this thesis.  Libarkin, Kurdziel, and Anderson (2007) had 63 
university students from four U.S. universities place four events on a timeline that 
began with “Earth forms” and ended with “Today”: appearance of first life on Earth, 
appearance of dinosaurs, disappearance of dinosaurs, and appearance of humans.  All 
students were enrolled in an introductory biology or geology course at the time data 
was collected. (As a reminder to the reader, introductory science courses in the U.S. 
include students from a variety of majors not simply those who are studying science.)  
Thus, students come to these courses with varied exposure to and interest in science 
topics.  Students were judged on the relative placement of events.  A few (six) 
students indicated that dinosaurs and humans co-existed, but overwhelmingly 
students placed events in the correct order.  However, very few students plotted 
events in relative positions that would agree with scientific consensus on the 
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placement of events in time.  Specifically many placed the appearance of dinosaurs 
much closer to the appearance of first life than would be appropriate.   This could well 
indicate a lack of knowledge of evolutionary biology and the timescale it requires.  It 
could also mean that the numbers on that timescale have little meaning to students.   
Trend’s work demonstrates that students are quite confused about absolute 
dates for geologic events.  Other research substantiates his findings.  Catley and 
Novick (2009) asked university students from two U.S. institutions to provide dates for 
seven key events in evolutionary history: origin of the Earth, first fossils, eukaryotic 
cells, Cambrian explosion, first mammals, dinosaur extinction, and the appearance of 
Homo habilis.  These questions were part of a larger questionnaire that provided data 
for several studies.  The 126 participants in the study were deemed to be of stronger 
or weaker background depending upon the amount of previous biology or geology 
coursework they had taken.   Stronger background students were on average one 
semester farther along in their education than the weaker science background ones 
and had taken more science courses. On average the stronger background students 
reported 3+ semesters of biology or geology courses.  This is contrasted with an 
average of 0.5 courses for the weaker background students.  Estimates for the age of 
events ranged across seven or more orders of magnitude for each event with no clear 
differences between students of stronger versus weaker background with one 
exception.  Stronger background students were more likely to underestimate the 
dates of events, which the authors term “forward telescoping.”  A similar 
phenomenon was observed by Janssen, Chessa, and Murre (2006) and described in 
section 2.2.2 in which people tended to underestimate the age for events that 
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occurred more than 1,000 days ago.  Unlike the stronger background students, the 
weaker background students in the Catley and Novick study assigned dates that were 
more evenly distributed across a range of times.  Compression of the timing of events 
was common amongst these students although some compressed events farther back 
in time while others compressed them closer to the present.   
Of the 126 participants in the study, a total of 16 (7 stronger and 9 weaker 
background) did not provide age estimates for any of the seven events.  Due to the 
nature of the experimental design, there is no evidence that these students were 
asked why they did not attempt the task.  There are many possible reasons from 
disinterest to a perceived inability to do so.  The number of courses taken could not 
have predicted who the non-responders were likely to be. 
Additional research that deals with both relative and absolute succession sits 
within the context of studies that probe students’ conceptions across a range of 
geoscience topics.  They primarily collected data via written responses, although 
several paired written responses with at least some interviews (Dahl, S. Anderson, & 
Libarkin, 2005; Libarkin et al., 2005; Marques & Thompson, 1997; Rule, 2005).  Many 
of the written responses were forced choice formats, either multiple choice or 
true/false.  However, there were several which used some or all open response items 
(Dahl et al., 2005; DeLaughter et al., 1998; Libarkin et al., 2005).  
When 10-11-year-old and 14-15-year-old pupils were asked about the origin of 
the Earth, Marques and Thompson (1997) found that a number of participants 
equated the formation of the universe with the origin of the Earth, findings that are 
consistent with Trend.  About half of the children also indicated that the appearance 
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of life on Earth occurred at Earth’s formation.   This could be evidence for a 
compression effect—old events are all simply old events.  The differences between 
them are not discriminated.  There is some hint of an increasing ability to deal with 
larger numbers with age.  Fourteen-and-15-year-old children were much more likely 
to indicate an older age for the Earth than 10-and-11-year-olds. 
 The issue of the numbers themselves appears in at least one of these more 
general geoscience studies.  Oversby (1996) compared geoscience conceptions of 
primary and secondary school children with pre-service postgraduate student 
teachers.  Participants were asked a series of questions, some of which required a yes-
no response and others of which were open-ended.  In response to the question, 
“How old do you think the Earth is?” Oversby says, 
A minority held the accepted scientific view that the Earth is older than 109 
years but the results could be partly explained by assuming that the 
respondents had a poor understanding of large numbers and an inability to 
distinguish between millions and billions.  Occasional answers which simply 
said ‘millions and millions’ were testament to this interpretation, (p. 95). 
Taken together, these general geoscience studies indicate confusion regarding 
both absolute and relative succession.  There is generally not enough information 
provided to speculate what is beneath those incorrect ideas.  Some general findings 
are: 
1. Dinosaurs lived contemporaneously with cavemen (Schoon, 1992; Schoon & 
Boone, 1998). 
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2. Life existed before (DeLaughter et al., 1998; Marques & Thompson, 1997)  or 
at Earth’s formation (Libarkin et al., 2005). 
3. A supercontinent was present at Earth’s formation (Libarkin & S. Anderson, 
2005). 
4. The Earth is anywhere from hundreds to millions of years old (Marques & 
Thompson, 1997; Oversby, 1996).  
5. Carbon-14 is the preferred method to date the age of the Earth (Dahl et al., 
2005). 
6. Coal formed at the same time as the Earth (Rule, 2005). 
7. Students’ understanding of geologic time after instruction is not appreciably 
different from their understanding prior to instruction (Libarkin & S. Anderson, 
2005; Libarkin et al., 2005).   
Dodick and Orion (2003a, 2003b) have been interested in how students 
understand geologic processes in time, both in terms of succession or temporal order 
and duration or lengths of geologic processes.  I will provide a brief description of their 
methods here and then discuss items in their instruments that relate to succession.  
Those that relate to duration will be described in the next section (2.6.2).   They 
distinguish between what they term a passive temporal framework which involves a 
sequence of events in absolute time and an active logical understanding which 
involves reasoning about the relative time of events, the relationship of adjacent 
strata to one another, and how geologic changes occur over time.  In their view, all the 
deep time research reviewed thus far in this section is of the first type.  Dodick and 
Orion’s attention to active, logical understanding is important.   A solid understanding 
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of deep time requires the ability to use relative dating principles to order events or 
geologic strata, as well as the ability to situate events in their appropriate places on a 
timeline.  They base their work on the ideas of Jacques Montangero (1996; Pons & 
Montangero, 1999) who was discussed in section 2.2.4.  I have already attempted to 
show why I do not believe the notion of diachronic thought is a useful construct to 
think about either conventional or deep time.    However, my disagreement with them 
on this point in no way diminishes the value of their research.  Dodick and Orion’s 
work provides very interesting findings that are important when considering how 
students understand deep time.   Furthermore, the manner in which I have organised 
this discussion demonstrates that their findings can be interpreted in the light of 
succession and duration.   
The authors developed a questionnaire, the Geological Time Assessment Test 
(GeoTAT) which consists of a total of seven line drawings and associated questions 
related to relative dating principles.  An additional drawing showed a room in which a 
crime had obviously recently been committed.  This item was included to see whether 
students would approach a sequencing problem differently when geoscience content 
knowledge was not a factor than when it was.  A number of the puzzles required 
students to place events or rock layers containing fossils in temporal order.  
Sometimes those rock layers had been folded so that a fossil could be below another 
one in the drawing but represent a more recent depositional event.  In other cases, 
there were unconformities or gaps in the rock record.  A layer containing a particular 
fossil might be present in one column of strata but missing from another.  Students 
had to use information about fossils and/or rock types to infer depositional 
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environments in several other puzzles.  In another puzzle, students used an outcrop 
with rock layers containing leg and foot fossils demonstrating horse evolution from 
Hyraotherium to a modern horse to deduce the events that led to the outcrop 
depicted in the drawing.   All of the puzzles in the GeoTAT involved relative age except 
one.  That puzzle had an outcrop with two igneous layers alternating between three 
sedimentary layers containing fossils (Figure 2.3, p. 132).  Students had to provide 
ages for the sedimentary layers.  This puzzle will be described more fully in the next 
section.   
The GeoTAT was specifically designed to limit the geoscience content 
knowledge required to complete the tasks, thereby only assessing students’ temporal 
understanding.  They did this in two ways: first, by providing some information 
explicitly, and second, by limiting the relevant content information to things students 
would likely be familiar with.  More will be said about this point shortly. 
As part of its development the GeoTAT was tested with 156 Israeli eleventh 
and twelfth graders (2003b), some of whom were studying geology and some of 
whom were not.   In Israel it is possible for high school students to major in a subject, 
which explains why some but not all of their sample were geology students.  Some of 
the non-geology students were studying biology and would likely have had some 
exposure to evolutionary biology.  Geology students generally outperformed non-
geology students, although differences were not always statistically significant. There 
was also an age effect, as 12th grade geology students performed better than 11th 
graders, a fact which the authors attribute to the cumulative effect of fieldwork. An 
age trend was not so consistent with non-geology students.  In some instances, 12th 
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graders outperformed 11th graders, but in other instances they did not (Dodick & 
Orion, 2003b). 
In the main study (2003a) the GeoTAT was used with 285 seventh through 
twelfth grade Israeli students.  None of these students were studying geology at the 
time of the study.  Not surprisingly, ninth through twelfth graders were significantly 
better able to interpret geologic processes and phenomena than seventh and eighth 
graders.  However, older students did not always score better than younger pupils, 
i.e., 12th graders didn’t always do better than 11th graders.  The authors do not 
speculate about why this may be the case.  The fact that seventh and eighth graders 
were less successful at solving the puzzles is consistent with what would be expected 
based upon research on conventional time described in section 2.2.2 (e.g., Friedman, 
2005). The authors hypothesize that seventh or eighth grade is the lower limit at 
which a student can display actualistic thinking, i.e., the notion that in geoscience the 
present is the key to the past.   
Despite the fact that the authors attempted to minimize the effect of 
geoscience content knowledge on responses, they are nonetheless aware that it is 
extremely difficult to do so.    The fact that 12th grade geology students generally 
outperformed 11th grade geology and 11th and 12th grade non-geology students in the 
validation study indicates that geoscience content knowledge must be a factor in 
responses, a point which the authors clearly acknowledge (2003b).   Results from the 
main study further illustrate how geoscience content knowledge may have affected 
responses.   
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One task (Puzzle 5) consisted of three outcrops each containing five layers with 
the names and pictures of fossils found in those layers.  They showed students the 
picture in Figure 2.2 with the following instructions, “The illustration below represents 
three rocks exposures containing fossils.  Try to order the fossils according to their 
implied age, from the oldest fossil to the youngest fossil” (Dodick & Orion, 2003a, p. 
439) 
 
Figure 2.2 Puzzle 5 of the GeoTAT (from Dodick and Orion, 2003a, p. 439) 
This could be expected to be an extremely difficult task for anyone who knows 
little about fossil succession and how it is used to correlate sedimentary strata.  To 
answer the item correctly, a student would need to know that two layers of rock that 
are separated from one another but contain the same fossil are the same age.  
Additionally, they would need to understand that sometimes there are unconformities 
(gaps) in the rock record due either to erosion or an absence of deposition.   One 
unconformity exists in the second stratigraphic column in Puzzle 5 between the layer 
containing the ammonite and the one containing the clam.  The missing layer is 
present in the first column (the coral).  Dodick and Orion felt that students who were 
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able to use principles of temporal organization correctly would be able to figure out 
how to sequence the strata correctly.  However, specific geoscience content 
knowledge seems to be a prerequisite for the successful completion of this task.  
Without knowledge of relative dating principles (declarative and procedural 
knowledge), a student would have to base an answer on other factors.  The correct 
order of deposition is: trilobite, ammonite, coral, clam, gastropod, brachiopod, fish 
scale, snail, sea urchin, and shark tooth.   
The authors note that it was common for students, particularly the 7th and 8th 
graders, to order the fossils randomly.  They say, “Indeed, it was not rare to see such 
students order three different fossils from three different localities temporally 
equivalent because they appeared on the same stratigraphic level (2003a, p. 428).   
The authors may be correct that students’ orders were random.  Indeed, they appear 
random to someone versed in the geosciences.  However, there may be an alternate 
possibility.  If I am to complete the task and know little or nothing about fossil 
succession, I must reason on some other basis if I wish to answer the question.  I will 
need to rely on any bit of general knowledge about the world that I possess and can 
retrieve at that moment.  Concluding that two fossils that occupy similar positions in a 
column are temporally equivalent is not an unreasonable inference if I have little else 
upon which to base my answer.  Students were not asked why they ordered fossils in 
the way they did so my next statement is speculative.  It is entirely possible that 
students were reasoning that in a pile, the thing on the bottom was put there first and 
things on top were added later.  Thus I may not be ordering the fossils randomly at all, 
even though I am using an incorrect strategy (in this instance).  Of course, if an 
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outcrop contains a series of undisturbed strata in which there are no unconformities, 
then reasoning that the oldest layer is on the bottom is correct.  For Puzzle 5, that 
reasoning is not sufficient.  I must know something about fossil succession, even if I 
don’t know the term, in order to complete this task successfully.   
Grade 9-12 students performed significantly better on this task than 7th-8th 
graders, although the highest mean score for any grade was 55%.   The authors 
hypothesise that this could be due to an improvement in visual-spatial ability.  A 
follow-up experiment in which they presented four of the GeoTAT puzzles and 14 
visual-spatial tasks to 172 10th-11th graders found a strong correlation between the 
two sets of tasks, thereby lending support to their hypothesis.  Given the relationship 
between space and time described in section 2.2, it is not at all surprising to see such a 
correlation.  Even though older students scored better than younger pupils, a mean 
score of 55% is not high.  Although visual-spatial abilities may account for the 
improvement with age, an absence of knowledge of principles of stratigraphic 
correlation may explain why no groups scored particularly well on the task.  Without 
the relevant geoscience content knowledge, a student is left only with whatever 
knowledge or experience she has to reason her way to an answer.   
A second example of the pivotal role played by geoscience content knowledge 
is found in Puzzle 6c.  The question says, 
When scientists excavated this area deeply they found an alternating 
arrangement of layers consisting of marine sedimentary rock containing no 
fossils and terrestrial sedimentary rock containing fossils of dinosaurs. What is 
the significance of this alternating arrangement of layers containing terrestrial 
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sedimentary rock containing dinosaurs, and marine sedimentary rock without 
dinosaurs? (Dodick & Orion, 2003a, p. 728) 
To answer this question correctly a student first needs to understand the meaning of 
the terms marine and terrestrial.   That understanding is not a given.  Secondly, the 
student would need to know something about a transgressive-regressive sequence.  
Such a sequence is evidenced by vertical strata that indicate rising and falling water 
levels in a shallow sea.  Sediment types that are normally deposited adjacent to one 
another are deposited atop each other leaving a record of rising and falling sea levels.  
The presence of layers containing dinosaur fossils interspersed with marine 
sedimentary layers indicates just such a sequence.  However, this would not likely be 
clear to a student who has not studied historical geology or evolutionary biology.  The 
authors state that this sequence indicates the migration of dinosaurs in and out of the 
region in response to changing sea levels.  The authors interpret difficulty with this 
puzzle as indicative of problems with interstage linkage (borrowed from Montangero).  
That is to say, students don’t understand cause and effect relationships or that some 
events are prerequisites for other events.  That certainly seems to be the case; 
however, I would argue that it is not due to any failure to comprehend time.  Rather 
problems with this puzzle are indicative of a lack of geoscience content knowledge.  It 
seems to me that the extent of a person’s knowledge of transgressive-regressive 
sequences is the best explanation for their findings.  That claim is further 
substantiated by the fact that students who participated in a program called “From 
Dinosaurs to Darwin,” a curricular unit integrating evolution and palaeontology all 
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improved dramatically on this question from their pre-unit to post-unit performance 
(Dodick & Orion, 2003b).    
Hidalgo and Otero (2004) looked at both succession and duration.  Their 
duration task will be discussed in section 2.6.2.  Two tasks were used to probe 
understanding of succession.  They administered a written test to a group of 16-year-
old secondary school students who were enrolled in an elective natural sciences 
course and 19-20-year olds who were in a post-secondary school technical 
programme.  Students were asked to list events of “personal, historic, anthropologic, 
paleontologic, geologic, or cosmologic character” (p. 849) that occurred in eight time 
periods ranging from 10 to 100,000,000 years ago.  Individuals of both ages were less 
able to place events in the correct temporal category the farther from the present the 
events were located.  This result is, of course, consistent with the research on both 
conventional time and large numbers that was reported in sections 2.2 and 2.3.  The 
farther from the reference point, the present in this case, the less likely a student was 
to be able to place it in its correct temporal category.  Participants were subsequently 
shown four pictures each showing a different moment in evolutionary history.   
 Invertebrate marine life against a hilly background containing no life forms 
 Two dinosaurs in a flat landscape with some vegetation 
 A variety of mammals and birds on a varied landscape 
 A group of hominids in a forested area 
Pupils were asked to place the pictures in the correct temporal order and 
assign a temporal label to each picture.  It does not appear that they were provided 
with a range of dates as was true in the first task.  Rather, it seems students had to 
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come up with their own temporal labels.  While over 80% of the older students placed 
the pictures in the correct order, none applied the correct temporal label to a picture.  
In other words, they could order the events on a relative scale but had no idea how 
long ago each occurred.  Fifty-six percent of the younger students ordered the 
pictures correctly and a few did correctly assign temporal labels to the pictures.  The 
authors propose that some students in their study may not have actually known the 
temporal order of the pictures.  Rather, they were able to deduce the correct order by 
using other knowledge [emphasis mine].  For example, one student noted that the 
picture containing marine life had no terrestrial vegetation in the picture.  Therefore, 
the student concluded that terrestrial vegetation couldn’t survive in that environment 
(or it would have been in the picture).  Hence, the picture with terrestrial life must 
come after the picture with marine life.   This student appears to have possessed 
sufficient knowledge of evolutionary biology to know that life appeared first in marine 
environments and only subsequently on land.  The authors conclude,  
...the high percentage of incoherence among the arrangements of events and 
labelling of antiquity suggests that the arrangement strategy used by the 
students on that level depends more on deduction than on the recovery of 
memorized labels (Hidalgo & Otero, 2004, p. 854) 
2.6.2 Research on duration in deep time 
All of the studies just reported, including those dealing with geoscience 
processes, have involved succession.  Dodick and Orion (Dodick & Orion, 2003a, 
2003b) also investigated duration.  Puzzle 4 of the GeoTAT, which was described in the 
previous section, is interesting in terms of what it indicates about conceptions of 
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duration.  This was used with the same group of 285 seventh through twelfth grade 
pupils described earlier. Students were shown the drawing in Figure 2.3.   
 
Figure 2.3 Puzzle 4 of the GeoTAT (from Dodick and Orion, 2003a, p. 439) 
They were told that layers of igneous rock (denoted by V) lay between the 
sedimentary layers containing fossils (clam, coral, and snail).  The igneous rock layers 
had been dated by geologists in the lab and their ages were written on the drawing.  
Students were asked to determine the absolute age in years of the fossil layers.  The 
correct answer for the clam would be >100 million years.  The coral would be between 
90 and 100 million years, and the snail would be <90 million years.  Ninety-eight 
percent of the students in the sample (at all ages) were unable to correctly solve this 
puzzle.  The most common error was to judge that each rock layer represented the 
same amount of time, thus the snail layer was judged to be 80 million years old and 
the clam layer was 100 million years.  This is very reminiscent of some of the younger 
children in Piaget’s tasks who equated amount of work done with duration.   In fact, 
these students seemed to be working from the premise that equal size means equal 
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durations.  Dodick and Orion have provided good evidence that the equating of spatial 
size and time operates in deep time much as it does in conventional time.  A person’s 
geoscience content knowledge comes into play as well.  If I know little about 
sedimentary or igneous processes, I am at a loss when trying to determine what 
information from this drawing is important to date the sedimentary fossiliferous 
layers.  It is not unreasonable for me to base my answer on the size of the layers.  
Since the strata appear to be the same thickness, the conclusion that they all required 
the same amount of time to form seems to be a logical inference.  
In addition to the GeoTAT, Dodick and Orion designed an additional test called 
the Strategic Factors Test (SFT) that sheds additional light on how students 
understand duration in deep time (2003a).  They administered this test to a group of 
52 Grade11-12 students who were all majoring in earth science.  Therefore, they 
might be expected to possess at least some of the requisite geoscience content 
knowledge necessary to complete the task.  Participants were shown three drawings 
each containing a pair of rock outcrops with strata of different thicknesses and 
number of layers.  They were asked to compare two layers and determine which was 
older, if possible.  They were told there were four possible answers:  
 A is older 
 B is older 
 both are the same age, or  
 can’t be determined (Dodick & Orion, 2003a, p. 422).    
In one situation both outcrops had the same number of layers but Outcrop B 
was taller.   In that scenario, the layers in B were thicker than the ones in A.  In the 
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second situation both outcrops were the same height, but A had twice has many 
layers as B.  In the final scenario, A had twice as many layers as B and B was taller than 
A.   In all cases, the correct answer is that it is impossible to know which layer is older 
without knowing something about depositional rates (the salient piece of geoscience 
content knowledge). 
Table 2.1 lists the percentage of students who correctly answered that it was 
impossible to determine from the drawing alone which of two layers was older.   Only 
a minority of students answered each question correctly.  Perhaps even more telling is 
the fact that less than 10% of the students who answered correctly said anything 
about rate of deposition in their explanation.  Some answers could be considered 
partially correct, as there were students who said that information regarding rock 
types or environmental conditions was missing.  While environmental conditions are a 
factor in rates of deposition, this answer was deemed incomplete since how 
environmental factors affect rates of deposition was not mentioned. 
Equal number of layers, B 
is taller 
Both layers same height, A 
has twice as many layers 
as B 
A has twice as many 
layers as B, B is taller 
35% 31% 29% 
Table 2.1 Percentage of students who correctly answered impossible to know which 
layer is older on SFT (Dodick and Orion, 2003a, p. 432-433) 
Students who did not answer correctly often thought that the more compact 
the rock layer the older it was.  Compaction was often cited by people in the second 
situation who said a layer in Outcrop A was older.  Yet, when both varied the number 
of layers was a more salient factor for students than the size of the outcrop.  In 
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situation three, about 75% of those who were incorrect said that the layer in Outcrop 
A was older.  
On the surface, it may appear that students are employing two different 
strategies to judge durations in these examples, however, they may actually represent 
similar ideas.  It can be argued that size is equated with duration in both instances.  In 
the first one because the total number of layers is the same, the size of the entire 
outcrop determines which is older.   Therefore, taller = longer duration.  On the other 
hand, when the heights of the entire outcrops are the same, size is not spatial 
distance but the number of layers from the starting point.  The reasoning is that it 
takes longer for more layers to accumulate.  Therefore, the number of layers indicates 
age.   When both vary, number of layers is viewed as more important than total height 
of the outcrop.  Interview data indicates that students relied upon what they knew 
about sedimentation as a process of compaction to make this judgment. They were 
making some use of their geoscience content knowledge.  Since their knowledge was 
incomplete, they reached an erroneous conclusion.  Thus, errors may not be indicative 
of problems with time per se but rather insufficient domain or topic knowledge.   
Hidalgo and Otero (2004) investigated concepts of duration using a series of 
written questions.  In one, students were shown a picture of a fold caused by flexion 
and asked to indicate what may have caused the fold.  The majority of students 
attributed the fold to a catastrophic process such as an earthquake, a volcano, or a 
plate collision. The authors state that students who indicated tectonic plate collision 
could be the causal agent did not appear to view the process as requiring a long 
interval of time.   Unfortunately, they do not provide information about how many 
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students attributed the fold to lithospheric processes but over incorrect time scales 
since all catastrophic changes appear together in their data.  Further, they do not 
include information about what time scales those students did assign to them.  About 
the only thing that can be said is that their results appear to mirror those of others 
who found that students have a poor understanding of the amount of time necessary 
for geologic processes to occur (Libarkin et al., 2007).   
2.6.3 Summary of the literature on conceptions of deep time 
Several observations can be made from the literature on conceptions of deep 
time.  The most obvious one is that succession has been explored far more frequently 
than duration.  This is not at all surprising since it is especially difficult to design ways 
to investigate duration that are not highly sensitive to geoscience content knowledge.  
Much of my remaining comments thus deal with succession.  Students of all ages and 
practicing teachers hold very similar concepts regarding deep time.  Age and prior 
coursework in biology or geology appear to have only a minimal effect on participant 
responses.  Age of respondents seems to be correlated with an older view of the Earth 
but sometimes this means that people state that the Earth is much older than it 
actually is.   
There are hints that poor discrimination amongst orders of magnitude exists.  
There is some evidence that individuals compress events farther back in time 
compared to more recent ones.  Equating the Big Bang with the formation of the Earth 
or the extinction of the dinosaurs are examples.  Libarkin et al., (2007) state that 
university students in their study placed more time between the appearance and 
disappearance of terrestrial dinosaurs than is warranted while compressing the time 
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between the appearance of the first life on Earth and the appearance of the 
dinosaurs.   This could be explained by positing that people don’t know and simply 
offer their best guess on the matter.  On the other hand, these findings are very 
similar to Confrey’s (1991) interview with Suzanne described in section 2.3.1.  There 
may be little discrimination between such large numbers.  A million and a billion are 
both simply really big numbers.  The difference between the two is unclear.  Hidalgo 
and Otero (2004) state, “the subjects of our study frequently used very short intervals 
of time in geologic terms,” (p. 854).  They also indicate that participants used labels 
such as one million years but seemed unaware of the amount of time represented by 
those labels.    The use of a compressed logarithmic scale mirrors what we have seen 
for both large numbers and also for events in conventional time, e.g., Janssen and 
Chessa (2006), and is consistent with the spatial example of the two hills in the 
distance described in 2.2.5. 
There were only two studies reviewed that dealt with duration at all. Yet, the 
latter is just as important to an understanding of deep time as the former.  In fact, it 
may be impossible to truly have a sense of the immensity of geologic time without 
some sense of the rates and durations of geologic processes. Dodick and Orion’s work 
suggests that adolescents equate size with duration in a geologic context, much as the 
younger children in Piaget’s work equated duration with either distance travelled or 
amount of work done.  It is difficult to say much from Hidalgo and Otero other than to 
repeat that students frequently underestimated the time required for geologic 
processes to occur.  It is important that students’ concepts of duration be explored 
more fully than they have to date. 
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Overall understanding of deep time is poor, but we are left to speculate why 
that is the case.  Most researchers report responses as correct/incorrect, but we have 
only hints as to the type of thinking that separates the two groups.  Further, we do not 
know much at all about the students who give correct responses.  In cases where 
students were asked the reasons for their responses, it is clear that correct responses 
may be coincidental more than anything else.  Therefore, we must explore why deep 
time is so difficult to grasp.  Only one researcher (Ault, 1980, 1982) attempted to 
probe children’s understanding of both conventional and deep time.  No one has 
conducted a similar study with older students.  Additionally, the literature is replete 
with suggestions that geoscience content knowledge or an understanding of large 
numbers may be influencing how students respond to questions about deep time.   
However, the extent to which those two variables might explain students’ difficulties 
with the concept has not been explored.    
2.7 A model for a concept of deep time 
Anyone who has taught geoscience at any level of the educational system has 
seen how difficult it is for students to comprehend geologic time.  The fact that many 
students make very modest gains in their understanding after instruction (Libarkin & 
S. Anderson, 2005) suggests that we may need a clearer picture of what is beneath the 
surface of their misunderstanding if we are to have any hope of addressing this issue 
within an instructional context.    If we are to move beyond simply describing what is, 
then it is useful to begin to ask why it is so.  What factors underlie a conception of 
deep time?  In this chapter, I have attempted to show that the difficulties students 
have with deep time mirror the difficulties they have in other areas.  Based upon that 
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research base, I propose a working model to account for the key underlying factors 
that are necessary to comprehend deep time.  Research reviewed in sections 2.6 
alluded to what those underlying factors might be.  This model arises out of the 
literature that has already been reviewed in this chapter as well as some preliminary 
interviews conducted prior to the main study for this thesis (see section 3.3).  I 
contend that the concept of deep time can best be represented by the metaphor of a 
“three-legged stool” (Cheek, in press).  The three “legs” are the pieces that support 
this understanding: conventional time, large numbers, and the subject matter 
knowledge of the geosciences (geoscience content knowledge).   The result, or the 
“seat” of the “stool,” is a solid concept of deep time.  As a stool needs all three legs to 
be sturdy and bear weight, so an understanding of deep time requires all three of 
these “legs” to be in place.  A three-legged stool might have legs of equal size, but it is 
also possible for its legs to be of unequal length and yet be stable.  At present no 
evidence exists to suggest whether the three “legs” of the “deep time stool” bear 
equal weight or whether any of these factors is more critical to a conception of deep 
time.  Thus, it could be that a person with well-developed concepts of conventional 
time and large numbers, but only limited geoscience content knowledge is able to 
grasp deep time to some extent.  The way(s) in which the “legs” interact is equally 
unclear.  Does growth in one area foster growth in the others or do they develop 
independently?  Despite the unanswered questions, the model enables us to explore 
student understanding in the three areas and then see how that knowledge is applied 
to a geologic context.   A poor understanding of deep time may reflect:  
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1. Failure to comprehend conventional time or failure to apply notions of 
conventional time to deep time.   Students do not have a solid grasp of 
succession or duration.  They are unable to judge them accurately in 
everyday situations.  If they are able to deal with succession and 
duration in conventional time, they act as if deep time operates by a 
different set of rules than conventional time does. 
2. Poor understanding of large numbers.  Deep time differs from 
conventional time by many orders of magnitude and employs 
quantities rarely encountered in the course of daily life.   Students 
possess poor number sense for numbers of great magnitude and 
minimize the differences between them.  They lack reference points 
and have trouble conceiving of temporal units that are outside their 
everyday experience. 
3. Limited geoscience content knowledge.  Alternative conceptions 
regarding deep time are based on ideas that have little to do with time 
itself. Students’ minimal knowledge of geologic processes means that 
they are reasoning on the basis of everyday ideas that may not coincide 
with scientific ones.   
2.8 Other factors that influence the stability of the “stool” 
I have posited a “three-legged stool” to account for a conception of deep time.  
Yet, there are other factors that influence a learner’s ability to comprehend deep 
time.  An exploration of these factors is outside the bounds of this thesis.  
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Nonetheless, they must be acknowledged as factors that may affect how at least some 
students understand deep time.   
The first is the role of an individual’s metaphysical beliefs upon a conception of 
deep time.  References to a student’s belief system as it influences their 
understanding of deep time appear in the literature, particularly in the U.S. (e.g., 
Catley & Novick, 2009; Libarkin et al., 2007).  In fact, the issue of people rejecting deep 
time on the basis of deeply held beliefs appears to be more of an issue in the U.S. than 
in other countries as it is not mentioned as a factor in research conducted outside the 
U.S.  In some cases, individuals may have a solid understanding of conventional time, a 
good sense of large numbers, and the requisite geoscience content knowledge to 
understand deep time as a concept yet reject the notion of deep time as being a 
fundamental characteristic of the world.  This rejection has less to do with 
conceptions and more to do with whether they feel acknowledging that deep time 
exists is in conflict with their fundamental views about the world, often their religious 
beliefs.  Chinn and Brewer describe how people tend to ignore, reject, or reinterpret 
anomalous data when it conflicts with well-entrenched beliefs (Chinn & Brewer, 
1993).  One could argue that just because a student rejects the notion of deep time 
doesn’t automatically signal a lack of understanding.  Conversely, it might be said that 
if a person truly understood the concept it wouldn’t be rejected.  In the case of 
strongly held beliefs, I would argue that it is possible to understand deep time, but 
reject it nonetheless.  In a sense the distinction may not matter.   Students, who reject 
the possibility of deep time on the basis of metaphysical beliefs, do not use the 
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concept to reason appropriately about the timing or duration of events in Earth’s 
history.  In essence, the concept doesn’t exist for them.    
 The credence a student gives to media representations of the past also affects 
a learner’s conceptions.  Many television programs and films portray humans and 
dinosaurs as cotemporaneous.  If a student accepts these sources as accurate 
portrayals of the past, a concept of the sequence of events in deep time will be 
distorted.   
 A third factor relates to a student’s attitudes and motivation.  This relates to 
their role in the acquisition of a concept, which is clearly important.  In university 
systems like the U.S. where students are sometimes in a course simply to fulfil a 
requirement rather than for any interest in the topic, it can clearly be a factor.  
Second, students’ attitudes and motivation play a role in how they respond to the 
questions in our instruments.  The inferences we make as researchers about student 
conceptions rest upon the assumption that participants are accurately expressing the 
conceptions they have which may, in fact, not be the case.  It is a point we must be 
aware of when drawing conclusions from our data. 
2.9 Summary and conclusions 
We are once again brought back to the model of the “three-legged stool.”  I 
have attempted to show how each of the three “legs:” conventional time, large 
numbers and geoscience content knowledge contributes to a conception of deep 
time.  I have also attempted to link each of those “legs” with published research 
results.  These ideas are not new.  Many people working to uncover student 
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conceptions of deep time have acknowledged the role played by each of these “legs.”  
What has not yet been attempted is a systematic attempt to investigate these “legs” 
together in a single study with the same group of learners.  This thesis seeks to explore 
each of these three “legs” in turn to determine how they might affect a conception of 
deep time.  The first research question explores the relationship between how 
learners understand conventional and deep time.  This investigation probes 
understanding of succession and duration at both conventional and deep time scales.  
This permits a comparison between how students understand those ideas at different 
time scales.  If students have a poor understanding of conventional time, they would 
perform poorly on succession and duration tasks in conventional time even if the tasks 
themselves “looked” geological.   This study also represents an attempt to help 
redress the imbalance between succession and duration studies in the literature. 
The second research question concerns students’ understanding of large 
numbers.  If larger numbers are a significant factor in a conception of deep time, we 
would expect that students would have difficulty with tasks dealing with numbers 
alone apart from a geologic context.   Their performance on “pure number” tasks 
would be no better than their performance on tasks that involve geologic events.   
 Finally, the third research question asks whether learners’ understandings of 
deep time are at least partially due to the amount of content knowledge they possess.  
If students’ difficulties with deep time can be partially accounted for by a lack of 
geoscience content knowledge, we would expect to see several things.  If we are able 
to remove content knowledge as a significant variable, we would expect that students 
would experience little difficulty with tasks in which that knowledge is usually a factor.  
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Second, if students are unfamiliar with events and processes that occur in 
conventional time, they should be no better at judging succession or duration than for 
events in deep time. 
  This exploratory study is designed to test the working model.  We now turn to 
the specific research design. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the deep time “stool” with 
its three “legs” is a viable working model to account for students’ difficulties 
understanding deep time.  First, I discuss the rationale for the methodology I chose.  
Strengths and weaknesses of the methodology are outlined.  Next, I describe the 
preliminary interviews that led to the development of the instrument, and then, the 
items in the instrument itself.  Finally, I provide information about the sample.   
3.1 A pragmatist approach to quantitative and qualitative research methods 
 The debate about the relative merits of quantitative versus qualitative 
research has raged for decades (Lancy, 1993).  Decisions researchers make about 
methodologies reflect their worldviews or paradigms (Mertens, 2005).  An exposition 
of the various paradigms that underlie educational research with their accompanying 
strengths and weaknesses can be found elsewhere (Creswell, 2009; Lancy, 1993; 
Mertens, 2005).   
There is great value in quantitative research with its emphasis on theory 
testing and isolation of variables to determine the distinct role they play in students’ 
conceptions.  One of the strengths of quantitative research is that its samples are 
often relatively large.  Samples are selected in such a way as to represent the 
population about which one wishes to generalise.  The appropriate quantification of 
data allows for statistical manipulation of that data and the ability to compare results 
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from one study to those of another.  Quantitative research is often favoured by 
government agencies in the U.S. (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Silverman, 2000) because it 
is seen as being valid, reliable, and less influenced by the researcher’s own perspective 
than qualitative methods.  Theoretically, quantitative data analysis is less dependent 
upon the researcher’s personal views on the subject (Libarkin & Kurdziel, 2002).  
Validity and reliability are based on statistical analyses and, thus, objectively 
determined.  However, no research study is value-neutral but always reflects the 
underlying philosophy and values of the researcher.   
On the other hand, Silverman (2000) points out that quantitative research is 
sometimes characterised as narrowly focused and thus divorced from a real world 
context.  The need to operationalise definitions can sometimes result in the very 
arbitrariness that quantitative researchers seek to avoid.  Choices must be made when 
constructing definitions, and it is difficult to completely remove researchers’ 
assumptions and values from the process. Ambiguity must be resolved.  This can result 
in the collapsing of data into one category when if distinct categories had been 
created and data from each category had been analysed separately, the researcher 
might have reached different conclusions.  Decisions about which variables warrant 
study and how data are analysed will always reflect an investigator’s overall 
orientation (Lancy, 1993).  Reliance on quantification means that only certain types of 
questions are asked—those that can be represented numerically and subjected to 
appropriate statistical manipulation and analysis.  People who engage in quantitative 
research are not ignorant of its imperfections.  High quality quantitative research 
designs acknowledge the limitations of the various quantitative methodologies and do 
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all that is possible to mitigate them, sometimes by the inclusion of qualitative 
methods at some point in the process. 
Qualitative research is often portrayed as a more holistic examination of 
students’ ideas in more naturalistic settings (e.g., Marshall & Rossman, 2006).  
However, this distinction may serve to imply qualitative research is “good” while 
quantitative is “bad” as the latter often occurs in “unnatural” settings.  Those who 
engage in qualitative research represent a variety of underlying paradigms from those 
who see the researcher as independent from the individuals studied, to others who 
see themselves as participants with the subjects of the research, to those who believe 
the role of their research is to advance a particular political or social agenda (Creswell, 
2009; Mertens, 2005).  Because it encompasses many different traditions and 
underlying paradigms, qualitative research can be more difficult to characterise.  
Lancy (1993) compares qualitative research to a “mixed forest” (p. 3) in which the 
various traditions sit almost independently of one another.   Even though similar 
methodologies are employed, the assumptions upon which they rest differ 
substantially. 
A primary strength of qualitative research is the richness and volume of data it 
generates.  Some might view the richness of the data as a drawback since data 
analysis can be quite time consuming.  Qualitative researchers would argue that what 
can be gleaned from the data is well worth the time required for its analysis.  These 
investigators would also say that the fact that data analysis is so closely tied to the 
data source is a second strength of the methodology.  In some cases this means that 
study participants can validate or modify conclusions (Silverman, 2000).  Data 
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collection in qualitative studies often evolves as the study progresses making these 
methods flexible to changing circumstances or to new information that is uncovered 
early in the study.  New questions are asked, while others are jettisoned to generate 
data with greater depth and breadth.  This stands in contrast to quantitative methods 
in which data collection methods are standardised.  Sometimes qualitative research is 
viewed as inductive while quantitative is deductive.  That may be another example of 
applying terms that are unfair to both traditions, since it appears to set up a false 
dichotomy.  Qualitative researchers employ both inductive and deductive means of 
data analysis (Hoepfl, 1997), and quantitative researchers do as well. 
There are some clear drawbacks to qualitative methods.  The relatively small 
sample sizes make it virtually impossible to make defensible generalisations about 
populations.  Further, samples are not chosen in such a way as to be representative of 
the larger population.  Instead, qualitative samples are often purposefully chosen to 
elicit the views of particular individuals or groups (Hoepfl, 1997).  Thus, while the 
sample chosen may reflect the range of responses one would find in the population as 
a whole, it is unlikely that those responses would occur in the same proportions in the 
population as they do in the sample. All three of these concerns make generalising 
very problematic.  Qualitative researchers sometimes use the term transferability 
rather than generalisability (Marshall & Rossman, 2006) to describe the relevance of a 
study’s findings to another context.  On occasion, this can translate into a lack of 
concern for the need to make one’s own findings transferable to other situations.  
Marshall and Rossman state,  “The burden of demonstrating that a set of findings 
applies to another context rests more with the researcher who would make that 
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transfer than with the original researcher” (2006, p. 201-202).  Thus, in their view, a 
researcher is not responsible to show how her study’s findings transfer to a larger 
population.  That task falls to those who read her results and want to apply them to a 
new situation.  The researcher is only responsible to provide enough detail so that the 
reader can make an informed decision about whether the findings are transferrable or 
not.  This leads to one of the strongest criticisms levelled at qualitative research—its 
anecdotal nature (Silverman, 2000).   
Definitions of reliability and validity are different in qualitative and quantitative 
research (Creswell, 2009; Hoepfl, 1997; Libarkin & Kurdziel, 2002).  To those who are 
more comfortable with quantitative definitions, qualitative measures of reliability and 
validity can appear “fuzzy.”  In fact, sometimes those terms are not used at all.  
Instead, validity is referred to as credibility while reliability becomes dependability 
(Mertens, 2005).   
One way to increase reliability or dependability has to do with the consistency 
of coding of responses.  Having more than one person code data and reporting inter-
coder agreement can provide readers with important information to judge the study’s 
dependability.   Additionally, research studies need to provide clear information about 
how responses were coded.  When readers are given information about how coding 
was done and examples of responses that were coded in particular ways, they can 
better evaluate how consistently coding decisions were made.  Quantitative research 
seeks to not only establish reliability in terms of how responses are judged but also 
the consistency of the responses themselves.  There is not the same assumption in 
qualitative research that responses will necessarily be consistent over time (Mertens, 
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2005).  Thus, qualitative research is more concerned with the first type of reliability 
but far less with the second. 
One way to increase a study’s credibility or validity is to triangulate data or 
collect data on the same idea in multiple ways (Marshall & Rossman, 2006).  If 
responses are indicative of actual conceptions or themes we would expect to see 
evidence of that across tasks.  If they are not, this discrepancy casts doubt on their 
validity or credibility as indicators of subjects’ ideas.  An additional point is the need to 
assess a wider variety of related ideas in the same study.  Johnson and Gott (1996) 
say, “A criticism we have of much of the research into children’s thinking is that 
studies have tended to be compartmentalized and have not sought to develop an 
understanding of a child’s responses over a range of related ideas” (p. 567).  That is 
precisely the point of this study: to assess students’ thinking across related ideas to 
determine how they connect to one another. 
The criticism that qualitative data is often anecdotal has already been 
mentioned.  It is easy to choose a few “good” examples of student responses that 
illustrate categories yet not attempt to deal with data that is less clear or 
contradictory (Silverman, 2000).  Thus, when writing up qualitative research it is 
important to include data that is confusing or that seems to be anomalous (e.g., 
Creswell, 2009; Mertens, 2005). Qualitative data reports in which all responses appear 
to fit neatly into categories have probably left out important pieces of information.   
The inclusion of detailed descriptions permits a reader to draw his own conclusions 
about the credibility of the investigator’s conclusions. 
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My own research orientation falls somewhere between the two extremes on a 
qualitative-quantitative continuum.  This study is best described as one that fits into a 
pragmatist paradigm (Creswell, 2009).  Within this view, decisions about research 
methodologies are not based upon a commitment to a particular method as the 
“right” way to conduct research as this limits what can be learned.  The strengths and 
weaknesses of each methodology must be evaluated in light of the research question 
in order to determine the appropriate methods to best answer that question. 
Pragmatism is frequently associated with mixed methods research that utilises 
both quantitative and qualitative methodologies (Mertens, 2005), although 
pragmatists would not say that every study should use both types of methodologies or 
that they should be applied in equal measure across studies.  If we accept that 
quantitative and qualitative methods each have a role to play, as pragmatists do, then 
determining which method is most appropriate in a given situation will be a matter of 
matching the study’s aims to one or more appropriate methodologies.  Mixed 
methods research can take several forms (Lancy, 1993, p. 11).  In some cases, a 
quantitative study precedes a qualitative examination of the same question, although 
the reverse is probably more often the case.  Some researchers in this tradition view 
qualitative methods as highly useful for exploratory research when little is known 
about the factors involved in a particular phenomenon (e.g., Creswell, 2009; Libarkin 
& Kurdziel, 2002; Marshall & Rossman, 2006).  It is not unusual to find studies that are 
largely quantitative that have embedded within them a small qualitative piece (e.g., 
Dahl, Anderson, & Libarkin, 2005).   Others view the two methods as complementary.  
A change from quantitative to qualitative methods or vice versa is warranted when 
152 
 
previously published research on the subject has reached a point where a new 
perspective is needed (Hoepfl, 1997). 
A comprehensive research programme designed to investigate how students 
understand a specific scientific concept will require a range of research strategies.  In 
order to develop the fullest possible picture of how students understand that concept, 
we will need to collect and analyse data in a variety of ways.   The picture will never be 
perfect for human beings are a complicated lot.  A flexible use of methodologies over 
time is needed.  Neither quantitative nor qualitative methods alone will suffice. At 
times that will mean a particular study will use only quantitative or qualitative 
methods.  At other times, a mixed methods approach in the same study is called for.  
This often puts us in the best position to be able to offer sound pedagogical 
recommendations that practitioners will find useful. 
Previous research on students’ conceptions of deep time reviewed in chapter 
two employed a variety of methodologies.  Studies and methods employed are 
delineated in Table 3.1.  Classifying a particular study as quantitative, qualitative, or 
mixed methods is not always easy to do, especially if the researcher did not define the 
study in that manner.  For the purpose of Table 3.1, the quantitative column includes 
studies that employed either descriptive or inferential statistics as the means to report 
and analyse data and draw conclusions.  In a few cases, a few qualitative interviews 
were embedded within the larger quantitative design (e.g., Dahl, Anderson, & 
Libarkin, 2005; Dodick & Orion, 2003a; Marques & Thompson, 1997) but the study’s 
design, analysis and reporting of data were mainly quantitative. The qualitative 
column includes studies that analysed data by searching for and reporting on themes 
153 
 
that emerged.  The mixed methods column can be especially problematic to define 
since it can include a variety of studies on a continuum from largely quantitative but 
with some qualitative analysis to the opposite scenario.  Decisions about where to 
place a particular study were also based upon the authors’ intent.  One study that is 
listed in Table 3.1 as qualitative did employ some quantitative analysis (Libarkin et al., 
2007).  The authors describe their study as qualitative at several points, thus I placed it 
in that column.  Table 3.1 demonstrates that quantitative methods have ruled the day 
in geoscience conceptions research on deep time.  As I indicated previously, 
quantitative methods have many strengths and provide valuable data and 
interpretations.  They do not, however, paint a complete picture.  For that, we need 
additional methods. 
Methodology Frequency 
Quantitative 14 
Qualitative 3 
Mixed Methods 1 
Table 3.1 Frequency of methodology used in deep time studies reviewed in chapter 
two 
 
3.2 Rationale for research methods for this study 
I argued in chapter two that the geoscience research community needs a new 
lens through which to view how students understand deep time.  It is also important 
that the present study fit into a larger methodological framework.  In the previous 
section, I briefly described some of the strengths and weaknesses of quantitative and 
qualitative methods.  I concluded the section with a description of the methods 
employed by others who have studied conceptions of deep time.  There is another 
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way to think about conceptions research that is important for understanding why I 
have chosen the methods for this study that I have.   
Hashweh (1988) delineates three types of conceptions research studies: 
descriptive, explanatory, and intervention.  Descriptive studies seek to explore the 
range of conceptions held by students, while the goal of explanatory studies is to 
determine why students hold the ideas they do.  Explanatory studies can also provide 
information about why some erroneous conceptions persist while others are easily 
modified.  As their name implies, intervention studies are designed to test the 
effectiveness of a particular teaching methodology or curriculum as a means to effect 
conceptual change.  All three types of studies are needed, yet all three are not 
adequately represented in the deep time conceptions literature.   
All of the studies dealing with deep time reviewed in chapter two can be 
described as descriptive.  Taken together, they have demonstrated that students and 
adults at every age that was sampled hold similar, erroneous ideas about deep time. 
This is an important finding.  Yet, we do not necessarily know why students are giving 
incorrect responses to our queries.  Just as importantly, we don’t know why some 
others are giving correct ones.  It may well be that students are not confused about 
what we think they are, but are confused about something else entirely.  Depending 
upon the response type chosen for a particular study, we may have overestimated 
some students’ understanding, assuming that if they responded correctly they 
understood.  That may not be the case.  How then are we to interpret students’ 
responses?  What factors may influence how they comprehend deep time?   
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Review of previous studies on deep time point out two weaknesses in the 
existing research base on the topic.  As was argued in chapter two from a theoretical 
standpoint, they have not looked systematically at the factors that underlie a concept 
of deep time.   Thus, I proposed the model of the “three-legged stool.”  Here I make 
the argument that additional research is needed on methodological grounds.  At this 
point an explanatory study is needed to address the fact that all research to date has 
been descriptive.  Second, as Table 3.1 demonstrates, quantitative methods have 
predominated.  Studies have primarily employed large-scale questionnaire type 
formats.  Sometimes a few interviews were conducted as part of the larger study, but 
not always.  While the large quantitative studies have been useful, additional studies 
employing qualitative methods in which students are asked to provide explanations 
for their responses are needed.  Applying similar methodologies to those used in the 
quantitative studies can help determine whether the “three-legged stool” is a viable 
model.  The themes that emerge from data analysis can provide an essential first step 
in a research programme to explore the utility of the model of the deep time “stool.”   
This view reflects a pragmatist approach.   
3.2.1 Why task-based semi-structured interviews? 
 Data collection in qualitative research can take many forms: observations, 
interviews, or the analysis of documents and artefacts (Creswell, 2009, pp. 179-180).    
Because this study is designed to investigate factors that may influence how students 
think about deep time, examination and analysis of documents or artefacts alone 
would not provide much useful information about how students were thinking about 
the subject.  Observations of students as they work on tasks related to deep time are 
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important.  In fact, the tasks used in this study are a key component of the research 
design, but by themselves observations would provide insufficient data about 
students’ thinking processes.   
Posner and Gertzog (1982) describe interviews as a way to provide a window 
into factors that underlie specific conceptions and the relationships among those 
underlying factors.   Interviewing allows the researcher to probe the thinking behind 
an individual’s responses.  Participants can be asked to clarify their responses and 
follow-up questions can be used to investigate particular avenues that may have been 
unanticipated prior to the study, giving them an advantage over paper and pencil 
surveys (Mahoney, n.d., Interviews section, ¶1).  The interviewer can make counter-
suggestions or simply even repeat what the interviewee has said in an attempt to elicit 
further information.  The addition of specific tasks to the interview protocol permits 
the researcher to focus on students’ strategies rather than whether answers are 
merely correct or incorrect (Goldin, 2000).   
Task-based interviews were used extensively by Piaget (see section 2.2.1).   
Those methods and Piaget’s highly detailed descriptions of his work (e.g., Piaget, 
1969) have permitted other researchers to use similar tasks to independently verify 
and refute aspects of his theories.    That is an important reason why interviews were 
chosen for this study.  A number of the tasks in the interview protocol are modelled 
after ones used by others whose work was reviewed in chapter two.  The similarity of 
tasks allows for comparison with previous studies and perhaps new interpretations of 
their findings.  Besides the more general strengths of qualitative research described 
previously, task-based interviews can be used to investigate the strength of responses 
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by looking for consistency across tasks.   The search for common language across 
participants can be used to develop a theoretical model for how students acquire a 
notion of deep time.   
3.2.2 Issues in the use of interviews 
 In a previous section I discussed some of the limitations of qualitative methods 
in general.  All those apply to interviews as a qualitative data collection method.  In 
this section I focus on weaknesses that are more specific to interviews.   
The use of semi-structured interviews, task-based or otherwise, is not without 
concerns.  Anyone employing this method of data collection must be aware of its 
limitations as well as its strengths.  Interviews are heavily dependent upon the 
cooperation of the interviewees (Marshall & Rossman, 2006).  Interviewee 
cooperation might be seen as a particular problem in other types of qualitative studies 
such as ethnographic or phenomenological research, but it is also a potential problem 
in a study of this type.  Another is that the setting of the interviews is not always 
constant from interviewee to interviewee (Mahoney, n.d.), thus it is not always 
possible to control for background distractors.  This can be a problem in a school 
setting where distractors are abundant.  The interview itself likely has an effect upon 
students’ responses.  When individuals are repeatedly being asked to justify their 
responses, they may approach tasks in ways that are different from what they would if 
no one was asking them why they answered the way they did (Goldin, 2000).  This 
may not actually be a limitation, but it certainly adds to the artificiality of the 
experience. 
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 Researchers have been aware for some time that what interviewees say 
during the study may not accurately reflect what they truly think.  Piaget, who used 
interviewing extensively, noted that children’s responses may not be indicative of 
their actual conceptions (in Posner & Gertzog, 1982).  In some instances the student is 
not particularly interested in the question and says the first thing that comes to mind, 
which is not necessarily what the person would say if asked the same question at 
another time.  At other times, the way a question is asked leads children to particular 
responses, a point also made by others (Marin, 2004).  Occasionally, children give the 
answer they think they are supposed to give.  This can be a particular problem when 
interviews are conducted in a school setting.  Some students may feel that the tasks 
require “school” answers, which may not correspond to what they would say if the 
interview was held in another place (Goldin, 2000).  Even when students are giving 
thought to the question their responses may suggest a level of coherence and 
forethought that is not actually there (Myers & Newman, 2007).  If asked similar 
questions at a later moment, they might reason quite differently.   Further, in asking 
students to describe their thinking processes we assume they possess metacognitive 
awareness, when they may not.   
The skill of the interviewer in both data collection and analysis has an 
important effect upon a study’s outcomes (Marshall & Rossman, 2006).   It was 
already mentioned that the wording of questions can lead participants to particular 
responses.  An even greater problem is that of the perspectives that the interviewer 
and interviewee each bring to the task. 
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Johnson and Gott (1996) argue that researchers need to pay careful attention 
to methodological issues in the use of interviews and recognize the effect those issues 
have upon a study’s outcomes.   They are concerned that much science conceptions 
literature leaves one with the impression that uncovering students’ ideas is “relatively 
straightforward” (p. 562).   In reality there are several points where the process can 
break down.  No matter what the subject of the interview, both the interviewer and 
interviewee bring their frames of reference to the task.  The interviewer is often a 
domain expert and, hence, comes to the interview with domain vocabulary and 
knowledge.  The interviewee will likely possess limited knowledge of the topic at 
hand, but will have some everyday knowledge.  The interviewee’s lexicon may contain 
some of the same words as those used by the interviewer but the definitions may 
differ.  This can lead to a disconnect between what is said and what is perceived.  
Thus, it is possible that the interviewee will interpret the question being asked in a 
manner that is different from the one the interviewer intended.  It is equally possible 
(and not mutually exclusive with the prior point), that the interviewer will interpret 
the interviewee’s response in a manner that is different from what was meant (see 
also Myers & Newman, 2007).  Thus, triangulation of responses (see section 3.1) is 
important if we are to have confidence in the credibility of students’ responses. 
Transcribing audio or videotapes can be challenging.  While punctuation is 
used regularly in written communication it is not used in the same way when 
speaking.  In a desire to transcribe in a manner that makes sense to a reader, nuances 
can be obscured.  Unless videotapes are generated, nonverbal visual information is 
lost if the researcher does not record it.  Interviews are also subject to potential biases 
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on the part of the experimenter.  Decisions about how data should be coded 
undoubtedly reflect a researcher’s underlying assumptions.  If coding categories were 
different, conclusions might also be different.  The task-based interviews designed for 
this study may not tell us the relative importance of each of the three factors in an 
understanding of deep time.   
All these concerns are inherent to the methodology, and minimally, call for 
caution in the interpretation of results.  Task-based semi-structured interviews can, 
however, provide a place to begin a research programme.  Themes that emerge from 
these interviews can be tested more fully using other methods.  Designing an 
interview protocol that tries to uncover students’ conceptions (and not simply the first 
thought that comes into their heads) is important for anyone using them as a research 
methodology.   
3.2.3 Issues that must be addressed in the development of task-based interviews 
One problem with interviews that was mentioned in the previous section is the 
possibility of misunderstanding between interviewer and interviewee.  That problem 
could lead one to conclude that conceptions research is futile, but this is not so.  
Johnson and Gott (1996) call for conceptions researchers to do everything possible to 
place the interface between researcher and student on what they term “neutral 
ground” (p. 565).  To place the interview situation on neutral ground means that, 
The child understands what the researcher is asking in the meaning intended by 
the researcher, and the researcher understands the child’s response in the meaning 
intended by the child.  The neutral ground will be a much more limited affair than 
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either the researcher’s or the child’s own frame of reference (Johnson & Gott, 
1996, p. 565). 
The authors are well aware of the difficulty of the task.  They offer several 
guidelines that are useful when designing qualitative interview protocols.  First, as 
much as possible it is important to construct items that neither lead participants in a 
particular direction nor limit their responses.  The problem of different lexicons has 
already been mentioned.  Researchers cannot assume that an interviewee holds a 
scientific conception simply because a scientific term is used.  By the same token, 
using scientific terminology in interview questions can be problematic since there are 
no guarantees that the interviewee has the same understanding of the term as the 
interviewer.  Johnson and Gott call for the triangulation of responses, a point that was 
made earlier. 
3.2.4 Why middle school, high school, and university students? 
 The National Science Education Standards described in section 1.3 show that 
geoscience topics that relate to deep time appear in the U.S. curriculum most 
commonly at the middle school (ages 11-14) and high school levels (ages 14-18).   In 
order to make sense of things such as tectonic plate motion and the fossil record 
students will need to possess some understanding of deep time.  It makes sense to 
include students from both middle school and high school in the sample for this study. 
The geoscience content taught in elementary school (ages 5-11) focuses 
primarily on Earth materials rather than Earth processes, thus, children at those ages 
are not included in this study.  (The water cycle is an exception that is often taught in 
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elementary school and then retaught in either middle or high school.)  Therefore, 
knowledge of deep time is not so crucial to understanding geoscience content at the 
elementary level.  Further, as was seen in chapter two, elementary school age children 
have sufficient difficulty with longer units of conventional time.  Deep time would be 
expected to be quite problematic for them.   
Many U.S. universities have introductory geology courses that students across 
the university take to fulfill general education requirements.  Thus, they contain 
students who are science majors and those who are not. For non-science majors this 
will often be the final science course ever taken in their educational careers.  Those 
introductory courses deal with a variety of Earth processes that occur in the context of 
deep time.  Research with this population has demonstrated that they have a rather 
poor understanding of the topic near the end of the course not just at the beginning 
(Libarkin & S. Anderson, 2005).   The fact that their understanding of deep time does 
not improve significantly by the end of the course makes them an important group to 
include in this sample.   A study designed to explore the factors that influence an 
understanding of deep time may be a first step in explaining why university students 
still struggle with the concept at the end of a geoscience course.   
3.2.5 Why a cross-age study? 
Once the decision to focus on middle school, high school, and university 
students was made, the next decision was whether to conduct a longitudinal or a 
cross-age study.  A cross-age study was chosen because it fits the study’s aims while a 
longitudinal study does not.  A cross-age study does not permit a researcher to 
investigate the development of a particular individual’s understanding.  However, this 
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investigation is not designed to uncover the process by which individual students 
come to understand deep time.  Nor is this study designed to invoke a change in a 
student’s conceptions.  It does, however, allow one to explore how age may be 
related to student responses.  While overall understanding of the concept doesn’t 
appear to change much with age, the reasons for why students hold those 
conceptions might vary with age.   Perhaps one of the three factors being explored will 
be a greater factor in a student’s difficulties with deep time at different ages.  This 
type of methodology is also likely to uncover a range of responses that can form a 
basis for later follow-up research.  A cross-age study appears to be the best design for 
the research questions explored in this particular investigation.  
3.3 Development of the instrument: The role of preliminary interviews 
A series of preliminary interviews based upon the literature reviewed in 
chapter two preceded the interviews for the main study. Results of those early 
interviews were crucial in the design of the final interview protocol. Hence, they are 
briefly described here.  There was a synergy between the preliminary interviews, their 
analysis, and the literature review.  Responses in those early interviews suggested 
further avenues to explore in the literature.  Thus the base of the literature review 
was broadened considerably to include literature in each of the three areas outside a 
deep time context.  At the same time, additional reading of the literature indicated 
ways in which the interviews could be modified.  For example, errors commonly made 
on conventional time tasks of duration (see section 2.2.3) such as the equating of 
spatial distance with duration pointed to ways to modify the interview protocol.  
Results of the preliminary interviews worked in tandem with the literature review 
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described in chapter two and resulted in the development of the model of the “three-
legged stool.”   
The purpose of the preliminary interviews was two-fold.  First, the items in 
these interviews were designed to investigate what types of questions should be 
asked in the main study.  While some of the items were common to all exploratory 
interviews, the questions evolved as a result of analysis of interview transcripts.   In 
that sense, there is an emergent quality to this study, although ultimately the 
interview protocol in the actual study did not vary from individual to individual.  
Second, the exploratory interviews provided an opportunity for the investigator to 
practice the interview process before beginning the actual research study.   
Preliminary interviews were conducted in three stages.  All participants in the 
preliminary interviews comprised a convenience sample.  First, four university 
undergraduates (three female and one male) were interviewed.  The interview 
protocol was subsequently revised based upon analysis of their responses.  One 12-
year-old female and two 14-year-old males (middle school students) were then 
interviewed.  Following analysis of these responses, the interview protocol was again 
revised.  This revised interview protocol was administered to two university 
undergraduates.  All participants in the preliminary stage were known to the 
investigator.  All interviews were audio recorded.  Three university student interviews 
and all middle school interviews were fully transcribed for analysis.   
Some of the questions in the preliminary interviews were set within the 
context of deep time while others were well within conventional time.  There were 
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fewer tasks in the initial interviews.  One item had nothing to do with deep time at all.  
Students in those very first interviews: 
 Sequentially ordered cards of nine geoscience events from the Big Bang to the 
extinction of woolly mammoths, a task modelled after Trend (2000) but with 
the inclusion of a card, “Great Pyramids of Egypt were built” 
 Drew a cross-section of the Earth as if it had been cut in half from North to 
South 
 Placed events in a day on one timeline and major holidays in a year on a 
separate timeline 
 Placed four events from Earth’s history on a timeline, taken from the 
Geoscience Concept Inventory, question 28 (Libarkin & Anderson, 2005) 
 Watched four animations, all of which are available online: the break-up of 
Pangaea, an oceanic-oceanic divergent plate boundary, an oceanic-continental 
divergent boundary, and a continental-continental convergent boundary and 
answered questions about what they thought was happening and how much 
time was required for the events in the animations to happen 
A few items were changed prior to the interviews with the younger pupils.  The 
one-day and one-year duration timelines were removed after analysis of the interview 
transcripts with the first four university students as they did not appear to yield any 
useful information.  An additional item was added for the younger pupils based upon 
work done with size of scale phenomena (Jones et al., 2009; Jones et al., 2008; Tretter 
et al., 2006; Tretter et al., 2006).  This item contained a list of events that ranged from 
very short (amount of time to eat dinner) to very long (amount of time for Pangaea to 
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break apart).  Students were asked to choose the duration of each event from among 
time categories that ranged from seconds to millions of years.  This item was added 
for two reasons.  The first was to compare students’ responses on this item and others 
in the interview.  The second was to compare students’ ability to estimate durations 
for events within a human lifetime and those outside it.   
Several themes emerged from participant responses across all the preliminary 
interviews.  These themes were used to revise the instrument for the actual study.  
One commonality among responses of both university and middle school students was 
an inability to work with numbers greater than thousands.  When talking about 
durations of events, only one of the interviewees used numbers greater than 
thousands of years.  This finding served to corroborate what others researching deep 
time conceptions had already said about the issue of large numbers (Oversby, 1996; 
Trend, 1998).  Thus, additional items were constructed to specifically probe how 
students understand large numbers both in and outside a geoscience context. 
If asked to place the duration of events in broad time categories similar to 
what Trend (Trend, 2000, 2001b) did for succession, students were able to place 
durations of geologic events in those categories, but when asked to offer their own 
judgment about how long a geologic process took, with only one exception (discussed 
below), interviewees never mentioned a time frame longer than a few thousand 
years.  One university student’s response was typical.  When asked how long it took 
for Pangaea to break apart she replied,  
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I’m pretty sure that would take a really long time because it has a far way to 
go.  The plates don’t move very fast.  I would say a thousand years or 
something. 
A 20-year-old male university student (history major) was the outlier in the 
group.  This young man has a self-described aversion to mathematics and science.  He 
has had no higher level coursework at university dealing with geoscience, and it is not 
a subject about which he reads outside of school.  During the interview he 
commented that there was really no difference in 1,000 years or one year in terms of 
geologic time—they were the same.  This understanding was not demonstrated by 
any of the other interviewees—middle school pupils or university students.  In the 
context of geologic time, their spontaneous comments indicated a view that a year 
was much longer than a day.  Within a human lifetime that is true, but within the 
context of deep time the differences are inconsequential.  This young man also 
indicated that he would use a historical event (the American Revolution) as a unit with 
which to determine how long ago a particular event occurred.  He said that since the 
American Revolution happened a little over 200 years ago he would ask himself how 
many 200-year periods have happened since the event in question occurred.  In 
contrast, one of the middle school pupils illustrated that it was possible to have a bit 
of information but be unable to use it.  He said he had heard from his sister that the 
Earth was five billion years old; yet, he was unable to use that information to reason 
about ages and durations.  The number had little meaning to him. 
Several students appeared to equate size of a feature with the amount of time 
necessary for it to form.  For example, one student said that it would take much 
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longer for the Colorado River to carve the Grand Canyon than for a coral reef to form 
because coral reefs are smaller than the Grand Canyon.  In his view, “It takes a long 
time to make a giant hole in the ground.”  This suggested some inability to apply a 
conventional understanding of time in a geologic context.  In other words, students 
made a similar error to one described in chapter two in which distance was equated 
with duration.  Here, amount of space (size) = duration.      
In explanations for their answers participants said they were unsure about 
some events.  Two of the three middle school pupils had not heard of the Big Bang.  As 
a result, they were unable to correctly place the Big Bang in a card sequence of 
geologic events.    This was in agreement with findings reported in chapter two and 
suggested that lack of geoscience content knowledge may play a significant role in 
student responses.   
Additionally, responses across tasks were sometimes inconsistent.  This 
underscored the need for triangulation of responses that Johnson and Gott (1996) 
indicate is critical if findings are to be trusted.   Further, a participant’s belief system 
influenced responses.  One person felt she knew what the scientifically correct 
response should have been but rejected it as inconsistent with her religious beliefs.  
The young woman’s views were an example of factors that could influence the 
stability of the deep time “stool” that were discussed in section 2.8.  This pointed out 
the need to both recognize the role of beliefs in responses and to choose a sample 
that would represent that demographic but not overly so.   A fuller discussion of this 
point follows in 3.5.1.1. 
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Following the middle school interviews, the protocol was revised again to 
include all the items that were a part of the final interview protocol.  These changes 
were made to more fully explore each area of the “stool” within a geoscience context 
and outside it.  Several items (all of which are discussed below) were added.  
Specifically, items that adapted methods used by others (Ault, 1980; Dodick & Orion, 
2003a) were included in order to facilitate comparison with their findings.  Some items 
were revised to make their meaning clearer.  For example, participants seemed 
confused when asked to indicate the amount of time necessary for “the start and 
finish of an earthquake.”  Responses indicated that some individuals were focusing on 
the stress leading up to the actual event rather than the duration of the vibrations 
during the earthquake.  This item was reworded to “the amount of time the ground 
shakes during an earthquake.”  
This revised interview protocol was administered to two female university 
preservice elementary teachers (primary teacher trainees).  The two women were 
asked to provide feedback as to the clarity of the interview protocol.  Audiotapes were 
also reviewed to check for item clarity and whether or not questions appeared to be 
leading students to particular responses.  No further revisions were made to the 
interview items after these two students were interviewed. 
3.4 The interview protocol 
The final decision for what items to include in the interviews flowed out of the 
literature review in chapter two and the themes that emerged from the preliminary 
interviews discussed above.  Items were designed to explore each of the three “legs” 
of the deep time “stool.”  Some items can be triangulated with other items in the 
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interviews to ascertain consistency of responses.  Figure 3.1 is a schematic of how the 
interview tasks fit together.  Succession and duration were the organising principles 
around which the tasks were structured.  Duration items outnumbered succession 
ones since research dealing with how students understand duration is 
underrepresented in the literature.  Each item looked at succession or duration in the 
context of one of the three “legs” of the “stool”: conventional time, large numbers, or 
geoscience content knowledge.  Items that addressed each of those categories are 
shown in the centre.  A number of the items provide information on several categories 
simultaneously.  Items are described briefly in the next few sections.  A complete 
transcript of the final interview script along with correct answers to the items can be 
found in Appendix A.   
 
Figure 3.1 Relationships among items in the interview protocol 
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3.4.1 Succession items 
Succession in time involves the before and after relationship as well as the 
ability to discern that two events occur simultaneously.  One succession item was 
adapted from Puzzle 5 of the GeoTAT (Dodick & Orion, 2003a, 2003b).   Puzzle 5 can 
be found in Figure 2.2 (p. 126).  In the GeoTAT students viewed Puzzle 5 and were 
asked to place the fossil layers in temporal order by appearance in the columns.  In 
the present study, students were shown the image and asked to indicate whether the 
trilobite or the brachiopod was formed first (trilobite is correct).  This pair was chosen 
because both appear at the bottom of a column, but a brachiopod also appears higher 
up in the second column.  This question should be sensitive to prior knowledge.  A 
student would need to know that, unless deformation of strata has occurred, older 
layers in sedimentary strata are found below younger layers (superposition).   
However, that inference may not require any particular geoscience knowledge as it 
conforms to an everyday idea.  When I see a brick wall, I know that the layer of bricks 
on the bottom was put there before the layers above them.  The problem is that the 
brachiopod and the trilobite are both on the bottom of a column.  Thus, I must also 
realize that two brachiopods that appear in different places represent the same 
depositional episode.  This does require geoscience content knowledge.   
An animation was created from Puzzle 5 so that students could watch the fossil 
layers appear in real time.   This was done to enable the task to be completed based 
solely upon an understanding of succession without the requirement for the 
geoscience content knowledge described in the previous paragraph.  A still image of 
the animation based upon Puzzle 5 is shown in Figure 3.2.  In the animation each layer 
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appeared on the screen as would be appropriate based upon fossil succession.   
Participants watched the animation on a laptop which they were able to move so that 
it was a comfortable distance for viewing.  They were told they could watch it multiple 
times both before and after being asked questions about it.  Students were then asked 
to compare three pairs of layers and say which one formed first or if they formed at 
the same time.  The pairs of layers were: 
 Clam vs. fish scale: chosen because both appear at the same place in adjacent  
columns, while the clam also appears at another position in the first column 
(clam is correct) 
 Coral vs. brachiopod: chosen because the brachiopod in the second column 
occupies a higher position than the coral in the first column while the 
brachiopod in the third column occupies a lower position (coral is correct) 
 Trilobite vs. brachiopod: chosen to serve as a comparison to a student’s 
previous response to this question when it was asked prior to watching the 
animation (trilobite is correct) 
   
Figure 3.2 Animation exploring ability to apply succession in conventional 
time 
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Finally, they were asked to sequence the layers in the three columns, as Dodick and 
Orion did with the static image.   This requires the before and after relationship since I 
must understand that if I saw the trilobite appear on the screen before the ammonite 
what I saw represents temporal succession.  I must also be able to judge that if two 
layers appear at the same time [ammonite in first column and ammonite in second 
column], they represent simultaneous events.  These last two statements are 
undoubtedly self-evident to the reader, however, that is not the case for individuals 
who do not possess a solid concept of succession in conventional time (see section 
2.2.1). 
An additional set of items explored succession and was modelled after Trend’s 
work (1998, 2000, 2001a, 2001b) discussed in section 2.6.1.   A complete list of items 
in correct order can be found in Appendix A and also Table 4.12 on p. 278 under the 
column Rank: Consensus. The difference between this task and Trend is that all his 
events occurred in deep time with the exception of one named “present day.”  Nine 
events in deep time were used for the present study.  An additional four events were 
added from ancient history through the Age of Exploration.  Adding these items 
provided a means to test understanding of succession in both conventional and deep 
time simultaneously.  In U.S. schools, ancient history and the Age of Exploration are 
frequently taught prior to eighth grade and again in high school.  Therefore, all 
participants in the sample should have had some exposure to these historical events.  
If students find it no easier to place events considered part of recorded history than 
those in deep time it could suggest that specific knowledge of the events may be a 
more important factor in their responses than how long ago the events occurred.  In 
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fact, one might argue that sequencing historical events accurately might actually be 
more difficult than sequencing at least some of the geoscience events, precisely 
because they are more sensitive to subject matter knowledge.  It might be possible to 
sequence several of the geoscience events using logical reasoning without specific 
geoscience content knowledge.  
Following the initial card sort, participants were asked to place cards into piles 
based upon how long ago the events on the cards occurred.  They were not given the 
categories but were told to determine the appropriate number of categories 
themselves.  This is similar to a task described in chapter two with scale related to size 
(Tretter et al., 2006a; Tretter et al., 2006b).  This method allowed participants to 
organize the categories themselves and could provide some insight into how students 
view the relationship of the events to each other.  Students were then asked to 
provide a name for each category.  If they did not mention an age, they were asked to 
provide an age for their categories. 
3.4.2 Duration items 
Three computer animations were created to address how students perceive 
duration in conventional time.  They were modelled after the types of tasks described 
in The Child’s Conception of Time (Piaget, 1969) which were reviewed in section 2.2.1.  
Students watched these animations on the same laptop used for the fossil layers 
animation described earlier.  Still images of the animations appear in Figure 3.3, 3.4, 
and 3.5.  All have the same horizontal coloured layers that appear against a black 
background in the following order from bottom to top: red, blue, yellow, green, 
brown, and pink.   Each layer fills up one after the other.  Animations run for between 
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33-41 seconds.  There is a timer that runs in the upper right portion of the screen 
although participants were not specifically directed to it.  Table 3.2 lists the layers for 
each animation and the amount of time it takes for each layer to fill.  In the first 
animation all six layers are of the same thickness, but fill at different rates.  Duration 
(amount of time to fill) varies but total work done (in a Piagetian sense) is the same.   
In animation two, the layers are of varying thicknesses but all take six seconds to fill.  
Duration remains the same but amount of work done (thickness of layers) varies.  In 
animation three, both the thickness of the layers and the time required for them to fill 
are varied. 
   
            Figure 3.3 Animation 1   Figure 3.4 Animation 2  
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    Figure 3.5 Animation 3 
 
Colour (from 
bottom to top) 
Animation 1 Animation 2 Animation 3 
Red 5 seconds 6 seconds 6 seconds 
Blue 8 seconds 6 seconds 4 seconds 
Yellow 4 seconds 6 seconds 7 seconds 
Green 6 seconds 6 seconds 7 seconds 
Brown 4 seconds 6 seconds 10 seconds 
Pink 6 seconds 6 seconds 7 seconds 
Table 3.2 Amount of time to fill coloured layers in each animation 
Research post-Piaget described in chapter two noted the strong relationship 
between temporal and spatial mapping for individuals well beyond the ages of the 
children used in Piaget’s research (Boroditsky, 2000; Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008; 
Friedman, 2005).  The question was whether spatial cues (thickness of the layers) 
would influence judgments of duration.  The animations are not designed to simulate 
actual deposition.  The coloured layers appear smoothly in the animations whereas 
deposition is much more uneven.  They are analogous to deposition only in so far as it 
occurs in horizontal layers that exhibit superposition under normal circumstances.  
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Rather, the purpose of the animations was to take horizontal layers and determine if 
students were able to correctly judge duration in conventional time even when spatial 
and temporal information did not co-vary (i.e., a thinner layer filled more quickly than 
a thicker one or a thicker and thinner layer filled in the same amount of time).   
After watching each animation participants were asked two questions that 
required them to compare how long it took two specific layers to fill.  They were told 
they could watch each animation as many times as they wished both before and after 
the interviewer asked questions.  This was so participants could focus on the 
perceptual task and not need to rely on memory to answer the questions.  Half the 
participants viewed animation one first and half watched animation two first.  It was 
not known whether order of presentation would affect student responses, but this 
was investigated in the data analysis.  
Table 3.3 lists the specific layers for which students compared durations on 
each animation.  Correct answers for each pair are in bold.  Neither answer is bolded 
for questions following Animation 2 since all layers required the same amount of time 
to fill.  These specific pairs of layers were chosen based upon the literature reviewed 
in chapter two and the type of errors described there on duration tasks.  For each 
animation the first question asked, “Which layer took longer?”  The second question 
asked, “Which layer filled more quickly?”  Comparison layers were chosen so that for 
question one, the first layer of the pair seen might elicit the type of error seen in the 
literature.  The second layer seen was more likely to elicit an error like those reported 
in chapter two for question two.   
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Animation Layers compared 
 
Animation 1 (A1) 
Red vs. blue  
Yellow vs. green 
 
Animation 2 (A2) 
Blue vs. yellow (same) 
Brown vs. pink (same) 
 
Animation 3 (A3) 
Green vs. brown 
Red vs. blue 
Table 3.3 Coloured layers compared on duration animations 
The animations required different strategies to answer the questions. For A1, 
one only needed to take account of different rates since the thickness of the layers 
was held constant.  In A2 one had to account for both the thickness of the layer and 
the rate at which it filled to determine duration.  A3 included one of the A1 type and 
one question unique to the animations.  Rate and size varied inversely for this 
question; however, the rate difference between the two layers was greater than for 
any other pairs compared across animations.  Alternatively, durations for all 
animations could be judged by counting the time it took each layer to fill, either in 
one’s head or by using the timer that was on the screen.   
The next duration item occurred immediately after the animations.  
Participants were shown a line drawing of a sedimentary stratigraphic sequence 
(Figure 3.6) typical of what one might find in the Southwest United States.  They were 
asked to use information from the animations to compare layers 3 and 4 and 
determine which one probably took longer to form.  Students were also told that 
neither the designs on the layers nor the erosional patterns had anything to do with 
how long layers took to form.   Since no information is provided about the 
depositional environment, the correct answer to this question is that it is impossible 
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to say for certain which layer took longer to form based upon the drawing alone.  This 
is consistent with the animations as there was no consistent pattern across 
animations in terms of thickness of the layer and time required to fill.  Ault (1982) 
alleged that elementary school students had no difficulty understanding conventional 
time but were unable to apply it to a geologic context.  This item was designed to 
explore whether or not that is so.   
 
Figure 3.6 Line drawing of a hypothetical stratigraphic sequence 
The next set of duration items were developed as a result of the preliminary 
interviews described in section 3.3.  As was noted earlier, participants in those early 
interviews had some difficulty conceiving of large numbers consistent with the 
literature on the subject reported in chapter two.  Additionally, chapter two pointed 
to the lack of research into how people conceive of durations over long periods of 
time.  Some research has explored how people perceive how much time has passed 
from the occurrence of an event to the present time, but not how they understand 
the length of the time period represented by a specific unit of time.  This set of 
questions was designed to address this issue.  
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Students were asked to create four timelines, each 50 cm long.  Three of them 
only involved numbers, albeit of various magnitudes.  The other line involved both 
large numbers and geoscience content knowledge.  For the timelines dealing only with 
numbers, participants were directed to place times on the timeline based upon how 
long they take “in proportion to each other.”  See Table 3.4 on p. 181 for an 
explanation of items in each timeline.  Appendix A includes possible correct timelines.  
In each case the order of items in Table 3.4 corresponds to the order in which items 
were presented.  For example, 1 day, 1 month, 1 year, and 100 years were written on 
four separate index cards.  Cards were placed in front of participants in left to right 
order with 1 day farthest left and 100 years farthest right.   If students expressed 
hesitancy or confusion about the directions, they were shown a timeline made by the 
investigator for one minute, one hour, and one day.  Younger students were more 
likely to be shown the investigator’s timeline than older participants.  Successful 
completion of Timeline 1 required knowledge of the proportional relationships 
between a day and a month and a month and a year, thus, some knowledge of units of 
time was required.  The proportional relationship between one year and 100 years 
might be determined purely on the basis of numerical reasoning since the unit (year) 
was the same.  Timelines 2 and 4 could be completed by using proportional reasoning 
since, again, the unit (year) was the same.   
Timelines were compared to determine if there was a difference in strategy or 
placement of times on the timelines.  In other words, would students find it easier to 
proportionally place the times when there were fewer of them and when the numbers 
were smaller?  Times on Timeline 1 were chosen for their familiarity and the fact that 
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three of the four times have been experienced by all participants in the study.  The 
fourth is often viewed as a long time in terms of human experience.  Times for 
Timeline 2 were chosen for several reasons.  First, they contained some time periods 
that fall within recorded history and others that do not.  Second, all relate to each 
other by powers of ten.  However, they do not all relate in the same manner (not all 
multiplied by 100, for example).  While, students might be expected to find it easy to 
relate 1,000 to 100,000, relating 100,000 to 1 million might prove more challenging.   
Timeline 1 Timeline 2 Timeline 3 Timeline 4 
1 day 1,000 years Earth spinning around once 1 minute 
1 month 100,000 years How long most coral reefs have 
been growing 
1 day 
1 year 1 million years Break-up of supercontinent Pangaea 1 month 
100 years 100 million years Earth going around Sun once 1 year 
  Moon going around Earth once 10,000 years 
  Carving of Grand Canyon by 
Colorado River 
10 million years 
  Time ground shakes during an 
earthquake 
100 million years 
Table 3.4 Items in Timelines 1-4 
On Timeline 3 participants were asked to place the events above on a timeline 
based upon how long they take to happen relative to each other.   This is a variation 
on the first two timelines where students simply placed numbers on the line.  For 
Timeline 3 they had to first determine how long each of the events takes to occur and 
then compare them to one another to decide on their relative placement on the 
timeline.  Thus, this item required knowledge of the duration of specific events 
(geoscience content knowledge) in addition to an understanding of large numbers. 
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In order to get the numbers for Timeline 4, scientifically accepted times for 
each of the events on Timeline 3 were rounded to the nearest power of ten or nearest 
familiar unit of time.  These numbers appear in column 4 of Table 3.4.  Participants 
were asked to place the numbers for Timeline 4 on a line in the same way they did for 
Timelines 1 and 2.   This final timeline was added for two reasons.  While it is similar to 
Timelines 1 and 2, it combines times both within and outside individual human 
experience.   Times outside individual lived experience encompassed times which are 
part of human history and those that are outside human history.  The second reason 
was to see if students approached this timeline differently after completing Timeline 
3.  The decision to round times to the nearest power of 10 was made because it was 
felt that using other numbers would add additional complexity to the task that would 
not yield significant information.  In terms of deep time, there is no appreciable 
difference between 10,000 and 20,000 years. 
Deep time encompasses time periods in the billions, but the largest time 
period in the timelines was 120 million years, or the amount of time for Pangaea to 
break apart.  This number was rounded to 100 million for reasons that were described 
above.  Billions were purposely not included.  Timelines 3 and 4 involved numbers that 
differed by more than eight orders of magnitude.  It was felt that the addition of a 
number in the billions would not provide significantly more information than 100 
million.  There was nothing in the literature reviewed in chapter two that would 
suggest that an additional order of magnitude would make any difference in the 
nature of students’ responses when dealing with numbers at this scale.  
183 
 
One duration item in the interview could most accurately be viewed as a 
geoscience content knowledge item.  Students were given a list of 20 items and asked 
to indicate how long each takes to occur (see Appendix A).  This is modelled after a 
similar task with size used by Tretter, et al., (2006a; 2006b).  Choices were seconds, 
minutes, days, years, hundreds of years, thousands of years, and millions of years.   
Some time periods were deliberately not added as choices because of the potential 
ambiguity.  For example, one could reason that a pumpkin seed grows into a fully ripe 
pumpkin in days, weeks, or months.  To eliminate this potential source of confusion 
weeks and months were not included as choices.  Since some of the events in this item 
were also in Timeline 3, durations for the two items can be triangulated.   The 
responses of someone who indicated a different duration for an event in this item 
than what was indicated for Timeline 3 may not be valid.   Other items were chosen as 
ones with which students would likely be familiar, such as the amount of time 
necessary to eat dinner or drive from one side of the state of Pennsylvania to the 
other (the state where participants lived at the time of the study).  A final group of 
items was chosen because their durations were likely to be unfamiliar to students.  
These included events with short durations such as the amount of time necessary for a 
red blood cell to travel through the entire body as well as longer durations such as the 
amount of time necessary for the Colorado River to carve the Grand Canyon.  The 
purpose of these items was to explore the question of whether subject matter 
knowledge of any type is a factor in judging duration irrespective of its length.   
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3.4.3 The interview procedure 
All interviews were conducted at the school or university at which the student 
was enrolled in a room with a small table and chairs and were audio recorded for later 
transcription and analysis.  The interview protocol was approved by the Ethics 
Advisory Committee at Durham University as meeting all requirements for the ethical 
treatment of human subjects.  A sample consent form signed by university 
participants and one signed by parents of eighth and eleventh graders are in Appendix 
B. 
A few minutes at the beginning of the interview were spent getting to know 
students, asking them about themselves, and their previous exposure to geoscience 
topics.  After each task, participants were asked to explain their thinking or why they 
completed the task the way they did.  Students were told at the beginning that they 
could ask questions at any time during the interview.  They were told they could think 
out loud as they worked if they would like.  They were encouraged to give responses 
throughout the interview but were told they didn’t have to guess.  If they weren’t sure 
they could simply say they didn’t know.  Follow-up questions were asked as 
appropriate.  Students were given the opportunity to change their mind about their 
answers.   When there were discrepancies in responses they were pointed out to 
participants.  They could then elect to change their answers or clarify them.   
Although, they were not specifically told they could take notes if they wished, several 
students used the paper and pencil that were on the table to do so. 
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3.5 The sample 
The sample consisted of 35 participants: 12 university undergraduates, 12 
eighth graders and 11 eleventh graders.  Interviews were conducted in fall 2007 and 
spring 2008.  This sample could be described as purposive for several reasons.  First, 
an attempt was made to balance participants by gender, although this was not 
successful with the 11th graders, a point that will be discussed later.   Second, science 
teachers of the 8th and 11th graders recommended students who they identified as 
high, middle, or low achievers in science.  This was done to include pupils who 
represented the range of ability levels.  Finally, one-half of the university students 
were selected from a group that is frequently deemed to hold metaphysical objections 
to the concept of deep time.  This is discussed in section 3.5.1.1.  No attempt was 
made to choose a sample that represented the racial and ethnic diversity found in the 
particular school or universities from which this sample was obtained.  Students were 
not chosen to represent the range of socioeconomic levels or their proportions within 
the larger student body of their school or university.  All university students self-
selected to participate.  They are unlikely to represent the ability levels or range of 
majors in their university. 
Information is provided about each subgroup within the sample, along with 
relevant information about the types of instruction these students are likely to have 
received prior to the interviews.  Information regarding topics participants studied 
may be useful to the reader.  However, as some research in chapter two 
demonstrated (e.g., Catley & Novick, 2009) the extent of prior coursework regarding 
deep time does not appear to have an appreciable effect upon conceptions of those 
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who can best be described as novices.  Additionally, this study is designed to 
investigate factors that may underlie students’ conceptions not explore the 
relationship of prior coursework to those conceptions. 
3.5.1 University Participants 
University participants were from two institutions.  A total of five males and 
seven females participated and represented a variety of majors offered by their 
institutions.  All participants were volunteers.   Students ranged in age from eighteen 
to twenty-four with a median age of twenty.   A list of university participants with 
their ages and majors can be found in Appendix D. 
3.5.1.1 Institution A 
The first six attend a small religiously-affiliated liberal arts college in eastern 
Pennsylvania, United States in which approximately half of the students are religious 
vocation majors (Institution A).  Undergraduate enrolment at the time of the 
interviews was 944.  The school population is 51% female and 49% male with 81% of 
the student body identifying themselves as white, non-Hispanic.   The Scholastic 
Aptitude Test (SAT) is an exam required by many U.S. universities for admission.  
While it is not required by Institution A, an annual ranking guide to U.S. colleges and 
universities indicates that 25% of admitted students who provided SAT scores to the 
institution scored below 860, and 25% of admitted students scored above 1180 
(Zuckerman, 2009).   This means that those students who took and reported their SAT 
scores to the college are in the average range of freshmen admitted to university in 
the U.S.  However, since the test is not required for admission to Institution A it 
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cannot be assumed that the student body as a whole falls into the average range.  In 
the U.S. the percentage of students receiving financial assistance is an approximate 
indicator of the overall socioeconomic level of the student body.  Ninety-eight percent 
of the students at Institution A receive some sort of financial aid (“Search For Schools, 
Colleges and Libraries” n.d.).   In 2003-2004, the national average was 63% for all 
colleges and universities in the U.S. (“Fast Facts,” n.d.) 
Three males and three females participated in the interviews.  All were 
enrolled in an introductory Earth Science course taught by the investigator in the fall 
of 2007 and were interviewed approximately two-thirds of the way through the 
course (November 2007).  The course is designed to meet general education 
requirements for a science course.  In the U.S., introductory courses include students 
from a variety of majors and not simply those who are studying science.   Two were 
preparing to be elementary (primary) teachers, one was a business major, and the 
remaining three were preparing for religious vocations.   The investigator asked for 
volunteers to participate in the study at the start of one class session.  Volunteers 
contacted the investigator individually to signal their willingness to participate.  All six 
indicated some prior earth science instruction in high school, and this was the first 
university geoscience course for all students. Prior to the interviews, students in the 
course studied tectonic and surface processes that produce Earth’s changing features.  
Rocks, minerals, and the rock cycle were covered early in the course.  They completed 
a section on geologic time that included relative and absolute dating methods used in 
geoscience and had a brief introduction to the nebular hypothesis, though a fuller 
discussion of the origin of the solar system occurred after the interviews took place. 
188 
 
It might be argued that this portion of the sample is purely one of 
convenience, yet it is also purposive.  Many students at Institution A come from 
backgrounds in which there is a perceived conflict between religious teachings and 
scientific understanding regarding the age of the Earth and the universe.  Therefore, 
students at this institution may be more likely to demonstrate a philosophical 
unwillingness to acknowledge deep time than those in the larger U.S. university 
population.  They come from an important demographic group for people researching 
understanding of deep time in the U.S. since they represent a view that is widely held 
within society at large.   According to a 2007 Gallup survey, 43% of Americans believe, 
“God created human beings pretty much in their present form at one time within the 
last 10,000 years or so." (“Evolution, Creationism, Intelligent Design”, n.d.)  As was 
noted in chapter two, other researchers in the U.S. have found that some students 
appear to reject the notion of deep time based upon their metaphysical beliefs (e.g., 
Libarkin, et al, 2007).  Therefore the inclusion of this group of individuals in the study 
was apropos.  However, it would have been inappropriate to have selected the entire 
university sample from this population as the results may have been skewed thereby 
making the study’s conclusions suspect. 
Additionally, these six students were the only ones in the study known to the 
examiner prior to the interviews.  The pre-existing teacher/student relationship makes 
the interview dynamic different with them than with any of the other participants.  
However, since Institution A is a small college, the examiner is the only instructor who 
teaches a geoscience course.  Thus, it was not possible to interview students at this 
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institution who were taught by someone else.  The purpose of the study justifies this 
group’s inclusion for the reasons stated above.   
3.5.1.2 Institution B 
An additional six students were interviewed from a comprehensive state 
university also located in eastern Pennsylvania (Institution B).  This school’s reported 
undergraduate enrolment at the time of the study was 10,818.  The student body is 
62% female and 38% male.  Eighty-six percent of students identify themselves as 
white, non-Hispanic.  The SAT is required for admission to Institution B.  Twenty-five 
percent of admitted students scored below 970 and 25% scored above 1150 
(Zuckerman, 2009).  Like Institution A, students at Institution B are in the average 
range for SAT scores for incoming freshmen.  However, that fact is deceptive since 
Institution B requires the SAT for admission while Institution A does not.  Overall, 
students at both institutions fall within the average to below average range of 
students at all U.S. colleges and universities.  Seventy-two percent of students at 
Institution B receive some sort of financial aid. 
All students from Institution B were enrolled in an introductory geology course 
in spring 2008 and were interviewed approximately two-thirds of the way through the 
semester (March 2008).  This is a course that includes both geology and non-geology 
students and is designed to meet general education requirements for a science 
course.  Students came from several sections of the course taught by a variety of 
instructors, none of whom was involved in this study.  Instructors of the respective 
sections made a general call for volunteers for the study during a regular class 
meeting.   After initial attempts to obtain volunteers were unsuccessful, a second 
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request was made.  All introductory geology students received a flyer requesting their 
participation, and they were offered $15 for their assistance.  Two geography majors, 
one history major, two computer science majors, and one geology major participated 
in the interviews.  Five of the six indicated some prior earth science instruction in 
either middle school or high school, and this was the first university geoscience course 
for all participants including the person who said he was planning to major in geology.  
Instructors of the various sections of the course employed a similar course outline.  
Prior to the interviews, all students had studied plate tectonics, with attention to the 
tectonic processes responsible for mountain building.  They had all been taught about 
rocks, minerals, and the rock cycle.  These students had also completed a unit on 
geologic time with attention given to relative and absolute dating methods.  
Not all students from Institutions A and B completed their compulsory 
education in Pennsylvania.  High school graduation requirements vary somewhat from 
state to state within the U.S. though all would provide instruction on place value, 
proportional reasoning, and scientific notation.  American universities require 
graduates to complete a mathematics course at the university level (or show 
proficiency), but that course can be taken at different times throughout a student’s 
university career.  Further, at both Institution A and Institution B, a student many 
choose from a variety of courses to meet the mathematics requirement.  Thus, it is 
likely that university participants in this study vary considerably in their mathematical 
skills.    
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3.5.2 Eighth and eleventh grade participants 
Eighth and eleventh grade participants attend a public charter school in 
eastern Pennsylvania.  This charter school is a publicly funded school that is granted 
the right to operate independently of some of the state and local school district 
regulations to which other U.S. public schools are subject (i.e., analogous to a UK trust 
school).  Students in many charter schools in Pennsylvania come from several 
neighbouring school districts including the district in which the school is situated.  This 
particular school serves students in kindergarten through grade 12.  Recent publicly 
available data (2007) indicates a student body of 911, 63% percent of which are white, 
non-Hispanic and 29% of which are African American.  In the U.S., the percentage of 
students in a school who are eligible for free or reduced lunch is used as an indicator 
of the socioeconomic level of the population.  Twelve percent of the students were 
eligible for free or reduced lunch in 2007 (“Schooldigger.com -- Search and compare 
elementary, middle, and high schools.,” 2008).  The state average for Pennsylvania in 
2007 was 35% (“Food & Nutrition: National School Lunch Program,” n.d.).  Thus, the 
socioeconomic level of the student body in this school is above average compared to 
other schools within Pennsylvania.  Eighth and eleventh graders were chosen by their 
science teacher to participate in the interviews.  All were interviewed in spring 2008, 
approximately one month before the end of the school year.   The teacher selected 
two males and two females from each grade who the teacher rated as high, middle, or 
low achievers.   Six boys and six girls in eighth grade were interviewed.  They ranged in 
age from 13 years, 9 months to 16 years, 1 month, with a median age of 14 years, 4 ½ 
months.  Several of the eleventh graders chosen by the science teacher did not return 
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the parental consent form for the interview and were therefore unable to participate.  
As a result of teacher substitutions to the original list, the total number of eleventh 
graders interviewed was eleven.   In the end, there were one female and two male 
high achievers, two female and three male middle achievers, and one female and two 
male low achievers.  The seven males and four females ranged in age from  16 years, 3 
months to 17 years 11 months, with a median age of 17 years, 1 month.  A list of the 
8th and 11th grade participants with their ages and achievement levels as ranked by 
their science teacher can be found in Appendix E.  All students in the 8th and 11th 
grade samples said they had studied earth science two years prior to the interviews in 
6th grade and 9th grade, respectively.   
Table 1.1 on p. 14 provides a framework for the types of topics 8th and 11th 
grade participants would have studied in previous earth science courses. Not all 8th 
graders could list specific topics they had discussed in earth science.  Those who did so 
mentioned plate tectonics, mountains, volcanoes, and earthquakes.  No one 
mentioned fossils or the rock cycle, even though these topics are commonly taught to 
students at this age level. 
By eleventh grade, students in Pennsylvania should have had two exposures to 
earth science, one in grade 6 and another in grade 9, although none of these students 
mentioned having learned about earth science in grade 6.   These students would have 
reviewed information taught in grade 6 and been taught principles of relative and 
absolute dating of earth materials.  Students at this level will have also been exposed 
to instruction regarding the Big Bang and the nebular hypothesis.   
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Place value, proportional reasoning, and scientific notation are introduced to 
students in Pennsylvania prior to 8th grade.  All students in this sample would have had 
some experience with these topics prior to the interview. 
3.6 Methods of data analysis 
Since this is an exploratory, qualitative study, data analysis was primarily 
qualitative.   The small sample size coupled with the way participants were chosen 
lends itself to qualitative rather than quantitative data analysis methods.  All 
interviews were fully transcribed.  Transcripts were analyzed by the investigator to 
find recurring themes or common responses across participants.  For example, did 
participants describe duration strategies that were consistent with the use of spatial 
mapping to temporal tasks?  Did they demonstrate confusion about the size of 
numbers of various magnitudes?  What types of reasons did they give for their 
answers?  Did they rely on surface features to make judgments rather than geoscience 
principles?  The goal of the analysis was to find patterns in responses that can be 
investigated in future studies.  Students were sorted into groups based upon their 
responses for some items.   
The investigator sorted numeric timelines into groups by accuracy on a linear 
scale using visual inspection of the timeline alone in accordance with a list of criteria.  
A second rater independently sorted responses according to the same criteria.  
Discrepancies between ratings were discussed, and all differences in categorisation 
were reconciled.  Inter-rater reliability was established and will be discussed in 
chapter four.  The investigator then compared transcripts with the timelines.  In any 
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case where the transcript suggested a more accurate conception than the timeline 
alone, the timeline was moved to a different category.  
However, there was some quantitative data analysis for which there is 
precedent in qualitative research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005).  Quantitative data analysis 
was done for two reasons.  First, several tasks in the interview protocol were adapted 
from items used by other researchers who applied quantitative methods to their data.  
The items in this study were analyzed in similar ways to allow for comparison with the 
data of others.  If findings from this study corroborated those in previous research it 
could lend support to the conclusions of others.  If current findings disagreed with 
those of earlier researchers, it may mean that new interpretations are required.   
Second, the duration animations were designed to not only provide qualitative 
analysis of why students chose the answers they did but also to be able to investigate 
whether the order of presentation of the animations affected student performance.  
Thus, t-tests were calculated in this one instance to ascertain if there was a difference 
between groups depending upon which animation was viewed first.  Effect sizes were 
also computed.  This small amount of statistical analysis was used in tandem with the 
qualitative analysis to reach conclusions about the data. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
 
This chapter is organized in the same manner as the literature review and 
corresponds to the three “legs” of the “stool” described in chapter two.  All tasks in 
the interview protocol dealt with either succession or duration.  Each was described in 
chapter three.  Some tasks were designed to investigate one of the three “legs” alone: 
conventional time, large numbers, or geoscience content knowledge.  Others were 
created to probe two “legs” simultaneously.  (Figure 3.1 on p. 170 lists interview items 
and “legs” to which each referred.)  Results for each “leg” of the “stool” are discussed 
separately and then compared with one another.  
4.1 Conventional time and a concept of deep time 
 According to the model of the “three-legged stool,” an understanding of deep 
time depends to some extent upon conventional time conceptions.  What would 
happen if we created succession and duration tasks that were set in a geologic context 
but allowed them to occur in conventional time? As stated in chapter three, these 
tasks were not created to model any geologic process per se, but rather to assess 
understanding of conventional time using tasks that could be adapted to ask a similar 
temporal question in a geologic context.  If difficulties conceptualising deep time can 
be partially accounted for by a poor conception of conventional time, we would 
expect to see certain things.  Overall, we would anticipate few difficulties with 
conventional time concepts since the students in this sample are all adolescents or 
adults.  However, there may well be some students whose understanding is marginal.  
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Students who have trouble with succession may be unable to successfully sequence a 
series of events in real time.  They may perceive simultaneous events as successive.    
Those who have difficulty with duration are likely to make some of the same errors 
described in chapter two.  They may equate size with duration, e.g., greater size 
equals longer duration.  When duration can be judged on the basis of size or rate 
alone, they may successfully complete the task.  When they must take account of both 
factors at the same time, they will be less able to judge accurately.  Results for 
succession and duration are discussed in turn.    
4.1.1 Tasks exploring understanding of succession 
The succession tasks in this study were of two types.  The first involved the 
before and after relationship in which one must determine which of two events 
preceded the other in time.    Students were asked to determine which of two fossil 
layers formed first after watching an animation of those layers appearing in order.  A 
still image of the animation is in Figure 3.2 (p. 172).  The second is an extension of that 
idea.  Participants were asked to sequence all of the fossil layers correctly.  This 
involved not only before and after relationships but also simultaneity since the same 
fossil layer could be found in multiple places in the columns and appeared together.  If 
students do not possess a clear understanding of succession they could be expected to 
be unable to determine which of two layers appeared first and/or be unable to 
accurately sequence the layers.  
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4.1.1.1 The before and after relationship 
After viewing the animation as many times as they wished, students were 
asked three questions in which they had to compare the relative age of two fossil 
layers.  Participants had little difficulty with these questions involving the before and 
after relationship.  Ninety-seven percent of the students (34 of 35) answered all three 
questions correctly.     An eleventh grade girl initially answered one of the three 
questions incorrectly, yet when sequencing all the fossils she ordered those same 
layers correctly.  When the discrepancy was pointed out to her, she self-corrected and 
was counted in the 34 who answered all questions correctly.  An eighth grade boy was 
the only one who struggled with this task.  He answered only one question correctly.  
He continued to have trouble with the next task, and his responses are discussed 
more fully in that context in the following section. 
4.1.1.2 Simultaneity along with the before and after relationship 
Students were next asked to place all fossils in order, a task modelled after 
Puzzle 5 in the GeoTAT used by Dodick & Orion, (2003a, 2003b) which was described 
in section 2.6.1.1 and can be found in Figure 2.3 (p. 132).  The difference is that their 
task only used the static sequence shown to the students in the present study prior to 
watching the animation (discussed in section 4.3.1), while in this study students 
actually saw the fossil layers appear on the screen.  Eighty-three percent (29 of 35) of 
the students placed all fossils accurately, slightly less than the 34 out of 35 who 
answered all three comparison questions correctly.  Thus, sequencing all the layers 
proved to be a more difficult task.   Three of the 29 originally placed some out of order 
but later self-corrected.  Six students (four eighth graders, one eleventh grader, and 
198 
 
one university student) did not order the fossils correctly.  Most switched one pair of 
fossil layers.  Jamal, the student who only answered one question correctly in the 
previous task placed only 20% of the fossils correctly.     
In order to compare these results with those of Dodick and Orion (2003a, 
2003b), similar data analysis methods were employed.  A full comparison of their 
results and mine can be found in chapter five.  There are a total of ten different fossils 
in the exposures.  Participants were scored based upon the number of fossils ordered 
correctly.  Number correct was transferred to a percentage.  Mean number correct for 
each grade level was calculated.  Means and standard deviations are reported by 
grade level in Table 4.1.   Mean number correct at each age level is quite high, and 
standard deviations are relatively low.   The exception is the relatively larger standard 
deviation for the eighth graders.  This is attributable to Jamal’s very low score which is 
described below.    As already indicated, the sample for this study is quite small and 
not randomly selected.  Thus, there is no assumption that these results would be 
representative of the population of 8th and 11th graders and university students.   
University Grade 11 Grade 8 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
99 2.8 98 5.8 89 20.2 
  Table 4.1 Comparison of mean grade scores and variance for succession task  
(N =35) 
In explanations for their ordering students described the before and after 
relationships and simultaneity among the layers, i.e., the principle of fossil succession 
without giving any evidence they were aware they were applying a geologic principle.  
At least nothing in what they said prior to or after the task would lead one to conclude 
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they were familiar with the term fossil succession.  Many noted that the columns filled 
in order from the one on the left to the one on the right in what they described as a 
diagonal pattern or a pyramid.  Ayanna’s explanation exemplifies the thinking. 
I knew that anytime two repeated even if they were in different columns they 
appeared simultaneously so the ammonite went on top on the left but it’s also 
in the middle so I did that. Then I did the coral and then clam cause I remember 
that as the first one was filling up the 2nd one started the clam.  Then you finish 
that column with the gastropod which also repeats in the middle.  From there 
you go up one to the brachiopod but that’s on the bottom of the 3rd so now not 
only do you have the 4th in the middle but you have the 1st one on the right.  
Then it didn’t skip so I had to go to fish scale, snail cause it wasn’t like just one 
floating in the air on top of that.  Then you finish it up with the sea urchin and 
the shark tooth. (Ayanna, 11) 
Only one student actually used before and after terminology in his explanation. 
Interviewer: Tell me what you’re doing when you’re giving me those in order.   
Sean: I’m looking at what comes before and after it cause you can almost put 
these into a certain order by looking.  You can use each row [column] to find 
out what the next one is by saying, ok the trilobite, then there’s an ammonite 
[1st column+.  There’s also an ammonite there *2nd column+ so there can’t be 
anything before that.  Then you say, ok there’s a clam in the second and in the 
first but before the clam is a coral although it’s not in the second row 
*between+ ammonite and the clam, so I know that there’s a coral, then I know 
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that there’s nothing else before the clams.  Then there’s nothing else before the 
gastropod, and then there’s the brachiopod cause obviously the snail can’t 
come before the brachiopod by looking at that row [2nd column] and this row 
[3rd column] so then before the snail, though, there is the fish scale.  Oh, I think 
I messed up on that one, now that I think about it, but it was the fish scale and 
then there was the snail.  
 Interviewer: That’s the order you put them in.  
 Sean: Oh, I did, ok.  Then after the snail I could tell that the sea urchin and the 
shark tooth cause there’s nothing else, there’s no other row to look at. (Sean, 
11) 
Four learners made an error similar to one found by Piaget (1969) with much 
younger children in that they said two fossils that appeared simultaneously actually 
appeared one after the other.   Piaget reports on a task in which two lamps were set 
up some distance apart from each other and the child, with different arrangements 
employed in various trials.  The child had to determine which of two lamps was lit first 
with a one-to-two second difference in when they were lit or if both were lit at the 
same time.  Younger children often answered incorrectly and said the two were lit 
successively when it was simultaneously, or vice versa.   By the age of 10-11-years, 
those errors were very uncommon.  However, in the present study a similar error 
appeared.  Despite the fact that two of the four students who made this error 
correctly ordered the fossil layers, all indicated that similar fossils did not appear 
simultaneously, but rather one after the other.   Alyssa (8) exemplifies the point. 
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Interviewer: I’d like you to tell me the fossils in order from the one that formed 
first to the one that formed most recently. 
Alyssa: Trilobite 
Interviewer: What came next? 
Alyssa: Ammonite, on the second column, though because it was this one [2nd 
column] and then this one [1st column].  And then ammonite same one. 
Interviewer: Ok, were they at the same time or did this one [2nd column] come 
before this one [1st column]? 
Alyssa: This one [2nd column] came before this one [1st column].   
Interviewer: Ok 
Alyssa: Then it would go ammonite again but on top of it [trilobite].   
She went on to say that the clams and the gastropods appeared one after the 
other rather than simultaneously.  Oddly, however, she indicated that the brachiopods 
appeared at the same time.   Two of the students in this group, ( Sofia, 8 and Nathan, 
11), initially said that the two ammonites appeared successively but after further 
questioning expressed confusion and finally decided that they must have appeared 
simultaneously.  Participants’ ocular movements were not tracked to determine which 
of the two pictures they judged to appear first.   Therefore, it is not possible to say if 
there is a pattern in which of the two pictures they said appeared first.  It can be said 
that at least some older students have difficulty judging the simultaneity of events.  A 
learner’s visual perceptual abilities may impact performance on this item. 
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The only person who had problems with this task was Jamal (8) who answered 
only one of the three questions correctly after watching the animation.  When 
sequencing the fossils he started with the gastropod.  When asked about the 
appearance of the gastropod relative to the ammonite he confirmed that he saw the 
gastropod appear before the ammonite that was below it in the first column [which 
was not correct since each column filled from bottom to top].  Jamal seems to have 
serious difficulty dealing with succession in conventional time.  It is not clear if that is 
an artefact of the experimental design or if he truly has a conception of succession 
that is typical of a much younger child.   
4.1.1.3 What do these students understand about succession? 
What can we conclude about how this group of students understands 
succession in conventional time?  With a few exceptions, this sample appears to have 
a good grasp of the concept.  They had little or no trouble judging the before and after 
relationship or simultaneity.  The geologic context itself proved to be no impediment 
to their responses.   Answers were largely consistent across tasks.  That is, students 
who got all three questions correct also correctly ordered the fossils.  There were a 
few exceptions.  Five students (three 8th graders, one eleventh grader, and one 
university student) answered all three questions correctly but mixed up the order of 
several fossils when sequencing them.    Inconsistent responses are often difficult to 
categorise.  It could be that errors represent a lack of attention to the task. 
Conversely, these students may be at the point in their understanding at which the 
concept is not solid and thus, they sometimes answer correctly and sometimes 
incorrectly.  Only one eighth grader appeared to have a poor concept of succession.  
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His explanations were typical of the younger children in Piaget’s studies who 
responded in ways that contradicted what they had just seen. 
Succession is only one component of a concept of time.  A person must also be 
able to judge the duration of an event using various cues.  
4.1.2 Tasks exploring understanding of duration 
 As was demonstrated in chapter two, duration of two events can be judged in 
several ways.   If starting and ending times are available, they can be used.  When that 
information is not available (and we are talking about motion), a person must weigh 
rate against distance to judge.  In this portion of the interview, students watched 
three animations designed to investigate their understanding of duration (p. 175-176).  
The animations were different from one another in the following ways: 
 Animation 1 (A1): layers all same size; different rates, different durations 
 Animation 2 (A2): layers different sizes; different rates, same durations 
 Animation 3 (A3): layers different sizes; different rates, possibly different 
durations 
Presentation of animations was counterbalanced so half the students saw A1 
first and half saw A2 first.  A3 was always shown last.   After each animation students 
were asked two questions.   The first question asked which layer took longer to fill 
while the second question asked which layer filled faster.  (See Table 3.3, p. 178 and 
Appendix A for correct answers.)  As with the succession animation, these animations 
were viewed on a laptop set at a distance of each participant’s choice.  They were able 
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to watch each animation multiple times both before and after the questions were 
asked. 
4.1.2.1 Results of duration tasks 
Table 4.2 presents total number of correct responses across all three 
animations and allows for comparison of responses across age levels.  The table gives 
a broad overview of student performance but does not indicate how many correct 
responses a student had for each animation.  For example, someone could get three 
correct by answering one question correctly from each animation or by giving two 
correct answers for the same animation and another correct answer for either of the 
two remaining animations.  In contrast to the succession tasks in which students 
performed quite well, they did not perform as well on these tasks as some of the 
research, particularly Piaget’s (1969), described in chapter two would have predicted.  
There is only a marginal difference in mean number of correct answers between 11th 
graders and university students and none between 8th and 11th graders.   Additionally, 
the only two students to answer all six questions correctly were eighth graders.   If 
there is any age effect at all in this data, it is very small. 
 1 
correct 
2 
correct 
3 
correct 
4 
correct 
5 
correct 
6 
correct 
Mean 
number 
correct 
8th grade 0 4 4 0 2 2 3.5 
11th grade 0 1 4 6 0 0 3.5 
University 1 1 1 7 2 0 3.7 
Total 1 6 9 13 4 2 3.5 
Table 4.2 Total number of correct answers to animation questions, all 
participants (N=35) 
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Another way to look at the data is to compare responses for each animation.  
This comparison can be found in Table 4.3.  This table indicates how many questions 
students answered correctly after each animation depending upon which animation 
they saw first.  Half (N=18) saw Animation 1 first and the remaining 17 saw Animation 
2 first.  This data is not broken down by grade level since age appears to be a small or 
nonexistent factor.  While a majority of students got at least one question correct for 
Animations 1 and 3, they did not do as well with A2.  Since size and rate both varied, it 
was expected that students would find A3 to be the most difficult, but this was not the 
case.  At all age levels students did better on this animation than they had on the first 
two.  There are several possible explanations for this, one of which is a practice effect 
which will be discussed more fully in section 4.1.2.4.  The number of correct responses 
for A3 was similar no matter whether a student saw A1 or A2 first.  That was not true 
for Animations 1 and 2, although the trend is not quite as strong for A1 as it is for A2.     
Students were randomly assigned to the group that saw A1 or A2 first.  There is 
no reason to assume any systematic difference between the groups.  Therefore, a t-
test for independent means was calculated for each animation to see if the difference 
in number correct based upon which animation was seen first was statistically 
significant.   For A1, t(33) = 1.74, p < 0.10, while for A2, t(33) = 2.20, p < 0.05.  Effect 
sizes were also calculated for A1 and A2 since they are not dependent upon sample 
size.  For A1, d = 0.43, which is a medium effect size but significant only at the 0.1 
level.  A large effect size (d = 0.86) which was significant at the 0.05 level was found 
for A2.  These results indicate that watching A1 first helped interviewees with their 
performance on A2 but that watching A2 first seemed to have a modest negative 
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impact on their performance on A1.  There was no statistical difference between 
groups on A3 depending upon which animation was watched first, [t(33) = 0.91, ns].   
A small, non-representative sample requires caution in the interpretation of these 
results.  They do, however, suggest further ways in which duration might be explored, 
a point that will be discussed in chapter six. 
As a group, students found it much easier to deal with a situation in which the 
size of the layers was the same but their durations were different (A1).  In this case, 
there was a direct proportional relationship between rate and duration.   A student 
only needed to consider the difference in rates to correctly determine duration.  Size 
of the layers was immaterial since it was held constant.  They found it more difficult to 
deal with questions in which the size of the layers being compared was different while 
their durations were the same (A2).   In that case there was an inverse relationship 
between the size of the layer and the rate at which it filled.  Those two pieces of 
information had to be reconciled with one another in order to conclude that durations 
were equal.    
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Animation Which one 
seen first 
0 correct 1 correct 2 correct 
 
Animation 1 
(A1) 
Saw A1 first 
(N=18) 
1 5 12 
Saw A2 first 
(N=17) 
3 7 7 
Total 4 12 19 
 
Animation 2 
(A2) 
Saw A1 first 
(N=18) 
8 6 4 
Saw A2 first 
(N=17) 
14 2 1 
Total 22 8 5 
 
Animation 3 
(A3) 
Saw A1 first 
(N=18) 
2 5 11 
Saw A2 first 
(N=17) 
1 3 13 
Total 3 8 24 
Table 4.3 Correct responses to animation questions by which animation was seen 
first 
 
4.1.2.2 Explanations given for responses 
 Students cited a variety of reasons for their responses, and many mentioned 
multiple reasons across their explanations for the six questions.  All the explanations 
reported in this section come from A2.  This is purely coincidental and means only that 
the explanations chosen as clear, illustrative examples of particular strategies happen 
to come from A2.  Perhaps this is because A2 required a coordination of rate and size 
to judge duration while A1 did not.  Therefore, the explanations were more indicative 
of the thinking necessary to judge durations when there was competing information.  
Explanations for the other animations were not deliberately excluded.   
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 The size of the layers, the perceived speed at which the layers were filling, or 
the use of counting (either in their heads or by using the timer on the animation) were 
named as strategies with basically equal frequencies when considering the animations 
as a group.  If a student focused exclusively on the size of the layers, judging durations 
for A2 was problematic.  This type of strategy would have been successful if rates had 
remained constant.  If rates are constant then the size of the layer would indicate 
which takes longer to fill.  Since rates were different, equating size alone with duration 
resulted in an incorrect response.  This is, indeed, a type of error that was predicted if 
students have difficulty judging duration in conventional time.   
Alyssa (8) saw A1 first and explained her answers by saying one layer moved 
faster than the other, using a strategy that was sufficient for A1.  Yet, on A2 she 
switched to a size-only explanation. 
Cause the blue layer has more levels and stuff to it than the brown layer. 
(Alyssa, 8) 
Some students like Ashley (8) seemed surprised by the question as she 
emphatically asserted, “The pink one cause it’s shorter.” 
Size-only explanations were used by older students, not just 8th graders.   
Cause there is more and I guess that since it’s more it would take more time to 
fill up then. (Malik, 11) 
To use perceived speed to obtain an answer, an individual had to weigh the 
perception of rate against the relative sizes of the two layers in question.   Some 
students were aware that they needed to take account of both size and speed but 
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were unsure how to do so.  Not all were able to successfully reconcile the two pieces 
of information.  Evan’s (8) explanation for a question in A2 exemplifies the dilemma. 
Evan: The yellow did take longer.  It just seemed to be moving a little slower 
compared to the blue.   The blue appeared to be just speeding along. 
Interviewer: The blue’s a lot bigger than the yellow. 
Evan: I know, I’m thinking, I’m thinking maybe that has some sort of 
connection.  [He was unable to elaborate.] 
 Justin (11) tried to account for both pieces of information but was similarly 
unable to connect them properly. 
Interviewer: Did the blue layer or the yellow layer take longer to fill up?  
[Yellow is correct.] 
Justin : The blue layer took a little bit longer and just from watching, like, if the 
yellow was probably proportional with the blue size then the yellow would have 
taken longer but I think the blue just took longer to fill up.  
 Interviewer: Let me see if I understand what you’re saying about the blue and 
yellow being proportional.  Tell me a little more about that.   
Justin: The blue was moving faster than yellow was but the yellow had less 
space to go so [pause]  
 Interviewer: That’s why the blue took longer?   
Justin: Yeah.  
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 Another 11th grader, Nathan was not merely conflicted about how to reconcile 
two competing pieces of information for A2.  He had a third piece—he had counted 
and knew that both layers took six seconds to fill.  Yet, the fact that the blue layer was 
filling faster (It was also larger), led him to conclude that the yellow must have taken 
longer to fill.   He qualified his answer by describing it as “slightly” longer.   
Interviewer: Did the blue layer or the yellow layer take longer to fill?   
Nathan: I think they were both around 6 seconds.  
 Interviewer: So you think they were about the same or did one take longer?   
Nathan: I think yellow might have been just slightly longer.   
Interviewer: Do you want to watch it again?   
Nathan: Yeah.   
Interviewer: If you think they’re the same you can say that as well.   
Nathan: The question was which one takes longer?  Ok, the blue just moved a 
lot faster.  The yellow was a lot slower, sort of around the same time but I think 
yellow was just longer.  
 Interviewer: You’re saying it seemed like it was around the same time because 
you were counting?  
Nathan: Uh huh 
Interviewer: But it also seemed to you like the yellow was slower?   
Nathan: Yeah  
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Interviewer: So you think it must have taken longer.  
Nathan: Well, it’s not necessarily but since they’re different sizes but [sic] I 
think it was just slightly longer. 
It is fair to say from the excerpt with Nathan that he displayed some confusion 
about how to deal with competing pieces of information.  It is possible that the 
interviewer bears some responsibility for his confusion.  The first follow-up question, 
“So you think they were about the same or did one take longer?” could have led 
Nathan to conclude that his initial answer was incorrect.  If he had been the only 
student who appeared bewildered by how to reconcile the different aspects of what 
he saw it would be inappropriate to make inferences based upon his responses.  
However, he was not the only one.   
Sometimes the attempt to reconcile size with rate resulted in faulty reasoning 
that did not fit the animation and evinced thinking that was similar to those who 
simply said larger = longer duration.  Elizabeth’s (univ) explanation for A2 is novel.  She 
appears confused as to why a smaller layer would take longer to fill, but attempts to 
solve her dilemma with an incorrect analogy.   
Interviewer: Did the blue layer or the yellow layer take longer to fill?   
Elizabeth: I think it was the yellow.  Yellow was taking a long time.   
Interviewer: Why do you say that?   
Elizabeth: I just noticed that, but I don’t know why it should take longer cause 
it’s like half the size of the blue one.  But I guess if you think about it, like, filling 
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up something that’s empty, the yellow may be more deep or something so it 
maybe is like taking longer.   
Interviewer: Let me see if I understand what you’re saying.  At first you said it 
would seem like the yellow would go faster because it’s smaller.   
Elizabeth: Yeah, well, and like at the end of it you think it should have been but 
I noticed that it’s slower.   
Interviewer: What was the last thing you said about it being deeper?  I didn’t 
understand.   
Elizabeth: I think if you think about taking a glass, or let’s say like a bowl.  One 
is more deep than the other, and one is wider and one is deep.  You think that 
that [sic] one that’s wider holds more, but it’s actually shallow so it probably 
fills up faster.   It may be like the yellow if it was a bowl or something, deeper 
one takes longer to fill.  That’s what I was thinking. 
 However, Elizabeth’s analogy does not conform to what she saw in A2.  She 
described the yellow layer as the deep one while the blue equated to the wider, 
shallower bowl.  The latter might appear to have greater capacity but actually does 
not and therefore fills faster.  Yet, in A2 both layers were the same width and the 
yellow one was shallower than the blue.   Elizabeth appears to be indicating that 
capacity and duration must vary in the same way.  In other words, size and duration 
are directly proportional.  The visual perceptual information in the animation did not 
conform to her idea, so she reinterpreted that information to make it fit. 
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 Durations could have also been judged by ignoring rate and size entirely and 
either watching the timer on the screen or counting to oneself.  As a group, this 
strategy was mentioned more frequently for the second or third animation watched 
than the first one.   
The blue layer, yeah the blue layer cause the blue layer takes 7 seconds and the 
red layer takes 5. (Matt, 8) 
Counting would appear to be an efficient strategy as it does not require 
someone to work back and forth from rate to size, but merely to watch the timer and 
engage in simple subtraction.  Ironically, however, not everyone who mentioned a 
counting strategy correctly answered the items for which they said they counted.  
Ryan (11) mentioned counting as a strategy for Animations 2 and 3, yet both of his 
answers for A2 were incorrect and only one was correct for A3.  Anthony (univ) said 
he timed Animations 2 and 3.  He got both answers for A2 incorrect, but both answers 
for A3 were correct.  In addition to Anthony, two other university students got 
answers incorrect when employing a counting strategy.  The fact that a number of 
students answered incorrectly when counting could be interpreted in several ways.  It 
could mean that some students have difficulty reconciling competing perceptual 
information (the number they got when counting and the size of the layers, for 
example).  Nathan’s response reproduced above lends credence to that 
interpretation.  It could also indicate inattention to the task.  The fact that some 
students chose to only watch each animation once despite multiple opportunities to 
see them again lends support to that inference. 
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4.1.2.3 Categorisation of responses by strategy employed 
 In order to compare cited strategies, participants were broken into two 
groups: those who answered three or fewer total questions correct and those who 
answered four or more correct.   Dividing participants into more than two groups 
could not be justified based upon the small number of total responses (six) and the 
sample size.  More groups would make distinctions between participants that are not 
justifiable since it was possible to understand the task and simply make a careless 
error.    Sixteen participants answered a total of three or fewer questions correctly on 
all three animations.  Six of those sixteen viewed A1 first while the remaining ten 
watched A2 first.  Nineteen students answered four or more questions correctly on all 
the animations.  Eleven of those individuals watched A1 first, and seven watched A2 
first.   Numbers reported in Table 4.4 list the number of students who cited each 
reason for their responses.   
Reasons cited for answer 3 or fewer correct (N = 16) 4 or more correct (N = 19) 
Size of layers 
 
14 13 
Pattern (alternating speed 
of adjacent layers) 
3 4 
Perception of rate (some 
said seemed longer) 
16 15 
Use of clock on screen or 
counting in head 
8 16 
Guessed or unsure why 
answer was chosen 
4 1 
Table 4.4 Reasons cited for answers to animation questions 
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Since students commonly cited multiple reasons across the six questions, 
column totals do not equal the number of students in that column.  Overall, there is 
not a lot of difference between the two groups in terms of the reasons cited for their 
answers with two exceptions.  The first is the number of students citing use of the 
timer or counting as a strategy.  Almost all (16 of 19) of the students who answered 
four or more questions correctly mentioned counting at least once, while only half (8 
of 16) of those who got three or fewer questions correct did so.  Two of the students 
in the latter group said they were counting in their heads or using the timer on the 
screen, but with only minimal success.  Seven of the eleven students who never 
mentioned counting as a strategy were eighth graders.  Ten of those eleven answered 
three or fewer total questions correct across animations.  However, the additional 
eighth grader who didn’t mention counting as a strategy was one of only two students 
to answer all six questions correctly.  Three of the remaining four students who never 
reported a counting strategy were university students.  All of them got four questions 
correct.   
The second difference between the two groups is not readily apparent from 
Table 4.4.  Students in both groups mentioned size of the layers in their explanations 
but with an interesting difference.  Those who answered three or fewer correct said 
the size of the layer determined how long it took to fill, i.e., thicker layers take longer.  
In contrast, when students who answered four or more correct mentioned size it was 
in the context of trying to weigh the size of the layer against the perceived rate at 
which it was filling.  For them, size was a factor, but not the sole determiner of their 
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answer as was typical for students in the other group.  They were able to deal with the 
inverse relationship between rate and duration, while the former group was not. 
4.1.2.4 Development of strategies 
 Many seemed to be trying multiple strategies as the tasks progressed and 
changing strategies with each animation.   As mentioned, students were more likely to 
name counting as a strategy for A3 than for the other two animations.  Students who 
employed a counting strategy for the first animation they saw tended to continue to 
use that strategy throughout, but not always with success.  There appeared to be a 
practice effect as the group as a whole did better on A3 than the other two which was 
not expected.  The first question following A3 was similar to A1 in that the two layers 
being compared (green and brown) were the same thickness.  However, since they 
filled at different rates the amount of time necessary for them to fill (duration) was 
different.  The second question was the only one of its kind asked during the 
interview.  The two layers being compared (red and blue) were different thicknesses, 
filled at different rates, and took different amounts of time to fill.  This question made 
an impression on a number of the participants as they cited this example later when 
trying to apply the animations to a stratigraphic sequence.   The blue, thicker layer, 
filled much more quickly than the red, thinner layer.  The perceptual difference in the 
rates was so apparent that it was difficult to ignore.  More students answered this 
question correctly than any of the other five in this portion of the interview. 
Hannah (11) is a good example of a progression of strategies from one 
animation to the next.  She watched A1 first.  Her explanation for the first question 
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after A1 reminds one of travelling to some desired event and how it always seems to 
take longer to get there than it does to come home. 
When I answered I was more thinking like the first time I watched it I didn’t 
really know what was gonna happen and so I was waiting to see what would 
happen, so, of course, you know, that’s gonna take longer, like it’s gonna seem 
like it’s a longer amount of time, but then like after I knew what was gonna 
happen, and like I watched it a second time it seemed like it took longer for the 
blue one to fill because I wasn’t like, no, why is this taking so long, what’s 
gonna happen?  You know what I mean, like, once you know something’s 
gonna happen you can see it the way it really is as opposed to what you are 
kinda like anticipating.  
 Next, she watched A2.  Note how her explanation changes. 
Interviewer: Which layer took longer to fill—the blue layer or the yellow layer?   
Hannah: The blue.   
Interviewer: Why?   
Hannah: Well, I started to pay attention to like the time, like the red one took 5 
seconds, the blue was like about 7, and then yellow I kind of, it was kinda hard 
to watch at that point cause I was trying to go back and forth like from the 
time and actually watching the different colours changing.  I think yellow was 
about the same as the red or like at least around there. 
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By the time she got to A3, she appeared to be having no difficulty employing a 
counting strategy.  When asked if the green or brown layer took longer to fill, she 
replied, 
The brown one took about 10 seconds or approximately as opposed to green 
which took about 5 or 6. 
4.1.2.5 What do these students understand about duration? 
Overall, there was very little difference in how students at different ages 
performed on this task.   One participant, a female university student, got one 
question correct, while only two students (both eighth graders) answered all six 
questions correctly.   The one age difference is that eighth graders were somewhat 
less likely to describe a counting strategy than older students.  Everyone, with the 
exception of two eighth graders, reported using at least two different strategies.  
Fifteen students cited three different strategies as reasons for their responses, and 
four said they used four different strategies.   
What can be said about how this sample understands duration in conventional 
time?  That is a difficult question to answer.   It is hard to allege that incorrect 
responses provide clear evidence that students couldn’t complete the tasks 
successfully.  Some seemed mixed up when explaining their answers but when offered 
the opportunity to watch the animation again they said they didn’t need to and then 
simply gave an answer.  Perhaps their performance says more about their motivation 
for the task than it does their understanding of duration in conventional time.  In 
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some cases there were specific hints that inattention rather than a faulty conception 
of time was responsible for errors.  Consider Vincent (univ), 
I guess I could have sat here and marked, oh, that one took 2 seconds and this 
one took 4 or 5 and been a little bit more observant. 
or Ashley (8) after A3, 
 I really paid attention this time. 
 Some students chose to watch each animation only once even after being 
given opportunity to see it again.  While this may have affected the accuracy of 
responses, the number of times a student watched the animation was not a good 
predictor of a correct answer as students who watched the animations several times 
also got answers incorrect.  The fact that participants reported changing strategies 
multiple times throughout the task makes it difficult to determine if any one strategy 
was more successful than another.  This is further complicated by the fact that the use 
of a particular strategy did not consistently produce either correct or incorrect 
responses.    
 Many students spontaneously said two layers took the same amount of time to 
fill on A2.  Even though that was not expressly stated as an option, they viewed it as a 
viable choice.  Claire was one of two students who specifically asked whether or not 
that was a possibility.   
Claire: The brown one, there was a difference in the rate at which it was filling 
up.  I definitely saw the pink one was slower and this one [brown] was faster.  
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The only thing I have to decide now is whether the difference in rate was 
enough.  Is it an option to say they took around the same time?   
Interviewer: Yes, that’s an option.   
Claire: I think they would have filled up around the same time.  The brown one 
is pretty much double the size of the first one even though it was filling up 
faster it would be around the same cause the other one is a slower rate. 
[answer is correct] 
It could be that some of the others who answered incorrectly on A2 did so, not 
because they didn’t know the correct answer but because they thought the correct 
answer was not an option.   
 Despite those caveats, some tentative findings emerge.   These students had 
more problems judging duration when they needed to simultaneously account for rate 
and size than when duration could be judged on the basis of rate alone.  When 
perceptual evidence disagreed with a current idea, the data was sometimes ignored as 
in the case of Ashley who seemed surprised that anyone would ask if a thicker layer 
could possibly fill more rapidly than a smaller layer.  For others, like Elizabeth, the task 
was reinterpreted to fit an existing idea and what she described did not correspond to 
what had actually taken place in the animation.  
4.1.2.6 Application of understanding of duration to a stratigraphic sequence 
 Ault (1980, 1982) reported that even when students displayed a solid 
understanding of succession in conventional time they were unable to apply that 
knowledge to a geologic outcrop.  The next item was designed to see if a similar 
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phenomenon would be observed with duration.  After watching the animations and 
answering the six questions students were shown a drawing of the stratigraphic 
sequence in Figure 3.6 (p. 179) that is typical of what one might find in the Southwest 
United States.   Students were asked to compare layers 3 and 4 (from the bottom) and 
say which one probably took longer to form based upon the animations they had just 
seen.  There were four possible responses:  
 layer 3 (thicker) took longer  
 layer 4 (thinner) took longer  
 both took the same amount of time 
 can’t be determined from the picture alone   
The last choice is the correct answer since the picture alone gives no clue as to the 
depositional environment.  Frequency of student responses can be found in Table 4.5.  
The animations were not specifically constructed as a teaching intervention as that 
was not the purpose of this study.  Therefore, the interviewer did not engage 
participants in a discussion about general principles they observed from the 
animations that might apply to this task.  Students were merely instructed to use 
information from the animations to help them answer the question about the 
stratigraphic sequence similar to Ault (1980).   
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Response Total Frequency Frequency for 
students who 
answered 3 or 
fewer correct on 
animations 
(N=16) 
Frequency for 
students who 
answered 4 or 
more correct on 
animations 
(N=19) 
Layer 3 (thicker) took 
longer 
8 6 2 
Layer 4 (thinner) took 
longer 
18 10 8 
Both took the same 
amount of time 
3 0 3 
Can’t be determined  
from the picture alone 
6* 1 5 
* includes one student who listed all three of the other possibilities as answers. 
Table 4.5 Student responses comparing time for two adjacent sedimentary layers to 
form 
 
Despite the fact that students were instructed that the design of the layers and 
the erosion patterns had nothing to do with how long the layers took to form, some, 
like Ben (8), initially focused on those features in their answers.   
Ben: I think the top one [layer 4].   
Interviewer: Why do you think that?  
Ben: I guess cause it’s smaller and like there’s a big chunk out of it right there 
so I think it woulda filled up quicker cause there’s a big chunk missing.   
Students who answered three or fewer correct were more likely to equate 
greater size with greater duration required for deposition.  Those who said layer 3 
took longer all focused on the relative size of the two layers in their reasoning.  Of the 
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eight students who said 3 took longer, five of them had invoked size as a reason for 
one or more answers following the animations.  Two of the others justified their 
responses to the animation questions by saying they counted.  Some like James (11) 
who said larger took longer said it was consistent with what they had seen in the 
animations, although that was not always the case, 
Because the bigger ones usually took longer than the smaller ones  
 A few like Ryan (11) who said the larger layer took longer indicated their 
answer was not based on what they saw in the animations at all. 
Ryan: I’d say this one *layer 3+ took longer to form.   
Interviewer: The thicker one?   
Ryan: Yeah.   
Interviewer: And why would you say that?  
Ryan: Just cause of the size, I guess.   
Interviewer: Is that based on what we saw in the movies or based on 
something else?   
Ryan: That’s based on just how long I would perceive it would take to make.  I 
figure if the average person’s gonna make a big ball as opposed to a small ball, 
it would take longer to make.   
Interviewer: Was that true in the movies?   
Ryan: Not all the time. 
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 Students were most likely to say layer 4 (the smaller one) took longer to form.  
This was true regardless of how many questions an individual answered correctly after 
the animations.  That response was unanticipated and unfortunate as one of the 
animation questions may have instilled an alternative conception about 
sedimentation in the minds of some participants.  The students who said “smaller took 
longer” appeared to be relying exclusively on the comparison of the red and blue 
layers from A3 (described in 4.1.2.4) for their explanations.  Even though the blue 
layer was almost three times as thick as the red layer, it filled two seconds faster than 
the red.  The rate difference between these two layers was greater than for any of the 
other animation questions and appeared to make a significant impression on many of 
the participants.  When probed, some acknowledged that “smaller took longer” was 
not true in all the animations.  Others like Evan (8) were unsure but ultimately decided 
all three animations demonstrated “smaller took longer,” 
Evan: I’m saying the smaller one, top one might take longer to form cause it 
just seemed like in the movie that the slower ones seemed in general to go 
slower than the faster ones, I mean the larger ones, like the last one the blue 
was larger but it was just speeding along and so I’m gonna say that one.   
Interviewer: Was that true in all the movies that the shorter ones took longer 
than the bigger ones?   
Evan: I’m trying to think, uh yeah I think so, I’m not sure, yeah. 
   Still others, like Michael (11) were more confident that “smaller took longer” 
was indeed true for all three animations, although that was not correct. 
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Michael: The thinner one took longer. 
Interviewer: Why do you say that? 
Michael: Because in all the movies the thinner ones took longer to fill. 
 Three students said both layers probably took the same amount of time to 
form.  Once again Claire (univ) appeared to be trying to coordinate information about 
a size difference with a rate difference as her response demonstrates, 
Claire: Does that relate to any one video or just in general?   
Interviewer: Just in general to the movies.   
Claire: I think in general if you have a layer which is like half the size of the 
other layer, the bigger ones were generally faster, came up faster and the 
smaller ones were a lot slower, but I think it would have taken around the same 
time because of the size again.  One is almost double the size and that would 
kind of compensate for the rate at which they accumulate.   
 Sean’s (11) response illustrates a point that cannot be overlooked when 
interpreting interview data.  Although he ultimately ends up concluding the two layers 
took the same amount of time, he appears to be attempting to figure out the intent of 
the question and base his answer upon what he thinks the investigator is looking for.  
He says that in the absence of the animations, his first conclusion would be thicker 
layer = longer duration.  He is also aware that the animations didn’t consistently bear 
that out.  His first response was to say layer 3 (the larger one) took longer to form. 
Interviewer: What about in relation to the movies?   
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Sean: Looking at that I would definitely question it more and think it would be 
closer to, like they would be closer to the same amount, but, I mean, then I see 
this one [layer 3], this other one of the same type [layer 1] and it kinda makes 
me think differently about it as well with this one [layer 3] and that one [layer 
4+ because that one’s *3+ bigger than that one *4+, so I would think *pause+ 
Interviewer: Suppose the other layers weren’t here.  Just suppose it’s those 
two [layers 3 & 4], then what would you think based upon the movies?   
Sean: I would think they’d be about the same.   
Interviewer: Why do you say that?  How did the movies help you decide that?   
Sean: I think just cause I felt more like, I don’t think it’s physically the fact that 
it is that, I think it’s just the matter of the fact, that, you know, I’m thinking 
since I’ve had that question asked to me and I feel like, mmm, maybe that is 
what they’re looking for.  You know, this long is the same as this long but we’re 
not realizing it.  I don’t know, I’m trying, like, yeah, I just think based upon what 
I saw in the movie and the way it sounded, like maybe I was right, maybe I was 
wrong, looking at the time and everything, yeah, they’d probably be about the 
same.   
Interviewer: And if you hadn’t seen the movies?   
Sean: Oh, I would have definitely picked the bigger one.   
 Six students said the answer to the question can’t be determined from the 
drawing alone.  While five of those individuals had four or more correct answers on 
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the animations, one of the six answered three animation questions correctly.  Three of 
the six said the answer to which of the two layers in the sequence took longer to form 
“can’t be determined” in addition to one of the other choices in the course of their 
explanation.  The sixth person was placed in this group because he listed all three of 
the other choices as possibilities and did not choose among them.   Peter (univ) is an 
example of someone who mentioned another choice but ultimately concluded it 
“can’t be determined.” 
Peter: A safe assessment would be to say that the thicker one took longer to 
form because it took more time for the deposit, for the sediment to deposit, but 
then it also depends on how fast the water was moving over the area where it 
was getting deposited so it could take the smaller layer the same amount or 
even longer just depending on how fast the water above it was moving.   
Interviewer: If I understand you correctly, while you might think it would be 
this one [layer 3], it could actually be either one of them.   
Peter: Right and there’s no way from this to tell. 
 David (univ), the lone university geology major in the group, indicated his 
response was based upon the animations, and seemed to feel that anyone could reach 
the same conclusions he did. 
David: Can’t really tell.   
Interviewer: Why do you say that?   
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David: If it’s based on the animations some of the larger ones formed a lot 
quicker than the smaller ones and that could be the same thing in sedimentary 
rock formation.   
Interviewer: Is that something you got out of the movie or did you know that 
before?   
David: That’s something I got out of the movie, but it’s not like it’s a hard 
concept to grasp.  I mean, just because it’s larger doesn’t mean it took longer 
to form.   
What are we to make of students’ responses?  As with the questions following 
the animations themselves, there may have been some who felt they had to choose 
one layer over the other, i.e., that “can’t be determined” was not an option.  There 
are hints of this phenomenon from several individuals as Justin (11) shows.  He is an 
example of a student who offered two other responses before finally settling on “can’t 
be determined.” 
Interviewer: Based upon what you saw in the movies what could you say about 
which of those layers probably took longer to form?   
Justin: Well, I guess it could be different cause sometimes the small one would 
take longer than a larger one but then, if I was just, if I was a geologist, I would 
just assume the longer one took longer just cause it’s bigger, but it could be 
different based on the videos.  If I had to guess I would take the larger one.   
Interviewer: You would guess the larger one based on the size.  What if you 
just had to base it on the videos?   
229 
 
Justin: Based on the videos I’d probably say maybe the smaller one just cause it 
seemed like if it’s smaller then sometimes it would take longer than like the 
larger ones would just go faster and then stop and then.  On the basis of the 
video it seemed like if it was smaller it could go longer so, yeah.   
Interviewer: Let’s suppose I gave you a third choice—the first choice is “the 
bigger one took longer,” the second choice is “the smaller one took longer,” 
and the third choice is “you can’t tell.”  What would you pick then?   
Justin: I would say you can’t tell by just looking at it. 
One of the eighth graders (Connor) who answered all six questions correctly 
following the animations also correctly answered the stratigraphic sequence question.  
The other (Kayla) did not.  She initially said the larger layer took longer.  When asked if 
she was basing her answer upon the animations, she said she wasn’t because the 
thinner layers took longer in the animations [not always true].  She then indicated that 
the smaller layer took longer to form. 
4.1.3 What can we say about how conventional time impacts an understanding of 
deep time? 
 The first research question asked whether students make similar errors on 
tasks involving conventional and deep time and whether they apply similar strategies 
to both.  Students in this sample showed little difficulty in performing succession tasks 
in real time.  They were almost uniformly capable of determining the before and after 
relationship between two events and using simultaneity to correctly order a series of 
events.  In this study the geologic context itself, i.e., the sequencing of fossil layers, did 
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not appear to impede a student’s ability to sequence events.  One could argue that 
showing students the formation of fossil layers in real time removes the salient piece 
of geoscience content knowledge (principles of stratigraphy).    
 Performance on the duration items stands in contrast to the succession items.  
Here results raise as many questions as they answer.  Many students did not perform 
uniformly on the items dealing with duration, and there is only the merest hint of an 
age effect.  For whatever reason(s), participants did not consistently demonstrate a 
solid grasp of duration in conventional time.  Possible explanations for this 
phenomenon will be explored in chapter five.  Typically, individual students cited 
different strategies for different animations.  It is unclear whether students changed 
strategies due to something inherent in the animations themselves or for some other 
reason.  While some students never cited counting or the use of the timer as a 
strategy, a few mentioned it after every question.  It was more common for students 
to mention counting later in this portion of the interview.  Generally, a counting 
strategy was more likely to produce a correct answer, but that was not always the 
case as was shown in section 4.1.2.3.    
 Since the animations were not designed as teaching interventions, there was 
no discussion following them of any general principles students discovered or how 
those might apply to a geologic context.  When comparing the two layers in the 
stratigraphic sequence, students were more likely to say the smaller layer took longer 
to form than the larger layer because that is what they observed in the animations.  
Yet, that was only true for one pair of layers they were asked to compare in A3.   In 
the case of that pair, the difference in rate was so significant that it appeared to make 
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an impression on many participants.  Even students who correctly concluded that it 
was not possible to determine which layer took longer to form from the drawing alone 
often suggested a different answer in tandem with the correct one. 
4.2 Large numbers and a concept of deep time 
 Another potential stumbling block to understanding deep time is an 
understanding of large numbers.   Participants constructed a series of timelines for 
this study, a strategy employed by others (e.g., Confrey, 1991; Dehaene, 2003; Petitto, 
1990; Siegler & Opfer, 2003) and described in chapter two.  The main difference here 
is that students were asked to indicate the durations of various time periods in 
relation to each other as opposed to placing Arabic numerals on a number line.  If a 
poor conception of deep time can be at least partially accounted for by a poor 
understanding of large numbers we would expect to see several things.  First, since 
everyone in the sample is an adolescent or adult, most students should be able to 
successfully construct a linear timeline using familiar numbers up to 100.  When asked 
to construct a similar timeline with large numbers we would expect that fewer 
students could successfully complete the task.  We would anticipate greater 
logarithmic mapping with large numbers.  Additionally, some students are likely to be 
confused about the magnitude of the numbers themselves and the proportional 
relationships between them.  A timeline that requires students to place numbers that 
range from common human timescales to those in deep time should be especially 
difficult.   Larger units of time will be less meaningful than smaller ones.  Students can 
be expected to reason with units of days and months but find it harder to do so with 
thousand and million year units.  
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A description of the timelines appears in chapter three in Table 3.4 (p. 181).  
They are briefly described here for the reader’s convenience.  The first two timelines 
each contained four numbers.   They were similar in several ways.  First, both involved 
only four numbers.  Timeline 1 (TL1) contained three time periods that everyone has 
experienced and one that no one in the sample has but that they would have all heard 
of.  All four numbers in Timeline 2 (TL2) were outside the ability of a single individual 
to directly experience.  Because the numbers in TL2 were all powers of ten, the 
timeline could show how students dealt with those proportional relationships.    
Timeline 4 (TL4) had seven numbers that ranged from small (one minute) to 
very large (100 million years).  TL4 was different from the other two in that it 
contained seven time periods that ranged from those in conventional time (one 
minute) to those in deep time (100 million years).  The scientifically accepted 
durations of the events in Timeline 3 were rounded to the nearest power of ten or 
nearest unit of conventional time to allow for easier proportional reasoning and to 
allow for comparison of Timelines 3 and 4.  A solid comprehension of deep time 
requires some understanding of the relationships among numbers that are very 
different from one another.  It’s useful to know that ten thousand years and ten 
million years are long periods of time.  However, it is an incomplete picture.  Some 
notion of the proportional relationship between those units provides a clearer image 
of the time required for various geologic processes.  It also provides some notion of 
the relative amounts of time from the formation of the Earth to the appearance of 
first life versus the extinction of dinosaurs to the present.   To save time students were 
only required to write the letter of each stimulus item for TL4 and not the time period 
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itself on the timeline.   Table 4.6 lists the items for TL4 with their accompanying 
letters.   
Letter Time period 
A 10 million years 
B 1 minute 
C 1 year 
D 1 month 
E 1 day 
F 10,000 years 
G 100 million years 
Table 4.6 Stimulus items for Timeline 4 
4.2.1 How timelines were categorised 
The three timelines were scored based upon whether or not students 
produced a linear timeline in which proportional relationships amongst numbers were 
clear.    All timelines were sorted by the researcher prior to listening to the recorded 
interviews based upon similar criteria.  Each timeline was scored as correct, partially 
correct, or incorrect based upon the criteria listed in Tables 4.7 and 4.8.    Criteria for 
Timeline 4 are reported in a separate table due to the need to assess a linear, 
proportional scale for seven numbers that differed by many more orders of magnitude 
than was the case for the four numbers in Timelines 1 and 2.  One table was 
insufficient to explain the categories adequately for four versus seven numbers. 
Criteria were chosen so as to allow initial sorting based solely upon the relative 
placement of all the events on the timeline on a linear scale.  In the case of TL1, this 
would mean that 100 years would be at the extreme right side of the paper.  One day, 
1 month, and 1 year would be clustered very closely together at the left side of the 
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paper.   This demonstrates an understanding that in the context of 100 years, there is 
little difference between 1 day and 1 month.  An attempt to create a timeline that 
shows a clear distinction between 1 day and 1 month serves to severely under-
represent the difference between 1 year and 100 years.   Latitude was given in scoring 
categories to account for perceptual-motor considerations.  In order to be counted as 
correct, a student needed to create a timeline that placed all of the time periods on 
the same linear scale with reasonable accuracy.   
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Category Criteria Students in 
Category—
Timeline 1 
Students in 
Category—
Timeline 2 
Correct Clear attempt to order times 
proportionally; first 3 numbers 
clustered at left side of timeline.  
Largest number is at or near right 
side of line.  Third number is about 
1/10 as far from left side of paper 
as 4th number is from 3rd number. 
 
 
21* 
 
 
16* 
Partial Some attempt to order times 
proportionally; distance between 
first 2 numbers is clearly smaller 
than distance between 2nd & 3rd 
numbers.  Distance between 3rd 
and 4th numbers is too small.  
Third number is no more than 1/3 
from left side of line. 
 
 
6 
 
1 
Incorrect No evidence or very minimal 
evidence that student was 
attempting to order times 
proportionally. One or more of the 
following is true:  Numbers are 
spaced fairly evenly across the line.  
The third number is at or near the 
halfway point of the line.  
Proportional relationship among 
first 3 numbers is incorrect (i.e., 
distance between first 2 numbers 
is greater than distance between 
2nd & 3rd numbers). 
 
8 
 
18 
 
*Indicates one student whose responses were very difficult to classify.  He is discussed 
in section 4.2.6. 
 
Table 4.7 Sorting criteria for Timelines 1 & 2 with number in each category (N=35) 
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Category Criteria Students in Category 
Correct First 5 letters very close 
together at left side of 
timeline; G near right end 
of timeline; A no more than 
1/4 of way from left edge 
 
10* 
Partial First 4 letters very close 
together at left side of 
timeline; proportionality 
lost with letters F, A, & G 
 
8 
Incorrect No evidence or minimal 
evidence that the student 
was trying to order times 
proportionally; generally 
numbers are spaced fairly 
evenly across the timeline 
 
17 
*Includes one student whose responses were very difficult to classify.  He is discussed 
in section 4.2.6. 
Table 4.8 Sorting criteria for Timeline 4 with number in each category (N=35) 
A second person independently sorted the timelines using the same criteria, 
again without listening to the interviews.  Since there were three categories into 
which timelines were sorted, two coders could be expected to agree 1/3 of the time 
by chance alone.  Initial inter-coder agreement was 80%, 89%, and 91% for Timelines 
1, 2, and 4, respectively.   All three are well above what would be expected on the 
basis of chance (χ2 = 12.6, p < 0.001).  Individual ratings were discussed and all 
differences in categorisation were reconciled by the two coders.   The investigator 
then listened to each interview to determine if a student’s verbal description of the 
timeline suggested a more sophisticated understanding than was indicated by the 
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visual inspection of the timeline alone.  In six cases for TL1, two for TL2, and one for 
TL4, a student’s explanation suggested a clearer understanding than the timeline 
alone.  In those cases, the timeline was moved to a higher category than it had been 
based solely upon visual inspection.  An inaccurate timeline could be explained by a 
lack of interest in being precise, spatial reasoning difficulties, or fatigue on the part of 
the student.  (After moving numbers several times some students said even though 
the final spot wasn’t exact, it was good enough.)  If this results in a systematic error it 
should be one that underreports a problem with large numbers.  One purpose of this 
exploratory study is to determine whether student difficulty with deep time can be at 
least partially accounted for by a difficulty with large numbers.  A systematic error 
that underreports the extent of the problem but still finds that a problem exists would 
lend credence to the notion that the phenomenon is real.    
Many responses were easily categorised as correct or incorrect.  A subset of 
the timelines did not fit neatly into either of those categories but seemed to represent 
either partial understanding of large numbers (or perhaps one of the alternative 
explanations mentioned in the previous paragraph).  The chief difficulty with the 
partial category is that it includes a wide variety of responses from those of students 
who just barely escaped being classified as incorrect to those of students who were 
very close to producing a correct timeline.   
In order to determine what the timelines might indicate about how these 
students understand large numbers, pupils were grouped by their scores on the 
timelines.  There were seven different categories generated which can be seen in 
Table 4.9. The distinctions made among students by the use of seven categories are 
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undoubtedly too fine for several reasons.  First, they are based upon only one timeline 
of each type.   The inability to draw a correct timeline might say more about a 
student’s perceptual motor skills or attention to the task than it does about a concept 
of number.  Secondly, the criteria used to define categories mean that some timelines 
are very close to the borderline of being placed in a different category.  One might just 
miss being categorised as correct while another is just barely sufficient to be named 
partial.   Thus, another visual inspection of the timelines was conducted, this time to 
search for similarities/differences between adjacent groups.  The goal was to generate 
meaningful categories that could be used to distinguish between students whose 
understanding of large numbers is or is not sufficient to comprehend deep time. 
Category Description Number of students 
7 All 3 TL’s correct 10 
6 TL 1 & 2 correct; TL 4 partial 6 
5 TL 1 correct, TL 2 partial, TL 4 incorrect 2 
4 TL 1 correct, TL 2 & 4 incorrect 3 
3 TL 1 & 4 partial, TL 2 incorrect 1 
2 TL 1 partial, TL 2 & 4 incorrect 5 
1 All 3 incorrect 8 
Table 4.9 Categories of students by scores on timelines (N=35) 
Timelines of students in categories 7 and 6 were very similar to one another.   
Everyone in both groups was clearly correct on Timelines 1 and 2.  None were 
borderline cases.  The only distinguishing difference between the groups on TL4 is that 
those in category 6 lost proportionality with 100,000, 1 million, and 100 million.  While 
it is possible that the two groups are indeed different from one another, there are 
other viable explanations for the difference.  First, the timelines were drawn fairly late 
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in the interview, and this was the fourth one.  Some students may simply have been 
tired of drawing timelines.  Thus their final attempt was not indicative of their 
understanding.  The second possibility is that the cognitive demands of sequencing 
seven numbers versus four were too great for people in category 6.   This does not 
automatically mean their understanding of large numbers is poor.  It may simply mean 
that seven numbers unnecessarily complicated the task for them. Therefore, these 
two categories were collapsed into one entitled: possessing sufficient knowledge of 
large numbers to deal with deep time.   
Students in categories 5, 4, 3, and 2 were also quite similar.   This may seem 
surprising to conclude that four separate categories could be viewed as similar to one 
another, yet there are reasons why that is the case.  Individuals scored as partially 
correct on one of the timelines just missed scoring correct, while those scoring correct 
on a timeline barely made the criteria.  Their timelines were more similar than they 
were different.  One of the two individuals in category 5 was moved to correct on TL1 
based upon his audio explanation.   There is one student, Kayla (8), whose placement 
in this category may be generous.  She will be described more fully in section 4.2.3.  
Whether she is placed in this category or the next one does not affect a conclusion 
about her ability to deal with the range of numbers necessary to understand deep 
time.  These four categories were collapsed into one entitled: possessing insufficient 
knowledge of large numbers to deal with deep time. 
The final category was comprised of the eight students who scored incorrect 
on all three timelines.  Their first timelines were sufficiently different from those in all 
other categories that they could not reasonably be combined with another group.  
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These people were unable to deal with proportional relationships among relatively 
small numbers, never mind large ones. They were placed into a category entitled: 
possessing a poor understanding of smaller numbers.  Categories and the number of 
students in each category are reported in Table 4.10.  Data are also broken out by 
grade levels.   Students in each of these groups share characteristics in terms of how 
they see the numbers involved in the timelines and in the problem solving strategies 
they employed to complete the tasks.  I now consider each of those groups in turn. 
Category Number of students  
 8th 
grade 
11th 
grade 
university 
Possessing sufficient knowledge of large numbers to 
deal with deep time 
2 6 8 
Possessing insufficient knowledge of large numbers 
to deal with deep time 
5 2 4 
Possessing a poor understanding of smaller numbers 5 3 0 
Table 4.10 Student groupings based upon their understanding of large numbers 
(N=35) 
 
4.2.2 Students who possess a poor understanding of smaller numbers 
Five of the eight students who scored incorrect on all three timelines were 
eighth graders and the remaining three were eleventh graders.  Their timelines share 
several characteristics.  These individuals seemed to be reasoning from left to right by 
starting with the smallest number then working up, a strategy that makes it difficult to 
place the final number proportionally.  For several students, the year served as a 
reference point or benchmark on TL1.  They emphasized the need to distinguish a year 
from a day and a month because a year was a long period of time.  Jenna (8) and 
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Jamal (8) both displayed this thinking.  Jenna placed a year at slightly less than the 
halfway point of her timeline.  When asked why she put it there she said that she 
didn’t want to make the space too small because then it would seem like a year is 
really small.  Jamal said,  
I did the year a little longer because a year; it’s a long period of time. (Jamal, 8) 
Their strategy resulted in the creation of a scale that is not clearly logarithmic 
or linear.  Often they compared two numbers at a time rather than trying to conceive 
of a scale that could handle all four numbers simultaneously, in the case of the first 
two timelines.  The end result was that they changed the scale between each 
successive pair of numbers.  They kept the size of the unit the same between 
successive pairs, (Ben used the term “tick marks”) but they changed its value.    Two 
students specifically stated that the space between a month and a year on the first 
timeline should be smaller than the space between a day and a month.  Ben’s 
explanation makes this point quite clearly. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Ben’s Timeline 1 
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Ben: A month’s like 30-31 days so I put 31 tick marks.  I left room for 12 tick 
marks because there’s 12 months in a year.  Then here 100 tick marks in 100 
years. 
Interviewer: Would all your tick marks be the same size? 
 Ben: Yeah, they would be the same size and spread out evenly. 
 Interviewer: Even though a month is longer than a day? 
 Ben: Yeah 
Leah used similar reasoning although her actual timeline made the distinction 
less clear than Ben’s did.  
 
Figure 4.2 Leah’s Timeline 1 
I actually said that a day might actually be more space between a day and a 
month than between a month and a year because it takes [an] average [of] 31 
days to get a full month to get to one month.  Then it takes 12 months to get to 
one year.  But then it takes 100 years obviously to get to 100 years.  So maybe 
this one then [points to space between month and year] would be the smallest 
one. (Leah, 11) 
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Leah continued with this same type of reasoning for TL2.  She said she tried to 
make the space between 1 million and 100 million the same size as the one between 
1,000 and 100,000 because there are 100 between both of them, while the space 
between 100,000 and 1 million should be smaller because there’s only ten between 
those numbers.  Malik (11) used similar reasoning and created the following timeline. 
 
Figure 4.3 Malik’s Timeline 2 
Interviewer: it seems like you’re thinking about something. 
Malik: The 100,000 years to 1 million if there’s 100 in 1 million years.  I’m not 
sure now. 
Interviewer: Hmm 
Malik: But that’s what I was trying to do, make it equal. 
Interviewer: So how many hundred thousands do you think there are in a 
million? 
Malik: I think it’s only 10, yeah, I think it’s only 10. 
Interviewer: Does that change your timeline? 
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Malik: Yes, I would make this smaller [space between 100,000 and 1 million] 
because it’s the only one of the amount divisible by 10.  The others are divisible 
by 100. 
Ben referred to “tick marks” for TL2 as he had done for TL1, but he was also 
confused about the multiplicative relationships between adjacent pairs of numbers.  
When asked why he spread the numbers out evenly across his timeline, he paused 
and then said, 
Actually, I think you would put 10 tick marks between each one because I think 
it’s times ten for each one. 
Interviewer: So a million times ten to get 100 million? 
Ben: Uh, I don’t know.  I kind of guessed on that one. 
Jamal (8) described an additive rather than a multiplicative strategy to 
compare adjacent numbers.  When comparing 100 thousand years to 1 million he said 
it takes nine hundred thousand years to make 1 million years.   He seemed to be 
thinking that if he has 100 thousand years he needs to add 900 more of those to make 
1 million rather than thinking that 1 million is ten times greater than 100 thousand.   
While Jamal was the only one in this group to employ an additive strategy, it was used 
by several others in another group and will be discussed more fully in the next section. 
Some students in this group indicated they understood little about the 
numbers involved on Timelines 2 and 4—a more basic problem than the multiplicative 
relationships among the numbers.  One thousand and 100,000 were written as Arabic 
numerals on the stimulus cards for TL2 while 1 million and 100 million were written 
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using the word million.  Vanessa (11) put 100,000 & 1 million at the same point on the 
timeline because, “they’re the same thing.”  
TL4 proved to be an impossible challenge for this group.  Students commonly 
spaced the letters on TL4 evenly across the timeline as can be seen from Jenna’s 
effort.  Despite the fact that they had used the entire space available for Timelines 1 
and 2, three students used only part of the paper for TL4.   This could be due to the 
two factors that were mentioned earlier.  Perhaps the cognitive demands of the task 
were too high for these pupils.  Alternatively, they may simply have been tired of 
creating timelines.  
 
Figure 4.4 Jenna’s Timeline 4 
4.2.3 Students whose understanding of large numbers is insufficient to deal with 
deep time 
This group could best be characterised by a “great variety in responses and 
strategies.”  Six of these students created a partially correct TL1, and the remaining 
five drew a correct one.   Those who produced a partially correct TL1 were more likely 
to place the smallest and largest numbers first and then place the middle terms.  This 
contrasts with the students in the previous group who employed a left to right, 
smallest to largest, orientation for all three timelines.  Students whose scales were 
more logarithmic were concerned about showing the differences between the three 
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smallest numbers.  This resulted in the spacing between the final two numbers being 
too small, as is shown by Ashley’s (8) TL1.  This could indicate that they are dealing 
with adjacent pairs of numbers separately and are not considering them all on the 
same scale. 
 
Figure 4.5 Ashley’s Timeline 1 
Some timelines in this group could best be described as borderline and were 
only placed in the partial or correct category based upon their verbal explanations.  
Kayla (8), who was mentioned in section 4.2.1, is a student whose TL1 was moved to 
the partial category based upon her explanation.  The timeline she produced is less 
proportional than Ashley’s and is more similar to Leah’s.  Visual inspection alone 
placed her in the incorrect category.  When explaining her timeline Kayla appeared to 
be starting from one day as her basic unit and referencing the other times to that.  She 
mentioned 30 days in a month and 365 days in a year.  She said, “Then 100 years, 
that’s a lot of days.”  When it was pointed out to her that the spaces between a month 
and a year and a year and 100 years were very similar on her timeline, she said that 
her timeline wasn’t long enough.  Kayla then indicated a space about 15 centimetres 
beyond the right side of the timeline as the place where she would locate 100 years if 
the paper was longer.  Although her strategy was similar to those in the previous 
group, that statement suggested to the interviewer that she had a clearer concept of 
the relationships among the numbers than what was indicated by her timeline alone.  
Therefore, she was given the benefit of the doubt and moved to the partial category.   
In questionable situations throughout the thesis, I have chosen to err on the side that 
would under rather than over report difficulties in any of the three areas being 
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investigated.
 
Figure 4.6 Kayla’s Timeline 1 
Nicole (univ) is another example of a student for whom a timeline was moved 
to a different category based upon her explanation.  Her TL1 was initially categorised 
as partial and is very similar to Ashley’s.  The only real difference is the small arrow by 
100 years.   Her reasoning strategy was reminiscent of Kayla’s described above.  Nicole 
talked about reasoning from one day to get to a month, then multiplying 30 times 12 
to get one year, and then multiplying 30 times 12 times 100 to get 100 years.  When 
questioned about the small arrow by 100 years, she indicated a space about 37 
centimetres beyond the right side of the timeline where she would place 100 years if 
the paper was long enough.  At that distance she would have created a timeline that 
met the criteria set out in Table 4.7. 
 
Figure 4.7 Nicole’s Timeline 1 
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What was most striking about the students in this group was the marked 
difference between Timelines 1 and 2. All of their TL1s showed some evidence of 
trying to distinguish the relationships between adjacent pairs of numbers.  However, 
on TL2 they frequently spaced all numbers equally across the line.  Of the eleven 
students in this group, nine of them scored incorrect on TL2, including three students 
who scored correct on TL1. As was typical of those in the poor category, many 
students expressed confusion about the relationships between adjacent numbers in 
their explanations. Several thought all were multiplied by 100 to get the next number, 
while others thought all were multiplied by 10.   A number of them mentioned the 
difficulty of the task.  Danielle’s (univ) TL2 was quite similar to Leah’s TL1.  She spaced 
the numbers out evenly across the timeline with a slightly larger space between 1 and 
100 million than the others.  As she was working she said, “The numbers between 
100,000 and 1 million are very blurry.”   
 
Figure 4.8 Danielle’s Timeline 2 
Emma (8) mentioned similar confusion about the numbers involved. 
Interviewer: You made the distance from 1 year to 10,000 years about the 
same as the distance from 10,000 years to 10 million years.  Are they the same 
amount of time? 
Emma (8): No, one’s longer than the other. 
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Interviewer: So why did you make them the same distance?  I’m curious about 
that. 
Emma: I don’t know.  I guess I wasn’t sure where to put them. …It’s a long 
period of time so I wasn’t really sure where to put it. 
When asked how to explain the relationship between two of the numbers, two 
students explicitly used additive rather than multiplicative reasoning, comparable to 
what was described for Jamal in the previous section.  The timelines they drew were 
typical of those in this category with the four numbers spaced fairly evenly across the 
timeline, similar to Danielle’s.  Jamal didn’t use the word “more” in his explanation, 
but Kayla (8) did when she indicated it takes ninety-thousand more thousands to 
make 100,000, nine hundred thousand more hundred thousands to make 1 million, 
and ninety-nine more millions to make 100 million.   Emma also used this strategy.  
She subtracted correctly on her timeline but then misspoke when giving the 
relationship between 100,000 and 1,000,000. 
Interviewer: How many hundred thousand years does it take to make 1 million 
years? 
Emma (11): Probably [pause], can I write this down? 
Interviewer: If you want, sure.  [She subtracted 100,000 from 1,000,000 on the 
back of her timeline and got 900,000.] 
Emma: Probably about 900 years. 
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As was true for the previous group, the need to place seven numbers on the 
same timeline that represent durations that are vastly different from one another 
created problems for many on TL4.  As a result, in some cases the student’s response 
didn’t make sense.  Ashley, another eighth grader, illustrates. 
Interviewer: You have about the same amount of space between the year and 
10 thousand years as you have between 10,000 years and 10 million years.   
Ashley (8): Yeah, cause they’re like be [sic] the same amount.   
Interviewer: From a year to 10,000 years would be the same as from 10,000 
years to 10 million years? 
Ashley: Yeah, cause they’re just another year or so 
The use of an intuitive logarithmic scale shows up in several places on TL4.   
Two university students demonstrate their confusion. 
Elizabeth (univ): Well, I thought that it would probably take more minutes in a 
day, 24 x 60, I don’t know how much that is, but it would probably take more 
minutes to make 1 day than it would take 1 day to make 1 month.  A minute is 
like a smaller amount of time so I kind of thought they would be about the 
same amount of time. 
Leah (11): Then for these [10,000, 10 million, & 100 million], they feel like 
they’re the same space to me.  They just feel like they’re the same to me. 
Interviewer: The same distance apart?  You mean the same distance from 
10,000 to 10 million as from 10 million to 100 million? 
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Leah: Well, I’m not sure what I’m saying but that’s what I was trying to do. 
Nicole’s (univ) reasoning was more explicit. 
Nicole: I knew that the minute was the shortest so I put it at the beginning of 
the timeline and I knew that 100 million years was the longest so I put it at the 
end.  And I tried to fill in the spaces between that.  But the way that I did it for 
this, because if I would have done it by the minute scale, I kind of like changed 
my thought processes for each one.  I did 60 minutes in an hour, 24 hours in a 
day, and I tried to do this in terms of minutes.  Then for the day I did 30 days 
into a month and then 12 months into a year.  Then, you know, 10,000 lines 
right here for 10,000 years, because the timeline wouldn’t be long enough if I 
had to do it like how I thought it would be.  Then for this one, I know that 
there’s a lot of notches that would go from 10,000 years to 10 million, 
definitely a lot for 10 million to 100 million if I did it on a minute scale. 
Interviewer: So you changed your scale between each two amounts? 
Nicole: Yeah, to make it fit on the paper. 
 What these students seem to have in common is the attempt to clearly 
differentiate between 1 year and 10,000 years and sometimes 10 thousand and 10 
million years.  The result is that the spacing for the remaining numbers is particularly 
out of proportion.  In some cases 100 million was simply put at the end “because it’s 
the largest” or because the biggest number always goes at the end.  Other students in 
this category demonstrated that they understood that on a linear scale the distance 
between 10,000 [F]and 10 million [A] must be greater than the distance between 1 [C] 
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and 10,000 [F].   Danielle is an example of the latter type, yet it’s not clear if she 
simply ran out of room and quit or if something else is going on.  The fact that she felt 
the space between a month [D] and a year [C] needed to be greater than the space 
between a day [E] and a month suggests that she does not realize that on this scale 
the difference is inconsequential. 
 
Figure 4.9 Danielle’s Timeline 4 
Danielle (univ): B is a minute.  E is one day.  The spaces between those 
compared to all the rest of them—very little.  Then a day compared to a month, 
there’s 30 days about in a month, then there’s a little more space.  12 months 
in a year give it a little bigger.  Then trying to think where the difference 
between 1 year and 10,000 years is probably much greater than that but it can 
be shown like that I guess.  Then what’s the difference between 10,000 years 
and 10 million years?  Oh that would be huge, so much bigger.  Then your 100 
million years would be all the way at the end. 
4.2.4 Students whose understanding of large numbers is sufficient to deal with deep 
time 
These timelines differed from the others in that there was a clear recognition 
that in order to represent all four numbers in the first two timelines on a linear scale, 
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the first three numbers would be very close together at one side of the timeline.  
Cole’s TL2 typifies the group. 
 
Figure 4.10 Cole’s Timeline 2 
These students differed from the others not only in their understanding of 
number, but also in terms of their problem solving strategies.    They were much more 
likely than the other groups to place the largest number first, make several attempts 
to place the first three numbers, and move them progressively closer to the left side 
of the line.   Justin was an example of someone who made several attempts.   
 
Figure 4.11 Justin’s Timeline 1 
Well, I would make the increments, the day.  I didn’t know how far apart to put 
them.  I found out how far apart the one was.  I just found out how much I 
wanted to put one.  Then I used my pinkie to see the size and I moved it over 
and marked it every time until I got to 30, put a line down for a month, and 
then tried to gauge my pinkie the other way so I could get all 30 onto it and 
made that as one month and then just kept moving the pinkie over until I got to 
12 until I got to a year.  That didn’t fit at first so I decided to make it even 
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smaller, still using my fingers to measure it up.  By the time I got to the 1 year 
point I wouldn’t be able to fit 100 years so I had to eventually make the year, 
the day, and the month pretty much in the same general starting area showing 
that they are so close in comparison to 100 years that it would fit. (Justin, 11) 
Michael (11) described a unique division strategy for TL1.  He began by dividing 
the timeline and writing the numbers 50, 25, 75, and 12.5. 
 
Figure 4.12 Michael’s Timeline 1 
I split in half 100 years here at the very end, split in half, got 50, split the two 
ends in half, 75 and 25, 25 in half, 12.5, that in half, 6 point 2 whatever, then I 
just guessed at one year be about here, and a month should be a little more 
over *left+, and the day’s the smallest. 
No one in the other two groups mentioned any connection between the 
timelines but students in this group did connect them.  In fact when they began TL2, a 
number of them commented that it was very similar to the first one in that the first 
three numbers were clustered to the left side of the line with the fourth number alone 
at the right side.  While completing the first two timelines a few students mentioned 
the need to reference the three smallest numbers against the largest number. 
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This group frequently mentioned a multiplication or division strategy in their 
explanations of their timelines.  Ryan articulated that for TL2. 
Interviewer: Tell me what you know about how these numbers are related to 
each other. 
Ryan (11): Multiplied by 100 [indicates 1,000] 
Interviewer: You mean you multiply 1,000 by 100 to get 100,000? 
Ryan: yeah, then you can multiply 100,000 by ten to get a million.  Then 
multiply that by 100 to get 100 million, so all factors of ten. (Should be 
multiples] 
Several students talked about how the first three numbers on TL2 were related 
to 100 million.  While not all students mentioned the specific multiplicative 
relationship between the numbers, many indicated the relative difference between 
the numbers.  Sarah’s (univ.) explanation is an example. 
Interviewer: It’s interesting because 1,000 years seems like a long time. 
Sarah: Yes, it does. 
Interviewer: Yet it doesn’t take up very much space on your timeline. 
Sarah: Not at all 
Interviewer: Why is that? 
Sarah: Because it’s a lot, a lot smaller than a hundred million years. 
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Mathematical language was used more frequently by these individuals.  Four 
of the students mentioned the word “proportion” or “proportional,” in contrast to the 
previous two groups, in which it was never mentioned. Those who used the word 
proportional expressed how difficult it was to make the timeline truly proportional.  
Sean talked about proportional reasoning for both TLI and TL2. 
When it comes to what was going through my head, I was thinking math, 
math, math the whole time.  I was thinking proportions.  You know, if a day is 
this small on the chart then it has to be, you have to multiply it by so many to 
make 100 years.  But it’s kind of hard to do without if you want to figure it out 
mathematically.  There’s other ways using a ruler or calculator. (Sean, 11) 
His explanation for TL2 is very similar. 
Sean: I didn’t do it thinking about the other one.  I did it thinking in proportion 
thinking that since I’m looking at such big numbers I should break it down so I 
thought ok this is just one instead of 1,000.  I thought just one, just 100 for the 
100,000.  Then just 1,000 for the *million+ cause I’m just thinking in the range of 
the three zeros at the end for the 1,000. 
Interviewer: Do you mean because a million is 1,000 thousands? 
Sean: Yeah, I thought of it [100 million] as 100,000 thousands...It pretty much is 
like the other one not in number wise because obviously one day compared to a 
month, a month has 31 days in it, a year has 365 days in it.  The last one was 
100 years, just 100 years itself so those numbers aren’t all the same as these 
but they could be linked in proportion. 
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Figure 4.13 Sean’s Timeline 2 
Although these students created accurate timelines and explained their 
solutions using some sort of multiplicative or proportional reasoning, they didn’t 
always get the relationship between adjacent numbers correct in their explanations.  
Initially Justin (11) said there are 100 hundred thousand years in a million years, 
although immediately afterward he said that he would multiply the space necessary 
for 100,000 by ten to get the space needed for 1 million.   Lauren was not immediately 
sure of the relationship between 100,000 and 1,000,000 either. 
Interviewer: How many hundred thousand years are in a million years? 
Lauren (univ): I have no idea, but I know there’s not a lot. 
Interviewer:  Why do you know there’s not a lot? 
Lauren: Because million there’s one more zero so that’s like 10,000 more of 
these.  I don’t know.  My brain can’t comprehend it right now.  I know it’s 
smaller by quite a few. 
Where students in this group diverged from one another was on TL4.  Michael 
said he wanted to indicate that the timeline should be longer.  When asked to draw 
the line as if this was the only paper he had, he produced the timeline in Figure 4.14.  
He tried to indicate the great difference between a year and 10,000 years, and 10,000 
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and 10 million years.  Neither his timeline nor his explanation provided enough 
information to say whether he wasn’t aware that his spacing between 10 million and 
100 million years was entirely too small on that scale or if he simply chose to leave it 
as “good enough.” 
 
Figure 4.14 Michael’s Timeline 4 
Lauren (univ.) attempted proportionality with the smaller numbers up to 100 
years, although one could argue that on a scale of 100 million years, they were still 
quite far apart.  Yet, her space between 10 million years [A] and 100 million years [G] 
was smaller than the space between 1 year (C) and 10 million years (A).   Once again, 
this could suggest that the cognitive demands of placing seven very different numbers 
on the same timeline were too great for some individuals. 
 
 
Figure 4.15 Lauren’s Timeline 4 
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Other students in this category appeared to approach TL4 in the same way 
they had the earlier ones, with many once again mentioning a multiplication or 
division strategy.  They also appeared to have a clearer sense of the scale required to 
deal with all the numbers, although in some instances it was clearer than others.  
Anthony specifically said that all the other numbers must be considered in terms of 
their relationship to 100 million years. 
Anthony (univ): B, C, D & E were all within a span of a year and in geologic time 
compared to 100 million years that’s just like a decimal percentage so that’s 
towards the beginning.  F just cause you’re adding 10,000 years.  It might have 
been a little bit bigger but not too much more different.   Then 10 million years 
would be a tenth of this since I decided to put 100 million years so I just kind of 
estimated that’d be 10% of the graph.  Then G would be what you’re basing 
everything off of. 
  James also demonstrated a sense of scale.  He said that it would be difficult to 
show all the numbers because the first few are so small in comparison to 100 million 
years.  Notice that he indicated that B [1 minute] should be against the edge of the 
paper.  In fact, he said, “I ran out of room.  B just went against the line cause I couldn’t 
draw any more lines.” 
 
Figure 4.16 James’ Timeline 4 
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Although he didn’t state it as clearly as Andrew, Ryan drew his timeline to show that 
the smaller numbers are essentially the same when thinking on a scale of 100 million 
years. 
 
Figure 4.17 Ryan’s Timeline 4 
Ryan (11): In 100 million years you have, what’s that, 10 million years, you have 
1/10 of that.  That’s what I think is 1/10 of the entire timeline.  The rest of them 
are almost nonexistent.  If I could have squeezed it closer I would have because 
10,000 years is 1/1000 of this so that would be all the way at the end.   
4.2.5 Anomalous data 
I have already mentioned why some timelines were difficult to categorise and 
have attempted to justify the reasons for their placement in a particular group.  One 
student’s (David, univ) responses were the most difficult to classify.  He is indicated by 
an asterisk in Tables 4.7 and 4.8.  His responses were so unique that I have chosen to 
discuss them at length, partly to illustrate the challenges inherent in interpreting 
interview responses.  David was the only university student to identify himself as a 
geology major, though like all university students in the sample this was his first 
university level geoscience course.  Initial sorting by both coders placed all three of his 
timelines in the incorrect category.    All are reproduced for the reader’s convenience.  
Each was difficult to interpret even with his explanation as it was unclear if, for 
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example one year was deemed to be a fixed point on the timeline or a line segment 
indicating its duration. 
 
Figure 4.18 David’s Timeline 1 
 
Figure 4.19 David’s Timeline 2 
After listening to the audio tape for TL1 and TL2, he was moved to the partial 
category.  When creating TL1 he made multiple corrections and finally said, “It’s not 
proportional but it’s closer than what I had.”  As he worked on TL2, he said, 
I’m just thinking of how big these numbers are compared to each other.  I’m 
not quite sure ‘cause we don’t deal with numbers this big normally in our 
average day.  So I really don’t know how long one million years is compared to 
a thousand.  I really don’t know how long a thousand years is.  It’s kind of hard 
to put that in the reference when I don’t know how long a thousand years is 
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much less a hundred million years.  It’s kind of hard to put that on the timeline.  
I’ll do my best but I don’t know so I’m just gonna keep going. (David, univ) 
That explanation suggested an intermediate understanding of the numbers.  
Yet his rationale for TL4 implied a much richer understanding of scale than either of 
his previous two explanations.  He expressed confusion about the size of the numbers 
similar to what he said for TL2, but this time he indicated that the problem was a more 
general one of scale by relating these times to very large objects.  The fact that he was 
able to relate large units of time to large size units suggests that he is not necessarily 
saying that he doesn’t know the proportional relationships among the numbers, 
although that may be the case.  When explaining his placement of numbers for TL2 he 
said that each successive number was 100 times greater than the previous one.  It is 
unclear if that represents a true misunderstanding or whether he was simply speaking 
without fully thinking through his response.  When talking about TL4 he appeared to 
be saying he has difficulty fathoming such large periods of time rather than simply 
ascertaining the proportional relationship between two quantities.    
 
Figure 4.20 David’s Timeline 4 
David (univ):  100 million years takes a lot of minutes, just the scale, just the 
way, I mean, I don’t really know how to explain it other than…umm 
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Interviewer: Do you mean you started at the right side of the timeline in your 
thinking? 
David: Not really.  I started down here but I kinda did start all the way at the 
right.  What I did was I took a look at all of these, A through G, and I saw the 
shortest one is a minute and the longest is 100 million years.  That’s gonna be a 
large time scale.  And I looked at all of what is in here, in between a minute and 
100 million years, 1 year is not that long.  100,000 years isn’t even that long.  A 
day obviously isn’t long, a month is not that long either.  That’s why I bunched 
them down here.  Cause 100 million years is a long, long time.  That’s pretty 
obvious, but that is a long time.  It’s kinda like when you get up to excessively 
high temperatures or excessively big objects such as stars or planets.  You can’t 
even fathom how big those things are.  They’re just so big; I don’t know how 
big a star is.  It’s just so big, I don’t know.  And that’s the same way with the 
years; it’s just so long that I have no clue.  Like I can judge a minute.  I can 
judge a year.  I can even judge 6 years, but after about 6, 7, 10 years it’s kind of 
hard to fathom, and that’s just 20 years, 10 years.  Imagine 100 million years?  
I can’t do that, no. 
David’s number lines suggest a fairly sophisticated understanding since he 
appears to be thinking beyond a mathematical relationship to the need to make sense 
of the numbers which is a great challenge for anyone attempting to comprehend deep 
time.   Therefore, he appears as correct for all three timelines in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 
with an asterisk.  Again, in an attempt to resist overstating the role of a large number 
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problem in a conception of deep time, it is deemed preferable to possibly introduce a 
systematic error that underestimates rather than overestimates the difficulty.   
4.2.6 What do the timelines indicate these students understand about large 
numbers? 
The second research question asked whether students in this sample possess 
sufficient understanding of large numbers to be able to comprehend deep time.  
Results demonstrate that a number of these individuals have relatively inadequate 
ideas about numbers of the magnitude that are necessary to understand deep time.  
All eight students who were classified as having a poor understanding of smaller 
numbers demonstrated problems with multiplicative reasoning as well as a more basic 
misunderstanding regarding the meaning of the specific numbers in the task.  They 
appeared to approach all three timelines in a similar manner with a left to right 
strategy that compared two numbers at a time rather than looking at the set of 
numbers as a whole.  These students also tended to change the size of the unit 
represented by the spaces between successive numbers.  In other words, they talked 
about the need to fit 30 spaces between a day and a month and then the need to fit 
12 of the same size spaces between a month and a year.  They perceived numbers 
that were relatively small on the scale as being large.  As Jamal (8) said, I did the year a 
little longer because a year, it’s a long period of time.  Students in this group rarely 
moved any of their numbers while explaining their reasoning.  As expected they knew 
how many days in a month, months in a year, etc.  They were not so clear on the 
relationships between numbers for the other two timelines, however.  Some thought 
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adjacent numbers were related multiplicatively by 10 and others by 100.    They would 
not be expected to deal very effectively with long durations. 
Students in the second group were able to deal with relatively small numbers, 
but their Timelines 2 and 4 were not appreciably different from those of the prior 
group.  They were also confused about the multiplicative relationships between pairs 
of numbers.  They tended to assume the same multiplicative relationship between 
each adjacent pair of numbers.  Hannah (11) said that the space between 100 
thousand and 1 million should be larger than the spaces between 1,000 and 100,000 
and between 1 million and 100 million.  Her reasoning was that 500 [thousand] is half 
of a million and 100,000 isn’t even at the halfway point.  When asked how many 100 
thousands in 1 million she replied, “A lot, I’m not sure exactly.” 
Two students in this group and one in the previous group attempted to use an 
additive strategy rather than a multiplicative one to relate two numbers to one other.   
On the first two timelines, people in this group often placed the smallest and largest 
numbers first and then placed the middle two numbers in relation to them.  They tried 
to clearly show the distinction between smaller numbers like 1,000 and 100,000 (TL2) 
or 1 year and 10,000 years (TL4).  The end result was that they ran out of room and 
telescoped the space between the two largest numbers on the line.  They struggled 
with TL2 but TL4 was clearly too great a challenge.   The numbers themselves, apart 
from any difficulties with geoscience content would likely impede the ability of these 
first two groups to deal with either succession or duration in deep time. 
The final group demonstrated a solid understanding of the relationships 
amongst the numbers in this task.  They displayed good proportional reasoning.  In 
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fact, the way they reasoned about the task set them apart from the other two groups.  
They kept the scale in mind and were able to consider the numbers as a group when 
deciding their placement on that scale.  A number of students in the correct category 
noted that each timeline was essentially the same task just with different numbers.   
Talking about TL2, 
It’s almost the same principle. (Cole, univ) 
Well, it’s kind of the same idea as the day and the month. (Sarah, univ) 
 I think it’s like the same thing. (Lauren, univ) 
They tended to start with the largest number and relate all the others to it rather than 
the strategies used by the other groups.  They recognized the role played by the 
largest number in the set on the scale.  As a group, they were more likely than the 
others to use the word proportion, proportional, or fraction in their explanations.  It 
was not unusual for these participants to change the placement of numbers on their 
timelines as they worked.     If these students have any difficulty understanding deep 
time, it will probably not be due to the large numbers involved. 
There appears to be a slight age effect for the timelines (see Table 4.10, p. 
240).    However, in positing an age effect, it must be pointed out that the university 
sample is not stratified like the eighth and eleventh grade ones.  On the other hand, 
only one of the university students self-identified as a science major.  The other eleven 
participants were enrolled in the course to fulfil a university general education 
requirement.  Further, demographic information for Institutions A and B reported in 
chapter three indicates that students at these schools are representative of students 
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within the average to below average range of ability for all university students in the 
U.S.  Hence, there is no implicit assumption that the university students in this sample 
represent a population that is more academically talented than the U.S. university 
population as a whole.  While I would not be on firm ground to allege too strong an 
age effect, there is a hint that one exists. 
We see, then, that some adolescents and adults do not possess a solid 
understanding of large numbers.  They could be expected to have difficulty 
comprehending deep time since they cannot relate time units to one another on a 
suitable scale.  Simply learning about geoscience will not be enough.  They will also 
need to learn something more about large numbers and their proportional 
relationships.  There is another factor that may impede a student’s ability to 
understand deep time.  We now turn to the final “leg” of the “stool.”  
4.3 Geoscience content knowledge and a concept of deep time 
 The role of geoscience content knowledge in students’ understanding of deep 
time seems obvious, yet it is difficult to isolate.  From a constructivist perspective, all 
knowledge acquisition is mediated by existing knowledge.  In this section, however, 
we are specifically investigating the extent to which errors students make about deep 
time can be at least partially attributed to a lack of subject matter knowledge of 
geoscience.   
If a lack of geoscience content knowledge contributes to a poor understanding 
of deep time, how would we expect that to manifest itself?  On succession tasks, we 
would expect students to be able to order events correctly when the ordering is 
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possible via logical reasoning that is largely independent of their knowledge of 
geoscience.  For example, appearance of first life is placed before appearance of first 
fish since fish are alive.  A student does not necessarily have to know anything about 
evolutionary biology, but could reason that since fish are subsumed under the more 
general category of life, first life is antecedent to first fish.  Conversely, where subject 
matter knowledge is more necessary for accurate placement we would expect more 
errors.  Regardless of whether answers were correct or not, we would expect the 
rationale for answers to focus on more extraneous surface features, e.g., size, 
appearance of picture.  As a result, a correct answer alone would not necessarily be 
indicative of a good understanding of time since a student could get the correct 
answer using faulty reasoning.   We would also expect that if specific subject matter 
knowledge was required, student performance would be no better for succession or 
duration tasks in conventional time.  Thus, if a student is asked to indicate how long it 
takes one blood cell to travel through the body, it would not be surprising if the 
question proved quite difficult.  Some knowledge of the circulatory system would be 
essential.  The fact that the process occurs well within conventional time makes it 
neither easier nor harder than processes that occur in deep time.  The important thing 
is that one must know something about the domain in question.   We first turn our 
attention to geoscience content knowledge as it relates to succession. 
4.3.1 Geoscience content knowledge and fossil succession  
Students were shown a line drawing of a series of stratigraphic columns 
containing specific fossils.  This drawing was taken directly from Dodick and Orion 
(Dodick & Orion, 2003a, 2003b) and was described in chapter two (Figure 2.3 on p. 
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132).  Students were asked to compare two layers, the trilobite and the brachiopod 
layer and indicate which layer probably formed first or if they formed at the same 
time.  They were deliberately not directed to the locations of the layers as that could 
have suggested a particular strategy.  Principles of stratigraphic correlation and fossil 
succession can be used to determine that the trilobite layer was formed before the 
brachiopod layer, and, in fact, was the first one in the sequence.  The brachiopod was 
chosen because it appears in two places in the sequence, one on the same level with 
the trilobite and one above it.  It was hypothesized that this dual placement might 
cause some cognitive conflict in students.  While the presence of the brachiopod on 
the same layer as the trilobite might suggest the two layers had formed at the same 
time, the presence of the brachiopod farther up the sequence in column two could 
challenge that thinking.    
Table 4.11 lists the number of students who chose each fossil and the reasons 
they cited for their answer.  Fifteen students said the trilobite formed first, six said the 
brachiopod did, and 13 said the two layers probably formed at the same time.  This 
total equals 34 not 35 due to the fact that Claire did not settle on an answer but 
named trilobite first or at the same time as equal possibilities.  She cites her lack of 
knowledge about the two fossils as an explanation for her difficulty.  Since Claire did 
not settle on a response, her reasons are not reported in this table.  Further, the total 
frequency in Table 4.11 does not equal 34 because some students invoked more than 
one reason for their answer, all of which have been reported.   From those numbers 
alone we might conclude that approximately 43% of the students had a good 
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understanding of fossil succession.  Yet, when we probe the stated reasons for their 
responses, that conclusion becomes more tenuous.   
Reason Frequency 
 Trilobite Brachiopod Same 
Physical appearance of fossils (e.g., one looks 
older, one is larger) 
4 6 1 
Same position in column (both at the bottom) 0 0 12 
Greater familiarity with (knowledge about) one of 
the two fossils 
4 1 0 
Reference to others in column (more recent, more 
familiar, name, where lived) 
6 1 1 
Correlating layers 4 0 0 
Table 4.11 Reasons cited for answer to question, “Which is older, the trilobite or the 
brachiopod?” 
 
Students who answered incorrectly and some who answered correctly cited 
some aspect of the physical appearance of the fossils, a surface feature, as reason for 
their answer.  None of the university students said this, but it was common among 
younger participants.  These responses included statements about size as well as 
other aspects of physical appearance. 
James (11): It [trilobite] looks like it has bones or something and the brachiopod 
doesn’t maybe.  It *trilobite+ took longer. 
Ben (8): It *brachiopod+ looks like it’s older and everything.  The trilobite one 
looks like it’s newer and there’s not that much dust and everything on it, dirt. 
Kayla (8): I think the trilobite would form first cause it looks bigger than the 
other one. 
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The same position in the column was cited by all but one person who said the 
layers formed at the same time.  There is some correlational reasoning here, since 
same place in a column equals simultaneity.   The problem is that these individuals 
failed to account for the brachiopod’s appearance in two different places.  It is not 
clear, however, if these people ignored the relevance of the brachiopod in the second 
column or if they didn’t see it.   
Alyssa (8): I’d say they both formed at the same time. 
Interviewer: Why do you say that? 
Alyssa: Because they’re both on the bottom of the rocks. 
Familiarity or lack thereof with one or more of the fossils shows up in two 
places in Table 4.11, both in the row of that name and also in the reference to other 
fossils in the same column.  The greater familiarity row is reserved for statements 
indicating students were more familiar with the trilobite or the brachiopod 
specifically.  In general, students in this category often said that the brachiopod 
looked like a clam, and they were familiar with clams.  The reference to others 
includes statements students made regarding any of the other fossils in the columns.  
Some mentioned that the fossils in one column were fossils they had heard of before.  
Therefore, the fossil at the bottom of that column must be younger than a fossil at the 
bottom of another column.  This, however, may not be the case since an unconformity 
could have removed intervening layers.  Matt’s response is an example of one that 
was classified as familiarity/unfamiliarity. 
I’ve never seen anything like that *trilobite+ before. (Matt, 8) 
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Nathan’s, Leah’s and Sarah’s, however, were classified as “reference to others in 
column.”  While they cited familiarity with certain fossils, the focus was on the other 
fossils in the column, not the two being compared. 
Interviewer: Why do you say the trilobite?   
Nathan (11): Um, these [1st column] seem to be like animals, I guess, yeah, 
animals that seem to be like more older like these [3rd column] are things that 
are like things that are alive now like snail and shark tooth where these [1st 
column+ like gastropod, I’ve never really heard of that so maybe it’s prehistoric. 
Leah (11): I was just looking at the ones that had pod at the end were higher up 
than the ones that didn’t. 
Sarah (univ): I think that the trilobite layer was formed first.   
Interviewer: Why do you say that?   
Sarah: Because the brachiopod layer has things on top of it that are more 
recent than the things in the trilobite column. 
The majority of people who invoked one of those reasons correctly answered that the 
trilobite was formed first.  The results provide a good example of the fact that it is 
possible to get the correct answer using a faulty reasoning strategy or one based upon 
a faulty premise. 
It was not unusual for students to combine the physical appearance of the 
fossils with familiarity with one of the fossils being compared or with others in the 
columns.  
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Chris (8): I would say the brachiopod. 
Interviewer: Why would you say that? 
Chris: It would take less time to encase it cause I’ve seen some of ‘em.  I used to 
collect seashells so I know what it’s gonna look like.  It *brachiopod+ could be 
possibly the size of that *trilobite+ but from the picture it’s not so, it’s a little 
smaller surface area so it may take a shorter time to encase.  
Only four of the students mentioned correlation of layers, and then with 
varying levels of sophistication.  Justin (11) said the trilobite was first because it was 
before the ammonite in the first column which was also at the bottom of the second 
column.   
I: Would your answer be different if you noticed there was also a brachiopod 
here [bottom of 3rd column] or would your answer still be the same?   
Justin: It would probably be the same cause then just further down this [3rd 
column] you could probably find an ammonite; I guess if the ammonites could 
live in that area then an ammonite would be further down on the third column 
then even farther than that would be a trilobite. 
Connor, an 8th grader, gave the clearest explanation of fossil succession. 
Connor (8): I think that the trilobite layer formed first. 
Interviewer: Why do you say that? 
Connor: Because comparing the brachiopod layer to the ammonite layer, the 
snail, like taking the snail and measuring up to there, maybe taking the 
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brachiopod and measuring to there.  Even though the fish scale is in between 
those it could be around the same time.  Yet, if you take the top of the trilobite 
layer which is the gastropod, you put it right up over against the gastropod 
there[in 2nd column+ really, it turns out the trilobite’s all the way up here and 
the shark tooth’s way up here so that’s kinda how I did it. 
 If we had merely stopped with the question, “Which layer was formed first?” 
we may have incorrectly concluded that 15 students had some understanding of 
succession in deep time.  However, when we look at the reasons they cited for their 
responses we find that roughly the same number of people who chose trilobite 
(correct) and brachiopod (incorrect) referred to some surface feature (physical 
appearance) of the fossils.    Those who chose trilobite were more likely than either of 
the other groups to cite a lack of familiarity either with trilobites themselves or with 
the other fossils in the first column where the trilobite is found.  In fact, only four of 
the 15 people who correctly answered trilobite did so for the correct reason.  The 
reason why these two particular fossils were chosen was described previously.  
However, one wonders what the result would have been if students had been 
presented with different columns in which a clam and snail occupied the layers where 
the trilobite and brachiopod exist in this drawing (assuming all other layers were 
adjusted accordingly to reflect possible realistic scenarios).  Students would likely be 
familiar with both clams and snails, perhaps making the task more rather than less 
difficult.  Alternatively, what would those same students have said if all fossil pictures 
were adapted to fill similar areas?  Then a decision could not have been made based 
upon the size of the animal in the picture.  Further implications of these results will be 
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discussed more fully in chapter five.  It should be noted now that correct answers may 
be false positives and lead us to conclude a greater understanding than may actually 
exist. 
 One caution regarding these findings is in order.  Students were not directed to 
the particular locations of the trilobite and the two brachiopods.  This was done 
deliberately so as not to influence responses.  Some students, however, may not have 
seen both of the brachiopods.  If that was the case it could have affected the 
responses of those who said the two layers were formed at the same time because 
they were both at the bottom.  Some students did notice both brachiopods, and this 
created some dissonance.  Cole and Megan, both university students, appeared to 
struggle with how to deal with the location of the two brachiopods.  Megan was able 
to come to the correct conclusion, while Cole was not. 
Cole: I guess they would have to form at the same time. 
 Interviewer: How do you know?  
Cole: Because both the trilobite and the brachiopod are both located on the 
lowest level of two of the columns and the brachiopod is also located almost at 
the top of the middle column so I guess it maybe also depends on elevation of 
land, too.  
Even though Megan correctly concluded that the trilobite layer must be older, she was 
still somewhat unsure of her answer.  
Megan: Probably the trilobite [voice rose at end as in question]   
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Interviewer: How do you know?  
Megan: Well, on here [brachiopod in 3rd column+ I’d say maybe around the 
same time but the brachiopod up here [2nd column+ is farther to the top so I’d 
guess that it was later.   
4.3.2 Geoscience content knowledge and succession of geoscience and historical 
events 
 The reader may remember that sequencing a series of geological events is a 
task that has been used a number of times in the literature to assess how people 
perceive succession in geologic time.  The task in this study was modelled after Trend 
(1998, 2000, 2001b), but unlike his task included events from ancient history and one 
from the Age of Exploration. A list of the events students sequenced for this card sort 
task is in Appendix A and also in Table 4.12.  If geoscience content knowledge 
influences responses in the way I’ve suggested, we would expect to see evidence that 
students were using logical reasoning strategies to determine answers.  The first life 
and first fish mentioned earlier is an example.   We would expect they would do better 
on items for which those reasoning strategies alone could produce a correct answer 
than those for which geoscience content knowledge would be more essential.  
Furthermore, we would expect that responses would be no less accurate for 
geoscience events than for historical events with which an individual was not 
acquainted.  Eighth and eleventh graders in this sample reported having studied 
ancient history in the past (in grades 6 and 9), as did all university participants.   
According to one eighth grader, however, that was practically ancient history itself. 
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I don’t remember that one *Julius Caesar] cause that one was from 6th grade. 
(Ashley, 8) 
 Table 4.12 lists the events from the card sequencing task for all participants.  
Data is reported for the entire sample and is subsequently broken down by grade level 
in Tables 4.13-4.15.  I have organised the data tables in the same manner as Trend to 
allow for comparison with his results in chapter five.    Columns in Tables 4.12-4.15 are 
identical to those in his data tables.  Column 2 (Rank: Consensus) refers to the rank or 
serial order assigned to these events by experts.  Events are ordered from most recent 
to oldest based upon the mean relative rank assigned by participants in this study 
(column 3) rather than by column 2.  Standard deviations are reported to gauge 
degree of ranking agreement among students.   I have not calculated the statistical 
differences between standard deviations due to the small sample size.  The deviations 
in this study will be compared to Trend’s data in chapter five.   
Adjacent mean differences provide a sense of how confident the group is, as a 
whole, in their responses.  The mean rank for each event was compared with the 
mean rank of the event that immediately preceded it in serial order.  Low adjacent 
mean differences suggest students are relatively unsure which of those events 
occurred first.  For example, mean ranks for woolly mammoths became extinct almost 
everywhere and first humans appeared on Earth differ by only 0.10.  In their 
explanations many students expressed confusion about which of these two events 
was first.  In contrast, mean ranks for Great Pyramids of Egypt were built and woolly 
mammoths became extinct almost everywhere differ by 2.10, indicating that students, 
as a group, are confident that woolly mammoth extinction preceded the building of 
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the pyramids.  This does not provide any indication that students know by how much 
woolly mammoth extinction preceded the building of the pyramids merely that it did.    
The only pair of events for which the mean relative rank of all students differed 
from the expert consensus was: very first life appeared on Earth and first volcanoes 
erupted on Earth.   This was also the only pair of items switched by the university 
students.  The volcanoes item was included specifically because it was expected it 
would be largely unknown to most students.  Their placement of the event and their 
reasoning could provide insight into how students approached the task. 
 
Geoscience or historical event Rank: 
Consensus 
Mean rank: 
relative 
Adjacent 
Mean 
difference 
SD 
Christopher Columbus sailed to the 
New World 
13 12.66 0.92 0.59 
Julius Caesar was killed 12 11.74 0.57 0.85 
1st Olympic Games held in ancient 
Greece 
11 11.17 0.91 0.92 
Great Pyramids of Egypt were built 10 10.26 2.10 0.66 
Woolly mammoths became extinct 
almost everywhere 
9 8.16 0.10 1.16 
1st humans appeared on Earth 8 8.06 1.27 0.94 
Dinosaurs became extinct 7 6.79 0.62 1.17 
1st fish appeared in Earth’s waters 6 6.17 1.20 1.01 
1st volcanoes developed on Earth 4 4.97 0.57 1.48 
Very 1st life appeared on Earth 5 4.40 1.50 0.81 
Origin/formation of Earth 3 2.90 0.97 0.51 
Origin/formation of Sun 2 1.93 0.13 0.57 
Big Bang 1 1.80 --- 2.39 
Table 4.12 Sequence of geoscience & historical events, all participants (N=35) 
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Geoscience or historical event Rank: 
Consensus 
Mean rank: 
relative 
Adjacent 
Mean 
difference 
SD 
Christopher Columbus sailed to the 
New World 
13 12.33 0.58 0.78 
1st Olympic Games held in ancient 
Greece 
11 11.75 0.25 1.06 
Julius Caesar was killed 12 11.50 1.17 1.24 
Great Pyramids of Egypt were built 10 10.33 2.00 0.49 
1st humans appeared on Earth 8 8.33 0.87 0.79 
Woolly mammoths became extinct 
almost everywhere 
9 7.46 0.71 1.16 
1st fish appeared in Earth’s waters 6 6.75 0.46 1.22 
Dinosaurs became extinct 7 6.29 0.62 1.74 
1st volcanoes developed on Earth 4 5.67 1.59 1.97 
Very 1st life appeared on Earth 5 4.08 1.20 1.08 
Origin/formation of Earth 3 2.88 0.67 0.80 
Origin/formation of Sun 2 2.21 0.79 0.72 
Big Bang 1 1.42 --- 0.90 
Table 4.13 Sequence of geoscience & historical events, 8th graders (N=12) 
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Geoscience or historical event Rank: 
Consensus 
Mean rank: 
relative 
Adjacent 
Mean 
difference 
SD 
Christopher Columbus sailed to the 
New World 
13 12.73 0.82 0.47 
Julius Caesar was killed 12 11.91 1.18 0.70 
1st Olympic Games held in ancient 
Greece 
11 10.73 0.55 0.65 
Great Pyramids of Egypt were built 10 10.18 1.54 0.87 
Woolly mammoths became extinct 
almost everywhere 
9 8.64 0.82 0.81 
1st humans appeared on Earth 8 7.82 0.91 0.87 
Dinosaurs became extinct 7 6.91 1.09 0.83 
1st fish appeared in Earth’s waters 6 5.82 1.27 0.75 
Very 1st life appeared on Earth 5 4.55 0.28 0.69 
1st volcanoes developed on Earth 4 4.27 1.45 0.79 
Origin/formation of Earth 3 2.82 0.00 0.40 
Big Bang 1 2.82 1.00 4.14 
Origin/formation of Sun 2 1.82 --- 0.40 
Table 4.14 Sequence of geoscience & historical events, 11th graders (N=11) 
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Geoscience or historical event Rank: 
Consensus 
Mean rank: 
relative 
Adjacent 
Mean 
difference 
SD 
Christopher Columbus sailed to the 
New World 
13 12.91 1.08 0.29 
Julius Caesar was killed 12 11.83 0.83 0.39 
1st Olympic Games held in ancient 
Greece 
11 11.00 0.75 0.74 
Great Pyramids of Egypt were built 10 10.25 1.83 0.62 
Woolly mammoths became extinct 
almost everywhere 
9 8.42 0.42 1.16 
1st humans appeared on Earth 8 8.00 0.83 1.13 
Dinosaurs became extinct 7 7.17 1.25 0.39 
1st fish appeared in Earth’s waters 6 5.92 1.00 0.79 
1st volcanoes developed on Earth 4 4.92 0.34 1.16 
Very 1st life appeared on Earth 5 4.58 1.58 0.51 
Origin/formation of Earth 3 3.00 1.25 0.00 
Origin/formation of Sun 2 1.75 0.50 0.45 
Big Bang 1 1.25 --- 0.45 
Table 4.15 Sequence of geoscience & historical events, university students (N=12) 
 Like the university students, eighth graders switched 1st volcanoes and 1st life.    
They also switched the historical events 1st Olympic Games in ancient Greece and 
Julius Caesar was killed.  The only pair switched by eleventh graders was the Big Bang 
and origin/formation of the Sun.  This was due to two students who placed the Big 
Bang very late in the sequence (one at the ninth position and one at the thirteenth) 
and also explains the high standard deviation for the Big Bang compared to the other 
groups.  At the same time, the eleventh graders were the only group to correctly place 
very first life appeared on Earth after first volcanoes erupted on Earth.    
 Because the students in this sample were largely in agreement with the expert 
consensus regarding the sequence of these events, we might conclude that there are 
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few difficulties with succession of either geoscience or historical events.  However, of 
greater interest than whether or not students ordered events correctly are the 
strategies they used to arrive at their answers.  As has already been demonstrated, it 
is possible to get the correct answer for the wrong reason.  The task itself appeared to 
engage students’ thought processes and resulted in students changing their answers.  
This occurred most commonly while students were explaining their sequencing.  
Fifteen of the 35 students changed the order of the cards during their explanations.  
Many individuals seemed to be employing any bit of information they knew to help 
them arrive at their conclusions.  For example, most students correctly placed the 
origin/formation of the Sun before the origin/formation of the Earth.  Their reasons 
often had to do with the fact that the the Sun provides light/heat to the Earth.  While 
this is true, that fact does not require that the formation of the Sun precede the 
formation of the Earth.  Consider these examples. 
I picked the Sun cause you need to have the Sun to obviously to help make the 
Earth live so you can’t have the Earth without the Sun so I picked the Sun and 
then the Earth. (Justin, 11) 
The origin/formation of the Sun, I thought that came first cause it needs to 
heat the Earth. (Ashley, 8) 
 Rationales demonstrate significant confusion about certain events like the Big 
Bang, as the following students’ comments show.  While many of these students 
placed the event correctly, they displayed interesting notions about it. 
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The Big Bang was something, I think, that made Earth or something like that.  I 
know cause we did that in science, but I don’t know.  Someone did a project.  
We had to do something with Earth, how it was formed or something like that.  
(Sofia, 8) 
Jamal (8): I picked the Big Bang because I think that’s when the Earth had been 
formed.  
 Interviewer: What do you know about the Big Bang?   
Jamal: That it was a large asteroid and it hit another one I think, and it became 
one huge planet.  
Elizabeth (univ): For the first two, the origin of the Sun and the Big Bang, I’m 
not sure if the Big Bang actually created the Sun or not or if it existed before 
but I guess it did exist before.  It was just like a guess.   
Interviewer: You guess that the Sun existed before the Big Bang.   
Elizabeth: Yeah, I know I read about the Big Bang but I can’t remember if it was 
what created everything in the universe or if the Sun already existed before 
that.   
Students not only displayed confusion about the timing of geoscience events 
but also more “recent” historical events.  Hannah confused the timing of Julius 
Caesar’s death with the Shakespearean play of the same name. 
Hannah (11): Then I remember I read the play [Julius Caesar].  I remember a lot 
about that.  I’m not completely sure on the year but I feel like it would have 
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been more modern than, oh well, duh, it had to come after Christopher 
Columbus because of Shakespeare.  Shakespeare was obviously after 
Christopher Columbus’s time.   
 Several students, such as Michael (11), mentioned movies when justifying their 
responses, specifically the film, 10,000 BC which unfortunately fosters the alternative 
conception that woolly mammoths were used to build the pyramids of Egypt. 
Michael: Then I watch the Discovery Channel too much so I think woolly 
mammoths died after the dinosaurs.  Then the humans [switched humans & 
woolly mammoths to place 1st humans before woolly mammoths].   
Interviewer: Why did you decide to switch the humans and woolly 
mammoths?   
Michael: 10,000 BC.  Then the pyramids, no!  [switched pyramids & mammoths 
to place pyramids before woolly mammoths]   
Interviewer: And why are you switching those?  
Michael: The movie [10,000 BC] 
Interviewer: What’s in the movie that would make you think that?   
Michael: They would capture the head of the pack of woolly mammoths and 
the others would just follow and they used them to carry the blocks to build the 
pyramids, but I don’t know if it’s right cause that was a crazy movie.   
 When explaining their sequencing, a number of students simply recited their 
cards in order without explanation and had to be prompted to provide reasons for 
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their choices.  It is difficult to know if they were simply reluctant to spontaneously 
express their reasons or if their placements were not well thought out and the reasons 
they gave in response to prompting were generated only after that prompting.   Often 
students appeared to combine specific knowledge of events with logical reasoning to 
order the cards.   
Then life obviously would have to come after that because no living thing would 
be able to happen if there wasn’t the 1st.  Then fish because it’s an animal and I 
know that animals have been around a lot longer than humans have and I 
know that they date back to dinosaurs and stuff like that. (Hannah, 11) 
That [first life] would be before the fish.  Then the fish because obviously if the 
first life appeared that wouldn’t be as complex as a fish.  (Anthony, univ) 
I’m not sure if mammoths became extinct before humans came or after.  It 
could probably be after too cause they aren’t as dangerous as dinosaurs so it 
could be that they were living some when humans appeared. (Claire, univ) 
 Claire’s response espouses a view that all dinosaurs were dangerous in contrast to the 
more docile woolly mammoths.   
While participants were often able to successfully use some combination of 
specific knowledge and logical reasoning strategies to correctly order events, 
sometimes the combination resulted in rather fanciful responses such as Danielle’s 
(univ), 
The first volcanoes developed on the Earth.  Well the Earth needed a little time 
to start colliding with the plates which would form volcanoes.  Then I would 
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imagine that all of the volcanoes going off would kill the dinosaurs and once it 
killed off the dinosaurs it would also kill some of the woolly mammoths.  But at 
the same time once everything had kind of been destroyed by the fires from the 
volcano it would get cold and end up killing the rest of the woolly mammoths 
which would make it extinct.  Then people are still around.  I’m not sure how 
they survived the volcano unless you take the Flood [Noachic Flood in the 
Hebrew Bible].  So anyway you have people.   
Twenty-six participants specifically said they were guessing or weren’t sure 
about some of their answers.  They were more likely to say they were guessing on the 
later ancient history items than with the earlier geoscience events.  Confusion about 
the geoscience events centred on 1st volcanoes, extinction of dinosaurs, extinction of 
woolly mammoths, and appearance of 1st humans.  Based upon mean relative 
rankings and standard deviations, students were able to sequence geoscience events 
as well as they sequenced historical ones.  The only standard deviation that is a bit 
larger than the others is the Big Bang.  The reason for this has already been 
mentioned.  Explanations suggest that an item such as first volcanoes erupted on Earth 
were difficult because participants were unable to use logical reasoning strategies to 
place it.   
Student explanations for their sequencing revealed a number of alternative 
conceptions, both scientific and historical.  Some have already been mentioned.  A 
few others are printed below.  
It’s probably just assumed that fish came before dinosaurs because one fish 
grew to a big dinosaur.  (Alyssa, 8) 
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Then 1st volcanoes developed on Earth that’s like a geographical thing, a 
geographical feature.  I guess after Pangaea there came volcanoes from the 
plates shifting and maybe on the other side of the earth where Pangaea wasn’t 
cause of the plates, there were volcanoes maybe on that side, so that’s why I 
put that there.  Then the 1st life, I think you need that for pretty much 
everything else to happen.  Then dinosaurs, I put that because I think they were 
the earliest forms of, not the earliest life but maybe the earliest form of 
advanced life like up from the single or double celled organisms or like smaller 
things.  I think the dinosaurs kinda started all the animals that we know and 
that’s also why I put the fish there was because maybe the fish developed after 
the dinosaurs became extinct.  There was DNA left from the amphibious 
dinosaurs and that’s why I put the fish there.  (Connor, 8) 
I think the Olympic Games were held really early on AD and Julius Caesar was 
killed in mid-400 definitely, I think.  I don’t know, I just remember the Roman 
Empire being around 300, 400.  (Ryan, 11) 
 What emerges is a mishmash of student ideas about events that they tried to 
make sense of to complete the task.  Frequently students took less than accurate 
domain or topic knowledge, coupled it with reasoning strategies, and placed events in 
the correct order.  Events that were closer in time, like the ancient history events were 
more problematic because specific subject matter knowledge was required to 
distinguish among them.  Many of the earlier geo-events could be sequenced on the 
basis of logical reasoning strategies, such as that displayed by Malik (11).   
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Then I chose the formation of Earth next because there’s no place for them 
[other cards] to be ‘cept on Earth.   
Following the card sort, students were asked to group cards into categories of 
their choosing and to provide a name for their groups, if possible.  This is similar to the 
methodology employed by studies investigating student conceptions of size (Jones et 
al., 2009; Jones et al., 2008; Tretter et al., 2006; Tretter et al., 2006).  Number of 
groups ranged from four to ten with a mean of 6.97.   Not all students were able to 
provide names for all groups, and one eighth grader was unable to provide a name for 
any group.  Those who did name the groups rarely mentioned age as a descriptor, 
suggesting that time was a minimal factor in their thinking about the task.  There was 
evidence of the compressed logarithmic scale described in section 2.3.1.  Finer 
temporal distinctions were made between events that were more recent (ancient 
history events were usually in a different pile than Columbus) while the first three 
events were often grouped together.  Students were then prompted to put an age 
name on as many groups as possible.  Again, many students had great difficulty with 
the task.  Seven students were unable to attach an age name to any group, while 20 
students did so for at least one group.  The remaining eight provided age names for all 
groups.  Those age names varied widely.  
The oldest age name given for the oldest group was hundreds of billions of 
years ago, well beyond the accepted date for the Big Bang, while the youngest age 
name for the oldest group was 2,500 BC.  Nine students said they were unable to 
provide an age name for the oldest group.  Of the 26 who provided a name, 12 of 
those said something in the billions, eight said something in the millions, and six said 
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something that involved BC [No one used BCE].   Only fourteen individuals gave an age 
name for the pile containing first humans.  Those dates ranged from 5-65 million years 
ago to 2,000 BC.  Ages suggested for the pile containing Columbus’s voyage to the 
New World were more accurate, but there was still wide variation with one student 
saying the date was 1942.  Many U.S. students are taught a rhyme to remember the 
date of Columbus’ voyage that begins, “In 1492, Columbus sailed the ocean blue.”  
Several students quoted that rhyme when trying to determine a date for his voyage to 
the New World.  It is quite possible that the student (Emma, 8) who said 1942 simply 
mixed up the digits in the date.  However, after she said 1942, it was pointed out to 
her that 1942 was around the time of World War II.  She was asked if that was the 
date she meant for Columbus’ voyage.  Emma immediately replied that it was.  On 
that basis, I think it is reasonable to conclude that she does not have a good sense of 
where that event sits in time.  It is not surprising that students have difficulty placing 
an absolute age on geoscience events no matter how the task is structured.  This study 
suggests that it is not only events in deep time that students cannot place, but that 
they have difficulty placing historical events as well.   
4.3.3 Geoscience content knowledge and duration 
 One unique contribution of this thesis is the investigation of how students 
understand duration in deep time.  Two tasks were employed to answer this question.  
By their nature, geoscience events are often unfamiliar to students, so it would not be 
surprising if they had poor understanding of the duration of those events.  This would 
easily be attributable to a lack of knowledge.  However, if they demonstrated an 
equally poor understanding of events that occur in conventional time with which they 
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are unfamiliar; this would suggest that the lack of familiarity with the event itself is a 
critical factor and not merely the length of the duration. 
4.3.3.1 Duration of events questionnaire 
 The items in the duration of events questionnaire can be found in Appendix A.  
The questionnaire was used in two ways.    The first was to compare accuracy of 
responses for items that occur within conventional time with those that occur outside 
its bounds. It was hypothesized that items of short duration (seconds, minutes, and 
days) that were unknown to students would be just as difficult for them as geologic 
events of longer duration.  If students are similarly inaccurate in their judgements of 
durations for unfamiliar events that require very different durations, this suggests that 
the most salient factor in their judgements is not the length of time itself but rather 
their familiarity with the event, i.e., their subject matter knowledge.   Of course, it is 
theoretically possible to get some answers correct without specific subject matter 
knowledge but by relying on logical reasoning strategies.  That is potentially true for 
items of both short and long duration.  There is no expectation that logical reasoning 
would be of greater help with items of longer as opposed to shorter durations or vice 
versa.  The second was to triangulate responses between this item and those on 
Timeline 3 which will be discussed in the next section.  These tasks had five items in 
common.  If a student indicated a time period for the duration of an event here that 
was different from the duration that was indicated in the timeline that would raise 
questions about the reliability and validity of responses.   
As mentioned in chapter three this item was modelled after one used by 
others to assess students’ conceptions of size (Jones et al., 2009; Jones et al., 2008; 
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Tretter et al., 2006; Tretter et al., 2006).  There are several cautions in interpretation, 
two of which are common to their work with size and one of which is more specific to 
time.   First, it is possible to check the correct unit box for the duration of an event yet 
still hold a fairly inaccurate conception regarding the event’s duration.  If a person 
checked the years box for the amount of time necessary for the Voyager probe to 
reach Jupiter, he could be reasoning that the probe takes up to 99 years to reach 
Jupiter when it actually takes two years.  His personal conception of the event’s 
duration may still be quite inaccurate.   Checking the correct box only indicates the 
extent to which an individual perceives the correct unit of time with which to express 
the duration of a particular event.   
Some events on the questionnaire have the potential for greater variability in 
the estimation of their durations than others.  An event that takes millions of years to 
occur could only be underestimated, not overestimated on this task since millions of 
years was the greatest time period possible.  An event that takes seconds could only 
be overestimated, not underestimated.   In contrast, an event that takes years could 
be both under- and overestimated.   Both of these problems are shared with the size 
studies mentioned above. 
Estimating durations raises an additional issue of interpretation that is not a 
factor when dealing with size.  Since students in the scale studies were asked to 
indicate the size of objects using metric measurements, the researchers were able to 
determine by how many powers of ten students had over- or underestimated the size 
of an object.   The difficulty with units of time is that they do not use the same base 
(60 minutes in one hour, 24 hours in one day, etc.).    Thus, it is not reasonable to 
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quantify over- or underestimation in terms of the number of scale factors by which 
the estimation was off.   Converting time units to powers of ten makes little sense 
since we don’t think of units of time in that way.  One doesn’t conceive of one second 
as being 0.0167 minute.  These three issues indicate that data from this item must be 
interpreted cautiously.  Nonetheless, it is a useful item for the two reasons mentioned 
above.   
 A tally was created for each item indicating the number of students who 
estimated the duration of an event with the accurate unit of time as well as those who 
over- or underestimated and by how many units of time they did so.  The percentage 
of students who indicated the correct unit was determined for each event.  Table 4.16 
shows items on the questionnaire whose durations were estimated most accurately 
and those that were estimated least accurately.    The responses of three students 
were excluded from this analysis because they indicated a different duration for an 
item on the questionnaire than they did on Timeline 3.  Those discrepancies will be 
discussed in the next section.  Excluding those three students made no difference in 
ranking of these events.   
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Item Percent estimating 
duration 
accurately 
Item Percent estimating 
duration 
accurately 
Eat dinner 100% Red blood cell to 
make one trip 
throughout body 
14% 
Fly from New York 
to Los Angeles 
94% Colorado River to 
carve the Grand 
Canyon 
17% 
Amount of time 
ground shakes 
during an 
earthquake 
(seconds & minutes 
were both counted 
correct) 
91% Build the Great 
Wall of China 
26% 
Pumpkin grown 
from seed to be 
ripe 
89% Light to travel from 
the Sun to the Earth 
29% 
Drive from one side 
of Pennsylvania to 
the other 
83% Appalachian 
Mountains to form 
29% 
Hair on head to 
grow ½” 
83% Sedimentary rock 
to form 
34% 
Table 4.16 Most and least accurate estimates on duration of events questionnaire 
(N=35) 
All the events that were estimated most accurately occur well within the 
bounds of conventional time.   In fact, none takes longer than days to occur.  One of 
those is a geological event (ground shaking during an earthquake).   While they may 
not all have been experienced by every individual in the study (e.g., earthquake), 
these events are all common to human experience more broadly.  In contrast, there is 
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great variety in the durations of the events that were least accurately estimated.  They 
range from less than one minute for a red blood cell to travel through the body to 
millions of years for the Appalachian Mountains to form.   Three of the events in this 
group are geological and one is astronomical.   The latter (amount of time for light to 
travel from the Sun to the Earth) demonstrated the greatest variability of any item in 
the questionnaire.  One person checked seconds, and three others said it takes 
millions of years for the Sun’s light to reach the Earth.  These results must be 
interpreted carefully, but they seem to indicate that specific knowledge of an event is 
at least as critical in estimating its duration as the length of the duration.  Events that 
occur within conventional time are just as problematic for students as those occurring 
within deep time if both are unfamiliar. 
4.3.3.2 Timeline 3: Geoscience content knowledge and duration with large numbers 
 Section 4.2 reports on the results of three numeric timelines.  The ability to 
correctly place times on those number lines involved knowledge of the numbers used 
and the proportional relationships among them.  No geoscience knowledge was 
required.  Timeline 3 was different in that students were instructed to place events on 
a timeline based upon how long they take to happen in proportion to each other.  
Based upon the model of the”three-legged stool,” we would expect that students 
would more accurately place the durations of events with which they were familiar 
and less accurately place those with which they were unfamiliar.  Further, events in 
conventional and deep time that are unfamiliar should be placed just as inaccurately.  
Surface features are likely to be used to place them.  Events are reprinted in Table 
4.17 for the reader’s convenience. 
295 
 
A. The Earth spinning around once 
B. How long most coral reefs have been growing 
C. The break-up of the supercontinent Pangaea 
D. The Earth going around the Sun once 
E. The Moon going around the Earth once 
F. The carving of the Grand Canyon by the Colorado River 
G. The amount of time the ground shakes during an 
earthquake 
Table 4.17 Stimulus items for Timeline 3 
 Timeline 3 was not scored for correctness.  It was not expected that anyone 
would be able to order all these events in a proportional linear scale.  It seemed likely 
that many students would be unsure about the durations of several of the events, 
particularly coral reefs, the Grand Canyon, and the break-up of Pangaea.  Instead, 
attention was paid to the reasons students gave for the placement of letters and any 
mention of duration in their explanations. It was expected that students would mix up 
the order of two unknown events.  What was considered important was that timelines 
reflected student explanations and that there was a clear, proportional distinction 
between the events that take one year or less and those that take much longer.  For 
example, if a student incorrectly said the Colorado River took thousands of years to 
carve the Grand Canyon and placed F on the timeline in a place that would make 
sense based upon that duration, that timeline would indicate an understanding of 
large numbers but a lack of knowledge about the event itself.     
Participants displayed many alternative conceptions about the durations of 
shorter events as well as longer ones.  Some said the Moon orbits Earth in one day, 
equating it with a day/night cycle.   Others said the Moon’s orbit requires one year.   
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One person thought the Earth spins around once in one hour.   Again, it was not 
surprising that many were unclear about the durations of B [coral reefs], C [Pangaea], 
and F [Grand Canyon], but some estimates for their durations were especially 
inaccurate.  A few indicated the break-up of Pangaea took a few years or months, and 
one person stated the Colorado River carved the Grand Canyon in a week.   
The rationales participants gave for their estimated durations are even more 
enlightening.  Several people equated size with duration.  This was evident in what 
they said about the Grand Canyon.  Two said that the great depth of the canyon 
required a long duration.  When Peter (univ) compared the Grand Canyon to coral 
reefs he said that the Grand Canyon would take longer because it’s larger.   
Others focused on the characteristics of the materials.  When explaining why 
the Grand Canyon took a long time, Hannah (11) said, 
You know it’s gonna take awhile cause land isn’t soft like, it’s not in all spots, at 
least not here so there’s no way it could have just broken up easily or in a short 
amount of time.  It would take a long time to get to the way it is. 
The comparison between the durations of coral reefs and the Grand Canyon, in 
particular, generated a lot of interesting responses related to characteristics of the 
materials.  Two students said the growth of coral reefs would take less time than the 
Grand Canyon because corals are living organisms while the Grand Canyon has to do 
with erosion [one used the term weathering instead].  The presumption is that 
biological processes require shorter durations than inorganic ones.  A university 
student who thought coral reefs take less time to grow than the Grand Canyon 
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attributed her answer to her understanding that “stuff in the ocean is older than stuff 
on the land,”  a view not solidly eradicated from the scientific community until the 
advent of deep sea drilling. 
Vincent’s (univ) responses suggest some underlying distrust of the validity of 
uniformitarianism, a cornerstone of modern geology.  When placing Pangaea he said 
it, “takes a long time, but not as long as they think.”  In talking about the Grand 
Canyon he said, “At today’s rate it takes a long time.”   His placements may indicate 
the presence of metaphysical confounding factors that affect the stability of the deep 
time “stool” that were described in section 2.8.   
Most striking of all, many students appeared to be trying to latch onto any bit 
of information they thought they knew that could help them answer the questions.  
Just as was the case for the card sort sequencing task, this resulted in very interesting 
responses.  In talking about the Grand Canyon, Chris (8) said, 
The Grand Canyon, definitely a long time because I remember reading or 
hearing somewhere that maybe in about 50 years that Niagara Falls is gonna 
be flat, so I heard something like that so the Grand Canyon with that deep it’s 
gonna be really a lot of time. 
Jamal (8) described the break-up of Pangaea as “moving a big island and pushing it 
into a different place.”  Danielle attempted to determine whether coral reefs took 
longer to form than the Grand Canyon.  She ultimately decided that was the case and 
offered this rationale. 
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I would guess longer than the Grand Canyon just because I don’t honestly know 
where the source of the Grand Canyon is so I imagine it would depend on how 
it started out, like if it started out as a lake or something and then the river 
started to flow out from it or if it’s an underground thing. 
 Once again, we see great confusion regarding these events.  This was true not 
only for geoscience events but also for events of shorter duration.   
4.3.3.3 Comparison of Timeline 3 with duration of events questionnaire 
Durations indicated on the questionnaire were compared to those on Timeline 
3 for the items that were common to both in order to triangulate responses and 
monitor consistency of responses.  Those common items were:  
 the amount of time the ground shakes during an earthquake 
 the Moon going around the Earth once 
 how long most coral reefs have been growing 
 the carving of the Grand Canyon by the Colorado River 
 the break-up of the supercontinent Pangaea 
Table 4.18 lists the number of students who mentioned a specific duration for 
these events as part of their explanation for Timeline 3.  The duration could have 
either been mentioned spontaneously or in response to a question by the interviewer.  
In order to be counted as having mentioned a specific duration, the student needed to 
mention a unit.  “A really, really long time” was not counted.  “Years” or “hundreds of 
years” was counted.  If all students had mentioned durations in their explanations for 
those five items in the timeline a total of 175 durations would have been cited.  What 
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is striking is the fact that students named few durations for events even after 
prompting by the interviewer.   There were only 58 instances when a student 
mentioned a specific duration for one of these items.  In contrast, no one left any item 
blank on the questionnaire, which was a forced choice format.  
Number of durations suggested  Number of students 
0 9 
1 9 
2 8 
3 5 
4 2 
5 2 
Table 4.18 Number of students who suggested durations for five events as part of 
their explanation for Timeline 3 (N=35) 
 
 Because few students mentioned durations for events on Timeline 3, only 
limited correlation with their responses on the questionnaire was possible.  Of the 58 
durations mentioned for Timeline 3, there were eight instances in which a person 
named different durations for an event on the timeline and the questionnaire.  Two of 
those could be attributed to the forced choice format of the questionnaire.  Justin said 
that most coral reefs have been growing for one billion years while constructing 
Timeline 3.  Anthony said that Pangaea took a billion years to break up.  Both checked 
millions of years for those items on the questionnaire (the largest choice possible).  
Rather than signalling an inconsistency in their responses, it is more likely a reflection 
of the fact that a response they might have chosen was not available to them.   
 Three other students had discrepancies between the durations they 
mentioned on Timeline 3 and the questionnaire.  Two of the students were eighth 
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graders.  Matt said it took the Colorado River 500 thousand years to carve the Grand 
Canyon while explaining Timeline 3.  He checked the box hundreds of years on the 
questionnaire for the same event.  He also said most coral reefs have been growing 
for ten million years but checked the box thousands of years on the questionnaire.  
Jamal indicated that coral reefs have been growing for either 100 or one million years, 
but checked thousands of years.  He said the Moon orbits the Earth in one day but 
checked the box years.   Elizabeth, a university student, said coral reefs have been 
growing for thousands of years, but she checked the box millions of years.   She said 
the ground shakes for minutes during an earthquake but checked the box seconds.  
The responses of those three students were not counted when determining the 
accuracy of responses for the questionnaire (see Table 4.16) since their answers were 
not consistent across tasks.  Other than these exceptions, student responses regarding 
durations were consistent across the two tasks.  This does not mean individuals were 
confident of their responses or that they weren’t guessing.  In fact, many students said 
they were guessing.  It does suggest that their guesses were not random and that their 
guesses were consistent across tasks. 
4.3.4 How does geoscience content knowledge impact how these students 
understand deep time? 
 In chapter two, I noted two ways in which a student’s geoscience content 
knowledge could be a factor in deep time.  The extent of a person’s declarative and 
procedural knowledge will determine how new information is perceived.  In the 
absence of solid geoscience content knowledge a student’s judgments of both 
succession and duration will likely be made on the basis of surface features such as 
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physical appearance.  The final research question asked whether students in this 
sample relied on surface features to make judgments about duration in deep time 
instead of citing geoscience ideas for their responses.  That was, in fact, the case for 
the items in this study.  Even students who gave correct answers frequently cited 
surface features as justification for responses, making their correct answers 
coincidental.  Paying attention to those same surface features could lead to an 
incorrect answer in another instance.  In fact, students who answer correctly and 
those who answer incorrectly sometimes do so for the exact same reason.   If we are 
not careful, we may assume students who respond correctly possess a better 
understanding than is actually the case. 
In both succession and duration tasks, students appeared to have few subject 
specific referents around which to base their answers.  Hence, their knowledge was 
often fragmentary and confused at best.  No one displayed evidence of accurate 
conceptions in all areas, which was not at all surprising since there were no 
geoscience experts in the sample.  Participants often recognised a term but displayed 
little understanding of the event associated with the term.  The Big Bang was 
associated with the formation of Earth as well as an asteroid impact.  When asked to 
provide specific ages or durations for events, the numbers provided varied widely 
across participants.  Events that occur within human timescales appeared to be no 
easier for students to judge than those that occur in geologic time if they were 
unfamiliar with both.   
As expected, duration appears to be a far more difficult concept for students 
to understand than succession.  There was some distinction between physical 
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processes and biological ones, with physical processes being deemed to require longer 
durations.  Size was often equated with duration.  Hence, the carving of the Grand 
Canyon was judged to require a longer amount of time than the growth of a coral reef 
since the former is larger.  With a few exceptions, students in this sample were 
consistent in their duration judgments across tasks.  This cannot be construed to 
indicate they were confident of their responses.  It does, however, suggest that 
answers were dependable.   
4.4 Relationships among the three “legs” of the “stool” 
 To what extent might success in one area be correlated with success in 
another?  That is, do students who do well in one area of the interviews tend to do 
well in other areas?  The next few sections explore relationships among several of the 
tasks across the interviews.   Each of the comparison tasks was chosen because it 
discriminated participants in some way.  Individuals performed so well on the 
succession tasks in conventional time that no real groupings emerged.  Duration tasks 
in conventional time did discriminate.   Thus, duration items for short time periods 
(animations) were compared with those for longer periods (numeric timelines).  
Durations involving numbers ranging from small to very large (Timeline 4) were 
compared with durations of the same time periods that added subject matter 
knowledge as a variable.   
4.4.1 Comparison of duration animations with the numeric timelines  
 Data from the three numeric timelines was compared to results for the 
duration animations at the individual level to see if students who had difficulty with 
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conventional time had similar problems with large numbers.   A scatter plot was 
created to show the relationship between the two tasks.   In order to create the plot, 
numeric values were assigned to the timeline groupings: three for the sufficient 
category, two for the insufficient, and one for the poor category.  This was done solely 
to allow for the creation of the graph.  It does not imply that the categories are 
interval.  In fact, they are not; they are ordinal.   Variability exists in the ways a student 
could earn four points on the animations.  This graph does not distinguish between 
those ways.  (Someone who answered both questions after A1 and A3 correctly may 
be different from someone who answered two correctly after A2 and one after A2 and 
A3.)  Thus, this data can only suggest that there may or may not a relationship 
between performance on the animations and the numeric timelines.    Data points on 
Figure 4.21 are different sizes to denote the fact that not all points on the graph 
represent the same number of students.  The dot at the ordered pair (1, 3) is very 
small.  That is because only one person answered one question correctly after the 
animations and was ranked in the sufficient category on the timelines.  In contrast, the 
dot at the ordered pair (4, 3) is quite large.  Nine people answered four questions 
correctly after the animations and were ranked in the sufficient category on the 
timelines.    
There does not appear to be any relationship between how many questions a 
participant answered correctly after the animations and whether or not their 
understanding of large numbers is sufficient to deal with deep time [r(33) = 0.24, ns].  
Performance on one task would not be a good predictor of performance on the other.   
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Figure 4.21 Comparison of performance on animation questions with performance 
on Timelines 1, 2, & 4 (N=35) 
 
4.4.2 Comparison of Timeline 3 with Timeline 4  
 In order to compare student understanding of large numbers with subject 
matter knowledge, Timelines 3 and 4 were compared to determine what, if any, 
differences existed between them.   In both, students had to place the durations of 
seven items on a linear, proportional scale.  TL3 required knowledge of the duration of 
specific events as well as the proportional relationships among those time periods.  
TL4 only required knowledge of mathematical relationships among powers of ten or 
units of time.  The reader will recall that numbers in TL4 were chosen because they 
are the durations of the events in TL3 rounded to the nearest power of ten or unit of 
time.    
Students who possess insufficient knowledge of large numbers to deal with 
deep time or a poor understanding of smaller numbers had great difficulty with TL4.  
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In fact, it would be practically impossible to determine if a student ended up in the 
poor category or the insufficient for the numeric timelines based solely by inspecting 
their TL4.  There is really no difference in the timelines drawn by students in those two 
groups.   The majority of these individuals spaced events for TL4 fairly evenly across 
the line.  These two groups constructed a TL3 that was practically identical to what 
they had done for TL4.  A comparison of Vanessa’s (11) TL3, printed here, with Jenna’s 
(8) TL4 which was reproduced in Figure 4.4 (p. 245), shows that for these students 
there was no difference between TL4 (numbers alone) and TL3 (events).   
 
Figure 4.22 Vanessa’s Timeline 3 
It is not possible to say much more about those first two groups beyond the 
fact that they have trouble with large numbers and with relevant geoscience content 
knowledge.  It is unclear, at present, if one of the two factors is more problematic 
than the other.  Both tasks may simply have been too difficult for them.  Even those 
who had successfully placed four numbers for TL1 were unable to place even the 
smallest durations proportionally on either TL3 or TL4.  The fact that some were not 
sure about the duration of shorter events (Alyssa said the Earth revolves around the 
Sun in a day) makes it difficult to argue that geologic events that occur over long 
timescales are necessarily more difficult to comprehend than those of shorter 
duration.    
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 Students with sufficient knowledge of large numbers to deal with deep time 
who had difficulty with TL3 lend support to the idea that while a knowledge of large 
numbers is crucial, if a student does not also possess relevant geoscience content 
knowledge, it will be difficult to develop meaningful understanding of the time 
required for processes in deep time.  As we saw in section 2.2.4, these students 
differed from the others in the sample in their problem solving approach to the 
timelines.  This group tended to use the same strategy for TL3 as they had for the 
numeric timelines.   Michael (11) is an example of a student who employed a 
benchmarking or reference point strategy on both TL3 and TL4.  His timeline TL4 is 
reproduced in section 4.2.4 (Figure 4.14, p. 258).   
 
Figure 4.23 Michael’s Timeline 3 
Prior to placing the letters on the timeline, Michael made a list of the events, and put 
a box around D, the Earth going around the Sun once.   He was trying to benchmark 
each of the events against a known duration for D as this interchange demonstrates, 
Interviewer: I have a question that has to do with what you wrote here.  Why 
did you put a box around D? 
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Michael: D? Because D takes a year and all these are really short and all these 
are really long so I put that right in the middle.  It’s important cause it’s so 
short compared to these.  
 Ryan (11) is an example of someone who assigned temporal markers to each of 
the events, a strategy that was common amongst these students.  His TL4 can be 
found in section 4.2.4 (Figure 4.17, p. 260).  While explaining TL3 he indicated that he 
was unsure of the durations of some of the events.  Like Michael, he combined what 
he knew about large numbers with his ideas about the durations of these events to 
complete TL3.  
Ryan: I took the longest one which was the break-up of Pangaea and brought 
that over to the end.  I just took a pretty random guess about how many years 
ago I thought that was.  I just went with like about 100 million.  Then I went 
down to coral reefs and I had to guess at how long they’ve been growing cause 
I don’t know anything about coral reefs and I just guessed about maybe 60 
million years.  Then I went down to Grand Canyon cause I know for a fact that 
took awhile so I’d say at least, well I probably could have brought it back a little 
further, but at least through the 100 thousands.  [moved F farther to left] 
Interviewer: So why would it make sense to move it to the left if it takes 
thousands of years? 
Ryan: Cause shortest we’re talking thousands of years to longest which would 
be millions of years. 
Interviewer: You squeezed the last ones very close together 
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Ryan: Yeah, cause relative to the timeline that’s like the blink of an eye 
 
Figure 4.24 Ryan’s Timeline 3 
Ryan’s TL3 is somewhat unique amongst this group as many of these 
individuals did not discriminate durations for the coral reef, Grand Canyon, or break-
up of Pangaea.  There were gaps in the knowledge base in this group.  Four of these 
students said the Moon orbits the Earth in one day while explaining TL3.  That 
alternate conception doesn’t show up on this scale but would result in an inaccurate 
timeline on a smaller scale. 
Just because students in this group used a numeric strategy did not guarantee 
they would produce a proportional TL3.  Sarah (univ) mentioned numbers for the 
durations of the events for TL3, but did not use the proportional relationships among 
those numbers to the same extent she did with her other timelines.  
Sarah: Then it takes a year for the Earth to go around the Sun so that’s next.  I 
think it took a really long time for the coral reefs to have been growing so we’ll 
say a couple million years for that and a couple million years for the Grand 
Canyon so they’re close to each other anyway.  Then the break-up of the 
supercontinent Pangaea is definitely the longest because it took millions, it 
took a long time so that’s the farthest away. 
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Figure 4.25 Sarah’s Timeline 3 
Contrast TL3 with TL4.  The year is placed very differently on the two timelines.  The 
shortest times including one year are bunched very closely to the left side of the 
timeline for TL4.  On TL3 she creates much clearer distinctions among the smallest 
durations than she does for the fourth timeline.  This is true even though she says A 
and E are both one day and D is one year.  Sarah maintains better proportionality 
between ten thousand years and ten million years and between ten million years and 
100 million years on TL4.  On TL3 she says the Grand Canyon took a couple million 
years but places it closer to Pangaea than she placed 10 million years to 100 million 
years on TL4.  At least in her case, the addition of the events themselves appears to 
have made the task more difficult.   
 
 
Figure 4.26 Sarah’s Timeline 4 
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David has been mentioned before as someone whose verbal explanations 
suggested a more sophisticated understanding than what the timeline alone 
indicated.   As with his numeric timelines, TL3 was somewhat problematic.  In this 
case, he didn’t even use the entire timeline and proportionality across the line was 
inconsistent.  Even though he didn’t get factual information entirely correct, he 
showed a good understanding of how to view shorter events in light of the scale 
necessary for this timeline.  The timeline alone without his explanation would not lead 
one to conclude his understanding was very good at all.   
 
Figure 4.27 David’s Timeline 3 
David: I put G 1st which is the amount of time the ground shakes during an 
earthquake which is relatively short.  Then I put the Earth spinning around once 
which is basically a day.  Then I put the Moon going around the Earth which is 
about 23 ½ days.  Then I put the Earth going around the Sun once which is one 
year.  Then I put how long most coral reefs have been growing.  Now I don’t 
know how long it’s been growing but I figure it’s more than a couple years 
considering the fact that it takes a plant like a tree, like 10 years to grow.  I’ve 
heard some things about how they’ve been growing for a long time I just, I 
couldn’t put a number on it.  Then I put the carving of the Grand Canyon by the 
Colorado River and then the break-up of the supercontinent Pangaea.  I don’t 
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know why I put those there like that cause I don’t know how long it took either 
of them to do that but I’m gonna guess that the Grand Canyon took a little bit 
of a shorter time than the break-up of Pangaea.   
Interviewer: You said the Moon going around the Earth once was around 23 
days.   
David: Something like that.   
Interviewer: And you said the Earth going around the Sun once was a year.  
You put them very close together on this timeline.  How come?   
David: Because, umm, well, why I put them close together.  Relative to how 
long it takes for Pangaea to break up, the plates are moving 2 cm a year, how 
long does that take to move, a long time basically.  Relative to how long it took 
for the carving of the Grand Canyon or the break-up of Pangaea, it’s like a day.  
It’s like if it was my life, if C, the break-up of the supercontinent was equivalent 
to my life, it would be like 7 seconds.  It’s very short.  That’s probably wrong, 
but still. 
Many individuals in this group said TL3 was more difficult than the other 
timeline tasks because they didn’t know how long the events took.  In other words, 
they found the task difficult due to their lack of geoscience content knowledge. Ryan 
(11) described the difference between TL3 and TL4 after he finished the fourth line. 
Interviewer: Let me ask you a question.  Of the last two timelines you did, did 
one of those seem easier or where they about the same? 
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Ryan: Yes, definitely numbers, just straight numbers.  
Interviewer: Why do you think that is easier? 
Ryan: Just for the fact that I don’t know the exact dates for the other ones.  
Had I known it might have been a little easier and plus all of those were factors 
of 10, well except for 1 minute and stuff, but I can just put it on a timeline 
thinking this is 10 times more than that, 10 times more than that as opposed to 
just a word I don’t really know when exactly it occurred plus I don’t think 
anyone knows for sure exactly when those events occurred so it would just be 
what I thought. 
4.5 Summary of the results: Is there a “typical” 8th, 11th grader, or university 
student? 
Students’ performance varied greatly across tasks and within the same age 
group throughout the interview.  There may be some slight age effect to the findings 
as university students as a group did somewhat better across all tasks than eighth 
graders.  There were, however, exceptions and the trend is not large if it does exist.  I 
will first review results across the entire sample and then briefly discuss specific age 
groups.  
Only one individual had any real difficulty with succession tasks in conventional 
time.   Results for duration tasks were mixed, with some students performing very 
well and others not well at all.  Fifty-six percent of the students in this study had 
enough difficulty with large numbers to suggest they would have problems 
understanding deep time on that basis alone.   
313 
 
Students who were better able to use logical reasoning to determine answers 
appeared to do better across the tasks.  Those who were able to weigh rate against 
size in the animations were more successful than those who focused on only one 
factor.  Many individuals used logical reasoning strategies to complete the card sorting 
task.  It was not unusual for someone to express greater confidence about his 
placement of earlier geoscience events than later historical ones.  Similarly, students 
who completed timelines by starting with the largest number and working backwards 
completed more accurate timelines than those who started with the smallest numbers 
and tried to work their way up to the larger ones in the set.   
Sometimes being asked to deal with the geologic context as well as something 
else was problematic for students.  As described above, Sarah mentioned durations 
for Timeline 3, but didn’t use the proportional relationships among the numbers in the 
way she had on the other timelines.  This was also seen in the application of duration 
to the stratigraphic sequence discussed in section 4.1.3.6.  Overall, the question 
appeared to confuse a number of participants. Even students who correctly concluded 
that the drawing itself didn’t contain enough information to judge the length of the 
deposition period often gave multiple answers before settling on the correct one.   
It is extremely difficult on the basis of this limited exploratory study to describe 
the responses of a “typical” student within any of the age groups in the sample.  The 
study was not designed to answer that question.  I offer only tentative suggestions 
about ways in which one age group in the sample might differ from the others.  
Overall, there are minimal differences across age groups consistent with previous 
literature on deep time conceptions (section 2.6).  There are a few exceptions to the 
314 
 
previous statement.  All university students displayed a solid understanding of time 
periods up to 100 years.  About 2/3 of them understood large numbers well enough to 
be able to comprehend the time periods involved for deep time.  Eighth graders were 
over-represented among those who posses either insufficient or poor understanding 
of large numbers to deal with deep time.  Eleventh graders were about evenly split 
between those whose understanding of large numbers would be sufficient to grasp 
deep time and those for whom that was not the case.   
Succession errors in conventional time occurred with greater frequency among 
8th graders than either 11th graders or university students.  There was no real pattern 
across ages for duration in conventional time.  The difference between university 
students’ performance and that of younger pupils was slight.  Geoscience content 
knowledge of students in the sample varied considerably.  All university students had 
been taught about deep time within two months prior to the interview.   Yet, there 
were many areas in which their understanding was similar to younger pupils whose 
most recent formal exposure to deep time was two years prior to the interview. 
What can be said is that everyone’s knowledge was fragmentary.  As expected, 
no one was able to complete all tasks successfully.  Some had trouble with a number 
of them while others with only a few.  This is not surprising if the crux of the argument 
is true, namely that a conception of deep time rests upon a notion of conventional 
time, a conception of large numbers, and relevant geoscience content knowledge.  We 
must now consider the implications of these results and how they relate to the work 
of others in the field.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DISCUSSION 
 
Chapter one introduced the three research questions investigated in the 
interviews (p. 21), each of which corresponds to a “leg” of the “deep time stool.”  In 
chapter four I reported the results of the interview tasks according to the three “legs” 
of the “stool” they represent: conventional time, large numbers, and geoscience 
content knowledge.  This chapter is organised somewhat differently to complement 
chapter four and synthesise the results of the research.  I attempted to show in 
chapter two, that in order to possess a solid concept of either conventional or deep 
time, a person must be able to deal with both succession and duration.  A robust 
concept of deep time also requires an understanding large numbers and some 
geoscience content knowledge.   Learners must apply their understanding of large 
numbers and geoscience content to succession or duration in a deep time context.  
Therefore, this chapter is organised around succession and duration.  Table 5.1 lists 
each task in the interview protocol and whether it relates to either succession or 
duration.  This table is a reorganisation of some of the information in Figure 3.1 (p. 
170).  Table 5.1 illustrates that duration tasks outnumber succession tasks in this study 
since duration has been explored in the literature to a far lesser extent than 
succession.  First, I discuss the succession tasks and describe how each of the “legs” of 
the “stool” impact students’ understanding in that area.  I then do the same thing for 
duration.  In each instance, I connect the results of this study with pertinent research 
reviewed in chapter two.  Due to the relative dearth of deep time literature on 
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duration, fewer connections with previous deep time research for duration can be 
made than for succession.  Finally, I make general comments regarding the findings of 
the research. 
Succession tasks Duration tasks 
Fossil succession animation Duration animations 
Fossil succession static image Duration in sedimentary layers (static 
image) 
Card sort Three numeric timelines 
 Duration of events timeline 
 Duration of events questionnaire 
Table 5.1 Succession and duration tasks in interview protocol 
 The first research question asked whether students use the same strategies to 
solve problems in conventional and deep time and if they make similar errors at both 
time scales.  I hypothesised that we would see several things if the “stool” is a useful 
model.  First, if students lack a solid understanding of conventional time, we would 
anticipate similar errors on comparable tasks in conventional and deep time.  Times 
that are outside the ability of an individual human being to experience would be just 
as difficult for students to deal with as those in deep time.   However, it might not be 
possible to disentangle an understanding of conventional time from the size of the 
numbers involved.   
The second research question asked whether students understand large 
numbers and proportional relationships among numbers to the extent needed to 
comprehend deep time.  I expected at least some students to be confused about the 
sizes of very large numbers and the proportional relationships between them when 
completing tasks that required no geoscience content knowledge to accomplish.    
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Finally, the interviews investigated whether students cited geoscience content 
knowledge or everyday ideas as reasons for their answers to questions about deep 
time.  I predicted that students who lacked the relevant geoscience content 
knowledge to complete the tasks would likely reason on the basis of tangential surface 
features.  In some cases, they would get the correct answer but either the reasoning 
that got them there or the underlying premise upon which their reasoning was built 
would be faulty.   
5.1. Succession 
 As chapter two demonstrated, succession consists of two facets.  The first is 
the ability to sequence two or more events in temporal order, referred to as relative 
time (Trend, 2000).  The second is the ability to place an event at a particular location 
in time.  In deep time this situates an event in relation to the reference point of the 
present.  For example, we say the end of the Cretaceous period was 65 million years 
ago.  In a context of deep time, this is referred to as absolute time (see section 2.2.2).  
Table 5.2 lists the three succession tasks from the interviews and briefly summarises 
the key findings discussed in chapter four.  The table does not capture the full range of 
results from each task, but does provide a basic summary for the reader’s 
convenience. 
  
318 
 
Task Key findings 
Fossil succession animation High degree of accuracy for all age groups   
Fossil succession static 
image 
Less than half the participants ordered fossils correctly.  
Most of the ones who ordered correctly did so based 
upon surface features. 
Card sort Sequencing was similar to accepted scientific sequence 
for events.  Deep time items were no more difficult than 
historical ones.   
Table 5.2 Summary of key findings for succession tasks 
5.1.1. Succession and conventional time 
The fossil sequencing task described in sections 4.1.1.1 and 4.1.1.2 assessed 
succession in perceived time and proved to be little problem for any student in this 
sample save one.  They had no difficulty comparing the sequence of two layers and 
minimal difficulty sequencing the entire set of fossils in the three columns.  No 
knowledge of fossils was required to complete the task.  The fact that the picture on 
each layer was of a fossil was beside the point.  It could have been of anything.  If the 
students in this sample are unable to sequence a series of events in something other 
than perceived time it is likely not because they lack knowledge of the concept of 
succession per se.    
There are two exceptions to that assertion.  First, four students had some 
trouble dealing with simultaneity.  Chapter four described a similar error Piaget (1969) 
found with much younger pupils on a task in which two lamps were turned on and off.  
He maintained the children were unable to distinguish their ocular movements 
(looking first at one lamp and then the other) from whether the lamps were lit 
simultaneously or successively.   Thus, the error is a visual-perceptual one.  The lamp I 
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see first must have been lit first.  I did not track students’ ocular movements during 
this task, so I cannot say whether Piaget’s conclusions might apply here.  It is possible 
these students have poorer visual-spatial abilities than others in the sample.  Two of 
the four appeared to have some dissonance between what they perceived and what 
they felt must be true.  Both initially said the layers were successive but then decided 
they must have been simultaneous.  The role of visual-spatial ability in this task will be 
discussed further when comparing this task to the work of Dodick and Orion (2003a). 
The other exception was a single 8th grader who was unable to either compare 
the relative appearance of two fossils or sequence the entire set.  It is unwise to make 
too much of one student’s responses, since they could be an aberration.  It is unclear 
why the task was so difficult for him.  He could have visual-perceptual difficulties as 
his fossil order bore very little resemblance to the true sequence of the fossils.  
Inattention to the task is another possible explanation, although there was nothing in 
his demeanour to suggest that was the case.  The fact that this boy was extremely 
confused by the task suggests that the ability to deal with succession in real time may 
not be universal for all young adolescents.   Although admittedly a different task since 
it is not in real time, Friedman’s (2005) findings that young adolescents could not 
consistently state the month that was two months prior to a specific month provide 
corroboration that succession is not universally mastered by this age group.   
Thus, although, succession in conventional time was not a problem for most of 
the individuals in this sample, when students made succession errors, they were 
consistent with the types of errors made in studies on conventional time reviewed in 
section 2.2.  Again, it is unwise to make much of results from one exploratory study 
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with a small, non-representative sample.  We can say that these students responded 
on conventional time succession tasks in ways that were consistent with what was 
predicted. 
5.1.2 Succession and geoscience content knowledge (fossil sequencing) 
A different picture emerged when students compared the appearance of two 
fossil layers prior to watching the animation.  Here we saw clear evidence that their 
geoscience knowledge was a key factor in the reasoning behind their responses.  Of 
the 15 students who said the trilobite layer formed first, all but four attributed that to 
something other than fossil succession.  While there was no expectation that students 
would use the term fossil succession, four students demonstrated some 
understanding of the principle (see section 4.3.1).  Consistent with literature reported 
in chapter two (e.g., Chi, Hutchinson, & Robin, 1989), many students’ rationales for 
their answers focused on surface features.   Lack of familiarity with trilobites or their 
physical appearance as compared to brachiopods was often used to judge age.   
These results relate to Ault’s (1980, 1982) work described in section 2.6.1.   
Children in his research focused on surface features like “crumbliness” when asked to 
determine the relative ages of strata in an outcrop.  When a learner is asked a 
question but possesses minimal declarative knowledge upon which to make a 
judgment, decisions can only be made on the basis of surface features.   If the learner 
doesn’t know which features are important, decisions might be made based upon 
what appear to be the most obvious features even if they are not the most salient 
ones.   The learner may arrive at the correct answer purely by coincidence.  Given two 
different fossils or outcrops, the same reasoning strategy may produce an incorrect 
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answer not a correct one.  For example, chapter four showed that many participants 
used a familiarity strategy to determine that the trilobite was older than the 
brachiopod because the latter looked like a clam with which they were familiar.  Yet, 
suppose the snail and the shark tooth fossils occupied the positions now held by the 
trilobite and the brachiopod.  A familiarity strategy would be far less useful since 
species of snails and sharks are both alive today.     
As described in chapters three and four, the stratigraphic sequences used for 
these questions and upon which the  animation was based were borrowed from 
Puzzle 5 of the GeoTAT described by Dodick and Orion (2003a, 2003b) and used with 
Israeli seventh to twelfth graders.  Students in their study sequenced all fossil layers 
from oldest to youngest with only the static image available.  In contrast, students in 
this study sequenced all fossils only after watching the fossil sequencing animation in 
real time.   A portion of Dodick and Orion’s (2003a) results appear in Table 5.3.  There 
were ten different fossils in the exposures, and participants were scored based upon 
the number of fossils ordered correctly.  These scores were transferred to a 
percentage and mean percent correct and standard deviations were calculated.  
Although their sample contained students in grades 7-12, only data for grades 12, 11, 
and 8 appear in Table 5.3 since they are most closely related to the ages in the present 
sample.    These authors did not report on the number of students at each grade level.  
Hence, that information is not included in Table 5.3. 
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 Grade 12 Grade 11 Grade 8 
Puzzle Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
5 55.0 32.8 44.5 38.1 27.9 33.9 
(Dodick & Orion, 2003a, p. 424) 
Table 5.3 Mean scores and variance for three grades on the GeoTAT Puzzle 5 
I calculated similar statistics for the animation sequencing task in chapter four 
and reported results in Table 4.1 (p. 194), which is reproduced here for the reader’s 
convenience.   
University Grade 11 Grade 8 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
99 2.8 98 5.8 89 20.2 
Table 5.4 Comparison of mean grade scores and variance for succession task,   
GeoTAT Puzzle 5 (N=35) 
 
The difference between the two tasks is that succession could be observed either in 
real time (my task) or had to be inferred (Dodick and Orion).  While Dodick and Orion 
report total sample size and number of classes (15), they do not break down the 
sample into number of students at each grade level.  Hence, I have not used statistical 
analyses to compare their results with mine.  There were no university students in 
their sample and no 12th graders in the present one.  Results for those groups are 
reported for information purposes only in Tables 5.3 and 5.4.  Clearer comparison can 
be made between the 11th and 8th graders in this sample and those in Dodick and 
Orion’s work.  In their study, students at each of those grades, on average, ordered 
less than half of the fossil layers correctly and variability in student responses was 
high.  Students in my sample exhibited much greater accuracy and far less variability in 
their responses than in their sample which contained far more students (285).   Even 
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though standard deviations for small samples are less reliable as they frequently 
underestimate the true deviation, the differences between the means and standard 
deviations for the two samples are large enough to suggest that sample size cannot be 
solely responsible for the difference.  The relatively larger standard deviation for the 
eighth graders in the present study compared to the other age groups is attributable 
to one very low score, but it is still lower than any of their standard deviations.   
As reported in chapter two, Dodick & Orion, (2003a) attribute the poor 
performance of students in their sample to difficulties with temporal organisation and 
visual-spatial perception.   They also point to the role of background knowledge in 
students’ abilities to approach such tasks.  We have already seen that some students 
in the present sample may have demonstrated some visual-spatial perceptual 
difficulties.    Yet, that group represents a small fraction of the sample as a whole.  
Dodick and Orion are undoubtedly correct that visual-spatial perception plays a role in 
this task, but it may not be the main discriminator between students.  In fact, a 
comparison of Tables 5.3 and 5.4 demonstrates that even the youngest students in 
the present study were able to sequence the fossils with far greater accuracy than the 
oldest students in their sample.  The main difference was that the current task relied 
almost exclusively on visual perception and an understanding of succession in 
perceived time; the need for any geoscience content knowledge was removed.   Even 
though articulation of the principle of fossil succession was not required, Dodick and 
Orion’s task required at least some notion that two fossils of the same creature 
appearing in different places were cotemporaneous.    
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 I would argue that, for the present sample, geoscience content knowledge is a 
significant discriminator in how adolescents or adults approach succession tasks 
involving geoscience events in deep time.  If all a student has to go on to make a 
judgment is everyday experience, that experience could either help or hinder a 
learner’s ability to sequence the fossil layers.  Experience with piles of clothes in the 
corner of one’s room (or anything else) could lead one to logically conclude that the 
trilobite must have preceded the ammonite in the first column since it was beneath it.   
Items at the bottom of an undisturbed pile were put there first.   Everyday knowledge 
could help one correctly sequence the trilobite and the ammonite as it accords quite 
nicely with the geoscience principle of superposition.  However if my domain 
knowledge is thin and I am dependent solely upon everyday experience, there is no 
particular reason to assume that two brachiopod layers must have formed at the same 
time.  If I am thinking about piles of items in two children’s rooms, I would not 
necessarily assume that a pair of black trousers found at the bottom of the pile in the 
first child’s room was added to the pile at the same time as a similar pair in the middle 
of the pile in the second child’s room.  The difference between Dodick and Orion’s 
results and mine are perhaps best explained by the role of geoscience content 
knowledge. 
5.1.3 Succession and geoscience content knowledge (card sort) 
The second task that explored succession in deep time was a card sort 
modelled after Trend (1998, 2000).  There were two aspects to this item.  In the first, 
participants sorted cards into relative sequence.  Second, students were asked to 
place events into groups, give names for the groups, and, if possible, provide an age 
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for each group if none had been already mentioned.  Across the entire sample, there 
was only one difference between how participants sequenced events and the 
scientific consensus for their order (1st volcanoes and 1st life).  Eleventh graders were 
the only group who placed the origin/formation of the Sun before the Big Bang.  
Eighth graders switched the order of two pairs of events: 1st Olympic Games and Julius 
Caesar and first volcanoes and the appearance of first life. The latter pair was also 
switched by university participants.    
Why might these three pairs of events create sequencing problems for 
students?  The common denominator among them is that they are difficult to 
sequence in the absence of some subject matter knowledge.  The statement is 
perhaps self-evident.  Yet, it is important to note that an inability to sequence two 
events correctly may say very little about students’ understanding of temporal order 
on that scale, a point made anecdotally in previous research on deep time conceptions 
(e.g., Ault, 1982; Dodick & Orion, 2003b; Trend, 2000, 1998).  In the case of 1st Olympic 
Games and Julius Caesar, one needs to know that ancient Greece preceded ancient 
Rome as a civilisation.   A student may be quite capable of dealing with the temporal 
order of events that happened thousands of years ago.  It is the events themselves 
that give the impression that the student does not understand.  If events that were 
familiar to the student had been chosen, the task could have been successfully 
completed.  As noted, 8th graders were the only group to switch the order of those 
two events.  While they reported having studied ancient history in 6th grade, 11th 
graders reported studying it in both 6th and 9th grades.  University students did not 
indicate how many times they studied ancient history in their educational careers, but 
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all said they had done so.  We have seen that number of courses taken is not a strong 
predictor of subject matter knowledge but it may be a factor.   
To sequence first volcanoes and the appearance of first life it would be useful 
to know something about out gassing from volcanic eruptions and the emission of a 
variety of gases into the atmosphere which contain the necessary elements for 
organic molecules.   [I have grossly simplified and skipped over steps between out 
gassing early in Earth’s history and the origin of life since a fuller discussion is not 
germane to my point.]  It would be helpful to know that the Big Bang had something 
to do with the formation of the universe to correctly sequence the Big Bang and the 
formation of the Sun.   
However, this does not mean that students who sequenced those pairs of 
events accurately held scientific conceptions regarding them.  In fact, it is possible to 
sequence the Big Bang and the formation of the Sun correctly without a clear 
understanding of how the Sun’s formation relates to the Big Bang.  While many 
ultimately placed the Big Bang before the formation of the Sun, they weren’t 
universally sure if it preceded the Sun’s formation or not.  Some appeared to view 
them as occurring in very close temporal succession, if not simultaneously.    Even 
students who placed the Big Bang correctly often had a poor conception of the event.  
They equated it with an asteroid or the formation of the Earth.  Some who accurately 
placed first volcanoes before first life did so with seemingly little or no knowledge of 
evolutionary biology or Earth’s early atmosphere.  Rather they reasoned that 
volcanoes preceded life because volcanoes are an Earth process and they felt 
terrestrial processes take longer than biological ones.  Therefore, the first volcanoes 
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must have appeared before first life.   Once again, limited domain or topic knowledge 
could result in a correct sequence albeit one based upon a faulty premise.  Thus, the 
ability to place two events from the distant past in correct temporal order will reflect 
far more than temporal understanding alone. These results corroborate the anecdotal 
assertions made by others and referenced in an earlier paragraph.  In some cases the 
failure to sequence items correctly is not specifically a temporal problem but rather 
evidence of insufficient knowledge of those events.  Conversely, a correct sequence 
alone cannot be equated with temporal understanding.  Additional information about 
why students ordered events the way they did is needed to determine the extent of 
their understanding. 
Geoscience events in this study were not identical to those used by Trend for 
reasons that were explained in chapter three.  Standard deviations for the items in 
this study were generally lower than those in Trend’s research (2000, 2001b) although 
the differences are not great.  Of the 20 events sequenced by U.K. primary teachers 
and primary teacher trainees in Trend’s studies, 18 events for primary teachers and 14 
for primary teacher trainees had standard deviations greater than or equal to 2.0.  Of 
the 13 events sequenced for this study, there was only one standard deviation greater 
than 2.0 for the entire sample (Big Bang), none for 8th graders, one for 11th graders 
(Big Bang), and none for the university students. 
Lack of parity between samples, specific items sequenced and research design 
between Trend’s research and mine make it unwise to make too much of the 
differences between results.  Differences could be due to the smaller sample size in 
this study.  It could also have been due to the items themselves since all of his items 
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were geoscience events while four in this study were not.  The latter explanation 
could account for the difference in results if historical events considered part of 
conventional time are easier to sequence than geoscience ones.  However, adjacent 
mean differences, standard deviations, and interview transcripts in this study indicate 
that students found the historical events no easier to sequence than the geoscience 
ones.  All of these factors may have played a role in the slightly different results, but I 
think there is another plausible explanation. 
 I would argue that the main difference between his task and mine is that 
many of the geoscience items in the current study could be sequenced accurately 
using logical reasoning skills with only minimal geoscience content knowledge while 
he included far more geoscience items for which background knowledge in the 
geosciences was necessary.  The logical reasoning students exhibited in this study 
might be based upon a faulty premise, but still produce a correct answer.  For 
example, several people said the formation of the Sun preceded the formation of the 
Earth since the Sun is essential for life on Earth.   That is not, however, required since 
the Sun could have captured the Earth in its orbit (even though that is not the case).   
It is intriguing that Trend (2000, 2001a) found the lowest standard deviations for the 
first three events on the list: Big Bang, origin or formation of the Sun, and origin or 
formation of planet Earth in his research with primary teachers and teacher trainees.   
I have attempted to demonstrate from my own results that students are able to 
sequence these events correctly even if they possess minimal or inaccurate knowledge 
about the events.   
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In contrast, the remaining items in Trend’s list may be more dependent upon 
some geoscience content knowledge to sequence them correctly.  How could one 
determine whether Earth’s Moon was formed before or after the first volcanoes 
erupted on Earth without some knowledge of those events?  There is nothing in the 
events themselves that would provide clues to their temporal order unless I know 
something about them.  It would be very difficult to determine if the first life with 
hard parts appeared prior to or after the first trees appeared without knowing 
something about evolutionary history.   In the present study, the Big Bang produced 
the highest standard deviation among 11th graders due to two students who said they 
had never heard of the event and placed it very late in the sequence.  Since the 
sample was small, they had a significant effect on the standard deviation for the entire 
sample.   That is the point.  The standard deviation for that item was high because of a 
lack of knowledge of the event, not necessarily because of a poor understanding of 
deep time.  First volcanoes produced the highest standard deviation for 8th graders 
and university students, and the second highest for the entire sample.   While this 
item is difficult to place without some knowledge base, some students did so for 
unusual reasons.  The present study corroborates Trend’s assertions (1998) that the 
geoscience content knowledge a student brings to the table plays a crucial role in an 
understanding of deep time.  There is likely a mutually dependent relationship here in 
which content knowledge and temporal understanding support the development of 
the other.  The nature of that relationship is an unanswered question.  The issue will 
be explored more fully in chapter six. 
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The addition of historical events in this study provides a benchmark against 
which to judge how people evaluated earlier geoscience events.   Learners appeared 
to approach these items in exactly the same manner as the deep time events and their 
responses were no more accurate.  In this study older students who had several 
exposures to ancient history expressed less confidence about their sequencing for the 
historical events than for the geoscience ones.  Again, I would argue this is because 
earlier events in this study could be sequenced on the basis of logical reasoning 
strategies, while it is more difficult to sequence the historical events without some 
knowledge of them.   This concurs with Hidalgo & Otero’s (2004) contention that 
students in their study were able to sequence events accurately using deductive 
reasoning even if they lacked knowledge of the events themselves. 
The types of responses seen here are highly consistent with previous research 
described in section 2.6.1 and support the predictions made based upon that 
research.  There is great confusion about the temporal order of geoscience events 
even among students with relevant prior coursework.  The events themselves seem to 
have little meaning for students.  Absent specific knowledge, they must rely on logical 
reasoning strategies to determine the answer.  In some cases, that works well and 
they come up with the correct answer.  However, in another situation similar 
reasoning may not lead to the correct answer.   
Taken together, these results indicate that the ability to comprehend 
succession in deep time and/or answer questions in research studies on the topic is 
highly sensitive to the amount of geoscience content knowledge a student brings to 
the table.  All of the researchers with which these results were compared are well 
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aware this is true.  I would argue that it, coupled with logical reasoning ability, may be 
the most important factor in many instances, especially for adolescents or adults.   
5.1.4 Succession and large numbers 
The previous two sections dealt with relative placement of events.  Succession 
also involves the absolute placement of events at a specific point in time.  In-service 
and trainee primary teachers in Trend’s research (2000, 2001a) were given temporal 
categories corresponding to deep time bands and asked to place the events in the 
appropriate category.  He noted a wide range of placements with some individuals 
placing events in the category “more than one million million years ago,” much older 
than the currently accepted age of the universe (Trend, 2000).  In the present study, 
students grouped events into categories of their choosing and provided a name for 
their groups, if possible.  While the methodology was different than his, students’ 
conceptions of absolute time as measured in this study were quite similar to those of 
participants in Trend’s research and in that of others discussed in chapter two 
(Libarkin et al., 2007; Marques & Thompson, 1997), namely that ages for piles ranged 
across many orders of magnitude.   Age names given for the oldest group ranged from 
more than ten times greater than the accepted date for the Big Bang to the fourth 
dynasty of ancient Egypt.  Nine students did not provide an age name for the oldest 
group.  This was reminiscent of two studies reported in chapter two in which 
university students (Catley & Novick, 2009) or in-service teachers (Dahl et al., 2005)  
were resistant and, in one case, refused to provide dates for evolutionary or 
geoscience events.     
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Results from those earlier studies along with this one suggest that people 
simply have few age referents for events in the distant past.  It is unclear if this is 
because very large numbers have little meaning for them or if they possess minimal 
knowledge of the events and couldn’t place them temporally for that reason.  It could 
be a combination of the two factors.  As mentioned in chapter four, the high degree of 
accuracy when dating Columbus’s voyage to the New World may have been largely 
due to a rhyme taught in American schools to help learners remember the date.  In 
fact, a number of individuals recited the rhyme while completing the task, although 
not all recited it correctly.  Even then, one student had the digits correct but 
concluded Columbus sailed to the New World in 1942.   
This item suggested that age appeared to play a minimal role in students’ 
thinking about the task.  They rarely applied age names to any of the piles unless 
specifically asked to do so.  Not only did participants not possess numerical referents 
for the events, they didn’t even appear to view the task as a temporal one despite the 
fact that the directions to them stated that they should place cards into the same pile 
if they represented events that happened around the same time.  While the task 
didn’t provide much useful information in terms of the specific temporal categories 
generated, its chief usefulness was in the fact that it reinforced that students didn’t 
appear to be thinking in temporal terms at all.  One-fifth of the students were unable 
to provide age names for any groups.   
There are several reasons why this might be true.  Literature reported in 
chapter two indicated that people tend to perceive both numbers and time (cf. 
Dehaene, Izard, Spelke, & Pica, 2008 and Janssen, Chessa, & Murre, 2006) in similar 
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ways.  They have difficulty placing numbers or events accurately the farther they are 
from a reference point.  For time, that reference point is often the present.  A 
compression of times that are farther from the present means that I may not perceive 
there is a greater temporal distance between events that happened 10,000 versus 
4,000 years ago than there is between ones that occurred 2,000 versus 500 years ago.    
Second, how should we interpret why people assigned very old dates to the 
origin of the universe such as hundreds of billions of years ago? Conversely, why 
would another learner place the origin/formation of the Sun and Earth at 2,500 BC?  
Might either simply be the largest number that comes to mind at the moment?   
Someone may allege that the younger date is indicative of a young Earth creationist 
view.  Yet, a person who says the Sun and Earth were formed in 2,500 BC is indicating 
an age that is still 1,500-5,500 years less than that espoused by people who believe 
the Earth is young. In some cases at least, I think a more likely explanation is that 
2,500 BC merely sounds like a very long time ago to some individuals.   The lack of a 
sufficiently large time scale on which to place geoscience events will make it difficult 
to develop a solid understanding of Earth’s geologic history. 
5.2 Duration  
Duration in deep time involves the ability to judge the amount of time 
necessary for an event to occur or the amount of time that has passed since an event 
happened.  Judging durations often relies on the establishment of a reference point. 
That could be the starting or ending time of one of the events, or it might be the 
present.  Duration can be judged by accounting for some spatial aspect of the task—
distance, size of the finished product, and the rate at which the task was completed.  
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When thinking about events that are not perceived in real time, a person must know 
something about rates of those events in order to judge durations. 
Table 5.5 briefly summarises the key findings from the duration tasks in the 
interviews.  The table does not capture the full range of results reported in chapter 
four, but does provide a framework for the discussion that follows. 
Task Key findings 
Duration animations On average students answered slightly more than half 
of the questions correctly.  Lowest scores were 
recorded when size varied but durations were the 
same. 
Duration in sedimentary 
layers     (static image) 
A small fraction of the sample answered correctly.  
Many students concluded that the thinner layer took 
longer to form and based their answer upon A3. 
Three numeric timelines Some students were able to deal with numbers 
involved in deep time while a significant number 
were not.  Some were unable to deal with time 
periods up to 100 years on a linear, proportional 
scale. 
Duration of events timeline Events with short and long durations were estimated 
inaccurately.  Surface features were used to 
determine durations. 
Duration of events 
questionnaire 
Students most accurately estimated durations for 
events taking seconds, minutes, or days to occur.  
Three of the six events that were estimated the least 
accurately were geoscience events. 
Table 5.5 Summary of key findings for duration tasks 
It will quickly become obvious to the reader that separating conventional time, 
large numbers, and geoscience content knowledge as factors in a conception of deep 
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time is even more difficult for duration than it was for succession.   Sections 5.2.1 and 
5.2.2 contain discussions that relate to geoscience content knowledge and large 
numbers.  To streamline the flow of the argument, I make some comments about 
each of those areas in sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2.  The alternative would necessitate 
dealing with the same data in multiple places, making the overall discussion more 
difficult to follow.   Points made about large numbers and geoscience content 
knowledge in sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 are briefly cited in later sections.  
5.2.1 Duration in conventional time via animations 
 Results for the three duration animations yielded interesting findings.  While 
determining succession in real time was easy for most learners in this study, duration 
was not so simple.  Performance when size was held constant and rate and duration 
varied was better than when rate and size varied but duration was held constant.  
While the former scenario relied on the indirect relationship between rate and 
duration, students did not need to judge the relative contribution of two different 
variables to account for duration, thus making the task easier according to Matsuda 
(2001).  If size is held constant, I need only attend to the differences in rates to judge 
duration.   
In contrast, the second animation in which layers were different thicknesses 
but had the same durations proved to be the most difficult of the three animations.  
To judge durations, learners needed to account for both size and rate.  Based upon 
interview transcripts reported in section 4.1.2.2, some students in this sample were 
unsure how to connect those two pieces of information to answer the questions.  As a 
result, they did not always make accurate judgments.  This stands in contrast to some 
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previous research in which adults made no errors when asked to judge durations using 
rate and distance (Matsuda, 2001) while supporting the findings of others that adults 
did not consistently judge duration accurately when considering the two factors 
(Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008).  The task in the present study may be more similar to 
Casasanto and Boroditsky’s than Matsudo’s.  In the latter study participants watched 
toy trains move across a track, thus simulating an event with which individuals may be 
familiar.  Casasanto and Boroditsky’s study and the animation tasks were more 
abstract and any real world analogue was perhaps less apparent. 
Inattention to the task was mentioned in chapter four as a possible reason for 
students’ performance on the animation questions.  Some learners chose to only 
watch each duration animation once even though they were given the opportunity to 
watch multiple times.  That still does not fully account for the results reported in 
chapter four because participants who watched the animations multiple times also 
judged durations incorrectly.  Several students expressed surprise that they were 
being asked whether a thick layer took longer to fill than a thin one for A2. Students 
who equated size with duration on this animation made an error similar to mistakes 
made by subjects in studies reported in chapter two.   It is precisely the same error 
that young children made on Piaget’s duration tasks described in section 2.4.1.   
However, Piaget would not have expected to see an “average adult” make this error.  
Yet, this is precisely the mistake Casasanto and Boroditsky (2008) found with MIT 
students (section 2.2.3).  It is purely speculation at this point and definitely requires 
further research to test, but one wonders whether the human brain possesses some 
default notion that is applied in the absence of other information, namely that size 
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should equate with duration.  That default notion is rejected only if there is some 
reason to do so such as specific knowledge or another piece of perceptual information 
that simply cannot be ignored, such as noticeable rate differences.    
Others (Dodick & Orion, 2003a) have found that students conflate size and 
duration in a geologic context.  This is precisely the error a large number of subjects 
made on Puzzle 4 of the GeoTAT reported in section 2.6.2 and is where the interplay 
between two “legs” of the “stool” becomes difficult to ascertain.  As mentioned in 
chapter two, this error could be seen as a lack of understanding of rates of various 
geological processes.  In that sense there is a geoscience content knowledge 
component to the error.  It could also be further evidence that when relevant 
geoscience content knowledge is missing people revert to a more basic notion of 
duration that equates it with size.  The spatial component of an understanding of 
duration is powerful (Boroditsky, 2000; Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008).  When the 
sizes of the layers are equal as they were in A1, the spatial component has effectively 
been removed from the equation since it is the same for all layers.  When size is 
different as was the case in A2, people attend to it. 
The other way durations could have been judged for all three animations 
would have been to rely solely on the timer in the upper right corner of the screen.  
This necessitated attention to starting and ending times for each layer and then some 
one- or two-digit subtraction to determine which duration was longer.  Alternatively, a 
person could simply count the amount of time necessary for each layer to fill either 
silently or aloud.  While some students used a counting strategy from the beginning, 
others, like Hannah (section 4.1.2.4) adopted a counting strategy for later questions in 
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the set.  As we have seen, this strategy did not consistently produce correct answers.  
Inattention to the task may be the best explanation.  While it is possible that a 
significant portion of the sample was unable to consistently perform the subtraction 
correctly, one would hope that is an unlikely explanation given the ages of the 
students involved.  The other possibility is that given a discrepancy between 
perceptual information and the result of counting, the perceptual information won 
out (Nathan in section 4.1.2.2).  
5.2.2 Application of duration to a stratigraphic sequence 
The pivotal role played by perceptual information is further demonstrated by 
A3 and its effect on how people judged durations for the stratigraphic sequence.  As 
described in chapter four, the most unfortunate aspect of A3 is that it may have 
instilled an alternative conception in the minds of some participants.  While the blue 
layer in A3 was much thicker than the red layer, it filled at a much faster rate.  Hence, 
its duration was shorter.   Even though size and rate both varied, the difference in rate 
was so significant that it made an impression on many of the participants.    When 
asked to judge the durations of the two sedimentary layers in the stratigraphic 
sequence, some learners reinterpreted the entire set of animation tasks to make them 
fit what they saw with the red and blue layers in A3.  Several said that in each 
animation thinner layers filled more slowly than the thicker layers to which they 
compared them although that was not true.  Others expressed surprise at being asked 
to apply information from the animations to the stratigraphic sequence.   
These results can be compared with those of Dodick and Orion’s (2003a) SFT 
described in section 2.6.2.  In chapter two, I argued that their results were best 
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explained by the geoscience content knowledge possessed by the students in their 
sample.  That is likely a factor, and perhaps is the most important one.  However, the 
present results suggest that geoscience content knowledge alone may be insufficient 
to account for their findings.  Size of a layer in the SFT was often equated with 
duration with a thicker layer being judged to require a longer duration than a thinner 
one.  Thus when both outcrops had the same number of layers, but Outcrop B was 
taller, it was judged to have taken longer to deposit.  However, students seemed to 
view the number of layers as a more important determiner of duration than overall 
size of the outcrop.  When the height of the outcrops and the number of layers were 
different, the most often cited reason for judging which outcrop was older was the 
number of layers.  As I argued in chapter two, those two ideas are not dissimilar.  In 
both cases, a greater quantity equals a greater duration.  In one case the greater 
quantity is the greater spatial distance occupied by the taller outcrop.  In the second 
case, the greater quantity is the number of layers.  This could well indicate a view that 
all depositional layers represent the same duration regardless of their thickness.   
Students in this sample made errors on duration tasks in conventional time 
(section 5.2.1) as well as those involving deep time.  They did not consistently make 
the same error, however.  Some equated size with duration in both tasks, consistent 
with what was expected based upon the literature in chapter two.  Conversely, the 
difference between the red and blue layers in Animation 3 led some to allege an 
inverse relationship between size and duration.   In both cases, students concluded 
that information about the size of a layer was sufficient to determine its duration.  
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5.2.3 Duration and geoscience content knowledge (Timeline 3) 
 We have seen that geoscience content knowledge appears to be important in 
determining how the students in this sample make judgments about what information 
to attend to when determining duration.  There are hints that at some individuals in 
this sample equated size with duration unless there was some compelling reason for 
them to not do so.  
  Students’ ability to assess duration when they are provided with no perceptual 
information but must rely on their knowledge of events was assessed via Timeline 3.  
Learners had difficulty judging durations not only of geoscience events, but also 
events well within conventional time.  Moon phases, day/night, and yearly cycles are 
all part of the elementary [primary] school science curriculum in the U.S.  Every 
student in this sample had likely been taught something about each of those ideas at 
least once in their educational career.  Nonetheless, their understandings of durations 
were quite inaccurate.  While most knew the Earth orbits the Sun in one year, one 
person said the Earth rotates on its axis hourly.  In some cases, their ideas regarding 
the durations of shorter events conformed to perceptual experience.  Many 
participants said the Moon orbits the Earth daily which is consistent with what some 
undergraduates in another study thought (DeLaughter et al., 1998).  In both studies, 
students may have reasoned that they see the Moon at night, but not during the day 
so its orbital period must be one day.  Yet, it is highly probable that many of these 
same students have seen the Moon during the day at some point in their lifetime.  The 
fact that the Moon is sometimes visible during the day was not pointed out to 
students during these interviews consistent with the aims of the study, but it would be 
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interesting to do just that in a follow-up study to see what, if any, effect that has on 
students’ responses.   
As described in the previous section, perceived size is frequently equated with 
duration.  This is true even if a student’s knowledge of which of two structures is 
larger is incorrect.  Several participants said the carving of the Grand Canyon required 
more time than the growth of a coral reef due to their belief that the canyon is larger 
than a reef.  If size equals length, that is incorrect.  While the Grand Canyon is larger 
than many coral reefs, the Great Barrier Reef is over six times longer than the canyon.  
Thus, it is possible to argue that there is at least one coral reef that is larger [longer] 
than the Grand Canyon.  To be sure, it is quite unlikely that students actually knew the 
size of the Great Barrier Reef.  It is also probable that at least some of them didn’t 
know the size of the Grand Canyon either.  The point is that for many students 
perceived size equalled duration. 
 Surface features other than size were also used to judge durations.  The view 
that terrestrial processes take longer than biological ones (which also emerged on the 
card sort) led some students to conclude that the carving of the Grand Canyon took 
longer than the amount of time most coral reefs have been growing.  Sometimes 
learners knew they did not have all the information necessary to make a judgment, 
but the information they said they needed to make a determination would not have 
helped.  One university student was quite concerned that she didn’t know the source 
of the Grand Canyon.  (She did not say the source of the Colorado River)  She felt that 
knowing the source would be important in order to judge its duration.   However, 
knowing that the Colorado River originates in the Rocky Mountains in Colorado does 
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not provide clues about the amount of time necessary to carve the Grand Canyon.  
Knowing something about how running water erodes underlying bedrock would be 
helpful. 
 Timeline 3 can be compared with Libarkin, Kurdziel, and Anderson (2007) 
reported in section 2.6.1.  Their timelines dealt with succession while timelines in this 
study involved duration.  The similarity is in how participants in both studies dealt 
with shorter versus longer time periods.  In Libarkin, Kurdziel, and Anderson, many 
students compressed the amount of time between older events such as the 
appearance of first life and the appearance of dinosaurs but spaced out more recent 
events such as the appearance and disappearance of dinosaurs.  This is very similar to 
what learners did in the present study.  They allotted more space between events of 
shorter duration than was warranted but compressed events of longer duration 
together.   Findings from both studies are consistent with studies reported in section 
2.3.1 on how people map numbers (e.g., Siegler & Opfer, 2003).   
5.2.4 Duration and geoscience content knowledge (duration of events 
questionnaire) 
 Just as was true for TL3, familiarity with an event was an important factor in 
how accurately students judged durations on the duration of events questionnaire.   
No one misjudged the unit of time necessary to eat dinner.  This is not surprising since 
it is the one activity on the list that students are likely to have done practically every 
day of their life.  As was the case for TL3, students not only misjudged durations on 
the questionnaire for events in deep time but also events in conventional time.  In 
fact, the event for which duration estimates were the least accurate was the amount 
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of time necessary for a red blood cell to make one trip throughout the body.  The 
issue, then, cannot be that long periods of time are inherently problematic solely 
because they are long.  On the contrary one issue is that the events involved are 
largely unfamiliar.  (I will discuss the problem that arises because the time periods are 
long in the next section)  For this sample, it was no easier to judge the durations of 
unfamiliar events in conventional time than it was to judge durations for those in deep 
time.   
The item that produced the greatest variability in responses was the amount of 
time necessary for light from the Sun to reach the Earth.  This was judged to be 
anywhere from seconds to millions of years.  Again, this points out that a number of 
students in this sample simply have no idea about the durations of shorter events as 
well as those that occur in deep time.  They may not know how fast light travels or 
what it would mean for Earth if the Sun was the right distance for its light to reach 
Earth in millions of years.    
Results from Timeline 3 and the duration of events questionnaire lend support 
to the notion that geoscience content knowledge plays an important role in how 
students approach tasks related to deep time.  It also plays an important role in how 
they approach tasks in conventional time.  While there is nothing surprising about this 
assertion, it points out the need to be cautious when attempting to describe the 
extent of students’ understanding.  Perhaps if we had asked a similar question with an 
event with which students were familiar, we would have gotten a different response 
and reached a different conclusion about students’ understanding. 
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5.2.5 Duration and large numbers 
 The tasks related to duration and large numbers were the most discriminable 
of any in the entire interview.  Over half the students in this sample demonstrated 
sufficient difficulty with large numbers to suggest that they will find deep time 
challenging on that basis alone.  A small subset of the sample displayed difficulty with 
proportional relationships between time periods up to 100 years.  Perhaps more 
significantly, this group approached the task in a less efficient manner that almost 
guaranteed they would not complete it successfully.  The left to right strategy they 
employed meant that they always ran out of room on the right side of the line.  
Essentially, they started at zero and compared successive pairs of numbers.  Their 
mention of the need to show that one year is a long time could suggest that they were 
using themselves and their own experience as a referent in some way.  When this 
group approached Timelines 2 and 4, their placement of numbers indicated they 
either understood little about the relative sizes of the numbers or attached minimal 
meaning to the numbers themselves.    
A second group was somewhat able to place time periods up to 100 years on a 
proportional scale, but lost that proportionality when the numbers became larger.  
Their overall understanding of larger numbers was not much different from the first 
group.  They did, however, have a better understanding of proportionality.  They 
attempted to deal with the entire scale by placing the first and last numbers and then 
the remaining numbers in light of those.  This stands in contrast to the first group that 
only dealt with two numbers at a time and not the entire scale.   The second group’s 
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proportional reasoning and problem solving strategies broke down when they had to 
deal with unfamiliar numbers. 
Students in the first two groups did not map large numbers logarithmically to 
the extent that would have been predicted based upon the literature reviewed in 
chapter two.  Instead, sometimes a smaller space was left between a pair of numbers 
that differed by one power of ten as opposed to those that differed by two.  Other 
times, all numbers were spaced fairly evenly across the line as if they all represented 
similar durations.   However, logarithmic mapping was evident on TL2 in the following 
way.  Some students commented that 1,000 and 100,000 and 1 million and 100 million 
differed by a factor of 100. Thus, they created equal spaces between the two pairs of 
numbers.    It is entirely possible that the cognitive demands of placing seven 
numbers of very different durations on the same timeline were too high for some 
students in this sample.  Many of the individuals in the first group and some in the 
second spaced all numbers evenly across the line for TL4.   
The final group differed from the others in two ways.  They were able to see 
the totality of the scale involved and to benchmark everything against the largest 
number in the set.  In that sense they were quite different from the first group in that 
they did not use themselves as a referent but appeared able to view the entire scale 
from the outside as an observer.  This allowed them to conceive of the proportional 
relationships between adjacent numbers on the required scale.  It didn’t mean they 
always got the relationships between adjacent numbers correct.   This group also 
differed from the others in their general problem solving abilities.  They saw the 
commonalities among the three timelines in a way that was not mentioned by 
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students in either of the first two groups.  Several of them described the second 
timeline as the same as the first one.  Formal proportional reasoning is generally 
taught in the U.S. in grades 6-8 (ages 11-14) which might explain why this last group 
was composed primarily of 11th graders and university students.  However, this group 
contained one 8th grader, and there were some 11th graders and university students in 
other groups.   
5.3 Is performance in one area a good predictor of performance in another? 
 The answer to this question is neither simply “yes” nor simply “no.”  There is 
some slight trend in which this is true, but it seems to be more from the standpoint 
that some people possess better logical reasoning skills.  Therefore they do better on 
all tasks because even if they lack background knowledge of numbers or geoscience 
content they are able to reason their way to many correct answers.  As we have seen, 
however, sometimes correct answers are based on faulty reasoning strategies or 
premises.  Students whose reasoning skills are less well-developed do not do as well 
on many tasks.   
On the other hand, performance on the numeric timelines did not correlate 
well at all with performance on the duration animations.  Conceptions of duration and 
number may not be as closely linked as succession and number appear to be.  These 
results could be an artefact of the study’s design.  The data from the interviews is 
limited so I will not speculate too much about this point.  Far more research is needed 
to investigate how closely related conceptions of large numbers are to both 
succession and duration.  Possible ways to explore the connection will be discussed in 
chapter six. 
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5.4 Evidence of other factors affecting an understanding of deep time 
In section 2.8 I mentioned other factors that might contribute to the stability 
of the deep time “stool.”  One of those is the credence that is attached to media 
representations of past events.  That was evident from Michael who placed the 
Pyramids of Egypt prior to woolly mammoths as a result of the film 10,000 BC in the 
card sort.  A more recent film, Ice Age III: Dawn of the Dinosaurs, perpetuates the idea 
that woolly mammoths, sabre-tooth tigers and Tyrannosaurus-rex were all 
contemporaries.   While many people who see the film will be aware that is 
erroneous, there will likely be others who will readily accept it. 
The very young ages ascribed to very old events could reflect a view that says 
the Earth is young.  Students who hold that view would obviously not suggest dates 
for its formation in the millions or billions.   Yet, as I indicated in section 5.1.4, I do not 
think that can explain all of the young ages that were mentioned.   Nevertheless, a 
young Earth view was likely demonstrated by several interview participants.  Vincent, 
a university student, said he did not accept uniformitarianism and believed that many 
geologic processes do not require as much time as geoscientists think they do.  While 
completing his card sort he said, “I disagree with the name they give it, the name Big 
Bang.  I think it’s just creation.”  It was not clear if Ayanna (11) was espousing a young 
Earth view or if she was simply aware that much of the general public in the U.S. 
perceives a controversy regarding the age of the Earth and the universe, although the 
debate many envision does not exist within the scientific community.  She did, 
however, mention that she saw evolution (and the Big Bang) as one possible idea for 
the origin of the universe and that it was the only one discussed in science class.   
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5.5 Students’ underlying conceptions 
 In chapter two, I discussed ways in which students’ underlying knowledge 
within a domain can influence new learning.  When a person’s domain or topic 
knowledge is limited, the individual often relies on surface features to answer 
questions within the domain.  There were a number of common ideas mentioned by 
students throughout the interviews.  While these views were not mentioned by all 
students, they were mentioned often enough to justify discussing them.  It is not clear 
how widespread any of these notions might be outside this sample.  They could 
indicate further avenues for research to determine how prevalent they are and what 
implications they might have for geoscience educators. 
 The first two concern succession.  One idea that appeared quite frequently in 
the fossil succession static image was the idea that relative age could be determined 
based on the familiarity of the creature.  Specifically, students said if a creature looks 
less familiar than another creature, the unfamiliar one must be older. This was often 
used to deduce that the trilobite must be older than the brachiopod because the 
brachiopod looks similar to a clam.  While students who employed this reasoning got 
the answer right in this instance, there are plenty of situations in which it would lead 
them to an incorrect response.   
The second idea that emerged from the succession tasks was that if one 
structure (X) is dependent upon a second one (Y), then Y is older than X.  Just like the 
other two ideas mentioned above, this one will often, but not always, be correct.  
Many domesticated animals are highly dependent upon their caretakers and could not 
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survive without their care.  Yet, it is clearly possible for the animal to be older than the 
caretaker.  
The second two underlying ideas involve duration.  Although it is described 
here under duration, the first idea surfaced in the fossil succession task as well as TL3. 
This view was one in which size was equated with age, or more fundamentally, 
duration.  Students who applied this reasoning said that if one creature (or structure) 
is larger than another, it must be older because it takes more time for a large creature 
(structure) to grow (or form) than it does for a small one.  Students who used this 
strategy in the fossil succession task relied exclusively on the size of the pictures on 
the image to make this judgement and not the relative sizes of the creatures 
themselves, presumably because they didn’t know the true sizes of the creatures.  
This reasoning was also applied in TL3 when judging durations of events.  By this logic, 
however, one would judge the Himalayan Mountains to be older than the 
Appalachians since the former are taller than the latter. 
  The final underlying notion that surfaced in the interviews was a view that says 
inorganic processes take longer than organic ones.  While there are examples in which 
this is true, there are many examples in which this is false.  An extreme example is the 
comparison of the Moon’s orbital period around the Earth with the gestation period 
of a human embryo. 
5.6 How do the three “legs” of the “stool” fit together? 
Before answering how the “legs” of the “stool” fit together I return to the 
research questions outlined in section 1.7.  
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1. Do students apply the same strategies to solve conventional time and deep 
time tasks, and do they make similar errors regardless of the length of time 
involved? 
2. Do students understand the size of numbers in the thousands or greater, as 
well as proportional relationships among numbers of various magnitudes? 
3. When students answer questions about deep time, do they cite geoscience 
ideas as rationales for responses or everyday ideas that may or may not be 
relevant to the task at hand?   
As we have seen in chapters four and five, these results suggest that students 
think about conventional and deep time in similar ways.  The difference between 
them is one of degree.  Students make similar errors on succession and duration tasks 
in both conventional and deep time.  It cannot be assumed that students 13-years-old 
and older have an understanding of large numbers and proportional relationships 
among them that is adequate to enable them to comprehend deep time.  In some 
cases, students’ responses on tasks involving deep time may say more about the 
extent of their geoscience content knowledge than it does about any difficulty 
understanding very large time periods.  However, this does not mean that more 
content knowledge will necessarily result in a better understanding of deep time.  The 
picture is more complicated than that.  All three components or “legs” of the “stool” 
must be present.  This leads us to ask how the three factors might interact to produce 
a robust concept of deep time. 
The “legs” of the “stool” appear to fit together in several ways.  First, there is a 
strong spatial component to how people conceive of number and time (at least 
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succession). The geoscience community has long recognised the role of spatial 
reasoning for skills like geologic mapping (e.g., King, 2008), yet I have found little 
discussion of its role in understanding deep time despite the fact that principles of 
relative dating use spatial transformations to infer temporal change (National 
Research Council, 2006).  If geoscientists make a spatial/temporal connection, it is not 
surprising that learners do too.  The commonality between how time and number are 
perceived and the implications of that commonality are key findings from this 
research.  The reader might argue that this finding is merely an artefact of the study’s 
design.  Yet, a comparison of these results with those of others discussed in chapter 
two lends support to the contention that these results are not solely a result of the 
questions that were asked.   
I believe the logarithmic mapping that occurs with both number and time 
happens because people do not “see” the entire scale.   In order to “see” the entire 
scale, I must be able to mentally sit outside it as an observer and view the entire scope 
at once.  If I am unable to do that, I am essentially viewing it from the perspective of 
someone who is on the scale.  I may be at the origin or somewhere else on the line, 
but I see the scale in a manner that is analogous to the person on the road viewing 
two hills in the distance.   The only real way to know how far apart those hills are from 
one another and from where we are now is to be able to sit outside the route.  If I see 
the hills from my current vantage point I will undoubtedly misjudge the distance 
between them.  That is one function of a map when dealing with spatial scale.  If I am 
headed on a trip, a map allows me to sit outside the route and see the entire path on 
a linear scale not just what I can visually perceive from my current vantage point.   
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In section 2.3.1 I described a scenario in which someone might be asked to 
compare the difference between 5 and 7 and 55 and 57.  I believe the reason why 
older children and adults are able to say that the numbers in each pair are the same 
distance apart is because they are able to step outside of the scale and look at all the 
numbers from the perspective of an observer.  Children generally grow in this ability 
with numbers as they get older.  Teachers of young children spend considerable time 
having children count objects.  As a result children develop a meaningful sense of the 
scale in which they are working as well as numerical referents on the scale.   The fact 
that children are able to represent a particular number in a linear fashion on one scale 
but cannot do so on a larger scale lends support to this assertion (Siegler & Opfer, 
2003).  This helps explain why large numbers are so difficult to comprehend, even for 
adults.  We have limited experience with the numbers involved.  Thus, we do not 
“see” the entire scale.  The ability to see the scale may necessitate mentally 
transporting oneself to that scale.  If we are unable to do that for the large end of the 
scale, then we can only view large quantities in relation to ourselves or the largest 
number that is meaningful to us.   If numbers greater than 10,000 have little meaning 
to me, I will have severe problems comprehending the scale of deep time.  This 
aggrees with research described in sections 2.3.2 and 2.4.2 on how experts deal with 
extremes of linear scale (Jones & Taylor, 2009; Tretter et al., 2006; Tretter et al., 
2006).   
The idea of referents, to which I already alluded, ties all three “legs” of the 
“stool” together.    Many people do not have good referents for large quantities of any 
type.  Powers and multiples of ten should function as those referents in the base-ten 
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system when dealing with pure numbers.  For large numbers, this requires facility with 
both standard and scientific notation.  The problem in the U.S., at least, is that many 
students do not have a clear understanding of the decimal number system.  The issue 
is further complicated for deep time because one must possess not only numerical 
referents but also geoscience content ones.   The call for specific content reference 
points to help students deal with deep time has been made elsewhere (Trend, 2001b, 
2001a).   
This brings us to two other functions of a map for linear distances.  First, it 
provides me with landmarks or referents along the way.  If I have reached Town X, I 
can see from the map on a linear scale how far I still have to go.  The other piece of 
information I get from a map is a scale of kilometres that gives me the units into which 
distance along my route is divided.  When I reach Town X, I not only know what 
fraction of the trip is still to be completed but I also know precisely how much farther I 
must travel and can estimate how long it is likely to take.  That is only true if the unit 
kilometre is meaningful to me.  Many Americans travelling in other countries with a 
map will not find the map nearly as useful as a native because the unit into which the 
route has been divided (a kilometre) is not meaningful.  They may remember that it is 
approximately 0.6 mile, but even then, they cannot “see” a kilometre in the way they 
can “see” a mile. 
What do American travellers to foreign countries have to do with my 
argument?  They help illustrate why scientists who work at large scales are able to 
make sense of the numbers and objects or events involved.  First, they “see” the scale 
they are working in.  Additionally, the units in that scale have meaning.  Experts 
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possess both numerical and content referents that serve to divide the entire scale into 
meaningful parts that can be combined and divided via proportional reasoning.   As 
McPhee (1982) points out, “In geologists’ own lives, the least effect of time is that 
they think in two languages, function on two different scales” (p. 128).  The ability to 
function at different scales gives them an intuitive feel for the numbers in which they 
work (Jones & Taylor, 2009; Tretter et al., 2006; Tretter et al., 2006).  People who are 
not experts but possess good number sense for large numbers have a portion of the 
tools they need to comprehend size or time at the large extreme of scale.    However, 
the lack of content referents means they cannot place events in their appropriate 
context if they are not provided with relevant numerical information.   
When we think about duration, the role of referents and a sense of the entire 
scale are more complicated.  I must still be able to “see” the whole scale and have 
meaningful referents.  However, I must also be able to use ideas about rates and 
perhaps size to judge duration.  Possessing relevant geoscience content knowledge is 
perhaps more crucial than it was for succession.  If I know little about average yearly 
rates of tectonic plate motion, I will have great difficulty imagining the amount of time 
necessary for the break-up of a supercontinent like Pangaea.  Yet, knowledge of the 
event will not be sufficient by itself.  I must also be able to apply multiplicative 
reasoning to figure out what that average yearly rate of tectonic plate motion means.   
We have seen that students in this sample struggled with all three “legs” of the 
deep time “stool.”  A few performed well or poorly or all tasks, but most people were 
somewhere in the middle.  They did well in some areas and not so well in others.  The 
three factors investigated in this study all seem to influence how students understand 
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deep time.  None appears to be sufficient alone to account for their difficulties.  All 
must be acknowledged for the role that they play. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
This study set out to determine if the geoscience community needed a new 
model for how to think about students’ difficulties understanding deep time.  The 
tasks in the interviews were designed to explore the roles played by three factors in a 
concept of deep time.  The conclusions reached point to the need to reinterpret some 
previous research in light of these findings.  
This thesis provides an original contribution to the literature in several ways.  It 
is the first time anyone studying the topic has explicitly tied together research 
literature about large numbers, conventional time, and geoscience content knowledge 
in the same paper (#1) and then related them to deep time (#2).  Third, this study is 
also the first attempt to explore these three factors in the same investigation with the 
same individuals.  Fourth, it is the first time anyone has looked at how a group of 
people deal with the three factors within and outside the deep time context.  My 
exploratory data provides a warrant for the assertion that the picture is more 
complicated than we in the geoscience research community have conceived of it to 
date.  I believe we need to take greater account of all three factors when trying to 
ascertain why students struggle so much to comprehend deep time.   Finally, this 
study suggests that spatial skills may play a more significant role in how people 
understand deep time than has been previously thought.  The last insight may be the 
most important contribution the study makes to the field. 
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The remainder of this chapter reviews what has been learned from the study 
and the ways future research might proceed in light of these findings.  I begin by 
describing the strengths and weaknesses of the model of the deep time “stool.”  I then 
discuss the study’s limitations.   Suggestions for future research designed to improve 
upon these results are outlined.  Finally, I make brief comments regarding how this 
study might inform the curriculum and teaching of deep time in the geoscience 
classroom.   
6.1 Is the deep time “stool” a useful model? 
 The deep time “stool” was introduced in chapter two as a working model that 
provided a framework for this study.  It has served its purpose by attempting to 
illustrate the role of the three factors that were explored.  The study has revealed that 
the model possesses strengths, but also some important weaknesses. 
6.1.1 Strengths of the “stool” 
 The construct of the deep time “stool” says that a solid understanding of deep 
time rests fully on the three “legs” of a person’s understanding of conventional time, 
large numbers, and geoscience content knowledge.  Instability can result if one of 
those “legs” is missing or is too short, although the “legs” need not be of equal length 
for the “stool” to be sturdy.  In this sense, the model is useful.   
The types of errors students make on tasks involving succession and duration 
in deep time mirror the errors made on those tasks in conventional time.   There is 
nothing in these interviews that would suggest that succession and duration in deep 
time function in ways that are different from how they function in conventional time.  
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Thus, it may well be that some adolescents and adults will struggle with a concept of 
deep time due to difficulties with conventional time, particularly duration.  This is 
important because it suggests we must take greater account of the research literature 
on how people understand conventional time.  We have assumed since Ault’s work 
(Ault, 1980, 1982) that conventional time is not a barrier for the acquisition of a 
concept of deep time, but my results question this view.   
 Secondly, nineteen of the 35 students in this sample had sufficient difficulty 
with large numbers to imply that the problem would hamper their ability to 
understand deep time.  They lack good number sense for numbers in the millions and 
billions, and sometimes even for smaller quantities.  Number sense provides the 
ability to see the whole scale and be able to divide it into meaningful numerical units.  
This impacts succession because if a student cannot conceive of a scale of 4.6 billion 
years, it will be difficult to place the appearance and extinction of dinosaurs on a 
timeline of Earth’s history.    Difficulty with numbers affects duration as well.   If a 
student cannot conceptualise millions of years, that student will likely possess an 
unclear understanding of what it means that dinosaurs lived on Earth for around 165 
million years.  They will be unable to compare the amount of time dinosaurs lived to 
the amount of time humans have been on the planet.  When the magnitude of the 
numbers is fuzzy, they are all just large numbers that are viewed as essentially 
interchangeable. 
Finally, many of the findings reported in chapter four point to the role played 
by geoscience content knowledge in a conception of deep time.  This is perhaps self-
evident to any science educator or researcher operating within a constructivist 
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framework.  The important point is not merely that we know this to be true but that a 
student’s geoscience content knowledge is a factor that we must take account of in 
our research.  Although the role of geoscience content knowledge has been 
mentioned in previous research on deep time, this is the first study that has tried to 
specifically investigate its role in the concept.  Being able to ascertain where 
understanding breaks down will help us more effectively devise instructional 
strategies to remediate students’ difficulties.  For future research, this will mean 
finding ways to isolate geosciece content knowledge from the other two factors to 
help determine its role in concept acquisition (a point that will be further developed in 
section 6.3).   
6.1.2 Weaknesses of the “stool” 
 Although the “stool” has been a useful working model, it has proved to be 
inadequate.  A satisfactory model should account for as many factors as possible that 
impinge upon a student’s understanding of deep time.  It should also elucidate 
relationships that may exist between factors.  It should account for whether one of 
the factors is more foundational to a concept of deep time than the others.  The 
“stool” does not measure up in any area.  I consider the issue of relationships among 
factors first. 
The factors appear to interact in ways that the “stool” does not capture.  In the 
model, the three “legs” of the “stool” sit independent of one another and are not 
connected except by the “seat” of deep time itself.  Yet, these interviews suggest 
there is considerable interplay among the factors.  In fact, they seem to be connected 
in ways that go beyond deep time.  Geoscience content knowledge and large numbers 
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provide reference points around which new information can be organised.  Large 
numbers and conventional time seem to be undergirded by similar spatial mapping 
strategies.  In each case there is a tendency toward logarithmic mapping with an 
expansion of numbers or time closer to the origin and a compression the farther one 
goes from the origin.  For time, the origin is often the present.  Yet, the model of the 
“stool” does not illustrate the commonalities among how people map space, time, 
and number.   Any model that accounts for difficulties with deep time probably needs 
to acknowledge the role played by space.  This is perhaps the greatest weakness of 
the model—that it does not account for a factor that may be the most basic of all. 
A second problem is that the “stool” does not account for whether the factors 
develop sequentially or simultaneously, a nontrivial matter.  The literature reviewed in 
chapter two indicates there is a developmental component to how people understand 
both time and number.  Whether one of those could be considered more fundamental 
than the other is not clear at present.  It would seem logical that a conception of 
conventional time might be the most elementary of the three factors.  This would 
seem to hold true for perceiving succession and duration as they occur in real time.  
However, it is unclear whether understanding of longer time periods within 
conventional time hinges upon an understanding of number, if the two ideas develop 
in isolation, or if they develop in tandem.   
A third problem with the “stool” metaphor is that it doesn’t capture the “other 
factors” mentioned in chapters two, four, and five.  Things like metaphysical beliefs or 
dispositions are not represented on the “stool,” yet, chapters four and five both 
outlined ways in which they influenced deep time conceptions for some in this 
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sample.  At least in the U.S., a student who perceives a conflict between scientific 
understanding of deep time and religious teachings sometimes chooses to reject the 
notion of deep time, even before engaging with the idea.  That student may not 
expend the intellectual effort necessary to understand deep time, no matter what the 
person understands about conventional time or large numbers.  The “stool’s” inability 
to account for factors like metaphysical beliefs was apparent from the outset, but a 
more robust model should find a way to incorporate the factors.   
6.1.3 Is there a better model? 
I am reticent to commit to a particular model to replace the “stool” in the 
absence of additional data.  Perhaps a rope with twisted strands that acknowledges 
the role played by spatial skills will prove to be a viable alternate model.  This model is 
better able to deal with the interconnectedness of the factors than the “stool” was.  It 
will be weaker if one of the factors is missing or of insufficient strength.   It has the 
advantage of being able to incorporate more strands to include the “other factors” 
that influence a concept of deep time.   Perhaps, ultimately the geoscience research 
community will conclude that one model is insufficient to account for an 
understanding of deep time.  Multiple models may be necessary similar to the dual 
understanding of light as a wave and a particle.   
6.2 Limitations of the study 
 As with all research, this study has limitations as well as strengths.   I described 
general limitations of the chosen methodology in chapter three.  This section deals 
with more specific limitations of the research.   
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This is a qualitative study that makes no claims regarding the 
representativeness of the sample chosen. It is highly probable that this sample does 
not represent the population of all 8th and 11th grade students or university 
undergraduates in the U.S., let alone around the world.  The sample of 35 students is 
small and self-selected, which also limits the ability to generalise findings.   Students at 
Institution A were unique amongst all members of the sample in that they were the 
only ones who were enrolled in a course taught by the investigator.  This prior 
relationship could have affected their willingness to speak honestly about their ideas, 
since some may have been hoping to improve their course grade by their 
participation.  While all university students in the sample were exposed to ideas about 
deep time in their course prior to the interview, students at Institution A may have 
been taught in ways that more closely mirrored the content of the interviews.  Finally, 
their pre-existing relationship with the investigator may have enabled them to more 
accurately read her facial and body language than students who met the examiner for 
the first time during the interview.  I have been careful throughout to relate the 
results only to the present sample and not to suggest that they are typical of the wider 
population.  It is possible that the study did not fully capture the range of possible 
responses of students at these ages.  Yet, there was sufficient variety in students’ 
responses to provide a starting point for future research employing more 
representative sampling techniques. 
Oral interviews and drawing tasks were used to collect data.  Any method of 
data collection has trade-offs.  The richness of interview data is one of its primary 
strengths, but there is always a danger of inconsistency or bias when interpreting oral 
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interview transcripts.  Other than the initial sorting of the numeric timelines, all data 
analysis was done solely by the investigator.  Thus, someone might argue that the 
researcher’s own biases were a significant factor in data interpretation.  Every attempt 
was made to be as consistent as possible, but the danger exists.   Finally, the criteria 
used to sort participants’ responses into groups constrain the conclusions that are 
reached.  For example, there were some “borderline” cases when sorting the numeric 
timelines.  Had the sorting criteria been different those students may have ended up 
in a different category.  Section 4.2.1 outlines how those decisions were made, but 
judgments inevitably reflect the investigator’s perspective.  Extensive transcripts were 
reproduced in chapter four to help the reader judge the validity of the criteria used to 
analyse data as well as the interpretations of that data and the conclusions reached.   
The tasks and the interview questions themselves may not have been sensitive 
enough to detect students’ actual conceptions.  David’s timelines (see section 4.2.5) 
are a good example.  The extent of his understanding was not fully clear.  In some 
ways, he seemed confused, but in other ways his understanding appeared to be quite 
sophisticated.   In situations where there were questions about the extent of a 
student’s understanding I have included specific information so the reader can 
evaluate the validity of my interpretations.  Another concern is that the questions or 
probes failed to fully address Johnson and Gott’s (1996) concerns about potentially 
leading questions.  There are a few instances in which the reader could argue that 
leading questions were asked (see section 4.1.2.2).  I reported those interchanges fully 
so readers could reach their own conclusions about the severity of that charge. 
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As described in section 3.2.2, researchers using cognitive interviews realise 
students do not always provide adequate reasons for why they respond in the ways 
they do.  If students have simply said the first thing that came to mind or answered in 
the way they thought they were “supposed” to answer, then many of this study’s 
conclusions are suspect.  There was some triangulation of data to mitigate the 
criticism, but more might have done in this regard.   
This study has demonstrated that, at least for this sample, understandings of 
conventional time, large numbers, and geosciences content all play a major role in an 
understanding of deep time, however, questions remain.   This study has not 
answered the question of the relative importance of each of the factors to a concept 
of deep time, particularly at the individual level.  In some tasks, an attempt was made 
to isolate the factors from one another. Overall, however, the three factors were not 
sufficiently disentangled to be able to comment on their relative importance for any 
single individual.  This is especially true in tasks such as the duration of events 
questionnaire and the card sort.  It is not clear if the three factors develop in tandem 
or if one or two develop first and are then followed by the third.   Additionally, the 
relatively poor performance on the duration animations is not adequately explained.  
It is unclear if this was an artefact of the experimental design, a problem with the 
visual prompts employed, and/or their placement within the sequence of tasks.  
Alternatively, it could represent a genuine difficulty with duration.   
The study noted but did not address any of the additional variables that may 
affect a concept of deep time such as metaphysical beliefs or dispositions.  Their 
relative importance needs to be investigated.   
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6.3 Suggestions for future research 
 The questions raised by this investigation and the study’s limitations suggest 
avenues for further research.   Some future research should be descriptive and 
endeavour to present a fuller picture of the role being played by each of the three 
factors in a concept of deep time, as well as the impact of spatial skills.  Intervention 
studies that flow out of those descriptive studies should attempt to determine ways to 
help students develop a better understanding of this pivotal geoscience concept.  I 
briefly sketch out possible research in each of those areas below.    
6.3.1 Additional descriptive research 
 First, the interview protocol itself could be modified in various ways.  The 
length of time necessary to conduct each interview is a drawback of this protocol in 
that it limits access to U.S. school children.  An interview that stretches across more 
than one class period or that appears to result in a measurable loss of instructional 
time can make school leaders less willing to grant access to their students.  Thus, one 
possibility is to break the interview into several segments.  This suggestion does not 
decrease the total loss of instructional time; however, it may be more palatable to 
school administrators who are concerned about stretching an interview across more 
than one class period.   A second possibility is to revise the interview items so that 
students are only asked certain items if they answer others correctly.  The drawback 
to this is that it could result in some students being misclassified.  Consider David 
(section 4.2.5).  Had he only created Timelines 1 and 2, he would have been 
categorised as possessing insufficient understanding of large numbers to deal with 
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deep time.  Yet, his explanation for TL4 suggests that would have been a 
miscategorisation.  
Second, the items themselves could be modified.  Results of the duration 
animations were the most difficult to interpret and raised the greatest number of 
questions of any items in the interviews.  The animations should be redesigned so that 
there is clearly no pattern between adjacent layers (some students perceived a 
pattern).  Future studies that use these animations should fully counterbalance the 
order of presentation.  While A1 and A2 were counterbalanced in this study, A3 was 
always presented last.  This may have affected outcomes.    It is not clear why students 
were more accurate on A3 than the other two.  The order of the questions should also 
be varied.  After each animation the first question was, “Which layer took longer to 
fill?”  The second question was “Which layer filled first?”   
 The fossil succession animation could be revised.  One way would be to use 
only fossils that look similar to creatures that are currently alive.  Another option 
would be to create a group of fictional ones.  In both cases, this would reduce the 
likelihood that a student would reason on the basis of familiarity/unfamiliarity with 
the fossils to sequence them correctly.  Additionally, all fossil pictures should 
encompass the same area to eliminate size as a factor.  If these approaches were not 
viable, students’ responses might reveal information about additional strategies they 
employ to determine succession.   
 Number lines could be revised in several ways.  First, they need to involve a 
greater variety of numbers with different proportional relationships between adjacent 
numbers.  Billions were not included on any of the number lines in this study, but they 
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should be in future research.  Varying how many numbers students must deal with in 
each timeline could be useful to help determine whether the problems are with 
numbers or with cognitive load.  Again, order of presentation should be 
counterbalanced to determine whether that has any effect upon responses.   
 The question of how the factors are related to one another might be 
addressed by adapting the interview protocol in several ways.  Timelines similar to TL3 
could be presented in two versions, one in which the numeric referents for the events 
are provided and one in which they are not.  This would allow for comparison of 
geoscience content knowledge with knowledge of large numbers.   A second place 
where content knowledge could be compared with large numbers is during the card 
sort.  In the second part when students are grouping cards into piles that represent 
similar time periods one group could be given the numeric referents for the events 
while the other group would not be provided with that information.  This could 
provide data about how people conceive of how close two events were to one 
another when they are provided with the dates for those events and may shed light 
on the extent to which difficulties are attributable to large numbers or content 
knowledge. 
 All of the adaptations to the interview protocol just described could be 
pursued via additional qualitative research.  However, in order to have greater 
confidence in the generalisability of findings, mixed methods may be more useful.  A 
quantitative questionnaire using a larger sample could employ a paper and pencil 
format or be adapted for computer presentation.  This is a similar strategy to one 
being currently used by Philip Johnson in his work on children’s understanding of a 
368 
 
substance which flows out of his earlier qualitative research on the same subject 
(personal communication, October, 2007).  This could easily be accomplished with the 
existing format, although breaking administration of the questionnaire into multiple 
sessions would be wise.  The specific adaptations to the tasks described in the 
previous paragraphs would strengthen a large-scale questionnaire-type study of this 
type.  Students could still be given the opportunity to explain their answers either via 
a forced choice or open response format.  The only caution is that some students may 
simply choose to say less when asked to write their answers than when asked orally.  
Therefore, random interviews with a subset of the sample would be important.   
Section 6.4 addresses science curricular recommendations, but additional 
research that relates more closely to that curriculum is needed.  Deep time is a part of 
U.S. science courses at the middle and high school levels (ages 11-18) as was shown in 
chapter one.  There is great variability at the age at which students are taught about 
deep time in the U.S. Children as young as 11 could be studying the topic in sixth 
grade and might differ collectively from the 18-year olds learning earth science as 
seniors in high school.  Studies employing a wider variety of age groups would be 
useful for several reasons.   First, it might be possible to determine a lower limit for 
the understanding of deep time.   In fact, a lower limit of grades 7-8 has been 
suggested by other researchers (Dodick & Orion, 2003a).  If they are correct, there 
would be implications for when students encounter the subject in middle school.  A 
broader study that involves more students at a greater variety of ages could assist in 
the development of a profile of what understanding of deep time looks like at 
different ages.   
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The other way that could be accomplished is via a longitudinal study that 
tracks but does not attempt to influence how students’ understanding of deep time 
changes as they progress through school.  The latter has the advantage of being able 
to capture the change in an individual’s thinking over time.  It is subject to participant 
attrition and the need for sustained funding.  While prior research (and this study) 
leads one to conclude that people at a variety of ages hold similar ideas about deep 
time, those who do understand the concept learned it somehow.  How did their 
understandings change and to what do they attribute the evolution of their ideas?  
Methodology similar to that employed by others with scale could be fruitfully adapted 
(Jones & Taylor, 2009).  Tracking how understanding of the individual factors changes 
over time may reveal that a particular factor is more important at one age than 
another.  This would provide the possibility of linking the development of a concept of 
deep time to a particular conceptual change theory such as Vosniadou’s framework 
theory (Vosniadou, 1994, 2002; Vosniadou et al., 2008) that situates naive science 
conceptions within theories that arise from perceptual experiences.  She and her 
colleagues (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992; Vosniadou et al., 2004) have documented a 
progression in children’s ideas about Earth’s shape and gravity.  Perhaps an analogous 
progression in people’s understanding about deep time will be uncovered. 
This ties in nicely to the current interest amongst science educators regarding 
learning progressions or “descriptions of the successively more sophisticated ways of 
thinking about a topic” (National Research Council, 2007, p. 219) as learners interact 
with the domain over a period of years.  An entire recent issue of the Journal of 
Research in Science Teaching was devoted to this topic (Hmelo-Silver & Duncan, 
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2009).  There are many challenges to this type of research.  One is the need to 
adequately define the upper limit of the progression—what should students 
ultimately know about the topic?  The Earth Science Learning Principles (“ESLI Home,” 
n.d.) described in chapter one may prove helpful in this regard. 
The final suggestion for additional descriptive research may appear to relate 
only tangentially to deep time.  This concerns investigations into the commonalities 
among space, time, and number.  Is there some correlation between the size of the 
numbers that can be dealt with at a given point, the time periods that are meaningful, 
and the size/spatial distance that can be conceived?  Ideally, studies of this type would 
begin with relatively small numbers, time periods, and spatial distances or sizes.  If 
some fairly consistent relationships among time, number, and space can be 
determined for smaller quantities, the methodologies could be expanded to include 
larger numbers, periods of time, and sizes/distances.  The reason for beginning with 
relatively smaller quantities would be to aid in the development of the learning 
progression described previously.  This could help establish that lower age limit at 
which students could reasonably be expected to think meaningfully about deep time.  
Multidisciplinary research that combines the expertise of geoscience and mathematics 
educators with that of cognitive and developmental psychologists could prove 
especially fruitful in the development of a deep time learning progression. 
6.3.2 Intervention studies 
As educational researchers, we are not merely interested in describing what is, 
but more importantly in providing information to practitioners that can be used to 
improve student learning.  Intervention studies would flow nicely out of the 
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descriptive studies just outlined.  One type would be to make the interviews 
themselves teaching interviews.  For example, the examiner could engage students in 
discussion about the duration animations and what they learned before showing them 
a picture of a stratigraphic sequence and asking them to compare durations of two 
layers.  Discussion of powers of ten and their proportional relationships could be 
provided. 
Other intervention studies would be even more closely linked to the 
descriptive studies described in the previous section.  These could be small-scale in 
which a particular intervention was tested with one or two classes.  For example, 
would direct instruction about large numbers and proportional relationships improve 
students’ understanding of deep time?  Further work would involve randomised, 
controlled trials which have been used with success in both the U.S. and the U.K. (e.g., 
National Mathematics Advisory Panel, 2008; Tymms & Coe, 2003).  There are several 
forms these trials could take.  One would be to isolate the factors one at a time.  One 
group would be provided with instruction in a specific area: duration, succession, large 
numbers, or geoscience content.  Pre- and post-tests would be devised and could be 
compared to determine whether specific instruction had an effect upon an 
understanding of deep time.  A second type which would probably succeed the first 
would be to develop (or use an existing) curriculum designed to improve students’ 
understanding of deep time and test its effectiveness via RCTs.   These studies provide 
opportunity to test hypotheses about how the factors influence a concept of deep 
time.  In that way, intervention studies can validate or refute the theories that have 
been generated in descriptive studies. 
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6.4 How might these results influence classroom practices? 
 Curricular recommendations based upon one exploratory qualitative study 
must be made cautiously.  For the reasons outlined in section 4.5, it is impossible to 
say what a “typical” student at any of these ages understands about deep time based 
upon the current study’s results.  Nonetheless, if these results hold up in more 
extensive research, they suggest that some adolescents and adults will not be able to 
comprehend deep time if we do not address one or more of the underlying factors.   
The National Science Education Standards (section 1.4) suggest that mountain building 
processes be part of the middle school geoscience curriculum in the U.S.  If a 
significant number of middle school students (ages 11-14) have difficulty dealing with 
deep time, this could be dealt with in one of two ways. The curriculum could be 
revised so that geoscience processes studied in middle school are confined to ones 
that encompass shorter time periods, such as volcanoes and earthquakes.  
Alternatively, the mountain building process could be used as a bridge to extend 
students’ notions about time.  
I can make only tentative pedagogical recommendations based upon this very 
limited data.  First, it appears that some students (at least in this sample) need help to 
see that deep time and conventional time play by the same “rules.”   This is probably 
true for students at all age levels represented by the sample in this study.  Perhaps 
explicit mention of the similarities between the two would be helpful for students.  
For example, when talking about rates of deposition, teachers could point out to 
students that big structures/events do not always represent longer time periods. 
Students could brainstorm a list of examples that accord with and refute this notion.  
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Second, science teachers may not be able to assume students come with a solid 
understanding of large numbers and proportional relationships from their maths 
classes.  Based upon this sample, even some university undergraduates will have 
relatively poor understanding of large numbers.  Geoscience teachers may need to 
spend time teaching about proportional relationships among large numbers if their 
students are to develop a good grasp of deep time.   
 Finally, in the U.S., early elementary (primary) classrooms often count up to 
and then celebrate the first 100 days of school.  Elementary teachers frequently have 
banners that circle the classroom to count off the days and list important events 
throughout the year to serve as referents.  A similar linear model may prove useful in 
geoscience classrooms to enable students to construct a time scale that is sufficiently 
large to deal with events in Earth’s history.  The widely used drawing of the geologic 
column in which everything prior to the Cambrian period is compressed due to space 
limitations may contribute to the novice learners’ difficulties with the geologic time 
scale.    The graphic presents no difficulty to those who already possess a solid 
conception of deep time (or those who take time to read the ages on the side) as the 
ages listed indicate there has been a compression.  Yet, for many learners the visual 
image may be more powerful and give an erroneous impression about the amount of 
time represented by different portions of the column.  Responses to the animation 
questions in which students ignored the timer in the corner and instead relied on 
perceptual information lends support to this contention.  Creating a linear classroom 
timeline is undoubtedly more difficult to adopt at the university level where lecturers 
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frequently share classrooms with others who teach a variety of subjects.  Nonetheless, 
it is worth considering.   
6.5 Final thoughts 
 The task before us is daunting.  There are many questions still to be answered 
about how students acquire a concept of deep time and why they often do not.  This 
line of research is worth pursuing and time well spent.  Knowing how geological 
processes take place in the context of deep time can help us make wise policy 
decisions about how to manage Earth’s resources for a sustainable future.  
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Appendix A 
Interview Script with Correct Answers Included 
 
Ask: How old are you?  (University—What year are you?) Are you studying earth 
science in school now or have you studied it in the past?  What topics have you 
learned about in earth science (geology)?  Do you ever watch television programs or 
visit websites about earth science (geology) topics?   
I will ask you some questions about earth science (geology).  After you answer each 
question, I will ask you to tell me what you were thinking when you answered the 
question or what helped you to decide how to answer the way you did.  I am very 
interested in learning about how students like you think about ideas in earth science 
(geology).  Please answer honestly.  Any information you can tell me about how you 
are thinking will be very helpful to me. 
You may ask me any questions you would like if you think you need more information 
to help you answer the question.  You can ask questions at any time and as many as 
you wish.  If you are still not sure of how to respond after I’ve answered your 
questions, please say so.   
I want to show you some movies.  In the movies you will see some coloured layers 
filling up.   Then I will ask you questions about the layers.  You can watch each movie 
as many times as you like.  When you think you have watched it enough to understand 
what is happening, I will ask you the questions. 
Show animation 1 (or 2).  Before asking specific questions, say—Tell me what you 
saw.  Did the red layer or the blue layer (point) take longer to fill?  How do you know 
that?  (BLUE IS CORRECT) 
Suppose that the yellow layer and the green layers had been filling at the same time in 
different places instead of one after the other.  Which layer would have filled first?  
How do you know that? (YELLOW IS CORRECT) 
Show animation 2 (or 1).  Did the blue layer or the yellow layer (point) take longer to 
fill?  How do you know that?  (BOTH TOOK SAME AMOUNT OF TIME IS CORRECT) 
Suppose the brown layer and the pink layer had been filling at the same time in 
different places instead of one after the other.  Which layer would have filled first?  
How do you know that? (BOTH TOOK SAME AMOUNT OF TIME IS CORRECT) 
Show animation 3.  Did the green layer or the brown layer (point) take longer to fill?  
How do you know that?  (BROWN IS CORRECT) 
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Suppose that the red layer and the blue layer had been filling at the same time in 
different places instead of one after the other.  Which layer would have filled first?  
How do you know that? (BLUE IS CORRECT) 
What do you know about how sedimentary rocks form?  You can find sedimentary 
rock in places like the Grand Canyon.  The movies we just saw are like models for how 
sedimentary rocks form.  They aren’t exactly the way sedimentary rocks form, but 
they can help us learn some things about how time is related to rock formation.     
Show sedimentary layers graphic.  This is a drawing of some rock layers that are 
found in the SW US.  All of these rock layers are above ground so you can see them.  
Each of the designs on the drawing represents a different kind of sedimentary rock.  
Look at these two layers. (Point to layers 3 & 4.)  Based upon what we just did with the 
movies, what can you say about which of these 2 layers took longer to form? (IT IS 
IMPOSSIBLE TO TELL WHICH TOOK LONGER BASED UPON THE INFORMATION GIVEN) 
Show static image of 3 columns.  Imagine that these 3 columns of rocks were 
discovered some distance from each other.  Each of these columns has layers of rocks 
containing the animal fossils in the pictures.  When the rock layers were formed 
animals that lived at that time got buried in the rock and became fossils.  We will call 
the rock layers by the names of the fossils they contain.  Geologists study the fossils 
found in rocks to help them figure out how old rock layers are.  Look at the trilobite 
layer and the brachiopod layer.  Which one probably formed first—the trilobite or the 
brachiopod?  Or did they probably form at the same time?  How do you know? 
(TRILOBITE IS CORRECT) 
Show block animation.  Now watch this movie.  We will pretend we can go back in 
time and watch each of these layers being formed in order. You can watch the movie 
as many times as you want.  Then I will ask you questions about it. (after movie)  I will 
pick 2 layers and ask you to tell me which formed first.  If you think they formed at the 
same time, you should say so.  Which fossil layer formed first, the clam or the fish 
scale?  How do you know?  (CLAM IS CORRECT) 
Which layer formed first, the coral or the brachiopod?  How do you know?  (CORAL IS 
CORRECT) 
Which layer formed first, the trilobite or the brachiopod?  How do you know? 
(TRILOBITE IS CORRECT) 
Place each of the fossils in order from the one that was formed first to the one that 
was formed last.  (CORRECT ORDER: TRILOBITE, AMMONITE, CORAL, CLAM, 
GASTROPOD, BRACHIOPOD, FISH SCALE, SNAIL, SEA URCHIN, SHARK TOOTH) 
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Here are some cards that list events that happened in the past.  Put them in order 
from the one you think happened first to the one you think happened most recently.  
Tell me why you placed them where you did. CORRECT ORDER: BIG BANG, 
ORIGIN/FORMATION OF SUN, ORIGIN/FORMATION OF EARTH, 1ST VOLCANOES 
DEVELOPED, 1ST LIFE APPEARED, 1ST FISH APPEARED, DINOSAURS BECAME EXTINCT, 
1ST HUMANS APPEARED, WOOLY MAMMOTHS BECAME EXTINCT, GREAT PYRAMIDS 
BUILT, 1ST OLYMPIC GAMES, JULIUS CAESAR KILLED, CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS 
SAILS) 
Now please take the cards and put them in piles based upon how long ago each of 
the events occurred.  If two cards show events that happened around the same time, 
they should go in the same pile.   You may make as many piles as you like.  Each pile 
doesn’t have to have the same number of cards.  How did you decide where to place 
the cards?  Please tell me a name for each of the piles.  Can you put an age name on 
each of the piles? (NO SINGLE “CORRECT” ANSWER FOR THIS ITEM) 
Show timeline.  You’ve probably seen timelines before.  I’d like you to make some 
timelines.  Use this paper to make a timeline for these times (1 day, 1 month, 1 year, 
100 years).  Tell me about what you did.  (If there’s confusion show timeline I made.) 
Say, here’s a timeline I made.  I have marked 1 minute, 1 hour, and 1 day on the 
timeline based upon how long it takes each of them to pass in proportion to each 
other.  (PLAUSIBLE CORRECT TIMELINE BELOW) 
 
Now make another timeline for these times (1000 years, 100,000 years, 1 million 
years, 100 million years).  Tell me how you decided where to put the numbers. 
(PLAUSIBLE CORRECT TIMELINE BELOW) 
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Now we will do something similar to the last question, but this time I want you to 
put specific events on a timeline.   You know that many events occur over a period of 
time.  For example, a soccer game takes 90 minutes (not counting half-time or injury 
time).  The following events take place over a period of time.  Put the letters in order 
on the line.  Place the event that takes the shortest amount time on the left side of 
the line and the event that takes the longest amount of time on the right side of the 
line.  Try to put the events in some kind of relative scale.  For example, if one event 
takes about the same amount of time as another, put them close together.  If one 
event takes a lot longer than another, put them very far apart.  Tell me why you put 
the events where you did.  (PLAUSIBLE CORRECT TIMELINE BELOW) 
 
I would like you to make one more timeline.  This time I wrote some times on the 
paper.  Where would you put each of the letters now?  (PLAUSIBLE CORRECT 
TIMELINE BELOW) 
 
Let’s think a bit more about how long it takes certain events to happen.  Look at this 
table.  (See next page)  Place an “X” in the box that is closest to your own idea about 
how long each of these events takes to occur.  Please place an X for each item. 
(CORRECT ANSWERS INDICATED IN TABLE WITH “x”) 
When finished--You may have been familiar with some of the items in the table, but 
you may not have been sure about some of the others.  Please put a “*” next to any 
items that you would say you simply guessed at how long they take to occur.  Tell me 
about how you decided where to place the X on the items you weren’t sure about. 
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Duration of Events Questionnaire 
Event Seconds Minutes Hours Days Years Hundreds 
of years 
Thousands 
of years 
Millions 
of years 
Fly from New 
York to Los 
Angeles 
  X      
Colorado River 
to carve the 
Grand Canyon 
       X 
Light to travel 
from the Sun 
to the Earth 
 X       
How long most 
coral reefs 
have been 
growing 
      X  
Ground to 
shake during 
an earthquake 
X X       
Spaceship to 
fly from Earth 
to the Moon 
   X     
Sedimentary 
rock to form 
      X  
The 
supercontinent 
Pangaea to 
break apart 
       X 
A pumpkin 
grown from a 
seed to be ripe 
   X     
Time for Pluto 
to make one 
trip around the 
Sun 
    X    
Time it takes 
to eat your 
dinner 
 X       
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Event Seconds Minutes Hours Days Years Hundreds 
of years 
Thousands 
of years 
Millions 
of years 
Moon to go 
around the 
Earth once 
   X     
Build the 
Great Wall of 
China 
     X   
Appalachian 
Mountains to 
form 
       X 
Hair on your 
head to grow 
½” 
   X     
Run 100 m 
 
X        
The Voyager 
probe to 
travel to 
Jupiter 
    X    
Drive from 
one side of PA 
to the other 
  X      
One red blood 
cell to travel 
through your 
whole body 
X        
Count to one 
million 
   X     
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Appendix B 
Informed Consent for Study Participants 
You are invited to take part in a study conducted by Kim Cheek as part of her PhD 
studies at Durham University.  The study’s goal is to learn more about students’ 
understanding of geology.  If you agree to take part, you will be interviewed for about 
45 minutes.  Your responses will be taped to allow for later analysis.  When the study 
is finished, you will be given a written summary of the results, if you would like one. 
All your responses will be anonymous.  No one reading the results will be able to 
determine what any particular individual said in the interview.  Participants like you 
will only be identified as undergraduate students.  There are no known risks 
associated with participating in this research.   You will be helping Kim Cheek better 
understand how students understand geology. 
Taking part in this study is voluntary.  Not taking part will not affect your grades or 
academic standing in any way.   You are free to withdraw your consent and stop 
participating at any time.  If you have questions at any time about the study or your 
role, please contact Kim Cheek, Department of Elementary and Early Childhood 
Education, Valley Forge Christian College at kacheek@vfcc.edu or 610-917-3936. 
 
I have read the above consent form and agree to participate in this research. 
 
_________________________________________                     
_____________________ 
Participant’s name (please print)     date 
 
______________________________________ 
Participant’s signature 
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Appendix C 
Informed Consent for Parents of Study Participants 
Your child is being invited to take part in a study conducted by Kim Cheek as part of 
her PhD studies at Durham University.  The study’s goal is to learn more about 
students’ understanding of geology.  If you agree to allow your child to take part in 
this study and your child also agrees, s/he will be interviewed for about 45 minutes 
about his/her understanding about geology.   The interview will be conducted at a 
time that is convenient for your child and his/her teachers.  All responses will be taped 
to allow for later analysis.  When the study is finished, you and your child will be given 
a written summary of the results, if you would like one. 
All responses will be anonymous.  No one reading the results will be able to determine 
what any particular individual said in the interview.  Participants like your child will 
only be identified as eighth or eleventh grade students.  There are no known risks 
associated with participation in this research.  Your child will be helping Kim Cheek 
better understand how students understand geology. 
Taking part in this study is voluntary.  Not taking part will not affect your child’s grades 
or academic standing in any way.   You are free to withdraw your consent, and your 
child is free to stop participating at any time.  If you have questions at any time about 
the study or your child’s role, please contact Kim Cheek, Department of Elementary 
and Early Childhood Education, Valley Forge Christian College at kacheek@vfcc.edu or 
610-917-3936. 
I have read the above consent form and agree to allow my child to participate in this 
research. 
 
__________________________                    _________________________ 
 ___________ 
Parent’s name (please print)   Parent’s signature   date 
 
___________________________ 
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Appendix D 
List of University Participants 
Pseudonym Age (years) Major 
Vincent 24 Vocational ministry 
Peter 19 Business 
Sarah 20 Elementary (primary) education 
Danielle 22 Elementary (primary) education 
Cole 20 Vocational ministry 
Megan 20 Vocational ministry 
Claire 18 Computer science 
Elizabeth 18 Computer science 
Anthony 19 Geography 
David 20 Geology 
Lauren 20 History 
Nicole 18 Undecided 
 
  
401 
 
Appendix E 
List of 8th & 11th Grade Participants 
Pseudonym Grade Age Achievement Level 
Evan 8 13 yrs, 11 mos. High 
Connor 8 14 yrs, 0 mos. High 
Ashley 8 13 yrs, 11 mos. High 
Emma 8 13 yrs, 9 mos. High 
Chris 8 14 yrs, 4 mos. Middle 
Kayla 8 14 yrs, 9 mos. Middle 
Alyssa 8 14 yrs, 3 mos. Middle 
Matt 8 14 yrs, 6 mos. Middle 
Ben 8 14 yrs, 11 mos. Low 
Jamal 8 14 yrs, 5 mos. Low 
Jenna 8 14 yrs, 9 mos. Low 
Sofia 8 16 yrs, 1 mo. Low 
Sean 11 17 yrs, 8 mos. High 
James 11 17 yrs, 1 mo. High 
Ayanna 11 16 yrs, 1 mos. High 
Justin 11 17 yrs, 2 mos. Middle 
Ryan 11 17 yrs, 5 mos. Middle 
Nathan 11 17 yrs, 11 mos. Middle 
Hannah 11 16 yrs, 9 mos. Middle 
Leah 11 16 yrs, 8 mos. Middle 
Michael 11 17 yrs, 6 mos. Low 
Malik 11 16 yrs, 3 mos. Low 
Vanessa 11 16 yrs, 9 mos. Low 
 
 
